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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This is a theoretical and ethnographic study of conceptions of “courage” among combat 
infantry, specifically U.S. Marines.  U.S. infantry combat soldiers conceive of the cultural value 
courage in its many manifestations and formulations.  I maintain that courage manifests itself in 
both vocal signs, as directly or indirectly referenced spoken discourses, and in action signs, as a 
way of moving in a semantically-laden enactment space.  In its many formulations within 
Western thought, courage has been understood primarily as the product of psychobiological or 
instinctive forces.  In contrast, I shall argue it is best understood as an expressed cultural and 
personal value. 
The study aims to contribute new knowledge to an American subculture almost entirely 
neglected by anthropologists: modern American combat infantry.  A unique focus of this project 
is to argue for a conception of courage as a moved value performed by dynamically embodied 
persons rather than a reified entity.  For example, while many Americans can readily appreciate 
that Japanese Geisha move in very distinctive ways, and acknowledge that those ways of moving 
are cultural, that is, value-driven, the distinctive movements of American infantry soldiers, both 
in terms of their cultural origins and as expressions of cultural values, are masked by the wide 
and deeply-held American value of utility and its long historical deployment in warfare.  In other 
words such movements are viewed as merely practical in function and efficient in their 
execution, without links to moral, ethical, gendered, racial, or other cultural values.  This 
invisibility coupled with a Western academic preference for explanatory resources that reify and 
render mysterious the source of personal action, makes courage as a moved value almost 
inconceivable. 
To see courage according to this new formulation requires special theoretical resources, 
most notably an agent-centered theory of human movement, provided in the work of linguistic 
and socio-cultural anthropologists Drid Williams and Brenda Farnell (referred to as 
semasiology).  It also requires a robust conception of agent causality applicable to the social 
sciences emerging from a critical realist philosophy of science as found in the work of the 
philosopher of science Rom Harré and the philosopher of social science Charles Varela.   
The position taken in this dissertation is that courage among American combat infantry is 
best understood as an idiom of body movement and the expression of cultural values made 
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manifest in the highly detailed and nuanced social situations generated in training and on a 
battlefield.  A battlefield per se, and as a value-laden context, is the joint creation of persons 
engaged in a certain kind of embodied talk.  I argue that training for battle can be captured in the 
phrase “domesticated combat.”  By this phrase I mean that certain key performative and 
contextual variables are controlled, but never entirely so, in the training context.  To the extent 
that training replicates key factors faced by infantry on the battlefield is the extent to which 
courageous action can be trained.  The term “courage,” at least as it is used in the United States, 
will be shown to be an abstract placeholder whose meaning is inseparable from specific semiotic 
practices of combat infantry in particular contexts.  For combat infantry, specifically U.S. 
Marines, courage will be shown to consist in the selfless pursuit of prized cultural values in 
situations of moral and physical risk. 
This study is based on over sixty individual and group, formal and informal interviews 
with combat and non-combat veterans from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom II 
and beyond.  These interviews are complemented by participant-observation in two seven-week 
training courses with active duty Marines during the summers of 2007 and 2008.  This study 
makes two contributions to anthropological understanding.  It provides new ethnographic 
knowledge of an academically neglected and misunderstood American community, and applies, 
and develops further special theoretical resources within socio-cultural and linguistic 
anthropology that preserve and foreground embodied human agency and action.  In other words, 
while this project is important for the empirical reason that few studies focus on modern Western 
combat soldiers, and none at all utilize an ‘anthropology of human movement’ approach, it is 
also important for the theoretical reason that it offers a conception of the relationship of biology 
and culture that is grounded scientifically, and so gives a plausible account of that relationship in 
the service of a proper representation of dynamically embodied persons living culturally.  Failing 
to ground ethnographic interpretation in a plausible account of the relationship between biology 
and culture promotes the replacement of the meaning of actors with those of the researcher.  As a 
result opinion often masquerades as insight and advocacy often becomes partisanship. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Social science needs to do more than give a description 
 of the social world as seen by its members (ethnography); 
 it needs also to ask whether members have an adequate 
 understanding of their world and, if not, to explain, why not. 
-- Peter T. Manicas, 1987 
 
The ontological question of the nature of being can be 
 asked as the ethical question of the nature of courage. 
  Courage can show us what being is, and being can  
show us what courage is. 
-- Paul Tillich, 1952  
 
 
The origins of this study lie in my graduate work on the values of American Civil War 
soldiers.  In examining the original diaries and letters of soldiers from both the Union and 
Confederacy, I was struck by the dissonance between their self-portrayal and their representation 
by contemporary historians, especially when it came to battlefield actions.  For historians, what 
counted as explanations of soldiers’ actions amounted simply to subsuming certain personality 
traits and actions under categories like ‘patriotism,’ or ‘honor’.  Often, the connection between 
the category and the actions or traits being interpreted was not explicated at all.  In these cases, 
the categories seemed more accurate in conveying the historian’s interest than any sense of the 
values and semiotic practices of the soldiers. 
In one notorious example, a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian explained an Irish immigrant 
soldier’s fighting courageously for the Union, a fact that got him promoted to his regiment’s 
color guard, by citing him as an exemplar of “immigrant ideology”.
1
  In reading this soldier’s 
letters, however, I found that he had left his wife and home in New York City to seek work in 
Boston and, not finding any, lost all his money on a drunken bender.  With no money and no 
other prospects, he enlisted.  This, not ideological fervor, first positioned the immigrant in the 
Union Army, a fact that is ignored by the historian.  There is a disservice here, not just to readers 
who are left with the impression of ideological fervor as some sort of monolithic and consuming 
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personal quality but also to the soldier who clearly demonstrates growing commitment over time 
to what we might suspect are new personal and organizational values. 
This kind of residual positivism, which mimics in form the “covering law model” of 
explanation in the natural sciences advanced by scholars Karl Popper (1935) and Carl Hempel 
(1948), first introduced me to the problem of the relationship between description and 
explanation.  For social scientists generally this problem can be captured in the question, “How 
do we explain social action?”  An answer is neither easy nor straightforward.  The prescription 
for research offered by philosopher of social science Peter T. Manicas indicates that a good 
ethnographer does not simply let her consultants speak for themselves—this is no different than 
showing a video recording of consultants in action—rather, she explains what is going on.  For 
Manicas, the researcher determines the extent to which her consultants understand their world 
and their semiotic practices in it if she is to avoid a charge of naïve descriptivism. 
While Manicas does not mention it, an implicit second judgment is required: what data 
does the researcher pick out as relevant for explaining her consultants’ ways of life?  On what 
basis, then, does she accept or reject their understanding of their world and semiotic practices?  
Was the historian mentioned above somehow justified in leaving out the way the Irish soldier got 
himself into the Union Army?  Since he never tells us the basis for his judgment we are left in 
the dark about his standard for assessing social action.  For me this an ethical issue of 
(mis)representation in scholarship.  If Manicas is right then the grounds for explaining human 
social action used by the researcher must be made clear and available to readers. 
Anthropologists face a similar issue in generating ethnographic accounts of the actions of 
members of their own or another’s culture.  To assume that explanation is not intimately tied to 
description, and vice-versa, is to make a fundamental mistake.  The philosopher of science Rom 
Harré (1986) illustrates the necessity of this relationship using Galileo and Ptolemy.  While both 
scholars presented shared similar descriptions of the solar system and planetary behavior, only 
Galileo’s description is revolutionary because of his novel explanatory theory.  In short, Harré 
argues, theory teaches the researcher not only what should count as data but also what shape a 
meaningful interpretation of that data should take.  Disjunctions between explanation and 
description emerge when a researcher fails to specify the relationship between theory and data.  
What I find troubling about much contemporary ethnography is just this lack of explicit 
discussion of theory and its relationship to ethnographic data.  One goal in this study is to 
 3 
provide an in-depth, explicit discussion of my theoretical position and its relevance to my data 
prior to engaging in ethnography.  In order to do so with clarity, I will offer vigorous and 
detailed critiques of some traditional approaches to ethnography offered by representative well-
known anthropologists.  In order to remain economical in terms of space, I focus on specific 
components of these anthropologists’ work that are relevant to my argument, to the exclusion of 
a review of their entire corpus or overall contributions to the field. 
This approach seems especially well suited to my topic of study, ‘courage’ among U.S. 
Marines, because, like historians and anthropologists, Marines too share the problem of the 
relationship between explanation and description.  In fact, many other Americans do as well.  In 
the course of preliminary research for this project I found that American civilians and American 
military personnel both describe courageous combat action in ways that contradict their 
explanations of human social action generally.  For example, Americans in general and Marines 
in particular often describe courageous combat action using words like, “he ran into the 
intersection with mortar shells exploding all around to pick up the wounded Marine and carry 
him back to the ditch.”  The source of the action described here is identified in the use of the 
personal pronoun “he,” which indexes the person.  The phrase “to pick up the wounded Marine” 
offers one (kind of) explanation of the action.   Interestingly and conversely, when explicitly 
asked to explain the action described above, the phrase “to pick up the wounded Marine” often 
disappears in favor of phrases like, “it’s in our DNA,” or “it’s a fight or flight instinct.”  The 
assignment of responsibility for the action suddenly changes from the person to the implied 
operation of a biological entity or process.
2
  
We are then, faced with an anthropological problem of interpretation that emerges right 
out of the theoretical considerations discussed above: our consultants’ person-oriented, agentic 
descriptions are contradicted by their biological, deterministic explanations. The result is not 
understanding, but incomprehensibility, both for us and for them.  One major question this study 
asks is, “How can we best explain this contradiction and so make such action intelligible, to us as 
anthropological researchers and to them as consultants?”  While it is perhaps common for people 
to live their lives in the midst of contradiction, one contribution of this study will be to make the 
meaning of the cultural lives of Marines as they relate to courage appreciable. 
Manicas’s prescription alerts us to the complexity of the project.  We must 
simultaneously assess the adequacy of our consultants’ and our own understanding of the world. 
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Were we to adopt a traditional anthropological strategy of describing the ethnographic situation, 
for example, we would leave untouched the problem of contradiction expressed in the discourses 
of these consultants untouched and so their semiotic practices would remain unintelligible.  
Adopting the more recent ethnographic strategy of “letting consultants speak for themselves” 
would be ineffectual for the same reason.  This means that the interpretive problem for both 
Marines and us cannot be solved empirically.  It can only be solved theoretically.  A second 
major question this study asks, therefore, is, “What anthropological resources are available to 
resolve the contradiction facing both consultant and researcher?”  It is here that the theologian 
Paul Tillich’s insight into the deep relationship between ontology and ethics serves as a guide to 
what we might be looking for. 
In the West, ‘courage’ has been a topic of study for more than two millennia, especially 
in relation to military action.  A very short sampling of relatively recent scholarship includes the 
former British soldier Lord Moran’s The Anatomy of Courage (1945), the German theologian 
Paul Tillich’s The Courage to Be (1952), the British writer Compton MacKenzie’s On Moral 
Courage (1962), the American historian Gerald Linderman’s Embattled Courage: The 
Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (1987), American philosopher William Ian 
Miller’s The Mystery of Courage (2000), and the American politician and former military pilot 
John McCain’s Why Courage Matters: The Way to a Braver Life (2004).  A range of other media 
complements the written word.  In film, for example, Bruce Beresford’s Breaker Morant (1980), 
Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan (1998), and Zack Snyder’s 300 (2007) are depictions of 
and meditations on the meanings of courage.  They are also exemplifications of ways of being a 
person.  
I will argue that courage is powerfully evocative and historically persistent as a topic of 
study for Westerners generally and Americans in particular exactly because of its ontological 
implications in our cultural milieu.  Courage constitutes the exercise of personal agency not for 
oneself but for others or for prized cultural values in contexts presenting a risk of moral 
degradation and physical death.  Such selflessness is a critical component of courage that defies 
our cultural expectations.  Americans in particular have for many years been subjected to the 
Darwinist and neo-Darwinist mantra that human behavior is, like that of any other animal, 
evolutionarily self-interested.  Within this worldview, the source of our behavior is thought to be 
mechanical; automated by extra- or impersonal forces that are thought to move or motivate what 
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is otherwise inert human matter.   Against this explanatory schema, courageous action, insofar as 
it is described as a choice and enacted selflessly seems either unnatural in its agentic enactment, 
or supernatural in its defiance of our specie’s built-in orientation toward self as against others.  
Understanding human beings as ethical beings would seem to depend on an agentic ontology; 
that is, people have real choice over and in their actions.  If the Darwinists and their followers are 
correct, however, courage as we seem to know it should not exist, no less be seen enacted by 
Marines in action.  We can ask, “What kind of being is a courageous Marine?  An agentic and so 
potentially selfless person or a determined and so selfish vehicle for evolutionary forces?” 
The linguistic and socio-cultural anthropologist Brenda Farnell captures the deep 
connection between ontology, ethics, and the ethics of responsible interpretive representations of 
consultants. 
 
Physical being and bodily actions have been denied the status of signifying acts 
and embodied forms of knowledge. 
 This raises important issues for the problem of the disembodied actor in 
social theory.  It is of direct import to anthropological inquiry since at the heart of 
the social sciences are major difficulties in characterizing what human beings are 
like and what human agency is.  Since re-inventions of nature are part of cultural 
politics, our constructions of human movement set on stage what kind of creature 
we expect to enact the human drama. Failure to make the action of moving agents 
central to a definition of embodiment (and therefore to social action) risks 
compromising anthropological inquiry by distorting our understanding of ways of 
knowing and being that do not evince the kinds of philosophical and religious 
biases against the body that can be found throughout the history of Western 
philosophy and social theory. [Farnell 1996: 312] 
 
Importantly, Farnell’s focus on the absent moving body in social theory is particularly apt for 
research on courageous combat action since, as we will see, most accounts of it demonstrate that 
it is accomplished with the body and not with other typically valorized modalities among 
Westerners such as the mind or the voice.  Not only must we find an anthropological theory that 
possesses an agentic ontology, we must find one that conceptualizes human agency as embodied 
as well as thoughtful or vocal.  This means we need anthropological resources that do not explain 
away, but rather explain, the full range of semiotic capabilities of persons. 
 Farnell’s remarks index a major theme of this study: the relationship between biology and 
culture.  As Westerners and Americans conceptualize it, this relationship serves as a meta-
narrative contextualizing not only the descriptive and explanatory discourses of civilians and 
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soldiers, but of anthropologists as well.  It is perhaps no surprise that this meta-narrative must be 
faced and addressed given socio-cultural anthropologist Doyne Dawson’s contention that warfare 
is one of the “two main battlegrounds” of the “longest-running controversy in the history of 
science,” namely, the nature/nurture debate (1996b: 2).  The nature/nurture debate (which 
instantiates the science/humanism debate over the problem of freedom and determinism, or its 
more recent articulation as the structure/agency debate) presents a long history of intractability in 
the social sciences.  The two sides are often seen as contradictory and diametrically opposed.  In 
the recent anthropological past two main interpretative frameworks for understanding human 
social action have emerged that resonate with the contradiction between description and 
explanation as well as the contradiction between biology and culture in the social sciences.  The 
first is the disembodied idealism Farnell marks, and the second is the biological determinism 
promoted by neo-Darwinists.  While other frameworks and sub-frameworks exist (for example 
radical social constructionism), I will concentrate mainly on these two in order to maintain my 
focus. 
Unfortunately, not since the mid-1970’s through the early 1980’s has the relationship 
between biology and culture been regarded as a serious, foundational concern for the discipline, 
cast in theoretical terms, and placed at the forefront of the discipline for systematic 
consideration.   Socio-cultural anthropologists Sherry Ortner (1974) and Carol MacCormack 
(1980), for example, placed the relationship at the forefront of the discipline as part of a 
sustained feminist critique.  Similarly, socio-cultural anthropologists Clifford Geertz in The 
Interpretation of Cultures (1973) and Marshall Sahlins in The Use and Abuse of Biology: An 
Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology (1976) raised theoretical questions about the 
relationship between biology and culture that, while not inflected by considerations of gender, 
focused specifically on the issues I have so far been discussing.  Since the early 1980’s the 
discipline seems to have chosen to remain agnostic about the relationship or has cast its 
arguments in ethnographic rather than theoretical terms.  This does not make the task of finding 
appropriate theoretical resources within anthropology any easier.  There is, however, an 
anthropological theory that appears to provide the required resources.  Semasiology (Williams 
1982) is an agentic theory of human social action that specifies that relationship between biology 
and culture according to the resources of a new realist meta-narrative, called critical realism.
3
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In semasiology the individual human organism (biology) and the embodied person 
(culture) are understood as one naturally occurring, unified entity.  From a non-positivist 
scientific point of view, this unity is the only appropriately structured and so plausible entity 
capable of producing the variable and rich ethnographic record so powerfully illustrative of 
human agency.  Moreover, the plausibility of the conception of human being embedded in 
semasiology grounds and guides the kinds of terms and predicates used by the researcher in 
describing and explaining human social action without contradiction.  It provides an in-principle 
reason for understanding the semiotic practices of persons from their perspective prior to 
assessment or criticism, as well as a standard for assessing human social action. 
In this study, the kind of social action I wish to explain is combat action and training for 
combat.  My motivation for exploring combat and training is threefold.  First, I want to offer an 
in-depth, appreciative study of modern American combat soldiers, one that grows out of my 
experience with the same kind of people referred to by a Marine I trained with in the summer of 
2007.  He said, “I constantly have people telling me, ‘Marines are stupid.  Who moves towards 
enemies firing?’” (Survey, July 23, 2007).  I want to know, are these “people” right in their 
assessment?  Are Marines stupid in the way they move toward people trying to kill them?  
Second, I want to bring out into the open the notion that the quality of ethnographic 
representation is a matter of ethics that depends fundamentally on the choice of theoretical 
commitments by which anthropologists define the nature of human social action (even those 
researchers who claim to be “simply describing, not explaining” their consultants’ ways of life).  
Finally, I want to show that today, the relationship between biology and culture should be of 
utmost importance to any anthropologist seeking to understand consultants whose way of life, 
like that of the U.S. Marines, is primarily expressed in dynamically embodied semiotic practices. 
To be sure, other anthropologists have studied the American military, and warfare 
generally, but not from the standpoint of modern, Western combat infantry. There is currently a 
deficit of anthropological knowledge about U.S. combat soldiers.  In Anthropology and the 
United States Military (2003), Pamela Frese and Margaret Harrell note that, “Today we find only 
a few book-length ethnographies that examine military units or military communities, whether in 
peacetime or in combat” (2003:x).  Though Frese and Harrell do not name the “few” 
ethnographies that concern U.S. combat soldiers, in my research I found the earliest to be Ralph 
Linton’s Totemism and the AEF (1924).  Linton argues for the appearance of “primitive” 
 8 
totemism in a “modern” state as evidenced by the adoption of a totemic symbol by a particular 
division of soldiers in the American Expeditionary Force in World War I.  The paper was thus 
primarily a contribution to the anthropological literature on the primitive-modern relationship 
and not about the soldiers themselves.  I will return to this issue of the lack of ethnographic focus 
on modern Western and American combat soldiers, as well as other issues, in chapter 4 where I 
examine the Anthropology of Warfare literature in its various traditional and contemporary 
permutations. 
The data I use in this study comes from three sources.  First, between 2002 through 2008 
I conducted a set of sixty formal and informal, individual and small group interviews. I had in-
depth conversations with active duty, retired, and reserve military personnel from all service 
branches, with and without combat experience, ranging in time period from World War II 
through Operation Iraqi Freedom II and the war in Afghanistan.  Second, and weighted more in 
this study, I completed three periods of participant-observation in training for combat with active 
duty soldiers and Marines.  In the summer of 2004 I spent four days with members of the U.S. 
Army’s 101
st
 Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky in live-fire, day and night iterations 
of woodland tactical problems.  In the summer of 2007 I was a participant in a seven-week 
Martial Arts Instructor-Trainer course with active duty United States Marines at the Martial Arts 
Center of Excellence at Quantico, Virginia.  In the summer of 2008, I repeated the Martial Arts 
Center of Excellence training program as a guest Instructor-Trainer. An additional source of data 
is popular media such as films, books, and songs.  While I do not examine the relationship 
between popular images and the self-identity of U.S. Marines, I do use these media to 
demonstrate the pervasiveness of otherwise complex notions of combat and courage as well as 
other themes in American culture 
Having introduced the problems to be addressed by this study in this chapter, the next, 
chapter 2, is given over to a more detailed examination of Tillich’s insight into the relationship 
between ontology and ethics as seen in the intuitive sensibilities of American civilians as 
expressed in the popular media.  This is the larger culture in which American combat infantry 
exist.  I first demonstrate a general American appreciation of battlefields and courageous action 
that leads to moral comparisons between the actions of soldiers and the actions of civilians.  We 
find these comparisons in a wide range of popular modalities such as films, popular music, and 
billboards.  These comparisons will be shown to assume human agency as a sine qua non of 
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ethical action and that, for soldiers, such agency is primarily exercised in and through the body.  
The conception of agentic, courageous battlefield action in popular modalities will be juxtaposed 
with pervasive and hegemonic bio-reductive resources for explaining human action among the 
American public.  From this juxtaposition I generate a preliminary formulation of courageous 
action on the battlefield and conclude that there is no way to honor simultaneously agentic 
descriptions of courage and deterministic explanations of social action. 
In chapter 3 I explore potential resources for solving the contradictions between 
description/explanation and biology/culture, from within Western anthropology.  I also explore 
the possibility that, despite the inability to honor agency and determinism simultaneously, there 
may be no way even to decide between agentic descriptions and deterministic explanations of 
human social action.  It will be shown that an in-principle decision is in fact possible, but not 
without clarifying the relationship of perception to conception (and vice versa), as well as the 
relationship of both to learning, especially in cases of novelty.  This will lead into a discussion of 
the actual bio-physiology of our species in pursuit of an understanding of how human beings 
actually work on that level.  A sustained critique of the bio-reductive framework emerges that 
provides the basis for a principled rejection of deterministic accounts of human social action.  I 
then delve into the ethical implications of social scientific research that chooses an interpretive 
framework based on a surprising similarity between idealistic and deterministic theories of 
human social action.  I move on to specify in more detail the characteristics of the resources 
necessary for resolving the contradiction(s). 
In chapter 4 I use the profile thus developed to review literature found in the 
Anthropology of Warfare and assess its applicability to the problem of contradiction.  I argue 
that the literature shows three trends.  First, an early twentieth century trend toward utilizing the 
ethnographic record as a way to argue against the inevitability of war, second, a multi-century 
realist trend toward explaining war as a function of impersonal biological or social forces, and 
third, a late twentieth and early twenty-first century idealist trend that assumes warfare is a 
cultural convention while hoping for its demise through a covert appeal to a common humanity 
through ethnographic descriptions of the experience of warfare.  I conclude that the 
Anthropology of Warfare literature in its various traditional and contemporary forms does not 
provide appropriate resources for resolving the contradiction between description and 
explanation or between biology and culture. 
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In chapter 5 I present semasiology as an anthropological theory of human social action 
that fits the requisite profile for resolving the contradiction(s).  I examine the realist scientific 
roots of semasiology and their critical role in grounding any theory of human agency as well as 
the impact on interpretive decision-making on the part of the researcher.  Semasiology will be 
shown to be an effective solution to the problem of disembodied social theory as well as the 
problem of bio-reductionism, and on that basis I offer a sense of the theory’s power using a 
sampling of ethnographic and ethno-historical military events. 
In chapter 6 I focus on using the appropriate theoretical resources rigorously to analyze 
the ethnographic context and detail of Marine combat training.  Based on my field research at the 
Martial Arts Center of Excellence (MACE) in Quantico, Virginia I show that the Marine Corps is 
a special kind of sub-culture, purpose- and value-driven in definitive ways based on their 
encounter with killing, life, and death.  I structure and base this demonstration on the 
semasiological principle of “nesting” that suggests critical contextual elements are necessary to 
understand the meanings generated by actors.  In this case I concentrate on the Marine Corps 
itself and the MACE as the most relevant contextual elements.  I explain the semiotic practices 
of Marines in training for combat in terms of formal and informal rules for action that then opens 
up a discussion of which values are embodied by Marines and why. 
chapter 7 develops the connection between embodied movement, meaning, and context in 
actual training.  I analyze the vocal and gestural discursive practices used in Marine combat 
training and formulate the conception of courage that emerges from them using semasiological 
principles.  In doing so, courage becomes comprehensible and so appreciable.  The 
semasiological framework respects Marines’ agentic vocal descriptions of courage, as well as 
their agentic, embodied expressions of, courage, even as it reveals interesting fault lines in the 
otherwise unitary presentation of Marine training.  I also provide an exposition of the 
relationship between combat training and actual combat, which grounds my claims about the 
nature of courage through two martial arts techniques taught at the MACE.  I present “training” 
as “domesticated combat,” meaning that it approximates and in some ways replicates actual 
combat, but is never identical to it.  An explanation of how visible, dynamically embodied 
movement constitutes this semiotic practice will be offered.  These endeavors culminate in an 
answer to the question, “What is courage to U.S. combat infantry?” 
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Chapter 8 is devoted to adding more depth to our appreciation of the complexities facing 
combat infantry in trying to be good in, and at, their way of life.  I examine a form of doubt 
about values and training at the MACE through an analysis of the views of one MACE trainer, 
Staff Sergeant Demster.  This doubt centers on the ethics of being an ethical warrior and is 
captured in the question, “Whose ethics should we use in MACE training?”  SSgt. Demster’s 
views lead me to consider one way to answer concerns offered by retired Marine captain and 
master martial artist named Jack Hoban.  Mr. Hoban, a special advisor to the MACE, advocates 
for a supposed universal human value, called the “dual-life value,” as the inviolable basis for 
assessing human social action.  Consideration of Mr. Hoban’s answer leads to an analysis of 
exemplary, and primarily vocal, discourses that simultaneously obscure and highlight the 
(ir)relevance of gender in being a good Marine.  The link between Mr. Hoban’s formulation and 
gender will be shown to be a startlingly similar universal standard for assessing human action 
advanced by the socio-cultural anthropologist Michelle Z. Rosaldo over thirty-five years ago.  
After developing this analysis I offer a few limited remarks on ethnicity. 
In chapter 9 I clarify the relationship between courage and fear.  I then discuss the 
deleterious and unethical effects of a social science that fails to include critical realist, 
scientifically plausible resources when addressing these issues, using an example from my own 
experience with a grant application.  In so doing, I summarize the benefits of such resources as 
they appear in semasiology.  I then summarize my findings and offer a few additional insights 
into courage, among them the fact that courageous action is both intelligent and learned, and 
melds realism with idealism in important, if at times contradictory, ways.  I also offer summary 
comments on the management of gender and gender relationships in Marine combat training at 
the MACE.  Using the deep connection between dynamically embodied movement and the 
expression of prized cultural values, I suggest that a more overt conversation about ethics and 
morals may be required to help Marines learn how and why to live with killing, and with the 
deaths of comrades.  I illustrate this suggestion with a brief analysis of the story of Marine Staff 
Sergeant Travis Twiggs, with whom I trained.  I end the chapter with an analysis of and 
commentary on the use of realistic as against ideological views of soldiers and warfare.  At the 
center of this analysis and commentary is Albert Einstein, whose mocking comments about 
soldiers, I argue, invites exactly the kind of violence that Western and American soldiers are 
dedicated to stopping. 
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In this project I hope to enlist the patience of the reader.  Based on my perception of 
serious problems underlying ethnographic work in American anthropology (to be delineated in 
chapters 2 and 3) I offer some exacting and detailed analyses.  These analyses are necessary 
steps, in my estimation, to resolving the problems I identify.  As such the first part of the study 
will concentrate extensively on theoretical issues.  This resolution of theoretical problems leads 
to an ethnographic presentation that, moreover, does not concentrate primarily on typical 
American anthropological categories of concern such as ethnicity, race, gender, or religion.  
These will be shown to be secondary issues to soldiers in combat and in combat training. 
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1
 See James M. McPherson’s For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (1997), Oxford University Press. 
2
 There are, of course, other options for both non-military Americans and Marines.  For example, “to fulfill his destiny,” or, 
“because God willed it.” 
3
 For example, see Aronson, Harré, and Way (1995), Bhaskar (2008), Bunge (2001), Harré (1986), Keat and Urry (1975), 
Manicas (1991), and Shotter (1994). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
FORMULATING A CONCEPTION OF COURAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
THEORETICAL AND ETHNOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This chapter is organized by Paul Tillich’s insight that, “The ontological question of the 
nature of being can be asked as the ethical question of the nature of courage.  Courage can show 
us what being is, and being can show us what courage is” (2000: 2).  I intend on demonstrating 
that there exists among Americans a deep and intuitive sensibility about courageous action and 
its form on battlefields.  This sensibility, often expressed in films, popular music, analogies 
between military and civilian actions, and descriptions of battlefield actions, focuses the moral 
worth of persons who act courageously: their actions are lessons on how to act for the rest of us.  
The general assumption, then, is that persons have the ability to manage their actions and it is 
this assumption of agency—the ability to choose how, when, why one acts—that generates the 
basis for an ethical component to action.  I will show that Americans implicitly focus on the 
human body as the primary resource for ethical expression in battlefield action.  This American 
sensibility is used pervasively in process of ascribing courage to persons as part of general 
cultural negotiations of moral standing. 
In this chapter I will also show the American conceptual landscape is dominated by 
biological explanatory resources that deny human agency and so present a contradictory 
understanding of human social action that results in explaining away, denying, or simply 
ignoring socio-cultural concepts like “courage.”  This is accomplished by locating the source of 
human social action in biophysical or bio-psychological structures and forces that determine 
behavior.  The contradiction not only fails to account for battlefield action in its full context and 
detail, it renders courageous action incomprehensible from an anthropological point of view.  
The biological explanatory resources as they are presented in what I call the bio-reductive 
framework will be juxtaposed to the agentic, descriptive accounts of battlefield action to 
highlight the radical differences between the two.  As I proceed I will offer a preliminary 
formulation of courageous action on the battlefield and from it specifically identify the 
impossibility of respecting the ethical nature of courage as Americans understand it descriptively 
 15 
if we employ a deterministic bio-reductive framework for explaining human action generally.  
These issues are, as Tillich argues, primarily ontological. 
 
Combat Infantry Actions Are Penultimate Examples of Courageous Action 
 
To begin I would like to offer a few categorical statements whose truth will be explored, 
assessed, and supported in the course of this study.  One is that the actions of combat infantry on 
the battlefield stand out as penultimate examples of courage for Americans.  In the United States 
and the West, infantry exist primarily for the purpose of attacking enemies or defending against 
them.  Infantry, by definition, are trained to engage in combat.  The term “combat” comes from 
the Latin word combattuere that translates into “to fight/pound/beat/strike with.”  We should 
notice that the translation of the original Latin and our modern usage implies that combat is a 
social event: infantry fight with others, the enemy.
1
  Combat is a social action that forms the 
basis for ascribing the culturally important quality of “courage” to the infantry that engage in it.  
Though important in its own right, the historical record of combat evoking a range of emotional 
reactions, from revulsion to amazement, such experiential reactions are not the point of this 
study.  Rather, the point is the connection between combat and courage as an expression of 
allegiance to prized cultural values. 
For many Americans, infantry combat and courage are synonymous if not closely linked.  
Poetry, novels, fictional and non-fictional accounts, paintings, sketches, videos, movies, 
documentaries, combatants’ letters, memoirs, blogs, and history textbooks bring the courageous 
actions of infantry into focus for Americans.  While varying in quality, the sheer amount of 
material is staggering.  Consider just the relatively recent phenomena of filmmaking, which 
developed into a robust expressive medium in the 1920’s.  Brassey’s Guide to War Films 2000 
(2000) contains an “A to Z” listing of international war films covering over 200 pages and 
numbering in the hundreds of films.  While only representations of actual combat, some of these 
films, like Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan (1998), portrays infantry combat so 
realistically that some World War II veterans reportedly were unable to view the entire movie or 
watch it without breaking down in tears.  It is this kind of realism that will permit me to develop 
a sense of popular depictions and metaphors of, as well as allusions and references to, combat 
across media that circle around the common notion that combat and courage are synonymous. 
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Representations of combat in the U.S. are complemented by the ready availability of 
actual infantry combat through news channels like CNN and MSNBC.  Youtube.com and similar 
video posting sites make available graphic depictions of combat, as do bloggers like Michael 
Yon.  In his entry entitled Gates of Fire (2005) he offers a first-hand account of American 
soldiers attacking insurgents.  His story coupled with still photographs covers a hand-to-hand 
fight between an insurgent and an army sergeant major as well as an army colonel being shot in 
the leg at close range.  Finally, veterans themselves offer explicit descriptions of their personal 
experience and understanding of battlefields in books, through websites, and in documentaries.  
This material is only what is most recent.  Hundreds of years of oral and written stories, 
photographs, drawings, carvings, textiles, and other media stand behind it. 
Bridging the gap between representations of combat and actual combat in the popular 
realm are the recent phenomena of computer video games.  These games are designed to deliver 
an immersive experience of virtual battlefields.  While one example actually produced by the 
U.S. Army was designed for the purpose of supporting recruitment, the appeal of the production 
rests, in my opinion, on the realistic portrayal of how and why combat infantry act on the 
battlefield.  Realism is enhanced by the ability of gamers to “fight” other gamers online.
2
  The 
game, America’s Army 3, 
 
delivers an authentic and entertaining Army experience by reflecting the training, 
technology, actions and career advancement of a Soldier within a unique exciting 
game experience. AA3 highlights different aspects of the Army from Army 
Values and the Warrior Ethos to Army career opportunities and lifestyles both on 
and off duty. Through their in-game characters, AA3 players will be able to 
experience the way Soldiers train, live, and advance in the Army. AA3 players 
will also experience different types of technologies and equipment used by the 
Army’s high-tech Soldier. Players are bound by Rules of Engagement (ROE) and 
gain experience as they navigate challenges in team-based, multiplayer, force on 
force operations. In the game, as in the Army, accomplishing missions requires 
teamwork and adherence to the seven Army Core Values. In the game, a player’s 
actions and demonstrated Army values will have consequences that are integral to 
success in gameplay and will affect a player’s career progression. 
[http://www.americasarmy.com/intel/article.php?t=289892] 
 
By October of 2007, the game had been downloaded 40 million times and registered 8.5 million 
users (Costa 2007: 54).  Importantly, of course, the actual experience of having an arm blown off 
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or seeing an friend shot in the head is missing, not because depictions of such events are not 
represented in these games (they are) but because they are in fact not real. 
U.S. Marine, veteran of close combat in Iraq, and interviewee for this project Colonel 
Bryan P. McCoy affirms this understanding.  In his small but powerful book, The Passion of 
Command: The Moral Imperative of Leadership (2006), he writes that despite the “daily deluge” 
of violence in the media and video games, 
 
[Americans] still fear interpersonal violence to our core.  Notwithstanding all this 
exposure to violence and our affinity for firearms, our alleged comfort with 
interpersonal violence is a cognitive illusion.  Ask yourself this question: Which 
do you fear more, death in a car crash or intimate death at the hands of another 
human?  Intimate death is an act of ultimate domination; another human snuffs 
out your life at close range.  Nothing unnerves us more.  This is why we, as a 
culture, collectively denounce violence. [2006: 15] 
 
While I will take up a number of Colonel McCoy’s themes later in this study, what I want to 
emphasize here is that these games do provide is a sense of how infantry, for example, are 
supposed to act on a battlefield along with a more or less visceral encounter with being hunted 
by other people.  For the critical reviewer, the encounter with these mediums can guide the 
imagination toward an in-depth appreciation of combat and the battlefield even if the experience 
of actual combat remains unavailable.  I take it as a matter of interpretive discipline to honor the 
realism of the American military to ensure that an imaginative appreciation of combat is different 
in kind from experiencing, especially, actual hand-to-hand combat. 
The exceptional quality of what the American military does on the behalf of the 
American people is constituted by their volunteering to embrace this radically different 
experience and with it a radically different ethic as Colonel McCoy implies.  In turn, Americans 
often look to the actions of combat infantry depicted in popular media as moral lessons, that is, 
how to be a particular kind of “good” person, a “courageous” person.  It is important to realize 
that the very presence of combat infantry can, and usually does generate a context of physical 
and moral danger.  Combat infantry means force or the threat of force for many, and rightly so 
given the purpose of combat infantry.  Associate Professor of History Anni P. Baker writes in 
American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence (2004), 
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The example of the U.S. forces in Germany demonstrates the importance of 
maintaining a defense consensus among host nation populations. If the people do 
not see the need for defense measures, their patience is taxed by any sign of the 
military presence, whether in the form of maneuvers, missiles, or merely the sight 
of uniformed personnel. [2004: xvi] 
 
The dissonance between American regard for combat infantry and German animosity toward 
combat infantry alerts us that the context makes a critical difference in ascriptions of courage.  
To be clear about my focus, I am referring to American regard for combat infantry action on the 
battlefield, not combat infantry stationed in a base on foreign soil.  To be even clearer, I am not 
referring to all combat infantry actions.  For example, eating on a battlefield might not be 
relevant to a discussion of courage, and might be a detail to be ignored, although the availability 
of what one puts into stomachs is of critical concern.  Breathing on a battlefield, however, might 
be highly important although not directly relevant to courage.  Peak physical condition increases 
the capability of soldiers to act at all as the Roman writer Vegetius tells us in Book III of De Re 
Militari, entitled Dispositions for Action, “What can a soldier do who charges when out of 
breath?” (390 C.E.). 
With these considerations in mind, we can pick out some battlefield actions as 
conspicuous.  Charging on a battlefield, for example, has become one action that appears to 
generate the American close identification of combat action with courage and so suggests that 
the soldier taking this kind of action is morally good.  Actions like those represented in Edward 
Zwick’s film Glory (1989) are more in line with what Americans pick out as pertinent to 
discussions of courage.  The climactic scene shows African-American soldiers fighting for the 
Union in the American Civil War charging a Confederate fort.  In point of historical fact, it was 
on the basis of this fundamental action of combat infantry—charging the enemy—that black 
soldiers silenced critics arguing that, as biological and so psychological inferiors of whites, 
blacks were incapable of the expression of commitment to values other than those of immediate 
self-interest.  James Horner’s accompanying musical score magnificently captures the pathos of 
their magnificent expression of commitment to the values of the Union and equality. 
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The Morality of Battlefield Action: Negotiation and Contradiction 
 
During the American Civil War the point was, and still is, that charging an enemy 
indexes, or points to, values prized as underpinning or constituting a way of life.  It does so 
especially because of the high risk, if not likelihood, of harm or death.  But the relationship 
between battlefield actions like charging the enemy and larger socio-cultural values is 
negotiable, not fixed.  For example, it is well known that American combat infantry in World 
War II differed radically from their Japanese counterparts in their view of the battlefield action 
of surrender: American cultural values permitted infantry to surrender while retaining their 
honor while Japanese cultural values did not.  American views of the Japanese as fighters was 
overshadowed if not compromised by this ethic.  In other words, the Americans nearly 
universally refused to honor the Japanese for their prowess in battlefield action like charging 
exactly because of the larger socio-cultural values for which those actions were taken.  This point 
is highlighted and reversed by those Americans who, especially after the war, expressed their 
respect of the battlefield actions of some German soldiers in Europe by describing them as 
“tough fighters” for example, despite their allegiance to Nazism and fascism.  It is this 
negotiable connection, sometimes denied, sometimes claimed, sometimes obvious, sometimes 
implied, that permits a distinction in the quality of courage that underwrites a distinction 
between what American combat infantry do and what Al-Qaeda suicide bombers do.  That is, 
American combat infantry act by taking into account, and therefore respecting, the status of non-
combatants as non-combatants by, primarily, not killing them.  Al-Qaeda suicide bombers make 
no such distinction (more on this later in the study).  This exposes, of course, the idea that there 
are some combat infantry actions that Americans view as morally bad, such as killing civilians. 
While Americans can negotiate or take as given the relationship between battlefield 
actions, larger socio-cultural values, and conclusions about the morality of those actions, there 
exists what might be a meta-narrative about the source of human social action, and therefore 
courage, that introduces a subtle but important contradiction into the conversation.  For example, 
during my field research in July of 2007, a U.S. Marine infantryman and combat veteran told me 
“aggressive behavior,” which is part of the meaning of combat and so part of the meaning of 
being an infantryman, is “instinctive.”  Killing, aggression, and courage are clearly linked on the 
battlefield.  This meta-narrative, therefore, prompts the question, “Are combat actions and their 
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moral status somehow biologically mandated?  Problematically, however, the same kind of 
biological meta-narrative is accessed by another U.S. Marine combat veteran in a Marine Corps 
Gazette article who ascribed to humans a “natural instinct not to kill” (Stevens 2008:20, 
emphasis added).  Two interrelated problems emerge.  First, it is not clear how we can reconcile 
the pronouncements of these two Marines: how can aggression (killing) be an instinct at the 
same time that not killing (aggression) is an instinct.  The second problem has to do with the fact 
that this meta-narrative locates the source of human social action in human biology functioning 
automatically (an instinct).  If so, it is not clear how or why we can (and apparently do) utilize 
these actions as bases for socio-cultural moral judgments.  After all, if this meta-narrative is 
right, we are essentially handing out medals for what amounts to good digestion.  The wide-
ranging popular American encounter with military action, its presence in daily American moral 
discourses in light of larger socio-cultural values, and contradiction among combat veterans 
about the source of that action suggests we take a much closer look at what is going on. 
 
Everyday Analogies and A Conception of Courageous Action 
 
Positive, everyday analogies and metaphors made by ordinary American citizens use 
these kinds of combat infantry actions as a standard for civilian actions.   They are a good place 
to start our examination.  These analogies and metaphors appear to be “master models,” that 
“help shape and organize large and important aspects of experience for particular groups of 
people” (Gee 1999:69).  Analogies and metaphors are broadcast daily through a range of popular 
cultural mediums ranging from commemorative writing to popular music and public billboards.  
Sometimes they are constituted in a simple phrase, as when a news reporter characterizes an 
impoverished single mother “courageously fighting” for a better life for her children.  Other 
times they are complex, like former Mayor of New York City Rudolph Giuliani, who, in the 
context of the attacks on World Trade Center Towers One and Two in September, 2001, wrote, 
“Like the brave soldiers who stormed the beaches of Normandy…our firefighters found 
themselves on the front lines of a war between freedom and tyranny” (2001: v).  Though I 
suspect that for many Americans the meaning of each analogy is clear and unproblematic, 
unpacking the more complex of the two will yield a more precise understanding of the 
“courageous action” of combat infantry.  From this we can develop a conception of “courageous 
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action” for further analysis.  This is especially important if we want to come to some better 
understanding of the contradiction between such presentations and the bio-reductive meta-
narrative we encountered above. 
One approach to unpacking Giuliani’s analogy is to do a close textual reading of the 
analogy by posing and answering the question, “What does Giuliani mean by it?”  Giuliani 
claims that the 9/11 firefighters share a similar action with World War II soldiers—storming the 
Normandy beaches—in a similar context—a war between freedom and tyranny.  The context for 
his analogy, an introduction to a book commemorating dead firefighters, suggests that he wants 
us to conclude that the 9/11 firefighters ought to receive the same respect we accord those World 
War II soldiers.  But isn’t our sense of what can reasonably be concluded as a “likeness” between 
firefighters and soldiers challenged to the breaking point on closer consideration of the first 
claim?  Is it reasonable to think that soldiers “storming” beaches filled with rifle, machine gun, 
mortar, and artillery fire directed at them by other soldiers is “like” entering skyscrapers filled 
with fire and smoke as well as disoriented, scared, injured and trapped people? 
Perhaps the similarity is at a somewhat more general level.  Perhaps it is captured in, say, 
the term “fighting.”  The firefighters fought a fire while the soldiers fought enemy soldiers.  Still, 
however, we are faced with a difference in kind.  The two actions are qualitatively different.  
Despite the bathetic, anthropomorphic presentation of fire by screenwriter Gregory Widen—“it 
eats, it breathes, it hates”—in the film Backdraft (1991), fire cannot possess the capability of 
intelligently hunting firefighters and purposefully killing them as do enemy soldiers.  By this 
analysis, Giuliani’s analogy is unconvincing in terms of the “likeness” at its heart, though I think 
there remains some sense of truth in it.  What is it, then, that the analogy captures, even 
tenuously, as a similarity between the actions of 9/11 firefighters and World War II soldiers? 
A billboard (see Figure 1 in the Figures section below) posted across the United States by 
The Foundation for a Better Life soon after the 9/11 attacks suggests an answer.  The image of 
the dust-covered firefighter evokes the mortal danger of the collapse of the towers.  Though no 
one knew that the towers would collapse, that they did reminds us that they could collapse, and 
firefighters like this one would have been aware of that risk.  Moreover, the quality of that risk 
was exceptional—1,350 vertical feet of collapsing steel and concrete would not yield good odds 
for survival.  The image, then, conveys a firefighter who, despite the odds, acted in this 
environment. 
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The image is associated with a phrase that describes the action taken by the firefighter 
given the lethal environment evoked in the image: he moved toward, not away from, this mortal 
danger.  The phrase implies that the firefighter chose to move toward, not away from, this mortal 
danger.  The combined image and phrase construct the firefighter’s choice to engage in this kind 
of movement as exceptional in three ways.  That the firefighter rushed denotes, at least, his 
willingness to engage the danger as well as his sense of obligation toward saving life and 
property.  That the firefighter rushed in suggests he actually entered a tower thereby assuming 
the high risk of harm or death should the tower collapse.  That others ran out affirms the mortal 
danger of the environment.  The word “courage” against a red background is the suggested 
interpretation of the image and the phrase.  In sum, then, moving toward (mortal) danger is 
exceptional; it is courageous. 
While both fire and enemy soldiers are dangerous, the quality of danger differs radically 
between the two.  That difference focuses squarely on the notion of intelligent action: enemy 
soldiers can use their intelligence to purposefully attack soldiers.  A fire has no such intelligence.  
What the billboard adds to Giuliani’s analogy, then, is a clarification of the nature of the 
environment.  “Fire” was not the only danger.  “Collapse” was also a danger, and in skyscrapers 
there is a very high probability of harm or death.  It is, I think, this sense of an environment in 
which harm or death are highly probable that Giuliani’s analogy contains an element of truthful 
likeness and that “courage” is appropriately attributable to firefighters and soldiers alike.  Both 
firefighters and soldiers choose to perform their respective purposes in environments presenting 
a high probability of mortal danger. 
In this light we can identify one key term in Giuliani’s analogy that is responsible for 
much of the success and the failure of the analogy: “stormed.”  In the context of the analogy and 
the kinds of things involved—soldiers, firefighters, enemy soldiers/gunfire, and fire/collapsing 
buildings—there is a sense in which the word does not accurately portray actions Americans tend 
to associate with firefighters.  Firefighters “enter” buildings, they might even “rush” into them, 
but they do not “storm” them.  Soldiers and police storm buildings.  There is a sense of force, 
violence, and destructiveness associated with the term when it is used to characterize the actions 
of persons.  That contextual sense is derived from the notion that within the building is a danger 
source that needs to be overwhelmed.  The implication is that “storming” has to do with 
buildings occupied with intelligent people who have the capability of intentionally doing harm to 
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the soldiers or police entering.  Persons described as “storming” a building are, ipso facto, not 
the same kind of person as those who “enter” a building. 
We now have a basic understanding of an American conception of “courage” in terms of 
exemplary action of combat infantry: moving toward danger.  The quality of that danger is 
special: persons who use their intelligence to fatally harm combat infantry.  The phrase “moving 
toward danger” is neither an explanation nor an idealization of what persons (combat infantry) 
are doing or why they are doing it.  Rather, it functions as an analytical device telling us what 
sorts of actions (moving toward) to look for in what sorts of contexts (danger) among the myriad 
actions taken by and associated with combat infantry.  A foundational assumption of this 
conception is that persons are the sources of the actions-in-context we are seeking.  Based on the 
interpretive analysis of Giuliani’s analogy, this analytical device constitutes a value judgment—
we should look here, not there; this counts, that doesn’t.
3
  Combat infantry then choose to move 
toward danger, danger that is constituted by intelligent others seeking to kill them. 
Perhaps this is why Americans who have a deep and intuitive sensibility about 
courageous action, rarely pick out eating or breathing on a battlefield as courageous.  We should, 
however, moderate this claim since it is possible to imagine a context in which eating or 
breathing might prompt an ascription of courageous.  A soldier, for example, who calmly eats 
her lunch on a picnic table while mortar shells fall nearby might be considered courageous. 
 
A Conception of Courageous Action Against Other Battlefield Actions 
 
This conception of courageous action enables us to explore other important conceptions.  
For example, a combat infantry action exists at the heart of an analogy in Bruce Springsteen’s 
pop song “No Surrender” (1984): 
 
Like soldiers in the winter’s night 
With a vow to defend 
No retreat baby, no surrender 
 
Just as Giuliani picked out a characteristic action of combat infantry—storming enemy-held 
beaches—Springsteen picks out another characteristic action, vowing to defend.  This action is 
constituted positively by fighting an enemy when he appears and negatively by a prohibition on 
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two other kinds of possible actions, retreat and surrender.  In the song, Springsteen is addressing 
not us, the audience, but the flagging commitment of his lover to each other and their way of life.  
In the song, the danger is presented by her flagging commitment in the face of an opposing but 
intangible social Other representing a contrary way of life.  The danger of flagging commitment 
is like the danger of enemy gunfire in Giuliani’s analogy and the threat of skyscraper collapse in 
the Foundation for a Better Life billboard.  Springsteen’s analogy, then, likens his preferred level 
of his lover’s commitment to that of soldiers who never give up, despite the commitment-
sapping cold and darkness, even if it means their death.  Given the prohibition against giving up, 
Springsteen’s call is for his lover to choose to fight to the death when their way of life, their 
being together with and for one another, is endangered. 
“Courage” in this analogy is conceived very differently though the principle of choice is 
retained.  The principle of choosing to move toward danger is not quite precise enough to 
capture the nuanced meaning in Springsteen’s analogy.  Rather, it is something like moving and 
not moving when endangered.  Moving in terms of fighting, and not moving in terms of retreat or 
surrender.  Springsteen’s analogy forces us, in the interest of clarity, to come to an understanding 
of moving and not moving.  In moving toward danger, the soldier is the active party in seeking 
out the source(s) of danger.  In not moving when endangered, the source(s) of danger is the 
active party in seeking out the soldier. 
Assuming the soldier has decided to await the danger, as is conveyed in the word 
“defending,” “not moving” applies to a range of possible actions from which the soldier must 
choose as the danger nears.  “Not moving” entails some form of “fighting” if the soldier rejects 
either the option of moving away from the danger (retreat) or the option of not moving at all 
(surrender).  Technically, there is no sense in which any of these options means “not moving” 
literally since even “surrendering” requires moving, for example, waving a white flag or 
relinquishing weapons or raising one’s hands. 
These remarks highlight important details of both Giuliani’s analogy and Springsteen’s 
analogy.  Giuliani’s analogy focuses on likening firefighters’ actions with soldiers’ actions 
through the key word “stormed.”  The analogy is rests on a metaphorical understanding of the 
characteristic actions of combat infantry as forceful, violent, and destructive.  Springsteen’s 
analogy focuses on likening his lover’s (future) actions to soldiers’ actions through the key 
phrase “vow to defend.”  The analogy does not rest on a natural event metaphor (storm) to 
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characterize combat infantry action but their action per se as an index of a level and kind of 
commitment.  Springsteen defines the meaning of “vowing to defend” as no retreat, no surrender.  
This means, in turn, that opposition to danger is “to the death” (or, perhaps, incapacitation).  
Importantly, in the context of the song Springsteen and his lover are morally, not physically, 
endangered.  “Fighting” here is figurative.  The actual struggle is of his lover with herself.  At 
issue is her choice to remain committed to him and them. 
In this construction, Springsteen reflects what seems to be an important American value: 
physical death is an absolute—“Ashes to Ashes, Dust to Dust” as the religious saying goes—
despite the fact that many Americans believe in an afterlife.  This world is qualitatively different 
than the one inhabited by the living.  The kind and meaning of actions taken when faced with 
physical death are considered the ultimate expression of the quality of a person’s life.  “Live 
every day,” as another saying goes, “as if it were your last.”  Moral death, on the other hand, is 
not absolute, since, after all, redemption is possible; but, more to the point, moral death can be 
just as deadly as physical death.  Napoleon Bonaparte is quoted as saying, “Death is nothing, but 
to live defeated and inglorious is to die daily.”  Oscar Wilde explores this theme in The Picture 
of Dorian Gray (1998).  The horrible visage of the painting tracks Gray’s moral degradation, his 
ability to sow death and destruction for himself and for others.  Gray’s suicide, his physical 
death, is the result of a prior moral death.  Springsteen’s call is for his lover to act as if she were 
faced with physical death in order to save the life she and he live in the name of a particular set 
of values. 
 
Courage: A Summary En Passant and A Challenge 
 
Courage is a concept with which Americans are familiar through the example of combat 
infantry battlefield actions.  Generally, courageous action is a way of being a good person in 
American culture.  Everyday analogies between American civilian and combat infantry actions 
among a range of popular mediums provide evidence of this familiarity.  When unpacked and 
closely scrutinized, everyday analogies also provide us with popular views of what combat 
infantry actions mean.  These views are useful for developing conceptions of “courageous 
action” as starting points for developing clarity and precision of meaning in light of a 
contradictory meta-discourse.  Two of those conceptions are moving toward danger and not 
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moving when endangered.  Moving toward danger is a choice to proactively seek out dangerous 
environments.  The quality of danger depends on the kinds of things found in the environment 
such as fire/collapse and enemy soldiers/gunfire.  Not moving when endangered actually is a 
form of movement as well as a choice to be reactive in a dangerous environment with, again, the 
quality of danger assessed by the kinds of things found in the environment. 
Both conceptions lead to the understanding that “courageous action” is choosing how and 
why to move one’s body—to act—in a dangerous environment.  Action in a dangerous 
environment is an expression of commitment, or lack thereof, to a valued way of life.  There 
appears to be a scale of courage grounded in our assessments of just how dangerous the 
environment actually is.  Just how dangerous the environment actually is depends on our 
conception of the capabilities of the things, events, or processes we think are causing the danger.  
As the danger increases so does our sense of the level of commitment it takes to act.  The 
implication here is that our knowledge or appreciation of the quality of the danger being faced 
makes it that much harder to remain committed.  As the level of commitment increases so does 
our sense of the level of courage when action is taken to express or realize other values. 
From this discussion we can conclude that there are at least three major, interrelated 
value judgments made in attributing “courage.”  First, the value of the actions-in-context—are 
they, for example, selfless or selfish; second, the value of the context—is it, for example, lethal 
or (merely) dangerous; and finally, the value of the purpose toward with the actions-in-context 
are directed—is it, for example, saving fellow soldiers so they might take their place again in the 
future among their families and friends or killing children to scare those still living into adhering 
to a value system. 
While the foregoing analysis has provided us with a good start in understanding the 
meaning of courageous action rooted in everyday descriptive analogies, we encountered another 
kind of explanatory discourse among Americans that not only raises serious questions about, but 
also in important ways contradicts, this analysis.  To go further then will require us to closely 
examine a distinctive American discourse occurring at the same time as the everyday use of 
civilian-military action analogies.  This discourse is positioned as having explanatory authority 
over human behavior. 
For example, Professor of Law John M. Conlon and Professor of Cultural Anthropology 
William O’Barr (1998) would have us believe that human social action—like combat infantry 
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storming a beach or firefighters rushing into a burning skyscraper—is to be explained by 
referencing the operation of biological entities or processes like ‘genes,’ ‘DNA,’ and ‘protein 
reactions.’  Supposedly these entities or processes mechanically determine our behavior.  These 
entities or processes and so human behaviors are thought to exist for the survival and evolution 
of humans as a species.  Since this biological narrative is thought to explain the actions of all 
humans, including of course combat infantry, it is accorded a special authoritative status among 
Americans.  We can think of this narrative as a framework of thought for understanding human 
behavior biologically.  Importantly, the framework runs counter to anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz’s (1973) contention that human life centers not on biology but on culture, which is 
constituted by persons interacting to create meaning.  If the biological framework has it right 
about human behavior then the accounts of courageous action we typically encounter in, for 
example, newspaper stories that honor the actions of combat soldiers are delusional.  Honoring 
soldiers for moving toward the enemy or not moving when endangered by the enemy becomes 
no different from honoring them for, say, their fine digestive processes that may be good for the 
survival of the human species. 
 
Describing and Explaining Human Social Action 
 
The analysis so far has proceeded on the assumption that precision in the use of a 
descriptive vocabulary is a fundamental component of a grounded and plausible social scientific 
inquiry about human socio-cultural actions if the goal is to respect the persons involved by 
respecting what they mean.  Though, as the philosopher Peter T. Manicas (2006) points out, our 
human languages reflect concepts and distinctions about action gleaned over long periods time, 
that fact does not mean that we have it right about our social or natural worlds.  We saw that 
Giuliani’s use of the metaphor “stormed” stretched the meaning of that word to the breaking 
point because it was being used to associate a class of persons, firefighters, with actions atypical 
of that class.  Firefighters, that is, cannot be characterized by reference to the qualities our 
culture associates with a “storm” as a natural event: force, violence, and destructiveness.  
Strongly implicated though not necessarily implicit in Giuliani’s well-intentioned analogy is an 
unintended form of disrespect—not of firefighters, but of soldiers. 
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We should take away from the analysis so far four important insights to guide the study 
of combat infantry action and its relationship to courage.  First, our language use, even single 
terms, captures or suggests something about our understanding of the way the natural or social 
worlds work.  As stated above, the metaphor “stormed” captures something distinctive and real 
about the actions of soldiers in the social world by referring us to a sense of the actions of storms 
in the natural world.  To the extent that firefighters don’t really act that way is the extent to 
which our sense of the likeness between soldiers and firefighters is stretched.  This view runs 
contrary to post-modern views of language advanced by, for example, Jean Baudrillard (1995), 
who flirts with anti-realism when he argues that government and media images, not actions on 
the battlefield, constituted the American-led coalition forces’ “war.” 
Second, and because of the first insight above, even a simple description of the actions of 
persons in a context necessarily expresses a framework for explaining those actions.  The 
ontological commitments that are conveyed through choice of terms as well as the choice of 
adjectives, predicates, and grammatical constructions that relate the subjects, objects, concepts, 
and values of the description constitute that framework.  In other words, to be accurate, such 
terms are theoretical, and therefore they reveal that theory expresses the ontological 
commitments of the theorist.  Thus it suggests to the observer or reader what (the author thinks) 
is real, what social action is, and what people are (e.g., machines, computers, animals, souls) 
even if the author is not explicit about these implicit theoretical commitments. 
By implication, the framework should control the author’s use of language if a consistent, 
precise, and clear description, explanation or interpretation is sought.  In the human social world 
of intersubjective semiotic practices, the descriptive sentence, “The soldiers stormed the beaches 
of Normandy,” expresses an explanation such as, “The soldiers wanted to capture the area from 
their enemies.”  As Manicas contends, “The social world is constituted by agents and thus 
become intelligible only insofar as one can discover the meanings or intentions of those agents” 
(1987: 267).  It might not be the only explanation or the only way to express it, but most 
plausible explanations of the description of the soldiers’ actions should be related to it. 
Third, understanding particular combat infantry actions as exemplary of courage for 
Americans is primarily a serious matter of semantics.  We need to understand how the actions of 
persons are meaningful in order to understand what the persons who are combat infantrymen 
mean.  Critically, the two conceptions of “courage” developed from Giuliani’s and Springsteen’s 
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analogies are ways of moving in a certain context.  Accordingly, we need to orient the study of 
combat infantry to how they move, not necessarily to how they speak.  In short, we need to 
understand the dynamics of human embodiment. 
Fourth, to generate a grounded and plausible interpretation of human social action 
requires rigor and precision in the use of language.  This is a special valuative interpretive 
matter.  Attributing the characteristic of courage to a person, group, or action in the context of an 
analogy, for example, is a complex interpretive act that combines ontology and ethics.  On what 
basis are the actions themselves considered “courageous” and on what basis are the actions 
attributed to both types of persons (e.g., civilians and combat infantry) in the analogy?  
Giuliani’s analogy picked out from the vast range of words that describe human social actions 
the act of storming, versus, for example, the act of sitting.  He did so rightly because the 
characteristic actions of combat infantry bear a family resemblance to the force, violence, and 
destructiveness of a real storm.
4
  But the analogy also attributed a distinctive kind of action 
characteristic of combat infantry to firefighters.  Again, the attribution fails because firefighters 
do not act with the force and violence characteristic of a real storm.  The actions of picking out 
(terms, phrases, examples) and attributing (qualities, moral status, values) are value-driven 
decisions. 
Deconstructing the term “courage” into two component conceptualizations—“moving 
toward danger” and “not moving when endangered”—suggests that for combat infantry 
courageous action has to do primarily with how one moves one’s body, and why, in context.
5
  
Specifying how and why is a necessary step, not an option, because our major, interrelated value 
judgments about the actions-in-context, the context, and the purpose for the actions-in-context 
rely fundamentally on them.  Similarly, we have seen that the context for moving one’s body 
plays a critical role in the generation of meaning and so too needs to be specified in detail.  The 
strong implication here is that Americans can and do make fine-grained distinctions among 
degrees, if not kinds of courage in an attempt to express a precise judgment of the quality of 
courage itself.  The U.S. military itself exemplifies these judgments in awarding different 
medals, in ascending order, for “meritorious,” “heroic,” and “extraordinary heroic” service. 
Similarly, we should be aware that attributions of “courage” depend on who is making 
the attribution and for what reasons.  To cite a negative example, the U.S. Army awarded former 
U.S. Army Private First Class Jessica Lynch a Bronze Star for “meritorious service in combat” 
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as reported by ARNEWS, the U.S. Army News Service in July of 2003.  Problematically, Lynch 
herself has since stated that she never actually fought in any way and when her column of 
vehicles was ambushed in Iraq her weapon was jammed and then she passed out.  The grounds 
for the attribution of the award were contradicted by Lynch’s inability to act in particular ways 
expected of a soldier in the context of lethal threat.  Since her weapon was jammed she could not 
kill her attackers, and since she passed out, she was incapacitated generally.  There was literally 
no way for her to be of service, no less of meritorious service.  Lynch herself later condemned 
the U.S. Army and Department of Defense for fabricating actions-in-context as grounds for the 
medal to increase support for U.S. military involvement in Iraq.  A political interest generated a 
disregard for reality; in short, it was an expression of commitment to an ideological position on 
the part of the U.S. Army and Department of Defense. 
I now turn to an analysis of a description of courageous action found in a respected 
American newspaper.  This further analysis will build on the basic conception of “courageous 
action” as “moving toward danger” in an attempt to push our appreciation to a deeper level.  The 
description and analysis together will also set the stage for the next section of this chapter in 
which I consider a range of explanations of “courageous action” that have been offered by 
scholars and service members. 
 
Fine-Tuning A Conception of Courageous Action: Military Examples 
 
A May, 2004 edition of The Wall Street Journal reported the story of U.S. Marine 
Corporal Jason Dunham. The events in the story took place the month prior, in April of 2004, in 
the Iraqi town of Karabilah, where a convoy of Marines was ambushed.  Corporal Dunham was 
part of a group of Marines going to help the convoy. 
 
Around 12:15 p.m., Cpl. Dunham's team came to an intersection and saw a line of 
seven Iraqi vehicles along a dirt alleyway, according to Staff Sgt. Ferguson and 
others there. At Staff Sgt. Ferguson's instruction, they started checking the 
vehicles for weapons.  
Cpl. Dunham approached a run-down white Toyota Land Cruiser. The 
driver, an Iraqi in a black track suit and loafers, immediately lunged out and 
grabbed the corporal by the throat, according to men at the scene. Cpl. Dunham 
kneed the man in the chest, and the two tumbled to the ground.  
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Two other Marines rushed to the scene. Private First Class Kelly Miller, 
21, of Eureka, Calif., ran from the passenger side of the vehicle and put a choke 
hold around the man's neck. But the Iraqi continued to struggle, according to a 
military report Pfc. Miller gave later. Lance Cpl. William B. Hampton, 22, of 
Woodinville, Wash., also ran to help.  
A few yards away, Lance Cpl. Jason Sanders, 21, a radio operator from 
McAlester, Okla., says he heard Cpl. Dunham yell a warning: "No, no, no -- 
watch his hand!"  
What was in the Iraqi's hand appears to have been a British-made "Mills 
Bomb" hand grenade. The Marines later found an unexploded Mills Bomb in the 
Toyota, along with AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled-grenade launchers.  
A Mills Bomb user pulls a ring pin out and squeezes the external lever -- 
called the spoon -- until he's ready to throw it. Then he releases the spoon, leaving 
the bomb armed. Typically, three to five seconds elapse between the time the 
spoon detaches and the grenade explodes. The Marines later found what they 
believe to have been the grenade's pin on the floor of the Toyota, suggesting that 
the Iraqi had the grenade in his hand -- on a hair trigger -- even as he wrestled 
with Cpl. Dunham.  
None of the other Marines saw exactly what Cpl. Dunham did, or even 
saw the grenade. But they believe Cpl. Dunham spotted the grenade -- prompting 
his warning cry -- and, when it rolled loose, placed his helmet and body on top of 
it to protect his squadmates. [Phillips 2004: A1] 
 
For clarity and emphasis, I have not yet provided the whole description of the event.  Pausing at 
this point permits us to focus our attention on the description of Dunham’s actions-in-context.  
Two are central.  First, Dunham is presented as fighting hand-to-hand with an Iraqi insurgent.  
Second, Dunham used his helmet and body to absorb the blast of the grenade.  For his second 
action Dunham received a Congressional Medal of Honor, the highest honor in the U.S. military.  
Speculatively, most Americans would agree with the U.S. Congress and the U.S. military that 
Dunham’s actions were courageous.
6
  As anthropologists, however, we should ask how and why 
his actions are courageous. 
As we saw through the distinction between “fighting a fire” and “fighting an enemy,” the 
kind of thing being fought and its capabilities bears directly on assessments of courage.  To this 
idea I would now like to add a similar claim about context.  The kind of context in which 
fighting occurs both creates, and is created by, the nature of the kinds of things involved thereby 
bearing on assessments of “courage.”  In short, if the 9/11 firefighters had entered fire-engulfed 
buildings that were 200 feet tall rather than over 1,350 feet tall and with no damage to their 
structural integrity rather than with substantial portions of their structural integrity compromised, 
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our judgment of the “level” of danger that the firefighters were moving toward would be quite 
different.  It is important to keep in mind the idea that which actions, things, and contextual 
conditions should be considered salient for the analysis is itself a choice conveying ontological 
and ethical content and so suggestive of how we should explain Dunham’s actions-in-context.  
The fact that the U.S. Army and Department of Defense chose to disregard certain actions and 
conditions in the case of Jessica Lynch resulting in a purposeful fabrication about the nature of 
the war in Iraq and Lynch’s status as a soldier is an example of the import of this idea. 
In Dunham’s case I will use distinctions between “danger” and “threat,” “pervasive” and 
“specific,” and “potential” and actual” to interpret the meanings of the context in which he acted.  
The purpose is to illuminate the qualities of Dunham’s actions.  Dunham’s unit was responding 
to an area of an Iraqi town in which an ambush had already taken place.  Dunham and his unit 
were not being specifically targeted, but recent history of the area created what might be called a 
situation of pervasive danger.  As American Marines Dunham and his unit shared with their 
ambushed comrades the identity “enemy” in the eyes of Iraqi insurgents.  As such, Dunham and 
his unit were subject to attack delivered in ways ranging from Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IED’s) to rifle fire from snipers. 
The encounter with the line of vehicles changed the context from one of pervasive danger 
to one of potential threat.  While the mere presence of a line of vehicles is in itself ambiguous, 
the combination of their linear arrangement and alleyway location within the vicinity of a recent 
ambush created this change in the overall context.  Vehicle linearity expressed to the Marines an 
organizational unity on the part of the as yet unknown drivers and occupants.  This meant a 
group of persons oriented toward some purpose(s).  The fact that the vehicles were located in an 
alley expressed an attempt to hide them and so signaled bad intentions.  These two characteristics 
of the vehicles drew the Marines’ attention. 
What was the nature of the potential threat?  First, the identity and intentions of the 
persons who lined up the vehicles in the alleyway were unknown.  The combination of the recent 
ambush and linearity of vehicles hidden in an alleyway invited the Marines to suspect the 
intentions of the persons to be hostile.  The threat, then, was the likelihood of deadly force being 
used against the Marines.  But the Marines could not be sure about this suspicion without 
investigating the vehicles or persons for evidence, even as their uniforms, equipment, 
organization, and historical actions openly defined or advertised their intentions and capabilities.  
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Americans value the controlled use of force and violence.  Calling for some degree of 
justification before using force or violence is a way of being principled in their use.  Often, the 
principled use of force is captured in what are known as Rules of Engagement (ROE’s) that 
define when, where, how, and why a soldier can, for example, fire his weapon.  ROE’s are so 
critical for the American military that they are included, as I mentioned above, in the U.S. 
Army’s video game, America’s Army 3. 
Ambiguity in this situation favored the (potential) insurgents because it permitted them to 
act first and in a range of ways, depending on their intentions and purposes.  This combination 
means that American combat infantry, in an insurgency situation like that of Iraq, are morally 
obligated to maintain a razor thin tension between giving a lethal advantage to the enemy and 
recognizing and acting on a threat before that advantage can be exercised.  We will see in chapter 
6 that U.S. Marines call this decision-making process, “flipping (the switch).”  Second, the 
vehicles might themselves be weapons like car bombs, or contain weapons that could be used by 
an enemy.  Adding to the ambiguity and heightening the sense of threat to the Marines were 
possibilities like a booby-trapped vehicle rigged to go off when a Marine opened a door or actual 
enemies near or in the vehicles armed to fight. 
In moving toward the vehicles to search them, Dunham and his fellow Marines created 
another change in the context, from potential threat to specific threat.   Physical distance is a 
salient issue.  In moving themselves toward the line of vehicles, the Marines were expressing 
their intention to scrutinize the vehicles and discern, perhaps, the intent of the people who put 
them there.  Decreasing the distance created a specific threat not just to the Marines, but to any 
possible enemies as well, whose advantage lay in the ambiguity of their organization and 
intention. 
It was in this volatile context, growing more and more dangerous as the Marines pursued 
their policing duty even as their principled control of force and violence gave their suspected 
enemy an advantage if fighting were to ensue, that Dunham chose to follow his orders and search 
the vehicles.
7
  If courage has to do with moving toward danger, combat infantry are unique in 
that the act of moving toward danger at least increases the danger if not creates a whole new 
order of danger exactly because of the presence of intelligent, creative human opponents.  This 
suggests that Dunham and his fellow Marines were acting courageously even before any actual 
fighting broke out. 
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The description indicates that the Iraqi insurgent acted first, affirming that the Marines, 
Corporal Dunham in particular, were honoring the American principle of controlling force and 
violence until their use is justified.  This implies a particular kind of action on the part of 
American combat infantry: the exercise of self-restraint.  In this situation, self-restraint expressed 
the principle of the controlled use of force and violence.  Honoring that principle permitted the 
insurgent enough time to pull the pin on his grenade in preparation for a possible confrontation 
with the Marines.  Dunham and the other Marines did have the possibility of approaching the 
man at gunpoint.  It may not have changed the outcome materially, but it may have altered the 
events to the point that none of Marines were injured.  It is unclear if or why Dunham did not 
approach the man at gunpoint.  One possible motivation would be the Marines’ attempt to reduce 
the affront that their policing of Iraqi towns generates when they threaten the use of force before 
seeking to find out the identity and intentions of persons of interest.
8
  I get the sense that the Iraqi 
was preparing for the worst while hoping that Dunham would not get close enough to reveal the 
weapons in his truck. 
There are three related values here; the exercise of self-restraint to control the use of 
force and violence until justified reveals a facet of context that I have not discussed yet.  When 
analyzing human action, contexts are not only physical—as a line of vehicles—but moral as 
well.  In fact, they are simultaneous and inseparable aspects of a human social context.  The very 
linearity of a set of vehicles expresses a human choice or series of choices that are embedded in a 
value framework.  The quality of the choice is revealed in the means to end relationship which 
the choice is serving, for example, the choice to park the vehicles linearly to keep the weapons 
and persons they contain readily available for the group’s purpose of killing others.  What we 
think of that choice—whether we find it good or bad or some combination—depends on the 
value framework we adopt for assessing the choice.  For example, building a car bomb in the 
context of an insurgency limits the range of plausible meanings for the intended use of the 
weapon to those centering on destruction of property and persons.  The intent to destroy property 
and persons is a value-based commitment.  Whether that destruction is legitimate depends on the 
value system that frames the commitment.  From the insurgent viewpoint, the use of the car 
bomb to sow discord might be justified even if that use kills persons that Americans would 
consider beyond the limits of the use of force and violence, such as non-combatant men, women, 
and children.
9
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With an elaboration of the physical and moral context for Dunham’s actions in hand we 
can (finally) analyze the first of the two important components of the description focusing on 
Dunham in particular, his hand-to-hand fight with the insurgent.  One of the first things to notice 
about the action is that the Iraqi might not have meant to kill Dunham immediately.  We can tell 
by the possible actions the Iraqi didn’t take.  He didn’t, for example, toss his grenade out the 
truck window as Dunham approached, while using the vehicle to protect himself.  He didn’t use 
any of the other weapons at his disposal such as the assault rifles or rocket propelled grenade 
launchers.  He didn’t, as a suicide bomber might, stuff his pockets with grenades, pull the pin on 
his grenade and allow Dunham to pull him out of the truck.  Instead, the Iraqi grabbed Dunham 
by the throat, an ambiguous action in light of the other possibilities just named.  From the 
description it seems that the Iraqi continued to hold the grenade, thereby ensuring it would not go 
off, even as the other Marines moved to help Dunham.  The point is important because we don’t 
know whether the Iraqi purposely let the grenade go during the ensuing struggle or, perhaps, was 
forced to let it go as Dunham’s fellow Marines tried to restrain him.  I tend to think that the latter 
was the case given the kind of warning Dunham voiced to his fellow Marines.  It is even possible 
that the Iraqi changed his mind during the fight and was simply waiting for other Marines to aid 
Dunham until he loosed the grenade, thereby taking with him as many Marines as possible. 
The hand-to-hand fight that ensued represents a special kind of fighting, even for combat 
infantry.  The American value framework that informs military action includes, ironically 
perhaps, the secular value of respect for the individual and the religious value of the sanctity of 
life.  These values underlie the aforementioned value that the use of force and violence ought to 
be controlled and dependent on justification.  They also underwrite American perceptions of 
appropriate physical and moral distances between persons (e.g., “personal space”).  These 
culminate in a cultural approach to others that, literally, defines being a good person in a social 
relationship as keeping a certain physical distance in order to honor a required moral distance 
from others, unless permission to act otherwise is granted. 
Close combat not only violates these values, it demands that combat infantry act toward 
achieving the culturally problematic purpose of killing the other person, whether or not they 
succeed in that purpose.  Viscerally, the use of body-powered weapons like fists, bayonets, and 
rifle butts in hand-to-hand combat requires combatants to be physically intimate with one 
another.  They can smell, hear, and feel the other’s body within the micro-context of personal 
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space violation and bodily actions designed to kill.  These qualities apply to both combatants.  
Nevertheless, there is a kind of ambiguity about fighting hand-to-hand that perhaps occurred in 
Dunham’s case.  If I am right about perceiving the ambiguous nature of the Iraqi’s throat-grab, 
coupled with his failure to throw or simply release the grenade at Dunham’s approach, then 
perhaps Dunham didn’t think the Iraqi was intending to kill him.  The generation of an 
interpretation like this in the moment on the part of combat infantry is not only not unusual, it is 
demanded by ROE’s that require Marines have a good reason for killing. 
U.S. Marine Sergeant Samuel J. Stevens described just such a split-second judgment as 
he and his fellow Marines kicked in a door to an Iraqi house in search of a suspected IED maker 
he describes as “murderous.” 
 
I was the second man to crash through the door.  The adrenaline was pouring 
through my veins.  The house was as black as the darkness outside.  Only our 
LED’s (light emitting diodes) fixed to our rifles pierced the blanket of darkness.  
My fellow Marines and I had performed this operation enough to be on autopilot.  
We were simply doing what we rehearsed, only this time we did it with amplified 
intensity. 
I entered a room behind another Marine, both of us performing basic 
clearing procedures.  As I entered I found myself holding my weapon a hair away 
from a man’s face.  Before I could act, he grabbed the compensator of my M16A2 
[rifle].  What happened in the next heartbeat has been replayed in my mind almost 
every day of my life since.  
 
“Hostile act equals hostile intent” was part of our rules of engagement.  
We were required to have this memorized.  We learned it, like other portions of 
our ethos, through maintenance rehearsal.  We repeated this phrase and others 
until we knew them flawlessly. 
 
I remember hearing the phrase in my mind as he snatched at my barrel.  
The words ran through my vision like a news flash running across a television 
screen.  I was interpreting his reaction as hostile.  I ran the situation through my 
thought process and decided I was justified to shoot this man in his face.  It was 
happening slowing and automatically.  I felt my finger curling around the trigger.  
I can still feel the imperfections in the metal.  I had decided to kill him. 
Then something else happened.  Looking in his eyes, I realized I did not want 
to kill him.  The bill was passed and about to be ratified when I reevaluated the 
situation.  It dawned on me that the man was scared.  I had kicked in his door, ran 
into his house, and put a gun in his face.  I reasoned that due to these premises the 
man was not fighting me but just responding to my actions.  This was a scared old 
man who did not deserve to die, and I did not want to kill him; therefore, I pulled 
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my rifle away and told him in Arabic to “calm down.”  It all took place in the 
blink of an eye. [Stevens 2008: 20] 
 
I would like to highlight two parts of this example.  First, intelligence and decision-making are 
involved in close quarters combat.  Second, both the use of intelligence and the decision to take 
or spare a life can happen extremely quickly.  The combination suggests a contrary 
understanding of combat compared to the popular notion of personal combat as “automatic,” a 
point made by Stevens himself.  But, despite being trained to act automatically, Stevens chose 
not to follow the training—training that associated “hostile action with hostile intent.”  When the 
Iraqi man grabbed his rifle barrel Stevens had justification for using force and violence, yet he 
didn’t.  We can characterize Stevens’ action then not as “automatic” but as “spontaneous,” as in, 
“he made a spontaneous decision not to fire.” 
I mention Stevens’ example because it is critical to understanding what Dunham did next.  
It is not clear, at least from the description, exactly how the fight with the Iraqi insurgent 
progressed.  Dunham kneed the man in the chest and as his fellow Marines helped, the grenade 
fell to the ground.  Dunham “placed his helmet and body on top of [the grenade] to protect his 
squadmates.”  I can find no manual for, mention of, or practice in training U.S. military infantry 
to place their helmets and bodies on top of grenades, to shield their comrades or not.  The reason 
and so the quality of the action is, therefore, open to question.  In the bio-reductive framework, 
we can imagine terming the action “instinctive,” and so interpreting the action as an evolved 
behavior designed to save the lives of other species members.  In an agentic framework, we can 
imagine terming the action “courageous,” and so interpreting the action as a choice by Dunham 
to save the lives of his comrades.  The difference can be captured as well by characterizing the 
action as either “automatic” or “spontaneous.”  Dunham, I think, was acting intelligently and 
making a life and death decision quickly, just like Stevens.  This suggests we can interpret 
Dunham’s actions agentically, despite the explanatory authority of the bio-reductive framework.  
This would be in keeping, at least, with the reporter’s sense of the courageous quality of 
Dunham’s actions. 
We can start this explanation by asking what it was about Dunham’s actions that permit 
and suggest courage?  There are three components to the answer.  First, his actions in and of 
themselves expressed culturally prized values.  Second, his actions were aligned with or 
generated further culturally prized values.  Finally, his actions occurred in a context of lethal 
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danger and so came the price of risking his own life.  In Dunham’s particular example there is a 
sense of the level of that risk ratcheting upward as he entered the area of the recent ambush, 
spotted the hidden line of vehicles, approached the vehicles, searched the vehicles, encountered 
the Iraqi occupant, fought hand-to-hand with the Iraqi, discovered the grenade, and, finally, 
smothered the grenade.  There are three places in this upward spiral of risk that deserve attention.  
There is a qualitative difference in risk at the point of (1) encountering the Iraqi, (2) fighting 
hand-to-hand with the Iraqi, and (3) smothering the grenade. 
The quality of the risk became more serious when Dunham encountered the Iraqi because 
the capabilities of a person are qualitatively different than those of a weapon.  Simply put, the 
structure of a weapon like an assault rifle or grenade affords them the capability of projecting 
bullets or pieces of metal at high speed, but not without being activated by some cause that is 
internal, external or in some combination, to the weapon.   One such combination is a person 
pulling a trigger that activates a firing pin that in turn ignites a powder charge behind a bullet in a 
gun’s barrel.  Another is a person opening a vehicle door that draws a wire attached to the 
friction igniter in a grenade.  The detail here is critical because it reminds us that some threats 
are passive and others are active.  Moreover, the intelligence of humans enables creativity, 
cunning, deception, and a host of other capabilities that, coupled with their realistic knowledge 
of how things in the world actually work, enable them to make an active threat look passive, for 
example.  The presence of an Iraqi with the vehicles, therefore, created a host of new 
possibilities that expanded the risk-scenarios exponentially.  With this expansion came new 
levels of ambiguity that the Marines had to consider. 
 When the Iraqi decided to grab Dunham’s throat, the range of possibilities diminished, 
but the risk of death or harm moved from possible to likely.  Someone was likely to get killed or 
hurt given, amongst other factors, the violation of space, the body part grabbed, and the weapons 
available.  I would have thought the odds were against the Iraqi at this point.  But, as Stevens’ 
example demonstrates, likelihood is not identical with certainty.
10
  We cannot tell from the 
description whether Dunham’s knee to the Iraqi’s chest was a non-lethal counter to what he 
thought might be a non-lethal attack, or his best option given his body position, or even an 
attempt to bring the Iraqi under control given a split-second judgment that killing the Iraqi would 
release the grenade, or any of a number of alternatives.  Again, given Stevens’ example, it is 
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even possible that Dunham and Iraqi understood one another: if Dunham moved to kill him by 
raising his weapon, the Iraqi would drop the grenade. 
It is important to emphasize the obvious (but usually unnoticed for cultural and 
theoretical reasons such as American radical individualism and its affinity for biological 
explanations): fighting hand-to-hand is a social interaction of a very special kind because of the 
ostensible purpose—to kill—and context—life and death, where meaning is generated and 
possibly changed or modified in split seconds.  It also illustrates the inextricable combination of 
physical action with value content.  Since we have established the fact that a range of possible 
actions was open to the Iraqi as noted above, his choice to grab Dunham’s throat was a value 
decision in and of itself.  What the Iraqi meant by grabbing Dunham’s throat itself is another 
level of meaning that is ambiguous, ranging from, for example, expression of a deep 
indecisiveness about whether or not to attack Dunham to an attempt to gather as many Marines 
around him as possible before loosing the grenade.  Without speaking to the Iraqi it seems to me 
impossible to go further than this speculative interpretation. 
When the grenade dropped free, the range of possibilities diminished even as the 
likelihood of death or injury became the probability of death or injury—not certainty since the 
mechanics of explosions are not necessarily consistent.  The explosive could be of an inferior 
quality or the fuse could be defective.  Moreover, the threat of probable death and injury 
expanded from Dunham and the Iraqi to those in the immediate area.  Dunham decided to 
remove the threat of probable death or injury to his fellow Marines (and the Iraqi in 
consequence) by limiting the effects of the grenade.  In limiting the effects of the weapon 
Dunham concentrated the force of the blast, pitting the force and shrapnel of the explosive 
against his helmet, body armor, and body. 
The values that Dunham’s actions expressed, aligned with, and generated, are many and 
varied.  His last earthly action is, perhaps, the most compelling because of its finality.  In 
smothering the grenade, Dunham chose to value others over himself.  Dunham “spoke” with his 
body, he actualized that value.  The action stands out as well because Dunham likely knew the 
potential effects of explosive blasts, if not from experience in Iraq then from his Marine training.  
Americans tend to think that knowledge of a threat enhances the quality of an action in the face 
of that threat.  I would suggest that the reason for this tendency is the pervasive sense among 
Americans that one’s interest is “naturally” oriented toward oneself, and not toward others.  
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Smothering a grenade with one’s body is “unnatural” because of the probability of the self-
destruction.  In this framework, choosing self-destruction for the sake of others seems 
incomprehensible.  But, as we have seen, the framework makes all the difference.  Choosing 
self-destruction on behalf of others is quite comprehensible in a value-system that bases self-
worth on the quality of life you make possible for others.  For U.S. Marines, as I found out in my 
fieldwork, everyone else constitutes “those for whom you are considered responsible,” even the 
enemy.  This is reflected, as we will see in detail in chapter 6, in physical-moral-character 
training at the U.S. Marine Corps Martial Arts Center of Excellence in Quantico, Virginia. 
To summarize, combat infantry operate in a volatile context of pervasive danger and, at 
times, specific threat, whether as an individual target or as a member of targeted group.  The 
nature of the threats varies widely.  Generally, a human opponent generates the highest threat 
given their capability of using their intelligence creatively to maximize their advantage and 
effectiveness, if and when they attack.  Further, the capability of persons to change intentions or 
purposes spontaneously generates an even deeper fundamental ambiguity in which combat 
infantry must act.  American cultural values prize life and the sanctity of the individual, but the 
purpose of combat infantry is to kill.  This purpose is, of course, modified by differences in 
context such as a conventional battle versus an insurgency, the rules of engaging an enemy 
formalized by the military organization to control killing, as well as individual decisions in the 
moment (e.g., the actions of Sergeant Stevens and Corporal Dunham).  Moreover, combat 
infantry are expected not only to take ground from the enemy and hold it but also to close with 
and destroy or disable the enemy.  This means that they must train for the possibility of fighting 
hand-to-hand with enemy soldiers.  The values that combat infantry embody and seek to honor 
through their actions are constantly challenged, constantly held in tension.  Killing, as a value, is 
contradicted by the value of the sanctity of the individual.  Valuing one’s own life is contradicted 
by the value of living for others.  Valuing the safety of a secure area is contradicted by the need 
to enter the area and risk the possibility of death to create that security.  These valuations are 
primarily embodied, meaning that soldiers use their bodies to generate meaning.  Courage, we 
can conclude, is a placeholder term that stands for the details of a dynamically embodied way of 
life instantiating and realizing prized cultural values.  Courage, per se, does not exist.  It is not a 
thing (e.g., the reified “will” of free will theory), a quality of an individual (e.g., a combination 
of radical individualism and instinctivism where a biological trait disposes the individual to 
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behave in a certain way) or a state of mind (e.g., a combination of radical individualism and 
mentalism where a psychological trait disposes the individual to act in a certain way). 
 
Explaining “Courage” 
 
In this section I want to further refine the formulation of courage offered above.  The 
overall purpose is to understand if or how this formulation relates to certain explanations of 
human social action as it relates to combat infantry on the battlefield.  By purporting to explain 
combat action generally, these accounts necessarily subsume courageous action.  I will juxtapose 
the foregoing description of the actions of U.S. Marine Corporal Jason Dunham against a 
sampling of explanations of combat action gleaned from scholarly work and service members, 
the latter emerging from interviews and ethnographic research. 
1) Courageous action is an  “evolved behavior,” that is, a “genetically inherited trait” of 
“males, who are almost always the warriors in humans,” which “benefits group fitness 
[for survival],” by increasing “the actor’s group’s probability to resist group extinction 
(defence), and on the other hand it increases the probability that the actor’s group 
conquers another group (offence)” 
2) Courageous action is “in our DNA.” 
3) Courageous action is the “nonrealization of the danger one is in owing to…a jolt of 
adrenalin released into the bloodstream by fear or rage.” 
The first explanation of “courage” is from biological scientists Laurent Lehmann and Marcus W. 
Feldman (2008: 2877, 2883).  The second is from a combat experienced, active-duty Marine 
Instructor-Trainer (IT) at the U.S. Marine Corps Martial Arts Center of Excellence in Quantico, 
Virginia.  The IT was addressing a training class on “Combat Mindset” held during my field 
research in 2007.  The third is from Pulitzer Prize-winning historian of the U.S. Civil War, James 
M. McPherson (1997: 39-40). 
  These explanations are unified around the idea that the source of human behavior is to be 
found in the action of microscopic biological entities and molecular chemical processes.  They 
emerge from a particular philosophy of biology framework that has taken hold in the United 
States over the past century.  Professor of Biology and Coordinator of Holistic Science at 
Shumacher College, Devon, UK, Brian Goodwin, describes the framework in this way, 
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A striking paradox that has emerged from Darwin’s way of approaching 
biological questions is that organisms, which he took to be primary examples of 
living nature, have faded away to the point where they no longer exist as 
fundamental and irreducible units of life.  Organisms have been replaced by genes 
and their products as the basic elements of biological reality. [Goodwin 2001: xi] 
 
This framework, as Goodwin points out, is one interpretation of Charles Darwin’s 
characterization of the overarching principle governing the natural world as “survival of the 
fittest” that connects the operation of genes and gene products with the survival and propagation 
of species to the ‘success’ of the organisms carrying the genes.  In the logic of the framework, 
genes are thought to direct the development and characteristics of the organism, and so its 
behavior, in a special way, “If organisms are mere assemblies of the molecular products of their 
genes, then there is a good case to be made that, despite their extreme complexity, they are 
basically molecular machines” (Goodwin 2001: 196). 
Varela (2009) argues that the machine model (of material and material entities) is both a 
cause and effect of an institutionalized philosophical-ontological mistake.  That mistake is that 
the material world is inert and so requires some power to move it (Toulmin 1990).  Being inert, 
matter blindly follows the dictates of forces internal or external to the object under consideration.  
Human beings are material entities, as their biology clearly shows, and so are thought to be no 
different, in this regard, from a rock.  This conception of matter means that we are determined by 
our biology in all that we are and all that we do.  Richard Lewontin, the Alexander Agassiz 
Research Professor at Harvard University, explicates the major components of the framework in 
this way 
 
There is the deep commitment to the view that organisms, both in their individual 
life histories and in their collective evolutionary history, are determined by 
internal forces, by an inner program of which the actual living beings are only 
outward manifestations. 
 
Variation between individual organisms, and even between species, is not of 
interest.  On the contrary, such variation is an annoyance and is ignored wherever 
possible.  What is at the center of interest is the set of mechanisms that are 
common to all individuals and preferably to all species.  Developmental biology 
is not concerned with explaining the extraordinary variation in anatomy and 
behavior…   which enables us to recognize individuals as different. 
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The concentration on developmental processes that appear to be common to all 
organisms results in a concentration on those causal elements which are also 
common.  But such common elements must be internal to the organism, part of its 
fixed essence, rather than coming from the accident and variable forces of the 
external milieu.  That fixed essence is seen as residing in genes. [Lewontin 2001: 
9-10] 
 
The impact of this kind of thinking on a conception of human social action can be profound.  
Responsibility and authorship of personal action can simply disappear.  Mark Twain, the 19
th
 
century American writer, for example, expresses just this idea through his Old Man in a quote on 
the ontology of human being.  Twain’s Old Man argues to the Young Man, “Man the machine—
man the impersonal engine. Whatsoever a man is, is due to his make, and to the influences 
brought to bear upon it by his heredities, his habitat, his associations.  He is moved, directed, 
commanded, by exterior influences—solely. He originates nothing, not even a thought” 
(Twain 2009: 22).
11
 
 In light of this discussion, and in order to remain true to the logic of these bio-reductive 
explanations, we can say that human beings, both as organisms and as meaning-making persons 
in socio-cultural contexts are only mechanical vehicles for the expression of genetic mandates.
12
  
As Goodwin (2001) noted, the production of behavior by the genetic material/biochemical 
process ‘engine’ is thought to be mechanical.  This means the relationship between the ‘engine’ 
and the behavior is comprised of the following, (1) direct causal linkage between the “engine” 
and the behavior, (2) automaticity, and (3) mechanical operation describable in physicochemical 
terms that capture the nature and operation of the material components of the engine.  Most 
often, as Lewontin (2001), researchers committed to the bio-reductive framework invite us to see 
the ‘engine-behavior’ relationship as “1-to-1” wherein a single gene produces a single behavior.  
While this mindset emerges from the inappropriate generalization of “knockout” studies where 
atypical cases such as that exemplified by relationship between a specific gene and the 
production of sickle cell anemia, are inappropriately generalized and presented as a fundamental 
principle of the relationship between genes and organisms, the principle is nevertheless applied.  
The result is that human behavior is not actually under the control of the organism or the person 
for two interrelated reasons.  First, behavior is generated from a biochemical and molecular 
level, both of which are unavailable for control by the organism or the person.  Second, the 
conception of matter as inert that pervades the framework ensures that the organism and person 
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can only receive, not generate, power.  No power, no behavior.  (This, perhaps, is the reason that 
there is no need to theorize either the organism or the person—they are considered extensions of 
molecular biochemical processes.) 
According to this view the semiotic or meanings of human actions we normally focus on 
and live by must be interpreted as primarily aimed at achieving genetic purposes if the logic and 
meaning of the framework is to be respected.  The combination of determinism and Darwinian 
biological theory as “survival of the fittest” means that Corporal Dunham’s behavior must have 
been oriented toward survival and reproduction of genetic material.  Problematically, however, 
the organism, the vehicle for genetic material, behaving according to genetic mandate, resulted in 
the death of the organism!  There is a substantial contradiction here.  How can genetically 
determined behavior result in the death of the organism given that the mandate of the organism’s 
behavior is survival?  Rhetorically we may ask, “Was there some deficiency in Dunham’s 
biology?” 
The contradiction is deepened if we consider further content from the Wall Street Journal 
article, 
 
Early this spring, Cpl. Jason Dunham and two other Marines sat in an outpost in 
Iraq and traded theories on surviving a hand-grenade attack.  Second Lt. Brian 
"Bull" Robinson suggested that if a Marine lay face down on the grenade and held 
it between his forearms, the ceramic bulletproof plate in his flak vest might be 
strong enough to protect his vital organs. His arms would shatter, but he might 
live.  Cpl. Dunham had another idea: A Marine's Kevlar helmet held over the 
grenade might contain the blast. "I'll bet a Kevlar would stop it," he said, 
according to Second Lt. Robinson. "No, it'll still mess you up," Staff Sgt. John 
Ferguson recalls saying. 
 
None of the other Marines saw exactly what Cpl. Dunham did, or even 
saw the grenade. But they believe Cpl. Dunham spotted the grenade -- prompting 
his warning cry -- and, when it rolled loose, placed his helmet and body on top of 
it to protect his squadmates.  
The scraps of Kevlar found later, scattered across the street, supported 
their conclusion. The grenade, they think, must have been inside the helmet when 
it exploded. His fellow Marines believe that Cpl. Dunham made an instantaneous 
decision to try out his theory that a helmet might blunt the grenade blast. "I 
deeply believe that given the facts and evidence presented he clearly understood 
the situation and attempted to block the blast of the grenade from his squad 
members," Lt. Col. Lopez wrote in a May 13 letter recommending Cpl. Dunham 
for the Medal of Honor, the nation's highest award for military valor. "His 
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personal action was far beyond the call of duty and saved the lives of his fellow 
Marines." [Phillips 2004: A1, emphasis added] 
 
The choice of vocabulary and grammar in this description suggests an agentic explanatory 
framework that deeply contradicts the determinism of a bio-reductive framework explanation.  
Adhering strictly to the bio-reductive framework would demand that we eliminate the use of 
personal pronouns as in “his” helmet and “his” body because genes, not persons, are the source 
of behavior.  Using these pronouns is a scientific mistake from the bio-reductive standpoint.  
Tellingly, no word, phrase, or sentence directly or indirectly stating something like, “The 
behavior of his genes was far beyond the call of duty,” is offered by anyone involved.  We can 
assume that the choice of pronouns and grammatical constructions are purposefully tied to their 
interpretation of the meaning of Dunham’s action as the reporter and his comrades saw it.  In 
doing so they suggest an explanatory framework that directly contradicts the bio-reductive 
framework ontologically. 
In an agentic framework, matter is dynamic, not inert.  The human organism is a dynamic 
material entity whose unique bio-physiological structure produces the capabilities and liabilities 
of being a human person.  The human person is a dynamically embodied entity whose socio-
cultural milieu emerges from linguistic capabilities providing a vast, but not unlimited, range of 
possibilities for being certain kinds of person—firefighter or combat infantryman, Muslim or 
Christian, father or mother.  Not only do people exist, they, not their biology, are the locus of the 
generation and management of their own social dynamism in terms of their semiotic practices.  
All of these concepts are constituted by the Marines’ ascription of  “courageous action” to 
Dunham the person, not to his organism (body) or the biochemical processes of his genes.  Their 
implication is that Dunham the person chose to use himself and his equipment as a resource to 
sacrifice himself to save them.  Without the ability to choose to move oneself there can be no 
such thing as “courageous action” as the Marines intend us to understand it in their description.  
In the bio-reductive schema Lt. Col. Lopez’s recommendation of Dunham for the Medal of 
Honor would be equivalent to decorating the Marine for an exceptionally well-functioning 
biochemical process, to use an earlier example, digestion.  In this framework, courageous action 
like moving toward danger or not moving when threatened is constituted by a personal choice to 
live or die in favor of a culturally prized value, in this case saving others. 
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With the agentic framework in mind, we can see a distinctly cultural character in 
Dunham’s action.  Since the deterministic bio-reductive framework does not theorize the 
organism, the conception of behavior that emerges runs along the lines of “an environmental 
Stimulus triggers a biochemical Response (resulting in behavior).”  This S!R conception 
reflects the “automaticity” of behavior that must be the case if human behavior is driven by 
mechanical forces originating in genetic material and delivered through biochemical processes.  
Dunham’s “split second decision” to smother the grenade with his helmet and body would be 
considered an instance of the operation of the S!R process.  Since we have already seen that the 
description ascribes agency and so decision-making power to Dunham, not his genes, the 
“automaticity” of his “split-second” decision requires clarification. 
Dunham was exercising his intelligence as we can see in his theorizing about potential 
actions in response to a grenade attack.  In the S!R conception, “intelligence” is a biochemical 
process beholden to genetic mandates (Richardson 2000).  Technically, theorizing should not be 
occurring.  But in an agentic framework, “intelligence” is a much more robust concept that 
includes the possibility of holding a stimulus.  Dunham, not his genetic material, was imagining 
a future event and working out a range of possible responses to that event.  This means Dunham 
and his fellow Marines were considering what would count both as a stimulus and as a “best” 
response from an array of possibilities.  For example, the grenade would have to land within 
some certain proximity for it to count in relation to the kind of action (smothering it) that 
Dunham proposed. 
In the classic S!R conception, the stimulus is given by the environment not selected by 
the organism (no less the person).   Similarly, there is no “best” response in the S!R 
conception; there is only one response for any given stimulus, and that response is the one that is 
genetically encoded.  Whether it is “best” or not can only be judged on the outcome for the 
organism in terms of survival!  Dunham the person was responsible for using his intelligence to 
define what counted as a stimulus and a range of possible responses to that stimulus.  In doing so 
he used his capability to hold a stimulus without a response until he decided to execute the 
response. 
The “automaticity” of Dunham’s “split second decision” is actually a mistaken 
characterization.  The decision was indeed “split second” but it was not “automatic.”  Dunham’s 
decision was to follow through on his commitment to one of a range of possible responses to a 
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grenade attack.  Even though Dunham clearly recognized that the grenade dropped from the Iraqi 
man’s grasp, he could have changed his mind.  He might have judged that there was not enough 
time for him to get his helmet off and also smother the grenade.  He might have decided that 
there was no imminent danger to his fellow Marines.  And so his decision in the presence of the 
grenade still remains a decision in the moment.  We should instead call his action “spontaneous,” 
not “automatic.”  His prior commitment to the theory of how to best act in a grenade attack and 
to ensuring his fellow Marines get home safely, not the mere presence of the grenade, offer the 
appropriate explanation as to why he acted as he did.  Dunham’s decision, incidentally, mirrors 
Stevens’ decision.  Stevens chose not to follow through on his prior commitment to kill when 
faced with “hostile act equals hostile intent.”  Sacrificing oneself for others is an American 
cultural value emerging from the Judeo-Christian religious tradition.  For combat infantry, this 
cultural value is prominent and real, not secondary and academic as it may be for many 
Americans.  The use of intelligence to commit to living and dying that value is the standard, not 
the exception, for combat infantry. 
 We have seen that scholars, Marines, and everyday civilians are familiar with courageous 
action to different degrees and with differing levels of sophistication.  We have also seen that 
there is a substantial contradiction between descriptions and explanations of courageous action 
among these groups.  I believe that the foregoing analysis demonstrates that there is a serious 
anthropological problem of understanding what these groups mean given that contradiction.  
Agentic descriptions of socio-cultural values enacted by persons and deterministic explanations 
of biological mandates functionally behaved by organisms result in a question like, “Is the 
richness of culturally-based meaning-making through the use the human kind of intelligence 
some sort of delusion, an evolutionary mistake that interferes with the otherwise primary purpose 
of the organism to survive as mandated by the biochemical processes of genes?”  The question is 
rhetorical.  The Harvard University psychologist Steven Pinker moved us toward an affirmative 
answer to this question when he wrote, “the apparent evolutionary uselessness of human 
intelligence is a central problem of psychology, biology, and the scientific worldview” 
(Richardson 2000: 122). 
 To further complicate the contradiction at the center of our focus here is not limited to the 
juxtaposition of descriptions and explanations offered by different persons, for example the 
Marine Instructor-Trainer’s explanation of courageous action as “in our DNA” versus Dunham’s 
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fellow Marines’ description of courageous action as “a personal choice to live and die for a 
cultural value.”  The contradiction, and attendant confusion about meaning, is evident at times in 
the same person.  U.S. Marine Sergeant Samuel J. Stevens’ explanation for his not shooting the 
old Iraqi man contradicts his own description of his action.  He writes, 
 
I thought about this event for years.  I wondered about why I had chosen not to 
kill him.  I am glad that I did not.  However, I could not help asking, “I am trained 
to kill, yet I cognimechanically [sic] chose not to.  [Stevens 2008: 20] 
 
Stevens characterizes his choice with an interesting neologism that alerts us to the conceptual 
framework he is using to try to understand his own behavior: mechanically knowing.  The term 
is not part of the agentic framework of dynamic socio-cultural action but rather the framework of 
behavior determined by biological processes.  The term is a fascinating construction: it appears 
to refer to “knowing” and “mechanical behavior” as separate but connected.  It is as if Stevens 
the person is irrelevant despite his ownership of both processes.   The question becomes, how do 
we understand Stevens’ account? 
Stevens supports his use of the term by explaining that, 
 
The military uses a number of exercises to train warfighters to kill.  Life-like 
targets are used in shooting drills to practice for combat.  When we run, we sing 
cadence songs about killing.  Our environment is filled with stimulis [sic] that 
prepare us for war by degrading the natural instinct not to kill.  Grossman 
explains the matter in basic psychological terms: 
 
Modern training uses what are essentially B.F. Skinner’s Operant 
Conditioning Techniques to develop a firing behavior in a soldier….  The 
soldier stands in a [fighting hole]…and man shaped targets pop up briefly in 
front of him.  These are eliciting stimuli that prompt the target behavior of 
shooting….  Positive reinforcement is given when hits are exchanged for 
marksmanship badges, which usually have some form of privilege or 
reward. 
 
Stimuli in one’s environment can induce learning that is reinforced by reward.  
These techniques are used to breed a killing mindset. [Stevens 2008: 20-21] 
 
To try to resolve his own lack of clarity about why he did not shoot the old Iraqi man in the face, 
Stevens relies on Skinnerian operant conditioning (via another author, former U.S. Army Lt. Col. 
David Grossman in On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill (1995).  
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Interestingly, conditioning is cited as a method of developing a behavior not given in our genetic 
material.  Our “natural instinct” is not to kill.  This directly contradicts the Marine IT noted 
above you thought that it is in our DNA to fight and kill.  While the contradiction is clear, the 
source is the same bio-reductive framework in both cases.  As we have seen the framework 
predefines all human behavior as a function of the biochemical processes of genes.  Stevens, like 
the Marine IT, has merely inserted a favored behavior that appeals to his experience.
13
 
Critically, however, the nature of the environment has changed in Sgt. Stevens’s case.  
The culturally constructed world of ‘military training’ has taken the place of the usual biological 
conception of the environment as the ‘natural world’ of impersonal entities and forces.  This 
means that people, as the authors of military training, have replaced impersonal entities and 
forces as the source of change in human behavior.  People and the training they impose are now 
against our biologically evolved genetic mandate not to kill.  People, through training, are 
capable and successful in defying nature.  While this fact contradicts the determinism of the bio-
reductive framework, the conception of learning at the center of our putative capability to defy 
nature is the deterministic bio-reductive framework’s S!R conception that renders the organism 
and so the person (and so intelligence) irrelevant to the generation of behavior.  The explanation 
of human social action here is incoherent. 
The problem is Sgt. Stevens’s uncritical adoption of Skinnerian behaviorism via 
Lieutenant Colonel Grossman’s work.  Varela (2009: 108-119) shows how Skinner was fatally 
inconsistent in his conception of behavior.  For Skinner, the causes of human behavior are 
external to the individual.  The environment determines what behavior individuals emit and the 
kind of behavior it develop into as it is reinforced in operant conditioning.  The idea of 
individuals emitting behavior is important because it suggests individual organisms are 
responsible for originating the behavior.  But for Skinner that cannot be the case.  The right word 
would be elicit as in “the environment elicited the behavior.”  Skinner’s theory is a perfect 
example of the contradiction between agentic and deterministic frameworks we have been 
encountering. 
 The impact of this internal contradiction for Stevens in his ethnographic representation of 
his own actions and his attempt to interpret them is that he uses the same Skinnerian theory 
simultaneously to explain why he should have shot the old Iraqi man and why he did not shoot 
him!  He writes, 
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Atrocity, however, must be avoided.  Modern militaries cannot afford to kill the 
wrong people.  Indiscriminate killing is counterproductive.  Atrocity serves to 
embolden the enemy and to turn allies against us.  Regardless of what some think, 
the United States Military, more specifically the Marine Corps, is not blind to the 
necessity of antiatrocity training. 
In recent years, strides have been taken on multiple levels to save as many 
innocent lives as possible.  These strides were evident as I went through my 
training prior to deployment. 
  
The Marines who went through that training experienced lifelike situations.  
Participants were required to conduct [military operations] while surrounded by 
civilians and insurgents (role-players).  The environment was that of a real Iraqi 
city: Mishandling the scenarios with role-players would result in negative marks.   
Maintaining the pride of our unit and learning how to deal with those situations 
properly was the reward for performing well in this Marine Corps-style Skinner 
box. 
 
Through these Skinnerian conditioning processes, Marines are taught to 
objectively scan their targets.  The Marine Corps trains us to kill, but it is taking 
measures to ensure that we are killing the right people. [Stevens 2008: 21] 
 
Stevens does not tell us how precisely his Skinnerian training accounts for his “don’t shoot” 
decision, only that it does.  Presumably there were rewards for not shooting civilians while there 
were rewards for shooting insurgents.  But there is no way to understand, either from Stevens’ 
account or from Skinnerian operant conditioning theory who or what makes the decision when 
there are multiple, simultaneous, contradictory stimuli!  The old Iraqi man’s hand and arm 
gesture stimulus indicated hostility and a “fire behavior” according to Stevens’ training while his 
eye and facial gesture indicated fear and anger and so a “don’t fire behavior” according to 
Stevens’ training.  Stevens’ question as to why he chose not to fire over firing cannot be 
answered using Skinnerian theory because the theory does not permit organisms or persons to 
choose anything.  The environment triggers behavior regardless of what or who is behaving.  In 
using the theory, Stevens has effectively cut himself off from any comprehensible or coherent 
explanation of why he acted the way he did.  By contrast, Stevens’ own discourse—“Why did I 
choose not to fire?”—illegitimately (in terms of Skinnerian behaviorism) locates decision-
making power over his actions with him.  We are left without any way to understand what 
Stevens means by his article since his description and his explanation contradict one another in 
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an article that mixes vocabulary and grammar from the contradictory frameworks thereby sowing 
confusion, not clarity. 
We should pause to note the moral lesson of this situation.  By choosing to use 
Skinnerian theory as an authoritative framework for explaining human social action, Stevens 
rejects his own description of the event, which I take to be the plausible source of his actions. 
That description places responsibility for not acting as he was trained to act on his own 
spontaneous re-assessment of the intentions of the old man in light of an imagined context.  
Stevens took the social role of the other (the Iraqi man) whose home was being invaded and 
interpreted a facial gesture centered on the old man’s eyes as expressing fear and perhaps anger, 
but not hostility, despite the man’s arm gesture of grabbing the muzzle of Stevens’ rifle.  (We 
can speculate that Stevens chose to believe his own interpretation of the old man’s face/eye 
gesture over his arm/hand gesture based on the American cultural emphasis on the eyes as 
“windows on the soul” and so windows on truth). 
For Stevens there must be something more than, or, more precisely, something other than 
him that accounts for his expertise and professionalism!  In my view this self-depreciating 
attitude is a measure of the extent to which the determinist bio-reductive framework, and 
positivism, has appealed to Americans.  It is also the extent to which Stevens undermines himself 
in making the following statements, 
 
The generic stereotype of an American fighting man is one of ignorance.  
Frequently, modern warriors are depicted as knuckle-dragging thugs.  Everyone 
acknowledges the bravery of our troops and often supports them despite political 
views.  The generic typecast of a ground pounder is, however, often that of an 
unintelligent robotic killer walking the battlefield.  Through my trials and studies 
I have firmly concluded that there is no such thing as a dumb grunt. 
Our military took numerous steps to ensure that I was not a senseless 
killer.  This training saved an old man’s life.  Through the study of basic 
psychological principles I have finally been able to learn why the most important 
half-second of my life did not end horribly. [Stevens 2008: 21] 
 
If “courage” is an example of an S!R relationship, Stevens has no grounds for protesting the 
generic stereotype of American warriors.  The relationship precludes the use of intelligence.  If, 
somehow, intelligence is used, it should be considered a mistake of some sort—perhaps the 
mistake of culture intruding detrimentally on the otherwise smooth functioning of unintelligent 
biology. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: The Foundation for a Better Life billboard posted across the United States 
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1
 This does not mean that infantry are not called upon to do other things, like “breach” an obstacle, “construct” a position, 
“occupy” a location, “police” a neighborhood, or “gather” intelligence. 
2
 Americans are not the only socio-cultural group to attempt to politicize people through realistic computer simulations.  Dan 
Costa of PC Magazine reported that, 
 
This past summer Hezbollah, the Lebanese-based Islamist paramilitary group, released Special Force 2, a 
first-person shooter [the perspective of the real player is “first-person” so that in viewing the computer screen 
the gamer sees what his or her virtual character sees] based on its pointless 34-day war with Israel in 2006.  
In the game, players are asked to destroy Israeli tanks and launch Katyusha rockets at Israeli towns.  In the 
game, the more Israeli soldiers you kill, the more weapons and points you get. [2007:54] 
 
3
 There are of course, reasons why I chose an analogy and Giuliani’s in particular.  Perhaps most important is that the full extent 
of the research so far has led me to think that courage is a way of moving one’s body, not a state of one’s mind, or a behavior 
necessitated by a biological mechanism triggered by some internal or external environmental stimulus.  I also chose the analogy 
because of the near perfect complement to it found in the Foundation for a Better Life billboard, which, I think, makes the 
analysis more clear. 
4
 The actions of combat infantry and of storms can never be more than a family resemblance: combat infantry (human beings) 
and storms are qualitatively different kinds of things.  For example, there is no such thing as a “context of danger” for a storm.  A 
context of danger can exist for human beings and it substantively modifies the meaning and status of their actions, as in, “The 
beach was blanketed by a perfect hail of gunfire.  The Captain simply walked along the beach encouraging the men.”  Human 
beings, unlike storms, live culturally as a function of the kind of agency permitted to them by their unique bio-physiological 
structure and their various, linguistically-tied cultural conventions. 
5
 Though constructed from everyday civilian analogies, we will see that this conception is shared not only by military personnel 
but by combat veterans as well. 
6
 Some Americans might characterize the actions as “stupid” or “foolish,” or even use them in combination with “courageous.”  
These possible interpretive outcomes serve to illuminate the existence of what I take to be a distinctive American ethic that 
generates our form of courage and places the action of combat infantry at the top of a moral hierarchy.  “Stupid” and “foolish” 
seem to me to be part of a different moral hierarchy based on contrary social values that requires further analysis.  Charging a 
machine gun nest, for example, might be foolish to a soldier’s father who values the life of his son preeminently over his son’s 
comrades.   
7
 I consider the act of Dunham following his orders a choice because the idea of military personnel, especially Marines, 
robotically following orders is based on two different kinds of mistakes.  First, there is an American penchant for advancing the 
wrong-headed ontological claim that persons are really biological machines that can be programmed as computers are 
programmed.  Second, Americans have encountered examples of some military personnel (as well as civilians) using the notion 
above as a vision for living their lives as if they were machines.  “As if” does not constitute an identity relationship however (see 
fn 12 below).  This is a theme explored extensively in American films portraying “cold” and “heartless” military personas such as 
The Great Santini (1979). 
8
 Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s insistence on “shock and awe” tactics for policing Iraqi population centers might be 
characterized as “break and enter” where soldiers and Marines kicked in the doors to Iraqi dwellings in order to achieve the 
advantage of surprise and cow any possible resistors into submission with the surprise threat of overwhelming force.  The 
damage to relations to American-Iraqi relations was substantive and inestimable given the need in an insurgency to cut off 
insurgents from popular support if control is to be established.  Tactics were switched to what Marines called “knock and cordon” 
where the target dwelling was surrounded and the troops knocked instead of kicking in the door.  In Dunham’s case, he may have 
been utilizing a characteristic posture of keeping his weapon low to show some sign of respect.  It is possible that Dunham was 
doing this despite the context that I elaborated, relying instead on a judgment that he could act appropriately if necessary.  
9
 These value frameworks can of course change over time.  The Official Irish Republican Army, for example, developed a value 
framework that gradually de-legitimated the use of force and violence despite a long history of their use to advance the cause of 
Irish independence from British rule. 
10
 “Likelihood” captures the contingency that characterizes human socio-cultural action.  “Certainty” would mischaracterize 
human socio-cultural action in terms of absolutes and necessity. 
11
 Dr. Charles Varela brought this quote to my attention. 
12
 The mechanical model that is pervasive in many scientific enterprises comes from the philosophy of the 16th century French 
thinker Rene Descartes.  Richard Lewontin writes, “The entire body of modern science rests on Descartes’ metaphor of the world 
as a machine, which he introduced in Part V of the Discourse on Method as a way of understanding organisms but then 
generalized as a way of thinking about the entire universe. ‘I have hitherto described this earth and generally the whole visible 
world, as if it were merely a machine in which there was nothing at all to consider except the shapes and motions of its parts’ 
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(Principles of Philosophy, IV)” (2001:3-4).  Importantly, Lewontin goes on to say that, “While we cannot dispense with 
metaphors in thinking about nature, there is great risk of confusing the metaphor with the thing of real interest.  We cease to see 
the world as if it were like a machine and take it to be a machine.  The result is that the properties we ascribe to our object of 
interest and the questions we ask about it reinforce the original metaphorical image and we miss the aspects of the system that 
doe not fit the metaphorical approximation” (2001:4). 
13
 In so doing Stevens opposes another Marine who, during my fieldwork in July of 2007, told me that killing is an “aggressive 
behavior” that is “instinctive.”  There is of course a substantive difference between “killing” and “aggression” but for this 
Marine, the underlying and explanatory concept for killing was aggression.  So, for one Marine it is instinctive not to kill while 
for a fellow Marine it is instinctive to be aggressive and so to kill.  Which Marine should we take to be “right” as informants 
about Marine and perhaps human culture? 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF CONTRADICTION: 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESOURCES 
 
 
 In this chapter I intend on exploring the potential resources for solving the problem of 
contradiction from within Western anthropology.  At stake is the critical anthropological 
assumption of human agency.  I use the term “assumption” because it has yet to be grounded in 
any legitimate and plausible theoretical framework.  As a consequence, we may be forced into 
the position of having to argue that there is no way in principle to decide between agentic 
descriptions and deterministic explanations of human social action.  Should this turn out to be the 
case, we would have to relegate some culturally important, value-oriented actions of combat 
infantry normally recognized as conveying lessons in being ethically good as, instead, 
incomprehensible.  Cultural celebrations of the enactment of prized values in, for example, the 
award of a Congressional Medal of Honor, would have to be termed illusory at best, self-
delusional at worst. 
This exploration will force us into to get clear about the relationship between 
ethnographic perception and conception, as well as learning.  I will show that not only are both 
required for any legitimate and plausible explanation of human social action, but that the nature 
of each activity needs to be formulated properly.  To do so will require delving into the actual 
bio-physiology of homo sapiens sapiens, specifically the structure of the specie’s nervous 
system, in pursuit of what human biology permits and prohibits in both the human organism and 
the human person.  This endeavor will lead to a sustained critique of the bio-reductive 
framework and to its dismissal as a pseudo-scientific fantasy.  As the critique emerges, we will 
see a surprising commonality of idealistic thinking in both bio-reductive and anti-bio-reductive 
approaches to human social action.  That commonality requires attention since it presents a trap 
for researchers seeking a respectful representation of cultural members based on judgments about 
what constitutes ethnographic reality for those members.  With the bio-reductive framework 
dismissed, I will identify the characteristics necessary for a plausible and legitimate engagement 
with the problem of contradiction with a special focus on why a proper understanding of science 
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is also necessary.  I then review present literature in the Anthropology of Warfare to assess its 
fruitfulness as a source for the required resources for resolving the contradiction.  Finally I note 
some intersections between the theoretical issues under discussion in this study and the position 
of anthropologists relative to warfare and combat. 
 
Defining the Problem and Its Effects 
 
We have seen that agentic descriptions of courageous action contradict deterministic bio-
reductive explanations of human behavior.  Contradiction is not unusual in the lives of persons, 
and it appears routine for people to hold diametrically opposed and so incoherent ideas 
simultaneously.  U.S. Marine Sergeant Samuel J. Stevens is an example.  But the contradiction 
should give social scientists like anthropologists pause: How would anthropologists explain, in 
any non-trivial way, what is going on amongst American combat infantry engaged in describing 
and explaining courageous action to an interested group of, say, Balinese?  Or, in a less 
speculative light, suppose a senior Pentagon official is charged with assessing applications for a 
recent U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense Small Business Innovation Research grant 
program worth hundreds of thousands if not millions of dollars that states 
 
In a world full of sophisticated weapons, forces who can more accurately 
forecast human behavior and use that data to make wise decisions will have a 
significant edge over their competition.  Today in DoD, this analysis is conducted 
by anthropological experts, known to carry their own bias, which often leads to 
faulty recommendations and inaccurate behavioral forecasting and take a 
significant amount of time to develop, in large part due to the rapid expansion of 
information produced from any given target population over the past decade. 
Alternative approaches, which significantly reduce or remove altogether this bias, 
while at the same time automating the overall analysis method, would provide a 
significant improvement over this status quo. 
Methods like genetic algorithmic modeling of human behavior are 
becoming increasingly prevalent inside marketing and advertising industries and 
have been shown to provide effective communication and marketing strategies.  
At the same time, the development of modeling and simulation software has 
produced more accurate forecast and analysis capabilities of target population 
behavior such as economics, decision making and identification of key 
influencers (human or other) within groups. 
Despite this progress, these tools have not been developed to support 
command-level military decision making processes in regard to troop movement, 
offensive / defensive strategy, or message communication which would help 
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create a favorable environment for our deployed forces.  A technology that would 
exploit these recent trends to enable accurate forecasting of a given populations’ 
potential responses to military relevant events would provide military decision 
makers with a powerful tool to more effectively use their limited resources to the 
greatest benefit possible. This tool could be used to facilitate or to replicate 
wholly or in part many of the tasks that a human anthropological consultation 
would provide such as, counter-insurgency, reconstruction or support operations, 
allowing faster and more accurate development of social-cultural behaviors. 
[http://www.dodsbir.net/solicitation/sbir092/osd092.htm] 
 
Let’s say that the senior Pentagon official is especially concerned because in trying to formulate 
a standard for assessing the applications she comes across these two positions on human warfare. 
 
“War is an art and as such is not susceptible of explanation by fixed formula” – 
U.S. Army Major (later General) George S. Patton Jr. (1926) 
 
“[War] is the domain of an unchanging human nature and thus subject to 
predictable lessons that transcend time and space” – Military Historian and Senior 
Fellow in Residence, Hoover Institution, Stanford University Victor Davis 
Hanson (2007) 
 
If the official thinks to ask an anthropologist for suggestions on how to formulate the standard, 
how should, better yet, how could we provide the requested guidance without formulating a 
position on the nature of human social action: is human social behavior susceptible to 
“forecasting” as the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s Office seems to think, and so available for 
“automated understanding”? 
To answer this last question in any coherent way depends on the realization that the 
difference between Patton and Hanson is not one of opinion but of ontology.  They are 
conflicting claims about what is “really real” in human social action.  On the one hand is the 
existence of Patton’s art, meaning the generation of genuine novelty.  On the other hand is the 
existence of Hanson’s universal, non-material (transcending time and space) structure that 
systematically produces formulaic, predictable results.  For Patton, people are not predictable 
because they can and do generate novelty in their actions.  For Hanson, people are not the point.  
Rather, the point is the operation of a transcendental, that is, super-natural, force that operates 
through people.  So how could we answer the interested Balinese or the hypothetical Pentagon 
official? 
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Our task is not made any simpler by some important outcomes of the contradiction that 
we saw in U.S. Marine Sergeant Samuel J. Stevens’s self-analysis.  First, deploying 
contradictory ontologies creates incoherence; we cannot explain to our Balinese friends what 
these American combat infantry mean by courageous action in any way that coherently meshes 
their descriptions and explanations.  The social world of combat infantry as it relates to courage 
is, in short, unintelligible.  Similarly, we cannot explain to the senior Pentagon official how to 
resolve the contradiction with the theoretical and discursive resources at hand: there is no non-
arbitrary—meaning plausible basis in what really exists—for deciding whether we should 
believe Patton or Hanson or even discard both in favor of a third, unnamed option.  This problem 
is primarily a matter of philosophy and science. 
Second, and even more disturbing is that the contradiction renders assessment of the 
outcomes of either ontological schema impossible.  Without clarity and precision of meaning, 
how could we know whether the advice given to combat commanders on the basis of 
“forecasted” human behavior was actually sound?  How would we know whether or not we are 
surreptitiously importing concepts and data considered inappropriate to either ontological 
position in the assessment process?  A critical understanding of self as researcher and self as 
combat infantryman is not possible amidst such contradiction.  Without a way to critically assess 
oneself (whether researcher or combat infantryman), monitoring and adjusting one’s actions in 
light of preferred values and goals becomes problematic: self-talk can capture a sense of 
inevitability that suggests resignation or submission to a prevailing course of action, not 
command or control of it.
1
  We saw a species of this in the argument of Twain’s Old Man in 
chapter 2.  Without new theoretical resources and a plausible scientific choice of ontological 
commitments we will not move further than the Geertzian/Sahlinsian position of identifying a 
problem. 
Some contemporary anthropologists and historians might counsel us to “let the subjects 
speak for themselves,” but if so, the contradiction is merely reiterated, not resolved or even 
explained.  The approach assumes that the way people talk and act is self-explanatory, that there 
are no serious questions of interpretation to be faced and decided upon. Taking the logic of this 
viewpoint seriously makes it impossible to distinguish between a Doctor of Philosophy in 
Anthropologist and a tape recorder.  What, then, should be done? 
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It might be tempting to choose, by fiat, one framework over the other.  While arbitrary 
decisions are risky there are many examples of successful and powerful scientific inquiries that 
emerge without knowledge of the actual ontological schema underlying the phenomena being 
observed.  We have seen that the bio-reductive framework carries the authority of a natural 
scientific explanation because it posits the existence of causal entities and processes.
2
  In the 
Platonic tradition that underwrites Western science, these biological mechanisms are the reality 
behind the appearances of culture.  Insofar as descriptions posit the existence of persons as 
nothing more than the vehicle of hidden mechanisms that produce human social action like 
moving toward danger, we must consider those descriptions illusory.  In fact, at least one scholar 
promotes this point of view and hence challenges the very idea that we as persons are capable of 
choosing our interpretations or frameworks, even arbitrarily!  Dean’s Professor in the Sciences of 
Uncertainty at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Nassim Taleb is the author of the New 
York Times Bestseller The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007).  Taleb 
contends that the behavior of split-brain patients (people who have no connection between the 
left and right sides of the brain due to surgery for epilepsy or other serious diseases) 
 
give us convincing physical—that is, biological—evidence of the automatic 
aspect of the act of interpretation.  There appears to be a sense-making organ in 
us—though it may not be easy to zoom in on it with any precision. [Taleb 2007: 
65, emphasis added] 
 
I want to offer my position on three claims made by Taleb.  First, we are built to interpret.  I 
agree with this claim.  Second, it is not the person, but an organ within the person that generates 
interpretations.  I disagree with this claim.  Third, in being generated by an impersonal organ 
within the person, the content of an interpretation is pre-determined for the person, not by the 
person.  I disagree with this last claim as well. 
If Taleb is right, our perception of a “choice” between frameworks must be an illusion.  
Our sense of having a choice in how we act in the world is simply mistaken.  If interpretations 
underlie our actions in the world, and interpretations are given by an “organ” that automates the 
generation of those interpretations, then all our actions are pre-determined not by us, but by that 
organ. The very important consequence of Taleb’s viewpoint is that there is no way to take 
seriously the idea of having a choice in our interpretations.  This means that we would have to 
explain to the Balinese that American combat infantry discourses of and about courage, like 
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“choosing to smother a grenade to save fellow Marines,” or “not firing because I’m facing a 
scared old man, not a hostile insurgent,” are mistaken explanations of human action.  To persist 
in the mistake and actually honor a soldier for choosing to act courageously through the cultural 
ritual of awarding a decoration like the Congressional Medal of Honor is self-delusion. 
Assessing Taleb’s viewpoint against the bio-reductive framework, however, we 
encounter a substantial problem.  If, as some scholars like ethologist Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt 
(1979) have claimed, culture is an adaptation to the environment in the same way that a 
chameleon’s ability to change color is an adaptation, it is unclear why humans should be 
generating multiple interpretations, no less contradictory ones.  It is difficult to imagine what 
species survival function “self-delusion” has served in our genetic past.  If, nevertheless, we 
remain committed to a bio-reductive framework, a disciplinary and methodological consequence 
follows: we should investigate discourses of and about courage using neurobiology and 
physiology, perhaps in the attempt to discover some malfunction or unfinished evolutionary 
process in our “sense-making organ.”  We should, at the very least, be in search of this 
mysterious organ and its operation in order to understand what we otherwise think of as 
culturally based semiotic practices like courageous action.  Strangely, Taleb (2007) himself 
seems unconcerned with “finding” this organ.
3
   It is tempting to speculate about a reason for 
Taleb’s lack of concern.  If Taleb took his own viewpoint seriously, wouldn’t he have to agree to 
have his “organ” cited as the author of his book?
4
 
The question of human self-delusion evokes more than mere puzzlement when 
considered against the human record of practical achievement in the world.  Though not without 
mistakes and disasters, humans have acted successfully in many kinds of endeavors ranging from 
the mundane activity of staying warm in cold environments to space flight.  That record of 
practical success implies a highly developed capacity to generate accurate, not delusional 
interpretations of and in the world.  It is important to notice, moreover, that practical success 
presumes socio-cultural success since interpretations are mediated in and through language use.  
Solutions to the practical problems of space flight are achieved through the socio-cultural realm 
of collaborative semiotic practices of persons.  In the first instance of space flight, the 
intersubjective development of scientific principles by which calculations of the differing effects 
of the moon’s gravity were successfully mitigated using a mathematical language developed not 
genetically, but socio-culturally.  The effects of the moon’s gravity had never been experienced 
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and so could not have made their way into any evolved genetic structure.  This means that socio-
cultural practices cannot legitimately be reduced to the automated functioning of genetic 
material.  The question of whether or not people delude themselves when awarding medals for 
the tangible enactment of intangible socio-cultural values itself, therefore, legitimately cannot be 
posed based on the assumption of an evolutionarily automated biological process.  These 
considerations actually reveal something quite telling about the bio-reductive model: it is 
grounded in the logic of a positivist metaphysic, which holds that the only authentic knowledge 
is that of the senses (Grene and Depew 2004).  If the results of such a metaphysic include the 
illegitimate elimination of the reality of human socio-cultural interaction as seen the historical 
fact of practical scientific success, then it is clearly the wrong metaphysic upon which to ground 
a putative scientific explanation of human social action. 
The radical incompatibility between the language used to explain human behavior using 
the bio-reductive framework and the language used to explain their socio-cultural lives is 
symptomatic of the deeply flawed ontology of human being emerging from an impoverished 
understanding of the natural world.  The bio-reductive framework does not resolve the 
contradiction between explanation and description as much as illegitimately eliminate it by using 
a flawed metaphysic supported by veneer of pseudo-science.  The flaw is at two levels.  First, in 
instantiates the fundamental mistake of presuming that, generally, matter is inert—passive—and 
so yields a view of nature as a world of physical and biological patients and not agents.  Second, 
it limits knowledge to the senses and in so doing destroys the very possibility of scientific 
inquiry based on the use of intangible, socio-cultural concepts to achieve practical success in the 
world.  Insofar as the bio-reductive framework is maintained, we are offered an incoherent 
picture of the various forms of natural activity that we see in the world every day, including the 
natural activity of persons being social and using intangible concepts.  To the extent that the bio-
reductive framework is ascribed the authority of an authentic and so legitimate science, we are 
force to view the semiotic practices of interacting dynamically embodied persons as an illusion, 
with the reality being that they are patient robots awaiting the instructions and motive forces of 
evolved genetic mechanisms. 
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“Being on the Ground with Our Informants”: A Successful Anthropological Resource for 
Resolving the Contradiction? 
 
Though not advanced in the same way, I think Distinguished Professor of Anthropology 
at UCLA Sherry Ortner appreciates our cultural capabilities and uses that appreciation to 
underwrite her claim that the practice of anthropology provides insight into the source of human 
action as (inter)personal agency (versus the operation of impersonal systemic forces).
5
  Ortner 
contends that “it is [anthropologists’] position ‘on the ground’ that puts us in a position to see 
people not simply as passive reactors…some ‘system,’ but as active agents…in their own 
history” (1984: 143).  In contending that persons, not “sense-making organs” or genetic material 
or protein reactions, are the source of human action Ortner positions herself in the agentic, not 
the bio-reductive, framework.  Though I don’t think Ortner recognized it, her contention is first 
and foremost an ontological claim about the existential status of social human beings.  On what 
basis does Ortner’s stake her claim?  Apparently, it is something like this: anthropologists’ literal 
(and perhaps figurative) position among their target subjects yields a certain kind of insight into 
the source of human action.  Since Ortner does not qualify her contention, we are invited to see 
her advancing a conception that can be expressed as a sort of simple formula: Position=Insight.  
To get more precise: Position (on the ground) + Seeing (what is really going on) = Insight 
(persons generate history).  Is it possible that the “counter” to the bio-reductive framework’s 
explanatory hegemony is simply to be with others and so see their enactment of semiotic 
practices as dynamically embodied agents? 
It does not take much reflection to realize that this formula is entirely inadequate as either 
an account or defense of putative anthropological perceptions of agency.  We can appreciate this 
inadequacy through a challenge to theories of knowledge based on human perceptions 
(empiricism) from the past.  In the 18
th
 century the philosopher David Hume argued that humans 
neither see nor experience causal relationships in the world.  How does he reach this startling 
conclusion?  Hume thought the world was composed of discrete, atomistic components that 
behave just like billiard balls.  Billiard balls are inert until an external force moves them.  Then, 
when two balls collide, we see one contacting the other and the other moving away.  In short, 
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two separate events are occurring in succession.  Our psychology then generates the illusion of a 
dynamic, causal interaction, much like flipping through a series of still photographs over time of 
a moving object that makes that object look as though it is moving in the pictures.  The 
continuity we seem to perceive in, say, a candle melting, is simply an overlay on the world 
provided by human psychology.  Our claim that the candle’s flame is an agentic entity that 
causes the melting is therefore an ungrounded assumption prompted by the operation of our 
psychology.  Continuity, and therefore causality, or agency, is an illusion.  In Hume’s 
conception then, one’s position—on the ground or not—is irrelevant since what we think we see 
beyond ourselves is really just a construct of our psychology.  Hume’s idea undermines Ortner’s 
contention by offering an account of human perception that renders our sense of seeing causal 
activity in the world illusory.  Since Hume’s account is of human psychology, not just his, even 
anthropologists are susceptible to his argument.  It is interesting to note in this regard that we 
could think of Taleb’s “sense-making organ” as a biological structure that grounds Hume’s idea.  
In the same vein as Hume, but more recently, the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss 
offered a conceptualization of his own experience that amounts to a direct challenge to Ortner’s 
claim.  He reports 
 
I never had, and still do not have, the perception of feeling my personal identity.  I 
appear as the place where something is going on, but there is no “I,” no “me.”  
Each of us is a kind of crossroads where things happen.  The crossroad is purely 
passive; something happens there.  There is no choice, there is just a matter of 
chance. [Levi-Strauss 1979: 3-4] 
 
Taking himself as a social ‘other’ under observation, what Levi-Strauss sees (on the ground as it 
were) is not an active agent in his own history, but a “crossroad where things happen.”  Levi-
Strauss characterizes the metaphorical meaning of being a crossroads as being “purely passive.”  
What he seems to actually mean, however, is inert.  “Passive” characterizes the agency of an 
entity as only contingently held in abeyance.  That the entity can act in some way but happens 
not to at the moment is a matter of the local conditions, not a matter of the possession of such 
capability in the entity itself.  A “crossroads,” upon reflection, is not the type of entity that is 
structurally capable of agency.  Just as firefighters do not “storm” buildings, crossroads are not 
simply “passive,” they are “inert.”  As with Giuliani’s analogy, we are up against another 
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imprecise and so misleading metaphorical construction, but one that is nevertheless provocative 
and important. 
My interpretive decision is to see Levi-Strauss constructing himself as not merely passive 
but inert since, in the last sentence of the quotation, he states categorically, “there is no choice.”  
For Levi-Strauss, his being is determined by chance, not choice.
6
  We might ask what possible 
recourse Ortner would have in an encounter, anthropologist to anthropologist, with Levi-Strauss?  
Picture it: both of them, standing there, on the ground (as it were) together, with Ortner seeing 
him as the source of his own history and Levi-Strauss seeing himself as an inert locus of 
intersecting external forces impinging on him by chance!  The only result possible is impasse, 
the kind we have seen for many years in American social sciences in the Science-Humanism 
debate.  The same kind of impasse that, I think, underwrote the fragmentation of some 
anthropology departments in the recent past. 
The stark simplicity and unqualified surety of Ortner’s contention suggests that she 
somehow missed the philosophical (ontology, what exists) and so the scientific (causation) 
challenge to her position from the past presented by Hume as well as the more recent version 
presented by Levi-Strauss.
7
  Hume directly challenges Ortner’s contention by arguing that what 
is sensed is not agency or even determinism, but mere successions of events we record and run 
together as a function of our psychology (as we would by flipping through the series of still 
photographs) to generate the illusion of causal relationships in the world.  Levi-Strauss directly 
challenges Ortner’s contention by arguing that what he sees is random determinative forces 
impacting an inert space-time locus, not the agency of a person.  These challenges strike at the 
heart of Ortner’s claim and expose the need for her to ground her claim in something other than a 
bald identification of anthropologists’ positioning in situ. 
This situation arises because Ortner confuses and equates perception with insight 
(knowledge) in a naïvely empiricist way.  Empiricism is a version of idealism because it 
artificially limits real knowledge to that which is experienced.
8
  Ortner’s claim, quite simply, 
tells us nothing about how cultural conceptions—those products of language in use by 
interacting, dynamically embodied persons—relate to human perceptions, which is a necessity 
given the challenges by Hume, Taleb, and Levi-Strauss.  This is not a new problem: theories of 
human perception seeking to understand the problematic relationship of humans to the natural 
world and each other are evident in the writings of the ancient Greek philosophers.  In the 18
th
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century the philosopher Immanuel Kant alerted us, in his Critique of Pure Reason, to the idea 
that perception without conception is blind.  In the 20
th
 century the anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz argued that 
 
Rather than culture acting only to supplement, develop, and extend organically 
based capacities logically and genetically prior to it, it would seem to be 
ingredient to those capacities themselves.  A cultureless human being would 
probably turn out to be not an intrinsically talented though unfulfilled ape, but a 
wholly mindless and consequently unworkable monstrosity.  Like the cabbage it 
so much resembles, the Homo sapiens brain, having arisen within the framework 
of human culture, would not be viable outside of it. [1973: 68] 
 
Ortner has either missed or dismissed these warnings that demonstrate perception, conception, 
and knowledge are not identical.  If they are not, knowledge claims based on perception require 
a theory of what exists and how it works.  We should note in passing Geertz’s affirming 
sensitivity to the absurdity of simply ignoring or subsuming human “culture” based on a claim 
that the primary motive reality for us is genetic material and biochemical processes. 
To illustrate the reality of the need for conceptual resources in human social action, 
including perception, consider this empirical and ethnographic example: on January 15, 2009, 
US Airways Flight 1549 struck a flock of birds after taking off from an airport in New York City 
resulting in both of its engines failing.  The plane was expertly landed on the Hudson River 
between New York City and the State of New Jersey.  The television news program The 
Situation Room featured a live interview with an ordinary citizen eyewitness named Joe 
Harrington.  Harrington was asked to describe what he saw.  He replied, “You don’t think to look 
for a plane in Manhattan no less at that altitude.  I don’t think I even recognized it as a plane at 
first.”  I contend that Harrington didn’t see the plane as a plane because the novelty of the 
situation defied his conception of where planes, as planes, ought to be, given how they work in 
relation to “cityscapes” and “airports,” both of which, in turn, are socio-cultural conceptions.  In 
short, though Harrington detected something in his perceptual field, he did not understand what 
that something was until he adjusted his conceptual resources.  We might call this the use of 
intelligence in understanding. 
This kind of example is not limited to the natural scientific world of the operation of 
mechanical objects like planes.  It includes the socio-cultural world of the actions of persons as 
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well.  During World War II, U.S. Marine Sergeant O.J. Marion issued the following report after 
observing a Japanese patrol on the island of Guadalcanal, 
 
We were observing and were carefully camouflaged.  We heard a little sound and 
then saw two Japs crawl by about 7 feet away from us.  These Japs were unarmed.  
We started to shoot them, but did not do so as we remembered our mission.  Then, 
15 yards later came 8 armed Japs.  They were walking slowly and carefully. … 
When I got back, we had a lot of discussion as to why the two Japs in front were 
not armed … I believe they were the point of the patrol and were unarmed so they 
could crawl better (In Poole 2001: 50-51). 
 
In this case, the cultural conception of the action of “patrolling” differs between U.S. Marines 
and the Japanese Army.  The Marines did not recognize the two unarmed, crawling Japanese as 
(part of) an organized patrol because being unarmed and crawling were not in the Marines’ 
cultural conception of how a combat patrol on a battlefield works!  Specifically, it has long been 
doctrinal among U.S. Marines that being unarmed on a battlefield is tantamount to suicide and so 
an affront to the deep obligation among Marines to protect their fellow Marines by being able 
and willing to fight.  Being unarmed while patrolling was not part of the Marines’ cultural 
conception of ‘how to be’ on a battlefield. 
Besides the doctrinal expression of what constitutes being a ‘good’ Marine (being 
properly armed) on a battlefield, I want support this interpretation using the following analysis.  
The Marines at first were tempted to shoot the two Japanese.  According to Marion they did not 
shoot because they re-minded themselves of the rules for engaging the enemy expressed in their 
mission orders.  We can tell by Marion’s report that his mission was to observe, not to engage, 
the enemy.  Given this mission—and the obvious self-discipline of the Marines who permitted 
enemy soldiers to get within feet of them without doing anything—it seems to me that no such 
temptation to shoot the Japanese soldiers would have occurred if the Marines had immediately 
perceived them as (1) part of an organized grouping of soldiers unified under the purpose of 
‘patrolling’ and (2) members of the class ‘enemy’.  The Marines, in short, were genuinely 
perplexed by what they were seeing and so they did not kill the Japanese.  Marion reports that it 
was only later, after discussion about what he perceived, that he concluded that the two 
unarmed, crawling Japanese were the “point” (meaning the soldiers out in front) of a patrol.  We 
should not forget either, that the report itself is important since its very existence demonstrates 
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Marion’s sense of being unsure of what he saw.  Importantly, were we to use the bio-reductive 
framework to analyze this ethnographic situation, we would have been led to expect an 
automatic behavior by the Marines in the presence of a stimulus on a battlefield.  But any sense 
of an automatic behavior is, simply, missing.  We might ask if it is missing because of some 
interfering process like, “culture,” that prevents the otherwise automatic operation of 
biochemical processes, or if it is missing because the Americans chose to act by observation 
rather than gunfire?  Rhetorically, we can ask the further question, “Which of these two options 
are more plausible from a scientific point of view?” 
In sum, Harrington and Marion present the rather common occurrence of having 
perceived something, but not knowing what it was and how it worked until later, after conceptual 
clarification.  Their relative actions—or inactions if viewed using the bio-reductive 
framework—were based on an encounter with novelty that required the use of intelligence to 
generate a conceptual and interpretative formulation.  This formulation, in turn depended, in 
Marion’s case, on complex cultural constructions such as “(how do ‘we’ properly conduct) 
warfare,” “(the right way to) patrol,” “(what counts as) mission fulfillment,” as well as a host of 
other necessary but culturally dependent conceptions.  I suggest that this host of conceptions 
even includes a basic understanding of “(what counts as a) person” to underwrite the categories 
“enemy” and “combatant” and so make them available for use in potential social action—like 
shooting and killing. 
This means that action was consciously and sub-consciously delayed until understanding 
was achieved in both cases.  Harrington didn’t dial 911 to report the plane’s emergency landing 
in the river until he understood what he had seen.  Marion and his fellow Marines didn’t shoot 
the unarmed, crawling Japanese soldiers (and in this case delayed action indefinitely) because 
they were unsure of what they were seeing.  Taleb’s notion of “automatic” interpretation on the 
part of a putative internal organ is flatly contradicted by these empirical and ethnographic 
examples.  More importantly, there is good scientific reason to think that Taleb’s notion is 
simply wrong.  Experimental biologist Donald O. Hebb (1958) and Nobel Prize-winning 
neurophysiologist John C. Eccles (1989) show us that the biophysical construction and 
functioning of our human nervous system permits us to not only to hold a stimulus indefinitely, 
but also to recall it or provide one of our own, sometimes imaginative, choosing!
9
  The 
relationship between the person and the uniquely structured brain and nervous system is itself 
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dynamic but, when functioning properly, remains under the control of the person: the person 
uses the capabilities provided by her biology, not the other way around.  This leads to the insight 
that the human nervous system, including the brain, materially and functionally alters the 
relationship between genetic material or biochemical processes and the behavior of the organism.  
This insight is either ignored in the bio-reductive framework, or, assumed—a la Taleb’s notion 
of an “interpreting organ in the brain”—to be another cog, albeit complex, in an otherwise 
mechanical causal system.  It is in examining the actual structure and functioning of the human 
nervous system through the work of Hebb and Eccles that we find a scientifically plausible 
account of human agency in its biological and social forms.  This plausible account spells the 
end of the bio-reductive framework. 
 
The End of the Bio-Reductive Framework: The Concept of Mechanical Determinism is 
Scientifically Implausible in Relation to Human Biology and Human Persons 
 
We can begin by taking seriously the idea that the attempt to explain a complex organic 
entity like a human being in terms of its parts is susceptible to an ontological requirement 
expressed by the Director of the Center for Philosophy Natural Science and Social Science at the 
London School of Economics, Rom Harré, that “The part-whole relation is useless unless we can 
also invoke the cause-effect relation to link the properties of parts with those of wholes (and of 
course vice-versa)” (1986: 40, emphasis added).  Such a causal linkage relevant to this 
discussion is found in the work of Donald O. Hebb on the systematic distinction between kinds 
of animals, for instance spiders, whose instinctive behavior is specie-specific and kinds of 
animals, for instance, homo sapiens sapiens, whose intelligent behavior is specie-specific.  
Hebb’s distinction between say a spider’s web-building and a person “smothering a grenade” 
rests on the different ratio of association cortex (thought process) to sensory-motor cortex 
(perception-behavior).  In instinctive species the ratio shows a significantly greater amount of 
sensory-motor cortex to association cortex––an s/a ratio.  Conversely, in Homo sapiens sapiens 
the reverse ratio holds: we have a significantly greater amount of association cortex to sensory-
motor cortex––an a/s ratio.  This very important neurological distinction between the s/a ratio of 
instinctive species and the a/s ratio of intelligent species demonstrates that human beings are 
literally not built to operate mechanistically. 
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The lesson of Hebb’s work is echoed that of Marc Hauser, Professor of Psychology, 
Organismic & Evolutionary Biology and Biological Anthropology at Harvard University.  Dr. 
Hauser writes, “Humans have a number of brain features in common with other species.  Where 
we differ from them is in the relative size of particular regions of the cortex and how these 
regions connect, differences that give rise to thoughts having no analogue elsewhere in the 
animal kingdom” (2009: 48).  Humans have the unique ability to generate the kind of language 
and culture that result in space flight, skyscrapers, theoretical physics, Van Gogh’s Starry Night, 
Beethoven’s 9
th
 Symphony, and Tolstoy’s War and Peace.  This ability is an affordance of their 
bio-physiology and how it functions.  Realistic and plausible scientific studies of the structure 
and functional capabilities of human biology ground this view.   
The philosopher of social science, Charles R. Varela, puts it this way, 
 
There is a difference in natural kind between, say, instinctive ants and intelligent 
Homo sapiens.  An automatic reaction is called an S-R reaction: a stimulus 
immediately and directly elicits a response, without any intervening cognitive 
activity.  For example, seeing food, you salivate; you don’t think about it first in 
order to salivate.  An important feature of instinctive behavior is that it is 
automaticity of a special kind.  When the behavior is an R elicited by an S, the 
responding system is robotic.  However, if the critical features of a complex habit 
system are not innate rigidity, fixation, and compulsivity, then automaticity is not 
roboticism.  Thus, in the kind of automaticity we can attribute to Homo sapiens, 
the learned formation of complex habits that can then function as skills, is 
functionally compatible with autonomy—the freedom to think of other things and 
even do other things, while on “cruise control,” so to speak.  It is the perfection of 
this kind of learned automaticity in sports and dance, or reading and writing, for 
example, that makes the foundation for and the instrument of the freedom and 
creativity of human action. [Varela 2003: 111] 
 
Importantly, “freedom” here is not political, but ontological.  Varela is referring to the 
bio-physiological structure of the human species as enabling us to be free of the kind of whole-
body instinctive behavior characteristic of species with the opposite relationship between 
association cortex and sensory-motor cortex.  It is exactly this resulting conception of freedom 
and automaticity that U.S. Marine Sergeant Samuel J. Stevens misses in relying on the work of 
Lieutenant Colonel Grossman, who bases his understanding of human social action on 
Skinnerian operant-conditioning. 
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As we saw, Skinner, using theoretical legerdemain akin to that employed by proponents 
of artificial intelligence, argues that human beings are merely organic systems whose behavior 
can be modified by external forces influencing the organism itself without regard for the agency 
of the organism.  Stevens thought his fire/don’t fire training influenced something “inside” of 
him, as if he was being programmed with an instinct and so had to act according to that pattern 
despite his own decision-making ability.  In so thinking, Stevens offers us an incoherent and so a 
mistaken understanding of his own actions in not firing on the old Iraqi man because he has the 
wrong version of automaticity, one that contradicts his own description.  In that description, we 
saw Stevens alert us to his use of his own intelligence to interrupt his trained response to “hostile 
action means hostile intent.”  In passing we should note how deeply influential the bio-reductive 
framework has been for Americans—a trained response can become beyond one’s control as if 
the programmer—Skinner, et Al.—were somehow immune to just that kind of training 
themselves.  After all, Skinner’s version of science permits, if not demands, a biological entity 
like Taleb’s interpretation organ, and so we can justifiably ask Skinner how he could ever know 
that he was not programmed himself to believe in a certain interpretive schema that makes the 
world appear mechanical when in fact it is agentic.  Of course given the logic of the bio-
reductive schema and Taleb’s interpretation organ, Skinner would have no choice but to answer 
that, first, he not know, and second, even if he did know, he could not properly claim that 
knowledge since its author is the organ, not him! 
If instinctive species—like ants and spiders—are the classic examples of mechanistic 
determinism generally and of biological determinism specifically, then their use as models for 
understanding human social action is a scientific failure.  Doctrinal prescriptions for 
understanding human social action based on them can be dismissed legitimately, secured by the 
plausible scientific ontology of human being offered by Hebb, Eccles, and Varela.   On the basis 
of his clarification of the meaning of concepts like “automaticity” based on a scientifically 
plausible rendition of the actual bio-physiology of human beings, Varela concludes, “It just isn’t 
human nature to behave instinctively” (2003: 115). 
But, it might be objected, there are clear causal relationships between human action and 
genes and brains.  Parkinson’s Disease and Sickle Cell Anemia are good examples of this fact.  
We can meet this objection by pointing out that the premise of the objection is wrong.  These 
diseases alter, obstruct, or limit behavioral capacities, sometimes radically or fatally, but they do 
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not determine which actions are taken.  So, for example, an analogy between whole-organism 
behaviors, like a spider’s web building and a person smothering a grenade is an illegitimate 
analogy.  While spiders are limited to web-building behavior by their particular kind of nervous 
system, human beings instead are capable of an indefinite range of actions.  In fact, it can be said 
that our biology mandates that we function autonomously from our biology.  To be clear on this 
point, there are indeed both biological and sociological limits.  This is not an argument for “free 
will” or any other such super-natural conception.  Biologically, we cannot perform the action 
“space flight” because of the liabilities afforded by our specie-specific bio-physiology.  Again, 
this is a matter of ontological freedom.  Socio-culturally, in the United States, we cannot perform 
the action “arrest that woman for not wearing a hijab” without altering our cultural conventions 
and values because of the capabilities and liabilities we afford ourselves through our cultural 
conventions and values.  This is a matter of political freedom.  Neither of these behavioral limits, 
however, is the result of an instinctivist design of our nervous system.  Both limits are capable of 
modification due to our capabilities of intelligent action: space flight can be achieved through 
prosthetic devices and arresting a woman for not wearing a hijab can be achieved through 
passing a new law. 
This view is founded on the Hebbian understanding that the brain of the human organism 
is dynamic—naturally agentic—rather than mechanical—naturally determined.  I now want to 
claim this view entitles us to believe that we in anthropology (and in sociology) have been right 
in our Geertzian/Sahlinsian conviction that the link between the human brain and human 
behavior is functionally discontinuous.  In other words, Geertz and Sahlins have separately 
argued for the proposition that cultural is grounded in but not determined by biology.  The 
natural agency of intelligent brains provides the complex capacities presumed by sociologist 
Emile Durkheim’s theory of enculturation through socialization in primary and secondary 
institutions (family, community, peer-relations, schools, and work).  That theory posits the 
transformation of human organisms (biological individuals) into human beings (persons).  In 
short, persons are culturally agentic not because Ortner thinks anthropologists see them as such 
in virtue of their position in situ but because they must be by virtue of their biology, specifically 
their unique nervous system. 
In The Selfish Gene (1976) Richard Dawkins gives us a deep evolutionary insight into 
this anthropological proposition of functional autonomy: genetics is the general mechanism by 
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which evolution provides for the reproduction of species, while culture is the novel specific 
mechanism by which cultures reproduce themselves historically.  With this joint understanding 
from Hebb and Dawkins that, on the one hand, biology (brain) and culture (behavior) in humans 
are functionally discontinuous, and that, on the other hand, culture is therefore functionally 
autonomous, it is possible to directly challenge the assumption within the bio-reductive 
framework that the human nervous system—meaning, the brain—operates mechanistically. 
The mechanistic “cause-effect” link is both broken and clarified in this idea: genes afford 
us the structure of our brains, but that structure is modifiable and dynamic, not fixed and 
mechanistic.  The operation of the brain affords persons the ability to function autonomously in a 
social world generated through dynamically embodied language use.  If the scientific conception 
of the way biology works in terms of the relationship of genes to behavior in humans is wrong-
headed, that is, definitive scientific evidence demonstrates that human biology is dynamic 
(intelligent species), not mechanistic (instinctive species), we can pose the question of “what, 
exactly, is ‘carrying the weight’ of the bio-reductive framework’s sense of mechanical, 
deterministic causality?”  I suggest that it is the notion of determinism itself, a notion that is 
derived from the mistaken idea that all matter is inert and that action, generally, is conceived 
mechanistically.  We now know that there is nothing in human biological nature that fits this 
conception! 
This knowledge reverses the burden of proof.  For anyone, ranging from scholars like the 
evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker in The Language Instinct  (1994) to combat infantry 
like the U.S. Marine Martial Arts Instructor-Trainer who stated, “It’s in our DNA,” to continue 
to talk as if the locus of control of human behavior is in our genetic material and expressed by 
instinctive behavior they must show us how Hebb is wrong.  That is, they must (1) show us how, 
exactly, the parts control the whole, which means (2) showing us, exactly, how our biology is 
structured to generate functional continuity and so determine behavior despite Hebb’s 
demonstration that we are built in a way that maximizes our agency through functional 
discontinuity.  Since no such demonstrations of an alternative bio-physical structures for human 
beings are on offer (because they don’t exist), we are justified not only in dismissing the bio-
reductive framework as scientifically implausible, but also understanding putative explanations 
of human behavior emerging from it in discourse like “it’s in our DNA” as, simply, wrong. 
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Similarly, we are prepared to refute former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Marine 
Vietnam veteran F.J. Bing West’s idea that American combat infantry possess a “natural 
instinct” for decisive battle—for closing with and destroying the enemy (2006: 4).  His claim is 
that American combat infantry are built in such a way that, when left without proper leadership, 
they prefer, over any other type of fighting, to engage in close combat.  This must simply be 
wrong.  This kind of reductive discourse, therefore, must be doing something other than 
explaining the behavior of American combat infantry!  What that “something other” is would be 
a matter of ethnographic investigation using discourse analysis and interpretations of meaning 
and context.  Some possibilities include the discourse functioning as a justification or motivation 
of preferred ways of acting. 
 
Some Lessons From the Failed Bio-Reductive Framework: Clarifying Necessary 
Anthropological Resources 
 
In our examination of the bio-reductive framework we encountered serious problems for 
the theory in its portrayal of human perception and conception as well as the relationship 
between these activities.  I now want to use those problems as a way to refine our sense of just 
what sort of anthropological resources are necessary to move forward with a scientifically 
legitimate ethnographic project.  An effective way to do so is by focusing on the human action of  
“learning” since we saw truly bizarre results emerge from applying the bio-reductive framework 
to situations where humans encounter novelty.  Human learning is a personal action, an 
engagement with concepts and experience that prompts or permits the person to modify his 
concepts and actions.  Due to our bio-physiology, our ability to learn is maximized among the 
species of the natural world.  In the logic and mechanical determinism of the bio-reductive 
framework, however, we are forced to assume not only that knowledge is impersonal but also 
that all the knowledge we need is contained in our evolved genetic material.  Our brain and 
nervous system, contra Hebb, Eccles, Hauser, and Varela, are merely extensions of the 
deterministic operation of genes.  This requirement emerges from the tenet of the bio-reductive 
model that every behavior is to be understood in terms of its survival function, a tenet that 
artificially and arbitrarily limits the interpretation of human action to concepts with a family-
resemblance to the master concepts of “function” and “survival.”  This is a superb example of 
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discursive hegemony.  “Learning” in the bio-reductive framework is only ever ‘discovery’ or 
‘realization’ of what is supposedly already present.
10
 
There are at least three serious problems with this updated version of Plato’s notion that, 
before we were born we knew everything, but in being born we forget, so learning is simply 
remembering what we already know.  First, since it is clearly not genes or biochemical processes 
that are doing the discovering or the realizing, the framework must be surreptitiously assuming 
the existence and power of the organism/entity as the reference for discovering or realizing what 
is already present (e.g., Taleb’s interpreting organ).  Second, the framework again positions 
culture as some sort of evolutionarily dysfunctional overlay that occludes the (surreptitiously 
assumed) organism/person’s ability to “see the obvious,” that is, discover or realize what is 
already there!  Finally, by ignoring or theorizing out of existence both the organism/person and 
culture the framework precludes any plausible explanation of learning in the sense of either self-
regulation or creativity in the face of novelty.  This means that in cases of genuine cultural 
novelty, such as the first time Joe Harrington witnessed a plane being landed on the Hudson 
River, or the first time American Marines witnessed a Japanese army patrol on Guadalcanal, we 
must assume that somehow Harrington’s and the Marines’ perceptions were not only temporarily 
disabled (perhaps by intelligence or culture) but that their behavior (as a response in the face of 
that novelty as a stimulus) was pre-coded into their genetic material.  How, we might ask, is this 
possible? 
A Skinnerian bio-reductionist might offer us an account where, in cases of novelty, most 
organisms delay a response or respond by not engaging or retreating from the novelty until, over 
time, the “right” response is conditioned.  So, where a situation does not fit a pre-established 
template, the organism delays or retreats automatically as a function of the organism’s biological 
make-up.  Three important questions arise in light of this hypothetical account.  First, how is 
learning possible?  What I mean is, how would any organism ever engage situations of novelty if 
all organisms were genetically programmed (mechanically determined) to delay or retreat should 
the pre-programmed behavior template not fire?  In the same vein we may ask whom or what is 
assessing the situation in terms of its “fit” with the template, and on what basis?  Is it Taleb’s 
interpreting organ? 
Let us entertain Taleb’s scientifically implausible construction for the sake of the 
discussion of the interpretive consequences of applying the bio-reductive framework to the 
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situation of U.S. Marines in World War II “learning” in the face of novelty.  The long history of 
human warfare and fighting may perhaps suggest, prima facie, that we give some credence to a 
genetically based behavior template bred into us over time.  But, what of unique human 
endeavors like flight?  Though he had been practicing in simulators, the actions of the pilot of 
US Airways Flight 1549 were unique.  As we will see in chapter 7, there is a substantive 
difference between training and “real” situations.  No simulator or amount of simulation time 
could prepare the pilot for the unique atmospheric conditions, in that area, along that flight path, 
on the day of the incident, or for the particular weight of the plane and its contents, the plane’s 
attitude at time of failure, or a host of other variables, for example.  Similarly, the first human in 
space, the Soviet astronaut Yuri Gagarin, got it right the very first time.
11
  No training, and, more 
importantly, nothing in past human history could have prepared either pilot for the unique issues 
facing him.  In short, the evolution or the conditioning of an instinct was impossible. 
Finally, in what sense are we to understand the organism as responsible for any behavior?  
It would be more in line with the bio-reductive framework to conclude that genetic material is 
somehow using the organism to learn, but that makes no sense: genes might “mutate,” 
“produce,” “generate,” “cause,” “divide,” “get spliced,” but they don’t “learn.”  Simply, genes 
do not possess the capability to learn in any plausible way because they are not structured to 
learn.  Even the notion that genes are liable to have information “coded” into them by the 
environment is wrong since that notion suggests genes are the passive receptors of consequences 
of the operation of an external force or entity.  The work of biologists like Brian Goodwin (1994) 
and Richard Lewontin (1998) ground these claims. 
This discussion of the implausible science underlying the bio-reductive framework which 
leads to untenable understandings of human perception, conception, and learning is a model for 
what Ortner would have to explain prior to making her claim about anthropological positioning 
on the ground: until she gives us a plausible account of how perception and insight are 
simultaneous and unproblematic Ortner’s formulation cannot be a factual claim about the results 
of the interpersonal positioning on the ground of socio-cultural anthropologists.  Instead, we 
should regard it as a mere expression of faith in the existence and primacy of human agency as 
against human behavior as the result of a mechanically deterministic system.  This does not 
resolve the contradiction between explanation and description so much as ignore it by fiat, 
which, of course, plays right into the hands of our “interpretive organ” proponent Nassim Taleb.  
 76 
Ortner’s claim about human agency is in danger of being hijacked by Taleb’s determinism.  
Ironically, too, we can see Ortner as having engaged in her own version of reductionism, despite 
her intention to honor rather than ignore or demote human semiotic practices. 
By way of comparison the bio-reductive framework neatly sidesteps the issue of 
perception in any of three ways.  We have seen that culture is seen variously as an evolutionary 
mistake that gets in the way of a truer or more real animal perception of the world, as an 
unexplained mystery to be ignored, and as an impersonal behavioral response to environmental 
stimuli originating in the evolutionary assemblage of our genetic code.
12
  In this last 
construction, human behavior is the automated response to perceptions that happened hundreds 
of thousands if not millions of years ago.  It is quite important to realize, however, that Ortner’s 
claim is a form of idealism while the bio-reductive framework is realist in that it presents an 
ontology of real entities and processes that are (supposed to be) the means of the actualizing the 
behaviors encoded in our genetic material, entities such as “interpretation organs” and “genetic 
material,” and processes like “chemical reactions of proteins.” 
To be clear, none of this is to say that either Hume or Levi-Strauss is, contra Ortner, a 
realist.  Hume’s idealism reveals itself in his notion that knowledge of the external world is 
impossible because it is really a construction of our psychology.  Levi-Strauss could be 
understood as a realist insofar as Durkheim’s social fact and Freud’s unconscious informed his 
fundamental theoretical thinking.  He posits the existence of real forces operating randomly on 
his inert space-time location, but his conclusions are, like Ortner’s, based on sense perceptions.  
Such perceptions are subject to Hume’s objection: claims to knowledge based on what one sees, 
or feels, or smells, or tastes, or hears are all automatic productions of our psychology.  In this all 
three authors share a common heritage with sociologist and philosopher Jean Baudrillard (cf. 
chapter 2).  Given the impact of idealist and realist thinking on the issue of representation of 
human social action, it is important to delve into these two very different ways for researchers to 
think, analyze, and interpret. 
 
Idealism Versus Realism 
 
To highlight the nature of the problem posed by subscribing to idealism, consider 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of the habitus.  The linguistic and socio-cultural 
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anthropologist Brenda Farnell (2000: 407) identifies it as “a socially constituted system of 
cognitive and motivating structures” that acts on the body, but not the mind.  In positing the 
existence of real “social structures” that determine human behavior, Bourdieu offers a realist 
theory of causal entities and processes just as the bio-reductive framework offers a realist theory 
based on internal “genetic structures” and chemical reactions of proteins.   We might call 
Bourdieu’s theory a social-reductive framework since human behavior is determined by social 
structures instead of genes or protein reactions.  Without Bourdieu, Levi-Strauss is as much an 
idealist as Ortner and therein lays the source of the impasse in their hypothetical meeting, on the 
ground.  There is no conversation possible because neither has any conception of the ontology 
and causality that might support their respective claims.
13
 
We can now deepen our understanding of why Ortner’s contention is simply a matter of 
faith, a bald claim: it is indistinguishable from a diverse array of similar idealist perspectives 
(Hume and Levi-Strauss).  In being an idealist position, it is susceptible to being undermined by 
at least two realist theories of human behavior (Lehmann and Feldman’s bio-reductive 
framework we encountered in chapter 2 and Bourdieu’s social-reductive framework just 
mentioned).  The real value of Ortner’s contention, then, is in alerting us to the necessity of 
finding or developing realist anthropological resources in order to resolve the problem of 
contradiction between descriptive and explanatory discourses among Americans in general and 
soldiers in particular.  Failure to do so ensures that we are both susceptible to misrepresenting the 
social action and meaning of our target cultural members as well as to being undermined by 
putatively deeper levels of analysis that “really” explain our target cultural members. 
Though I would speculate that Ortner never intended it, we should note that her 
contention is not only ineffectual either as a resolution of the explanation and description 
contradiction or a realistic response to the bio-reductive framework, it is as imperialistic as the 
bio-reductive framework in dismissing a whole category of what seems to be a fundamental 
component of human being.  What I mean is that Ortner’s contention, in effect, erases the 
ethnographic fact of a substantive contradiction between description and explanation of 
“courageous action” among combat infantry and civilians by collapsing insight (knowledge) into 
perception (empiricism) and so explanation into description.  As such, there can be no 
recognition of a problem between the two as found in the daily discourse of military personnel 
and Americans generally.  Ironically, then, Ortner’s conception brings us to rest in exactly the 
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same place as the bio-reductive framework: the problem of the contradiction between description 
and explanation of “courageous action” simply doesn’t exist.  Indeed, it can’t exist.  Adopting 
Ortner’s position would require us simply to ignore the contradictory deterministic explanations 
of “courageous action” in favor of the agentic descriptions among combat infantry and civilians.  
Meanwhile, adopting the bio-reductive (or social-reductive) framework would require us simply 
to ignore the contradictory agentic descriptions of “courageous action” in favor of the 
deterministic explanations among combat infantry and civilians.  Though I, like Ortner, clearly 
fall on the side of the agentic framework, delineating the grounds of this choice is not just 
important, it is mandatory, if we are to avoid the charge of propagating an ungrounded idealism 
emerging from the failure to give a properly scientific account of human action.  This amounts to 
the production of ideology, not anthropological knowledge. 
By now it should be apparent that there is a fundamental and complex problem 
underlying the conversations about the source of human social action, whether those 
conversations are among combat infantry or between biological and socio-cultural 
anthropologists, which requires special theoretical resources to address.  The problem can be 
formulated through two questions.  First, “what is a plausible, realist ontology of the source of 
human action?” and second, “what does a plausible, realist scientific account of how that 
ontology works look like?”  These questions are primarily philosophical (ontology, what exists) 
and scientific (causation, how the world works).  To be more precise, from the standpoint of a 
proper philosophy of science that demonstrates and respects how science actually operates, the 
questions of philosophy and science are internally related in this way: there is philosophy in 
science where theory (science) is a conceptual answer to an ontological (philosophical) question.  
The physicist Max Born illustrates this idea with his simple statement that “I am convinced that 
theoretical physics is actual philosophy” (1968: 48). 
As we have seen through the examination of Ortner’s claim, neither of these questions 
can be answered empirically since what exactly constitutes appropriate data as well as what the 
data means, differs radically according to the conceptual framework that informs one’s vision.  
To reiterate the philosopher Immanuel Kant’s insight, perception without conception is blind 
while the converse, conception without perception, is empty.  Moreover, a plausible, realist 
ontology coupled with a plausible, realist account of how that ontology works must take into 
account the uniquely human capabilities (and liabilities) for learning based on an appropriate 
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conception of the relationship between perception and conception.  The philosopher of science 
Rom Harré (1986) brings to the fore the importance of realism in the development of theoretical 
resources.  The choice of theoretical resources is an important moral issue. 
 
To be a realist is to acknowledge an ‘aboutness’ in one’s discourse, a referential 
tie to something other than one’s own states.  But for a scientific realist that 
something must include a realm of active beings both independent of oneself and 
partially known.  For the physical sciences this other is the natural world. [Harré 
1986: 145] 
 
This point speaks to Hume’s radical empiricism (idealism) where discourse is only ever from, 
and so about, one’s psychology.  There is no agency in the world, deterministic or not, because 
there is no such thing as a realm of active beings independent of ourselves and partially known, 
whether those beings are black holes, ants, molecules or trees.  Harré goes on to write, 
 
For the human sciences the other is more complex, since people live not only 
within a physical but also within a symbolic universe, the conversations of 
mankind.  In the end one’s adherence to scientific realism is an act of moral 
commitment rather than a wholly rationally grounded realization of some 
inescapable conclusion from incorrigible premises.  That idea is part of the myth 
of the strict system.  The actual ideal system is a network of human exchanges 
and practices based on a morality of trust. [Harré 1986: 145] 
 
Harré shares with Ortner a rejection of human being as a “system.”  There are no “first 
principles” or “foundations” from which an investigator can gain a radically objective point of 
view, thereby rendering human social action susceptible to deductions or predictions of future 
states and behavior.  The morality of the commitment to realism centers in what comes next, 
which, incidentally, is what is missing from Ortner’s claim: 
 
But it must also be grounded in a genuine and interpersonal experience of such 
aspects of the natural world as our evolutionary heritage has fitted us to take 
account of.  The defense of scientific realism must in the end be based on a realist 
theory of perception.  We cannot escape the obligation to delve into the 
metaphysics of human experience. [Harré 1986: 145, emphasis added] 
 
This is not a call for a retreat into subjectivity.  In fact, “subjectivity” fails as a philosophy for 
understanding human beings in the same way that “objectivity” does—both are idealist 
conceptions that demote or ignore the realism required for a morally appropriate approach to 
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human beings.  Human beings are built to interact with both the physical natural world and the 
physical-symbolic, socio-cultural world of persons.  Note that Harré has distinguished these as 
two different kinds of worlds.  The critical issue revolves on how we are to understand the 
relationship between our evolved physicality and our lived symbolic, semiotic sociality.  This is 
another formulation of the biology-culture divide. 
Harré presumes the reality and primacy of the symbolic, semiotic world in the lives of 
human beings.  That primacy depends for its existence on the further existence of a bio-physical 
realm.  This means that, first, as Kant and Geertz maintained, our perception is mediated by our 
conceptions, which are conventions we develop together through our discursive and embodied 
interactions with each other and with the world.  Second, we have a choice as to which symbolic, 
semiotic constructions will we use and on what grounds we proffer them.  Experience, or 
subjectivity, alone can never tell us all there is to know, nor even what there is that we should 
know.  This is why the entire issue is metaphysical—above the physical, in the conceptual realm 
of what we take to exist and how what we take to exist actually works—and not simply 
empirical.  As such, our frameworks are choices and so inherently carry a moral component. 
 
Searching for New Realist Theoretical Resources in Anthropology 
 
Unless we are ready to adopt the fatalistic view that the daily lives of Americans in 
general and combat infantry in particular are, in important ways, unintelligible, we need to 
resolve the contradiction between description and explanation as it relates to human social 
action, namely the enactment of courageous action.  This is why we should proceed.  How to do 
so emerges from the preceding sections, which have offered a number of required concepts and 
changes in ontology.  The prevalent American cultural preoccupation with explanatory resources 
that implausibly and illegitimately reduce human social action to the operation of genetic 
material and biochemical processes means that an a plausible scientific conception of how 
human social action is grounded and generated must be offered as a corrective.  In short, while a 
new ontology and new understanding of causality are required, the seductiveness of the prevalent 
ideological approaches to explaining human action stands in opposition.   
While the bulk of the last two chapters have been devoted to exposing the these 
requirements from the standpoint of the internal logic, ontology, causal conceptions, and 
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consequences of the bio-reductive framework, a deeper appreciation of the uniqueness and 
necessity of acknowledging these requirements can be seen in the remarks of historian Doyne 
Dawson, who notes, 
 
Clearly the debate between nature and nurture, perhaps the longest-running 
controversy in the history of science, is still vigorous. Its two main battlegrounds 
have always been warfare and gender, two closely related subjects that raise so 
many interesting questions about human nature that to take a scientific position on 
these issues is usually thought to imply a political agenda: the authors of the 
Seville Statement take it for granted that to say warfare is in human nature is "to 
justify violence and war," while to call these products of human nurture is to 
suggest they can and should be easily controlled. The issue is complicated by the 
fact that in the twentieth century it has tended to become a war of the faculties, 
with biologists, including many biological anthropologists, on the side of nature 
and cultural and social anthropologists flocking to the banners of nurture. Much 
of it is a dismal story of inconclusive and repetitious rounds between passionately 
held half-truths. [1996: 2] 
 
The point here is that “taking a scientific position on these issues” is absolutely necessary in 
order to break the theoretical deadlock in anthropological thinking about human social action.  
What is political is the idea that “science” is identical to inhuman and inhumane “positivism” 
when substantial, readily available evidence demonstrates that the identity is groundless 
(Manicas 1987).  Though different in content, purpose, and effect, collapsing all science into 
positivism is formally the same idealist mistake that Ortner makes, along with Caspi et. Al. 
The consequences for these idealist approaches can be quite unprofessional and 
unscholarly.  One outcome—an inability to communicate meaning and have that meaning 
appreciated, if not accepted—is exactly what is at risk in remaining theoretically agnostic about 
the biology-culture divide exemplified in the contradictory ways of explaining and describing 
“courageous action” among combat infantry.  Indicative of the severity of the problem of 
theoretical agnosticism is not only the ongoing deadlock within anthropology mentioned by 
Dawson, but the lack of disciplinary leaders in anthropology focusing on this issue as an issue in 
appropriately theoretical terminology without being directed at other concerns (e.g., gender).  
The last disciplinary leaders to do so were Clifford Geertz and Marshall Sahlins in the 1970’s. 
Geertz and Sahlins began a prematurely short-lived disciplinary dialogue about human 
culture with Geertz arguing that, “Man is to be defined neither by his innate capacities 
alone…nor by his actual behaviors alone, as much of contemporary social science seeks to do, 
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but rather by the link between them, by the way in which the first is transformed into the second” 
(1973: 52).  For Geertz “culture” was that link.  Geertz claimed that the bald fact of the 
wonderful diversity of human cultures and behavior doomed the pursuit of a universal, general 
concept of “Man” based on any of these categories.  While our biology, for example, is 
necessarily related to our cultural actions, it could not determine it.  Ultimately, Geertz’s 
position, much like Ortner’s, rested on the “obviousness” of the empirical data demonstrating 
human social action to be cultural and agentic, while remaining agnostic on the specification of 
the nature of the connection between culture and bio-psycho-sociological processes: 
 
There is no serious attempt here to apply the concepts and theories of biology, 
psychology, or even sociology to the analysis of culture (and, of course, not even 
a suggestion of the reverse exchange) but merely a placing of supposed facts from 
the cultural and subcultural levels side by side so as to induce a vague sense that 
some kind of relationship between them…obtains. [1973: 42] 
 
Marshall Sahlins (1976) joined Geertz in framing out a position against, especially, the 
biological forms of determinism.  Responding to the sociobiological program emerging the early 
to mid-‘70’s, he argued that the problem with biological determinism is, “The isomorphism 
between [human biological and social properties] required by the sociobiological thesis does not 
exist” (1976: 12-13).  It does not exist because “…while [biology] is an absolutely necessary 
condition for culture, [it] is equally and absolutely insufficient; it is completely unable to specify 
the cultural properties of human behavior or their variations from one human group to another 
(1976: xi).  Like Geertz, Sahlins’s position rested on the “obviousness” of the empirical data of 
humanity’s vast variation in cultural meaning making despite a shared biological structure.  Like 
Geertz, Sahlins saw the issue, ultimately, as theoretical.  He contended that “a theory of the 
nature and dynamics of culture as a meaningful system” is required to fill the gap between 
biology and culture” (1976: 16).  Again, like Geertz, Sahlins does not specify the nature of the 
relationship because a plausible ontology of human being is missing, despite Sahlins’ direct 
focus on what exists and what does not in bio-cultural relationships. 
Sahlins himself inadvertently identified both the natural scientific and anthropological 
problem if the relationship between biology and culture is not specified theoretically: 
 
 Now the notion of a secret wisdom of [genes disposing kin relationships among 
humans], together with an unconscious system of algebra [proposed by 
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sociobiologists as the cost-benefit calculation for individual reproductive success 
based on DNA’s program of self-maximization and so the basis of human 
behaviors like kin selection] … makes it extremely difficult to argue the point of 
kin selection anthropologically.  The most careful demonstration of the lack of 
correspondence between degrees of genealogical relatedness and a given society’s 
classifications of kinship can only hope to meet the reception that the 
anthropologist has been mystified by the same self-deceptions as the people 
concerned, that something else (biological) is really going on.  There is really 
some hidden, disarticulated structure of genetic self-interest.  We thus arrive at a 
point of argument where there is no appeal but to the facts.  I have to insist from 
the outset—taking my stand on the whole of the ethnographic record—that the 
actual systems of kinship and concepts of heredity in human societies, though 
they never conform to biological coefficients of relationship, are true models of 
and for social action. [1976: 25, emphasis added] 
 
Sahlins recognized that the sociobiological process of “genetic self-maximization” was being 
advanced as a theory of the relationship between biology and culture: humans behave socially in 
the ways they do because DNA operates the organism for its own ends.  The natural scientific 
problem Sahlins identified inadvertently was whether or not DNA actually had the power to 
operate the organism for its own ends.  Insofar as sociobiology is a natural scientific theory, it is 
a disguised ontology (Harré 1986).  This means that the deeper natural scientific problem, for 
Sahlins and sociobiologists and now us, was and is that of specifying the actual structure and 
powers of DNA so as to specify the causal relationship between the unobservable operation of 
DNA and observable results—human social behavior. 
Neither Sahlins nor sociobiologists engaged the relationship at this level.  To the extent 
that neither party did is the extent to which both operated on, at best, a promissory note, and at 
worst, simple faith.  Ultimately Sahlins’ position is indeed a matter of faith.  In the context of 
theory as a disguised ontology and the ethnographic record as the supposed effect of DNA 
powers, variability in the data (the ethnographic record) can only be a symptom of, never a 
solution to, a problem with the imagined deep structure and powers of an in-principle 
unobservable entity.  Sahlins, then, attempted to shore up his interpretation of ethnographic data 
not with a better specification of the biology-culture relationship than the one advanced by 
sociobiologists, but with an expression of faith.  It was exactly on the basis of a lack of 
engagement with the natural scientific problem underlying sociobiology that the biologist Eric L. 
Charnov stated of Sahlins’s position, “If biologists may be rightfully accused of claiming too 
much for sociobiology as applied to humans, Sahlins is clearly open to the criticism of 
 84 
misunderstanding how sociobiology applies to biology. …I found this book unconvincing” 
(1977: 329).  Here we have the foundation for the anthropological deadlock and the roots of the 
disintegration of Stanford’s anthropology department.   To the extent that Sahlins’ strategy of 
faith remains in use by socio-cultural anthropologists, socio-cultural anthropology is rendered 
irrelevant not only to the nature-nurture debate but to explanations of human social action 
generally. 
 The evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould stood with Geertz and Sahlins when he 
wrote that “human sociobiology…is invalid not because biology is irrelevant and human 
behavior only reflects a disembodied culture, but because human biology suggests a different and 
less constraining role for genetics in the analysis of human nature” (1981: 326).  Unlike Geertz 
and Sahlins, Gould does not rest his position on the suggestion of grounding human behavior in 
culture rather than in genes provided by ethnographic data.  In identifying the problem with 
sociobiological theory as, “One of the most common errors of reasoning: discovering an analogy 
and inferring a genetic similarity,” Gould centered on a critical problem within the natural 
science of sociobiologists (1981: 328).  He wrote,  “Analogies [e.g., lions hunt herbivores and 
humans hunt herbivores] are useful but limited; they may reflect common constraints, but not 
common causes” (1981: 328).  The “cause” of human behavior is not genes but the capabilities 
of our brain according to Gould.  The human capacity for intelligent, flexible behavior is 
biologically grounded in but not identical to the structural design of the human brain.  
Furthermore, natural selection “may set some deeply recessed generating rules; but specific 
behaviors are epiphenomena of the rules, not objects of Darwinian attention in their own right” 
(Gould 1981: 329). 
Gould’s “brain-rules” theory of the relationship of biology and culture offered the 
structure, organization, and operation of the human brain, not the operation of DNA, as the key 
biological entity to focus upon in trying to understand the causes of human social behavior.
14
  In 
arguing explicitly that a different kind of biological structure existed as the source of human 
behavior, Gould highlighted the central conceptual difference between his position and that of 
Geertz and Sahlins: his theory offered a competing ontology of the biological basis of human 
behavior and so offered a better specification of the relationship of biology and culture.  While 
Gould’s theory was a step in the right direction, it did not go far enough: His “brain-rules” theory 
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and the sociobiologists’s “gene-behavior” theory were in competition with no in-principle way to 
decide amongst them. 
Geertz and Sahlins argued anthropologically, if unconvincingly, in terms of natural 
science, for the need to specify the biology-culture relationship.  Gould argued more 
convincingly in the natural scientific realm for the same need, though not definitively.  
Collectively, these arguments offer a “state of the art” look at both historical and current thought 
on the nature-nurture debate within anthropology.  This claim rests on the following proposition: 
Postmodernism, specifically the idealism inherent in the radical social constructionism of, for 
example, the anthropologically influential authors Barry Barnes (1972), Michel Foucault (1972), 
David Bloor (1976), and Steve Woolgar and Bruno Latour (1979) derailed the investigation into 
the natural scientific questions underlying culture theory.  These thinkers justified anew the long 
humanist tradition of de-legitimizing and rejecting science by supposedly demonstrating that 
science was just another language game amongst many (Harré 1998, Varela 2009). 
While idealism has helped illuminate an important concern with social power and 
politics, it has also permitted, if not required, redefinition of natural scientific questions as 
merely those of social power and politics.  Scientific discourse is not about anything real, 
especially if what is under consideration is unobservable in principle, like a quasar or a 
subatomic particle; rather, science is about the use of language itself as an expression of power.  
This position inappropriately restricts the notion of human freedom to something like “the 
political power of persons.”  It is inappropriate because it excludes and therefore hides the notion 
of human freedom as “the natural powers of human organisms and persons.”  The former is a 
political issue while the latter is a scientific issue.  But without the ability to talk about real, 
existing things that is inherent in natural science, theoretical resources grounding but not 
reducing the social activity of persons in the biological activity of the human organism are 
impossible.   
This is why Geertz and Sahlins’ positions are sensitizing but not viable as arguments 
against the bio-reductive framework.  A plausible theory of social action is therefore also 
impossible.  It is this lack of a plausible theory of social action that leads to Sahlins’ frustrated 
“insistence” on the ethnographic record as the only available counter to sociobiology.  
Problematically, Sahlins’ profession of faith looks just like the kind of ungrounded faith rejected 
during the Scientific Revolution but adopted by Ortner, and so would not be convincing to many 
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natural scientists, no less sociobiologists.  Sahlins and Geertz could not remain empirical because 
empirical arguments in the social sciences are notoriously unconvincing: answers to deep 
philosophical and scientific issues are assumed, not foregrounded, argued, and explained.  The 
anthropologist Franz Boas’ empirical “solution” to racism in the early 20
th
 century is an example. 
The possibility of convincing resolutions to these types of problems is located in the 
ontology of the theoretical framework researchers adopt—implicitly or explicitly.  After all, the 
case could be easily made—and has been made in many natural scientific cases—that simple 
refinement in the present theory or more computing power is all that is required to explain those 
apparently contradictory empirical cases.  While even these efforts will not convince dogmatic 
ideologues, they will certainly highlight the implausibility of their beliefs and the groundless 
components of their arguments.  On the positive side, exposition of theoretical commitments and 
attention to their plausibility empowers other serious, critical scholars to critique, change, or 
build on the work already accomplished. 
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1
 Among Americans, the conception of one’s life as pre-determined by some impersonal force suggests the consequence of 
“resignation” or “submission.”  As with “courage” it is a common enough theme that it is broadcast in popular music.  Consider, 
for example, Anna Nalick’s pop song “Breathe (2 A.M.)” (2006): 
 
'Cause you can't jump the track, we're like cars on a cable 
And life's like an hourglass, glued to the table 
No one can find the rewind button, girl. 
So cradle your head in your hands 
And breathe... just breathe, 
Oh breathe, just breathe 
 
Another example is Bonnie Raitt’s pop song “Luck of the Draw” (1991): 
 
These things we do to keep the flame burnin’ 
And write our fire in the sky 
Another day to see the world turnin’ 
Another avenue to try 
 
It's in the luck of the draw, baby 
The natural law 
Forget those movies you saw, little baby 
It's in the luck of the draw, baby 
The natural law 
(Flame keep on burnin’) 
Forget those movies you saw, little baby 
(Wheel ever turnin’) 
 
2
 I am not implying that the authority of a scientific explanation is identical with the quality of a scientific explanation.  There 
are explanations in science that are wrong because the powerful entity or causal process thought to produce the phenomena under 
investigation simply doesn’t exist.  For example the 18
th
 century theory positing “phlogiston” as an element released during 
combustion or oxidation.  
3
 Taleb writes, “All I am trying to show is the biological basis of this tendency toward causality, not its precise location [on a 
neural] map” (2007:66). 
4
 After all, everything is fair in love and war: one can go on to suggest that, perhaps, Taleb’s lack of concern is a way of avoiding 
a legal battle over royalties from his book—a court of law could conceivably order a fund originated to hold the royalties in trust 
until the “organ,” as the real author of the interpretations expressed in the book, could be found.  If Taleb and others subscribing 
to the bio-reductive framework were not actually serious in their promotion of such viewpoints in order to advance their careers, 
we could easily conclude that my comments were quite silly.  
5
 For what follows, I am indebted to Charles R. Varela’s introduction and discussion of examples from Ortner and Levi-Strauss’ 
work in Science for Humanism: The Recovery of Human Agency (2009). 
6
 Levi-Strauss’s conception provides the anthropological, phenomenological counterpart to Bonnie Raitt’s conception in popular 
music (see endnote 1 above). 
7
 My interpretation of Ortner being unaware or dismissive of these challenges is supported by her suggestion in the same paper 
that “we might even see the whole sociobiology movement as part of this general trend [to reintroduce human agency into 
otherwise sterile structures determinative of human behavior], insofar as it shifts the evolutionary mechanism from random 
mutation to intentional choice on the part of actors seeking to maximize reproductive success” (1984:146).  In sociobiological 
theory, however, the overarching goal of “maximizing reproductive success” is simply given in our DNA and so it is conceived 
as an unconscious mandate that is exactly not open for modification by the organism.   The primary theorist of sociobiology, E.O. 
Wilson, wrote, “In a Darwinist sense the organism does not live for itself. Its primary function is not even to reproduce other 
organisms; it reproduces genes, and it serves as their temporary carrier” (2000:3).  Wilson’s formulation suggests that the term 
“intention” can only mark an automated attempt to realize a pre-given, fixed goal, and “choice” is simply the wrong word to use.  
In short, if there is either “intention” or “choice” in sociobiology, they are concepts evacuated of any of the sense of agency that 
gives them their usual meaning.  The bald contradiction of Ortner’s understanding of sociobiology by Wilson’s remarks could be 
due to Wilson and other sociobiologists’ tendency to talk out of both sides of their theoretical mouths when it comes to human 
culture (they import concepts that are otherwise logically excluded from the bio-reductive framework in order to get the theory to 
work).  That Ortner neither alerts us to this possibility nor explains how she comes to her suggestive conclusion about 
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sociobiology given the bald contradiction in Wilson’s work affirms at least an unawareness of the complexity and sophistication 
of the issues at hand. 
8
 We will never experience (see, hear, taste, touch, or smell) a black hole but we know not only that such an entity exists, what it 
is, and how it behaves. 
9
 See also Charles R. Varela Biological Structure and Embodied Human Agency: The Problem of Instinctivism (2003). 
10
 If proponents of the bio-reductive framework were to remain true to the logic of their chosen conceptual schema, they would 
define learning in a very different way, using language like that found in G.W. Flake’s The Computational Beauty of Nature: 
Computer Explorations of Fractals, Chaos, Complex Systems and Adaptation (2002): “A process of adaptation by which 
synapses, weights of neural network's, classifier strengths, or some other set of adjustable parameters is automatically modified 
so that some objective is more readily achieved” (http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/FLAOH/cbnhtml/glossary-L.html). 
11
 Things look even bleaker for a bio-reductive explanation of space flight when viewed in evolutionary rather than Skinnerian 
learning terms.  When in the evolutionary past have humans expressed the behaviors necessary for space flight?  More 
specifically, when in human history have some human organisms produced the random genetic variations that resulted in 
successful space flight behaviors that then permitted them, as vehicles for the necessary genetic profile, to be selected by the 
environment? 
12
 See also R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong’s Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism (1989) where 
they claim that their theory of the genetically-required behaviors of humans shows “why existing peace initiatives are inept.  [The 
book] is not a political agenda, however.  It is the result of scientific inquiry.  We avoid moralizing, seeking only to communicate 
‘what is,’ not ‘what ought to be’ about human nature.  The only moral we would advocate is that behaviors and institutions that 
are outfoxing humanity’s efforts to prevent nuclear annihilation be abandoned” (1989:xi, emphasis added).  Again, the bio-
reductive framework has no place for culture other than at best a benign mistake to be ignored, or, as in this worst case, a positive 
obstacle to us that could drive our species to extinction. 
13
 Our responsibility as scholars is to reveal the ontological and therefore conceptual grounding of our worldview.  This is the 
basis for our interpretations no matter what framework is utilized.  During my first-year graduate seminar at the University of 
Illinois I asked one of the socio-cultural anthropologists teaching the course about the literature on agency in the discipline as 
against the literature on power discourses or subjectivity.  His blunt response was, “I don’t believe it.”  The problem of 
contradictory frameworks for interpretive focus was not simply dropped but denied.  As a first-year graduate student, what I 
would have wanted to know, what I was owed, was what this professor conceived—a statement of the grounding of his view—
not what he believed—a statement of his faith in a view.  Such idealist, ex cathedra pronouncements extinguish dialogue and are 
symptomatic of the kind of imperialism for which Western social scientists are often criticized.  Strangely enough this professor’s 
own work centers on the experience of sub-cultures whose voices have been suppressed or marginalized due to religious and 
sexual orientation.  Incidentally, the other two professors in the team-taught seminar, from biological anthropology and 
archaeology respectively, said nothing. 
14
 I should note that Gould’s specific argument in context seeks to show that, given an interest in seeking biological entities and 
processes, it is scientifically unwarranted to focus on genes.  In my view, and I think in Gould’s view as well, the biological 
organism as a whole in environmental context (with human beings this includes the socio-cultural as well as natural world) is the 
most important biological entity to focus upon. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF WARFARE 
 
 
In this chapter I apply the profile developed in chapter 3 to review literature found in the 
Anthropology of Warfare and assess its applicability to the problem of contradiction.  I argue 
that the literature exhibits three trends.  First, an early 20
th
 century trend toward utilizing the 
ethnographic record as a way to argue against the inevitability of war; second, a multi-century 
realist trend toward explaining war as a function of impersonal biological or social forces; and 
third, a late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century idealist trend that assumes warfare is a cultural convention 
while hoping for its demise through a covert appeal to a common humanity through ethnographic 
descriptions of the experience of warfare.  I proceed in a roughly chronological fashion.  
Ultimately I will argue that traditional and contemporary realist and idealist approaches to 
warfare are ineffectual as theoretical frameworks for understanding warfare and modern combat 
infantry.  At certain points I will name what I think are the distinctive qualities of this study 
compared to those being examined. 
 
Clarifying the Relationship of Biology and Culture? 
 
Given Dawson’s identification of warfare as one site for the ongoing nature-nurture 
argument, it would be wise to review and assess the Anthropology of Warfare literature in terms 
of potential resources for resolving the contradiction between description and explanation found 
in combat infantry discourse.  For the purposes of this study, I will concentrate on the conception 
of human social action held by the various authors.  The pursuit of “the primitive” emerges as a 
thread in the work on warfare by anthropologists ranging from the nineteenth through the early 
21
st
 century.  Being more simple or closer to nature primitive societies are thought to reveal true 
principles that organize the otherwise widely varying qualities of human social life.  The focus is 
on discovering systematic, necessary, non-personal forces that control human behavior.  Because 
of this preferred focus on forces rather than persons most of these anthropological studies of 
warfare never get to soldiers, qua soldiers.  Such studies ignore informants’ meanings or imply 
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that informants’ meanings are epiphenomena of some deeper reality to which the social scientist 
is privy, but not the informants. 
In response to this realist but reductive approach to studying war some anthropologists 
simply insisted that the variability of the ethnographic record factually demonstrated the failure 
of the reductionist approach.  As we found in the last chapter, however, this approach is idealistic 
in that it fails to provide a plausible, causal explanation of the source of human social action.  An 
outgrowth of the idealistic reliance on the ethnographic record as obvious and convincing 
appears in the work of some anthropologists during the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century.  This 
work is characterized by a focus on describing the experience of participants in warfare as a way 
to appeal to a (supposed) common human(e) feeling that would otherwise undermine willingness 
to engage in warfare.  I want to turn now to selected anthropologists and the works that 
exemplify these trends. 
The earliest anthropological work on American warfare and American combat soldiers 
that I have been able to locate is Ralph Linton’s short essay, Totemism and the A.E.F (1924).  
Linton’s paper was an addition to the conversation prevalent at the time centering on the 
question of the relationship between “uncivilized” and “civilized” cultures.  He suggests that a 
“totemic complex” characteristic of uncivilized peoples was evident in the American 
Expeditionary Forces in World War One.  A veteran of the 42
nd
 Division, Linton observed that 
the American army had, by the end of the war, divided itself into groups, each of which used 
totemic devices to represent itself.  The military unit generated a “crystallization point” for the 
“same social and supernatural tendencies” that produced totemism in uncivilized peoples and this 
then precluded the development of marriage regulations.  In “primitive” groups, these tendencies 
usually crystallized through a clan or gentile system, and the marriage regulation features of this 
system became incorporated into the complex.  Despite major differences between military units 
and clans, for example, single versus dual gender social organization, Linton’s argument implies 
that the key scientific metaphor of “crystallization” is the primary explanation of the 
development of marriage regulations.  “Crystallization” works regardless of the content of an 
organization.  For Linton, then, “marriage” and “marriage regulations” appear to have been mere 
symptoms of the operation of impersonal forces that were operating through, not enacted by, 
persons. 
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It appears that Linton’s paper was colored by a conception of biological and cultural 
evolutionary progression that had been deployed by some of anthropology’s founders.  Herbert 
Spencer in Principles of Psychology (1853), Edward Burnett Tylor in Primitive Culture (1871) 
and by Lewis Henry Morgan in Ancient Society (1877), all aimed to defeat the religious basis of 
theories of human culture as degenerating in a downward spiral as a consequence of the Biblical 
fall from grace.  Linton’s reference to marriage and the “gentile system” lead back directly to 
Morgan’s (1877) work on kinship as the impersonal organizing force of human culture.  For 
Morgan, that principle operated—it is difficult to characterize clearly—either without regard for, 
or by co-opting, interpersonal semiotic practices as we might view personal activity today. 
More specifically, Morgan advanced a conceptualization of human societal evolution as a 
series of progressive steps along a linear path from lower to higher and from savage to civil.  He 
wrote, “…the institutions of mankind have sprung up in a progressive, connected series, each of 
which represents the result of unconscious reformatory movements to extricate society from 
existing evils…mankind have advanced under a necessary law of development.”  The means of 
cultural advancement is not through interpersonal semiotic practices in value-rich social 
contexts.  Rather, it is through incremental advances in human biology—the brain to be specific: 
 
Out of a few germs of thought, conceived in the early ages, have been evolved all 
the principal institutions of mankind.  Beginning their growth in the period of 
savagery, fermenting through the period of barbarism, they have continued their 
advancement through the period of civilization.  The evolution of these germs of 
thought has been guided by a natural logic, which formed an essential attribute of 
the brain itself.  So unerringly has this principle performed its functions in all 
conditions of experience, and in all periods of time, that its results are uniform, 
coherent and traceable in their courses. [Morgan 1907: 59-60] 
 
Whatever people do and say overtly is beside the point for Morgan.  Here human behavior is 
merely a symbol of some sort of “unconscious reformatory movement” proceeding not only of 
necessity, but of necessity in stages from evil to goodness, from simple to complex.  The 
functioning of this movement or force appears to preclude any sort of consideration of persons, 
no less of culturally convened conceptions of beings in terms like ‘men’ and ‘women.’  Persons 
do not exist except as vehicles for the teleological development of the movement.  In fact, we 
might question how any sense of morality, good, or evil might be understood as pertinent to 
human activity since Morgan’s conception precludes the attribution of agency to persons! 
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In fact, Morgan, as with Spencer, advances the notion of Lamarckian inheritance of 
acquired characteristics.  While scientifically discredited, the idea of a Lamarckian inheritance 
may have given Morgan leave to write of the idea of a pertinent human moral realm that has 
somehow been worked into the natural structure of humans.  In this case, however, morality and 
the meaning of moral action is a given, not chosen.  Linton and his predecessors would never 
have recognized (and in fact did not recognize), for example, important socio-cultural concepts 
like ‘gender’ and ‘race’ as categories marking semiotic practices generating personal and cultural 
identity.  A conventional value orientation like ‘masculinity’ simply did not exist as a focus of 
theoretical interest.
1
 
One of the earliest American efforts to understand warfare without reducing it to the 
operation of impersonal forces was prompted by anthropologists seeking to understand World 
War II.  Margaret Mead’s Warfare is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity (1940) 
represents an attempt to find room for meaningful personal experience as against a systematic, 
necessary, non-personal force.  In her paper, Mead thinks it is a mistake to assume that warfare is 
a characteristic of humanity as a species simply because, like marriage, simply because it appears 
to be found universally in human cultures.  Thinking that warfare is caused by human instincts 
that in turn produce aggression, or, by social structures that in turn produce power struggles, miss 
the point in her estimation.  Instead, Mead argues that 
 
Warfare is just an invention known to the majority of human societies by which 
they permit their young men either to accumulate prestige or avenge their honor 
or acquire loot or wives or slaves or sago lands or cattle or appease the blood lust 
of their gods or the restless souls of the recently dead. [Mead 1968: 420] 
 
Mead’s focus is on those cultural conventions, those values, which different cultures honor 
through engaging in warfare.  She deepens her argument by offering numerous ethnographic 
examples of cultures, such as the Eskimo, who do not have the idea of warfare.  For her the idea 
of warfare is essential to practicing warfare in the same way that an alphabet is essential to 
writing.  Without the idea of it, warfare is impossible.  In her presentation of the Eskimo as 
“turbulent” and “troublesome” people who “fight” and “steal wives” she indicates that the usual 
markers of a personality traditionally associated with motivation to warfare is present, but does 
not result—as she thinks it otherwise necessarily should—in actual warfare. 
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 We can read in Mead’s argument three important implications.  First, the conscious use 
of intelligence in the generation and management of ideas upsets the supposedly linear path from 
biological or social structure to behavior: persons and their ideas are between the structure and 
the behavior.  Second, the variation in ethnographic data suggests that the fact of possessing the 
idea of warfare does not deterministically mandate the practice.  Finally, meaning is generated 
through cultural conventions, not given by biological or sociological structures.  While these are 
important implications, we have already seen that the presentation of ethnographic examples 
does not engage either ontology or scientific plausibility, both of which, as I have argued, are the 
critical arenas for understanding the relationship of biology to culture.  In this case the issue can 
be appreciated in the form of the question, “Do impersonal biological or sociological entities or 
processes have the power to determine the form and content of human semiotic practices?  
Mead’s central focus on ethnographic examples to counter the notion that the operation 
of systematic, necessary, non-personal forces make people behave represents a very different 
theoretical orientation compared with, say, Linton.  The upshot of ethnographic data for Mead is 
that “the tie-up between proving oneself a man and proving this by success in organized killing is 
due to a definition which many societies have made of manliness.”  And even then, Mead 
indicates, killing was not necessarily the goal.  Plains Indian cultures demonstrated as much by 
valuing the act of touching a live opponent with a coup-stick more highly than bringing in a 
scalp from a dead opponent.
2
  By accepting ethnographic evidence as relevant and the main point 
Mead takes the theoretical position that people in their social interactions create what only 
appear to be unconscious, deterministic forces.  This is an interesting reversal of the bio-
reductive framework’s Platonic commitments.  In that framework, as we have seen, the social 
world of varied, semiotic practices of dynamically embodied persons is the appearance while 
unconscious, deterministic forces are the reality.  Such non-personal forces are really people 
acting in accordance to a value-position to which they are committed and which is often out of 
focal awareness, but not “unconscious” in a Freudian sense. 
Mead is responding to a hegemonic narrative whose historical development and lodgment 
in foundational Western social scientific thought is traced by philosopher Peter T. Manicas in A 
History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1987).  Her paper is an attempt to disconnect 
ethnographic data from being given its meaning by the master narrative about human social 
behavior propagated by the bio-reductive framework and identified by Lewontin (1998) and 
 94 
Goodwin (1996).  It is an attempt to re-center anthropological and popular thinking about 
warfare (and about masculinity) on the meaning-making activity of persons in social interaction 
with one another.  Mead, in effect, was trying to switch the ontology from impersonal biosocial 
forces to personal interactions of agents.  People, not structures, are responsible for semiotic 
practices.  Apparently, however, what seems to be a well-supported, strong argument in favor of 
concentrating on what people mean did not convince other anthropologists pursuing the 
primitive. 
For Mead, those who think warfare is a biological necessity exhibit a brand of 
commitment to a belief that appears to be secularly religious: the depth of commitment suggests 
a religious-like confidence in the truth of the belief.  Only this sort of true belief would prevent 
the critical self-reflection on basic assumptions about the world that would then block the 
appreciation of the meaning of ethnographic evidence—perhaps today some anthropologists 
would term this sort of commitment a ‘fetishization’.  She writes that, “A form of behavior [like 
warfare] becomes out of date only when something else takes its place, and, in order to invent 
forms of behavior which will make war obsolete, it is first a requirement to believe that an 
invention is possible” (1990: 220).  I will not risk psychologizing the problem of belief by using 
a Marxist or Freudian concept like “fetish,” however attenuated that concept may have become, 
because the issue is not psychological, it is ontological. 
Mead recognized the problem that mechanically deterministic systems have in producing 
change and accounting for variation.  If human culture is run by a biological or sociological 
determinism, not persons, and that determinism is mechanical and necessary in its operation, 
how can new effects ever arise from the same causes?  Read generously, Mead’s question is a 
natural scientific, not simply a psychological, one and so the import of her call is multi-leveled.
3
  
Such deterministic systems, on one level, cannot account for the social change that history 
demonstrates and, on another level, perhaps the more important one for her, such systems cannot 
account for the human inventiveness evident in the ethnographic record.  I do not think Mead 
realized that her call could have a scientific reference as much as a psychological one.
4
  In fact, 
Mead could not have realized this scientific reference given that the theoretical and scientific 
resources about causal relationships in both the natural and social worlds were unavailable to her 
(and to everyone else) until the 1970’s.
5
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As a point of comparison, Malinowski in his An Anthropological Analysis of War (1941) 
asserts a viewpoint similar to Mead’s.  He too considers warfare a cultural phenomenon, not a 
“psychological or biological destiny” (1941: 521).  His approach is also like Mead’s in that he is 
responding to deterministic master narratives.  But what Malinowski means by “cultural” is not 
at all what Mead meant.  His approach differs fundamentally because he posits the reality of a 
biologically necessary and universal nature for individual human organisms.  He contends that 
“animal psychological” and “biological determinism of aggressiveness” in humans is (positively) 
correlated with examples from pre-human behavior.  Birds, dogs, apes, baboons all fight over 
food, and spatial or territorial rights.  Malinowski thinks that humans are in fact animals, and 
inherit such aggressiveness as a matter of their biological connection with pre-human animals.  
Moreover, he asserts that Freud had conclusively shown that aggressive impulses are 
characteristic of human family life.  Interestingly, Malinowski writes that, “Impulses to beat a 
wife or husband or to thrash children are personally known to everybody and ethnographically 
universal.  Nor are partners in work or in business ever free of the temptation to take each other 
by the throat, whether primitive or civilized” (1941: 530).  Human beings share a universal 
biological basis for behavior, but not all behavior. 
For Malinowski the biologically necessary is mediated by the development of 
cooperative, concerted activities into larger-scale institutions.  Like Freud’s attempt to root 
family life in sex, Malinowski argues that cooperative, concerted activities like family life and 
clans are rooted in the biologically necessary.  But at the level of institutions, relationships 
among groups of persons are governed by culturally convened rules, not by biological impulses, 
thus implying a difference in kind, not a difference in degree, between the personal and familial, 
and the impersonal and lawful.  According to Malinowski, the regulation of force and violence 
by authority—law, custom, ethics—is the “very essence of the social organization of an 
institutionalized group.”  As a result, inter-familial, inter-clan, and inter-local group fighting is 
always conventional and cultural, not determined and biological.  As such, the human 
“psychological fact of pugnacity” can be “transformed through cultural factors into any possible 
or even improbably channels,” it is “infinitely plastic” and “can be linked with an indefinitely 
wide range of cultural motives” (1941: 533). 
In a way, Malinowski is claiming that we ‘behave like (a-cultural, biologically-driven) 
animals’ only in the most intimate of settings, like family life or clans.  At the level of 
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institutions, we are culturally conventional and political, and our biological impulse of pugnacity 
is transformed into a collective format that in turn leads to organized, ordered fighting.  The 
transformation in social ordering prevents us from being spontaneously reactive according to our 
physiology in inter-group relationships.  Malinowski’s question then becomes, what are the 
historical steps taken through which intra-group relationships became inter-group relationships?  
How did humans get from individual biology determining interaction to rule-governed cultural 
sociality?  Malinowski offers a speculative stage plan reminiscent of the work of Morgan and 
other early anthropologists.  The plan’s details are not the point because Malinowski’s approach 
fails to reject the idea of systematic, necessary, non-personal forces.  It is in the acceptance of the 
reality of such forces that Malinowski differs fundamentally with Mead, at least in reference to 
warfare. 
The relevance of a theoretical orientation toward interpretation emerges here.  Writing at 
nearly the same time as Mead, and with access to nearly the same data, Malinowski sees 
evidence for the universality of human biological aggressiveness in the ethnographic data rather 
than evidence of the groundlessness of that claim as Mead discerned.  As with the hypothetical 
confrontation between Ortner and Levi-Strauss discussed in the last chapter, Mead and 
Malinowski interpret the same ethnographic data in contradictory ways thus reminding us again 
that the root issue is not empirical but theoretical.  From what theoretical perspective (meaning 
what ontological model of human social action) is the data being a) considered data at all, and b) 
interpreted using the kinds of predicates provided by the theory?  Apparently, in the forty years 
between the hypothetical Mead/Malinowski confrontation and the hypothetical Ortner/Levi-
Strauss confrontation, American anthropology as a discipline has generally failed to recognize 
the ontological and scientific questions underlying interpretation of ethnographic data.  Between 
the early 1980’s and today, the need for specification of the relationship between biology and 
culture called for by Geertz and Sahlins has all but disappeared from mainstream socio-cultural 
anthropological concern, largely under the influence of the post-modernist rejection of science as 
necessarily positivist and so inhuman(e). 
In 1968, anthropologists Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, and Robert Murphy edited War: 
the Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression.  They are perhaps the first anthropologists 
studying warfare who sought to break with the positivist search for impersonal forces through 
reflexive assessment of how anthropology is written.  The interesting way in which they do so 
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ushers in the third trend identified above.  The authors first note that in the ethnographic tradition 
of the discipline, “Fieldworkers have been encouraged to present their data as if the colonial 
wars, labor recruitment, taxation, indirect rule, forced migration, missionization, and other post-
contact phenomena did not exist” (1968: ix).  This observation echoes Mead’s contention that 
cultural issues emerging from the interaction of persons (vs. impersonal forces) fundamentally 
change the meaning of the lives of primitive people.  For Morton, et al., semiotic practices per se 
were not only legitimate data they were the primary kind of data.  Moreover, the authors state 
unequivocally that they “reject the idea that any socio-cultural phenomena can be pursued 
without political consequences.”  On the other hand, the authors also state that, “those who seek 
political justification for subordination of science to politics will find it at their peril.  The 
greatest danger confronting any political movement is for it to permit its analysis of reality to be 
contaminated by its own rhetoric” (1968: xii).  The authors, in their time, saw the danger of 
rejecting science in order to pursue the political or ideological purposes of the researcher.  
Problematically, however, and as with Geertz and Sahlins who followed them, the authors did 
not pursue a research agenda that in any way focused on natural scientific literature, whether 
philosophical or empirical, in terms of trying to get clear about the relevance or irrelevance of 
science to the study of human social action.  This, it seems to me, at least invited if not promoted 
the ensuing inattention to the relationship between natural and social science, between biology 
and culture. 
The authors do capture the sense of disengagement produced by the search for the 
primitive (and, I would add the phrase “forces putatively controlling human beings” as a 
necessary corollary).  Such a search “automatically legitimizes study of that which may be 
irrelevant or inconsequential for the contemporary world” (1968: ix).  At the very least we can 
read this warning as referring to the idea of studying social and cultural issues as if they were 
disconnected from people.  The result is, as the authors note, a wholesale rejection of socio-
cultural phenomena like colonial warfare, which, of course, would mean that one of the most 
disturbing issues of their day—the Vietnam War—could likewise be deemed irrelevant. 
Within Morton, et Al.’s edited volume, however, anthropologist Andrew Vayda’s 
Hypotheses about the Functions of War (1968) is an attempt 
 
to explicate various hypotheses which attribute to war life-sustaining functional 
consequences when war is considered as a component of homeostatic systems.  
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Such systems relate human populations to their ecological matrix, and are 
functional in the narrow sense of acting to maintain or restore an evolutionarily 
selected equilibrium. [In Morton, et. Al.1968: xvi] 
 
For Vayda, war is “a counteracting response made by a system when a variable or activity within 
the system has been disturbed from its proper, desired, or accepted state” (1968: 85, emphasis 
added).  With this kind of anthropological work going on, it is no wonder that Morton, et. Al. 
were concerned with the relevance of the study of the primitive to the contemporary.  I suggest 
that the irrelevance of system equilibrium explanations to the Vietnam War matches the 
irrelevance of genetic explanations to U.S. Marine Corporal Jason Dunham’s actions: in both 
cases the wrong ontology leads to ungrounded dismissal of critical socio-cultural data and what 
socio-cultural data is admitted is disastrously limited by pre-definition to the meanings 
prescribed by the theory. 
This last point is aptly demonstrated by a respondent to Vayda’s paper, the anthropologist 
Alexander Lesser, who calls the whole examination into question on the basis of a lack of 
appreciation of the lived meaning of the persons involved. 
 
Because of its exclusive concern with abstract hypotheses about its functions from 
the standpoint of equilibrium theory, Vayda’s discussion offers little that is 
concrete about what actually happens in armed conflict among primitives: raiding 
for horses had nothing to do with equalizing the distribution of horses in the 
Plains.  Individuals raided for horses because…a horse was the only trade item 
with which a man could acquire a gun.  Individuals, not tribes, gained prestige as 
they became wealthy in horses.  Raiding among pastoral peoples does not 
function to reduce inequalities in ownership.  The Ruwala Badawin camel 
breeders of Africa demonstrate that raiders from strong tribes preyed on weaker 
tribes, not the reverse. [In Morton, et. Al. 1968: 93-94] 
 
In essence, Lesser is asking Vayda, “where are the people in your analysis?”  “Where are their 
intentions and motivations, their meanings, whether instrumental or not?”  But Vayda is not to 
be put off.  His response to Lesser is that 
 
systems are collections of variables, not warring groups or societies.  What can 
constitute such a collection are the size of the group, whether it is fighting or not, 
its rate of population increase, its degree of population dispersion, its level of 
anxiety, its efficiency of land use, the number of offenses committed against it, 
and so forth…  Judgments about whether the occurrence of war is functional in 
such systems can be based simply on extensive observation or measurement of 
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pre-war, war, and post-war values of the systemic variable. [In Morton, et. Al. 
1968: 103] 
 
In Vayda’s understanding, warfare is not really about fighting, it is about the function of that 
human behavior in redressing systemic imbalances.  The point if this kind of anthropological 
analysis then is not people, but a system that supposedly operates the people.  This is the same 
kind of deterministic approach found in the bio-reductive framework in which genetic material 
and biochemical processes operate people. 
Perhaps more importantly, Vayda seems immune to Lesser’s objection.  In fact, he co-
opts Lesser’s objection.  Vayda argues that “when Professor Lesser makes a point of noting that 
Plains Indians traded horses for guns, I see the possibility that he too is talking about functional 
relations but with guns rather than horses per tribe as the variable being maintained within a 
range of values” (1968: 103).  It seems important here to return to what I take to be the deep 
meaning of Mead’s 1940 paper.  The problem with and for Vayda and for Lesser is the scientific 
issue of whether or not such systems are real and have the power to determine human behavior in 
the way Vayda claims.  Vayda clearly believes in his chosen theoretical stance, and that stance 
permits him to read the socio-cultural content out of, and bio-systemic function into, Lesser’s 
objection.  The only chance Lesser might have of closing off the possibility of this discursive 
move is to provide a scientific critique of the evolutionary schema Vayda has adopted. 
The conversation between Vayda and Lesser characterizes the ontological issues facing 
American anthropology into the late 20
th
 century.  The pursuit of impersonal entities, processes, 
or forces that move otherwise inert matter in anthropological talk about warfare continues 
straight into the late 1980’s.   At an advanced seminar at the School of American Research in 
1986 another group of anthropologists gathered to discuss the causes of both war and peace in 
pre-state societies.  The resulting volume was edited by Jonathan Haas and titled The 
Anthropology of War (1990).  As with Morgan in 1877, Linton in 1924, Malinowski in 1941, and 
Vayda in 1968, the pursuit of the primitive was the major focus of the anthropological 
engagement with culture.  Haas writes, “the goal of the seminar was to arrive at a better 
understanding of the causes of both war and peace in pre-state societies and the impact of war on 
the evolution of those societies” (1990: xi).  Given Haas’ goal statement, it appears that the 
Malinowskian view of warfare as a (generative) force in the evolution of culture had been, by 
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1986, institutionalized.  That culture should be thought of in terms of evolutionary concepts was 
also an unmarked value position. 
Brian Ferguson in his paper from the seminar, Explaining War (1990), continues Vayda’s 
discursive move of co-opting what ethnographers might otherwise identify as value positions 
generated by dynamically embodied persons.  Ferguson disconnects the causes of (pre-state) 
war—which he views as material in nature, for example, land, water, food, and trade goods—
from how war is practiced.  He argues that 
 
individual military accomplishment may be a prerequisite for achieving 
adulthood; and is reinforced for adults by shame for cowards, and prestige for 
accomplished warriors.  Shame and prestige do not stand alone, however.  They 
often have very tangible correlates, in marriages, in resources, in influence.  All 
these within-group reinforcements will be backed up by the threat that war will 
“select out” groups which have not sufficiently motivated their fighters…  
Expectably, individuals will express the cultural values as their motives in war, so 
emic accounts will often be at variance from the material gain view.  Evaluation 
of the material motivation proposition is still possible, however, by investigating 
whether it—in contrast to other motivational premises—can explain actual 
military behavior. [1990: 46-47] 
 
Ferguson’s questioning attitude toward “material motivation” is rhetorical.  His suggestion is that 
in fact actual military behavior is explained by material causes.  And he clearly delineates the 
notion that somehow personal discourse, and what that discourse is about—issues like shame and 
prestige—are best understood as code-words for ensuring human organisms perform the 
behaviors that will thereby ensure the survival of the (fittest) group.  Natural selection is the 
force operating behind and above persons in social interaction.  Value and meaning are illusions 
while impersonal forces are the reality. 
This trend of anthropological theorizing culminates, at least in reference to the 
Anthropology of War literature, in S.P. Reyna and R.E. Downs’s Studying War: Anthropological 
Perspectives (1994).  Reyna and Downs alert their readers to this fact when they state that, 
“Studies emphasizing cultural hermeneutics are not represented in this volume.”  By this time, 
the distinction between a cultural hermeneutics approach and what may be thought of as a 
bio(social) structural approach to accounting for human social life is obvious enough to permit a 
clear statement.  The authors define the difference when they argue that 
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Structures matter: scientific realism is the thesis that objects of scientific inquiry 
exist independently of peoples’ consciousness of them.  Structural realism might 
be said to be a doctrine that the forms occurring in human populations exist 
independently of individuals’ consciousness of these forms.  In different ways the 
contributions to this volume suggest the appropriateness of a structural realist 
position when studying war. [1994: xx] 
 
We’ve encountered this thinking before: the bio-reductive model is a realist formulation.  In 
contrast, Ortner’s ungrounded collapse of conception into perception is a form of idealism.  
While realism is the only way to retain a connection to a scientific approach to generating a 
plausible ontology to ground human social action, we have seen that there are implausible 
ontologies, despite their realism.  Reyna and Downs claim that the power over peoples’ behavior 
they think they are referencing is grounded in a real, existent structure.  But, they neither name 
nor explicate that structure!  What could these “forms occurring in human populations” possibly 
be?  If they are real, where are they?  In our bio-physiology?  In our genetic material?  In 
biochemical processes?  Reyna and Downs never tell us, instead relying on the different papers 
within their volume to make the case.  None of those papers, however, propose any robust 
understanding the location of these forms. 
As it stands, Reyna and Downs’s argument asks us to think that what really matters is not 
persons interacting and generating semiotic practices through their use of language and culturally 
convened meanings of that language and its use, but the supposed structures that generate powers 
that control peoples’ behavior.  As a result studying war is not about studying persons interacting 
in terms of values like ‘courage,’ experiences like ‘suffering,’ meanings like ‘being a man’ 
worked out through cultural conventions about sex roles, or the enactment of violence.  Rather, 
studying war is about “understanding the causes and consequences of the evolution of social 
forms” and since “structure matters for the understanding of war,” the idea is to study structures 
in order to understand war (1994: xx). 
What I hope to have brought out in this examination of selections from two of the three 
trends I have identified in the Anthropology of Warfare literature is that contemporary 
explanations of warfare have not progressed in sophistication for over a hundred and fourteen 
years.  Rather than presenting alternative theoretical resources for clarifying the relationship 
between biology and culture, they simply repeat the reductionist argument.  Like those who 
propagate the bio-reductive framework, anthropologists like Ferguson, Reyna, and Vayda offer 
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simple variations on what is essentially nineteenth century anthropological thinking.  Consider 
Morgan’s notion, for example, that “the institutions of mankind have sprung up in a progressive, 
connected series, each of which represents the result of unconscious reformatory movements to 
extricate society from existing evils…mankind have advanced under a necessary law of 
development” (1907: 58).  Morgan’s idea that what matters in the study of human social action 
are forces emanating from real, powerful, but somehow undefined structures or forces (whether 
progressive or not) operating on persons shows up in the bio-reductive framework still informs 
the bio-reductive framework and the positions of Ferguson, Reyna, and Vayda.  Arguments to 
the effect that human populations are homologous to organic systems that require equilibrium or 
that warfare is a way for humans to reset chance perturbations to their intra-group dynamics offer 
a realist account of human social action.  Human semiotic practices are at best ciphers for the 
operation of impersonal structures and forces that determine those practices in not only form but 
content as well.  The realism of evolutionary theory permits anthropologists like Ferguson, 
Reyna, and Vayda to simply and convincingly ‘explain’ ethnographic data by reducing it to a 
result of the operation of these structures and forces. 
Anthropologists who perceive semiotic practices as a primary reality of human social 
action risk having their data simply and convincingly co-opted by reductionist claims.  Warnings 
like that offered by Fried, Harris, and Murphy are unconvincing in the face of the explanatory 
power of a realist approach that holds up as long as one does not push too hard on its 
philosophical and scientific underpinnings.  Meanwhile, an Ortnerian idealism is simply a non-
starter.  Consider, for example, Shaw and Wong’s contention in The Genetic Seeds of Warfare 
(1989) that, “Specific differences in warfare, its forms and historical conditions surrounding the 
outbreak of war, are of secondary importance.  The most important, yet unresolved question [is] 
why warfare exists at all” (Shaw and Wong 1989: 2).  Supposedly, this is a scientific outlook on 
data supported by the notion that there exist universal laws or forces that render individual 
variations irrelevant.  Consequentially, if the historical particulars of the tremendous varieties of 
ways people, groups, and states fight is irrelevant, then we must assume that the people doing the 
fighting and the warring are not important since variety is the expression of human agency using 
socio-cultural resources.  They are not important because they are not the cause.  They are not 
the cause because they have no agency.  They have no agency because the supposedly 
deterministic operation of genetic material ensures the universality of their behavior. 
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Compare this supposedly scientific outlook on data with Lewontin’s notion that “A 
central problem of [non-developmental] biology, not only for biological scientists but for the 
general public, is the question of the origin of similarities and differences between individual 
organisms” (Lewontin 1998: 4).  What matters for Lewontin the natural scientist is how and why 
we are the same and different as individuals embedded in historical actions and processes exactly 
because we are not the result of putative universal, deterministic laws or forces that render us 
each individually flawed approximations to be ignored.  The difference in focus between Shaw 
and Wong and Lewontin is not to be accounted for by noting their different analytical foci, but 
by realizing that their different analytical foci emerge due to fundamental differences in their 
respective ontological commitments.  If anthropologists who value personal meaning as real, 
versus illusory, wish to prevent the product of their ethnographic research from being co-opted 
by an established master narrative, then a plausible scientific response is required—one that 
addresses head on the plausibility and reality of bio-psycho-social forces that are systemic, 
necessary, and non-personal as they relate to human social life. 
 
“Missing Persons” in the Anthropological Study of Modern Combat  
 
The socio-cultural anthropologist Anna Simons reviews the anthropological literature on 
warfare in War: Back to the Future (1999).  Simons focuses on anthropology and related 
disciplines that use the concept of “culture” in writing about war.  In a section entitled “The 
Absent,” she argues that “no one has systematically studied cross-cultural encounters via 
combat” and so actual ethnographic data on modern warfare and battle is simply missing from 
the ethnographic record.  Simons drives the point of her statement deeper when she notes that 
there is little agreement in the literature on what “combat” means to individuals since “only a 
handful of anthropologists have studied the military and the mechanics of soldiering.  And when 
anthropologists have studied particular military units, they have generally done so in the safety 
of the rear and/or during peacetime” (1999: 89). 
Although she does not mention any of the handful by name, she supports her point with a 
reference to anthropologists working for the Army Research Institute and the Walter Reed Army 
Institute of Research.  She terms the purpose of their work “practical,” but not  “academic,” 
implying that their relevance to understanding the cultural aspects of soldiering is secondary to 
enhancing the actual practice of soldiering for soldiers.  Moving upward in scope, Simons names 
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thirty-six different authors writing in fields ranging from anthropology to non-fiction military 
history from 1961 through 1997, but she notes that their topical areas are not the semiotic 
practice of combat or training for combat.
6
  Her conclusion supports my argument that both bio-
reductive and idealistic anthropological approaches fail to utilize appropriate theoretical 
resources to underpin ethnography, at least in the realm of the study of warfare.  We have seen 
the reasons for the failure of the bio-reductive approach.  Humanist anthropologists, on the other 
hand, have failed to ground their ethnographic studies of war in any plausible ontological and 
scientific theory of human social action.  These anthropologists are left with little more than the 
option of insisting that others adopting their viewpoint directly or indirectly.
7
 
Between 1997 (Simons’ summary) and today there emerges another strain of idealism in 
the anthropology of warfare.  These anthropological works on warfare appear to follow a general 
template that constitutes the third trend I mentioned above.  An avowed horror at the conduct and 
pointlessness of warfare and its terrible effects on people generally is usually expressed.  From 
this position of moral indignation proceeds a blanket rejection of any engagement with soldiers 
themselves, especially modern American soldiers, in favor of other theoretical or political 
concerns.  For example, socio-cultural anthropologist Alisse Waterston states in War: Views 
from the Frontline (2009), “My goal in putting together this collection is to undermine war” 
(2009: 14).  She describes her work as a “plea—desperate, frantic, anxious” (2009: 14). 
Waterston’s goal, apparently, is to collect evidence to support her pre-determined moral 
assessment.  It is not to generate an analysis in order to understand and then propose an argument 
supporting an assessment.  This approach suggests that her moral judgment is unproblematic and 
obvious.  In her presentation of her moral assessment as obviousness, Waterston implies that all 
of us should have the same conclusion about warfare scholarly argument.  In the last chapter, 
Sherry Ortner presented a similar approach to the perception of agency in everyday life.  But 
there is a new twist here.  The subject matter is not what we ought to see in the world, but how 
we should judge the actions of others.  But, the suggested standard is an unsupported moral 
claim, not, as in Ortner’s claim, an unsupported theoretical argument that offers the possibility of 
being examined and contradicted or corrected.  Waterston’s approach in this regard presents her 
as closed to the possibility of discovering something other than her own conclusion about 
warfare and the attendant agenda of undermining, rather than understanding, warfare. 
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While Waterston, like most humanist anthropologists, seems to have laudable motives, 
the lack of grounds for her moral assessment is fatal to her plea because it results in a blanket 
rejection of soldiers, who, we might otherwise assume, ought to be at the center of any attempt to 
theorize warfare.  She writes, 
 
I am indebted to Ellen Weinstein for so generously allowing us to use her artwork 
for the cover of this book.  Artist Mark Vallen describes Camouflage as “a close-
up portrait of an American soldier.… Such images are always tragically the same, 
a gallant warrior in uniform imbued with the virtues of service and self-
sacrifice.…But Weinstein’s artwork looks beyond facile patriotism to expose an 
unsettling reality.  The soldier’s portrait…and the American flag back-drop are 
entirely composed of snippets of tabloid press reports trumpeting … 
inconsequential celebrities.… Does the camouflage hide a thoroughly narcissistic 
and debauched society—or does a manufactured culture of distraction mask a 
deep-rooted militarism?” (Foreign Policy in Focus Web site, 12 March 2008).  
Camouflage visually captures both the anthropological approach to understanding 
war and a key mechanism that makes war possible. [2009: ix] 
 
In her selective and favorable quotation of Vallen’s interpretation, Waterston subsumes the 
soldierly values Vallen identifies—gallantry, service, and self-sacrifice—under “facile 
patriotism.”  Intentional or not, Waterston’s presentation denigrates soldiers by implying that the 
values that comprise their professional identity are simply affectations assumed for political 
expedience or indulgence in power trips with lethal consequences.  She does so without any 
ground except her own ideological stance on warfare, which she terms “insanity” (2009: 14).  
The further implication is that that soldiers are the kind of person who engages in insane 
behavior.  We may ask if this attitude is not its own form of imperialism.  Is it not the case here 
that Waterston erases the semiotic practices of soldiers and so soldiers themselves from the 
ethnographic record by imposing her own ideological viewpoint about warfare? 
For soldiers who, as we will see, are willing to die for cultural values, war may be insane, 
but that is not the point.  In fact, personal or subjective experience is not the point.  At their best, 
soldiers engage in warfare despite the horror of death, moral outrage, psychological damage, 
destruction of friends, civilians, and property, moral turpitude, profiteering, and political 
grandstanding.  They endure these terrible outcomes and contexts because they choose to honor 
values greater than their own experience.
8
  The quality of those values and what they mean thus 
become of primary importance if a researcher wants to understand modern American warfare.  I 
take the position that only after we find out who soldiers are, and exactly how their values are 
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constructed in relation to the employment of violence, are we entitled to offer a judgment as to 
the meaning of their lives. 
Summarily, Waterston’s approach to understanding war appears to consist in, on the one 
hand, simply discounting the fundamental anthropological requirement of understanding a 
primary constituency—American soldiers—and yet, on the other hand, justifying such 
discounting based on the simple fact of her own subjective feelings and political position about 
warfare.  Unfortunately, she may be right when she claims that this template captures the current 
approach of the discipline towards this subject.  Socio-cultural anthropologist Antonius C.G.M. 
Robben’s Iraq at a Distance: What Anthropologists Can Teach Us About the War (2010) writes 
that, “This book arose from three pressing concerns in mid-2005: a moral outrage against the 
Iraq War, the absence of an anthropological voice in professional and public debates, and the 
similarities with previous armed conflicts worldwide” (2010: vii).   
If personal, unexplained moral outrage and other types of subjective experience are now a 
legitimate substitute for scholarly participant-observation with primary constituencies rather than 
a means to reflexive self-criticism, then is it any wonder that both Waterston and Robben 
continue the (at least) forty-year-old lament that anthropological voices are nowhere to be found 
in the political or military discourses of the United States or other Western nations?
9
  This should 
be no surprise to American anthropologists, however, since Waterston’s erasure of soldiers in her 
work is complemented by the American Anthropological Association’s publication of statements 
against involvement of anthropologists with the military that appear to based on similarly 
subjective, unexplained moral grounds.  Apparently anthropologists and their professional 
association in America think that war can be understood without knowing who soldiers are and 
what they mean, just as we found to be the case for proponents of the bio-reductive framework.  
As with that framework, this idealistic approach is not so much a grounded resolution of the 
contradiction between description and explanation or biology and culture as it is a choice to 
assume that the contradiction does not exist and has no bearing on present anthropological 
inquiry. 
We find a similar approach in the anthropological literature on masculinity and the state, 
which some might count as anthropology of warfare.  A popular Western conflation holds that 
masculinity and aggressiveness are interchangeable, and constitute resources to be marshaled in 
the service of a national agenda that includes warfare.  One instance of this conflation is 
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analyzed in Catherine Lutz’s Homefront: A Military City and the American 20
th
 Century (2001).  
Of a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) informant, she writes, 
 
He emphatically wanted to join as a ‘traditional’ combat GI, not a ‘humanitarian 
soldier’.  When he eventually goes overseas with the Army, he said, “I don’t 
really want to do that.…  You go to some Third World country, you baby-sit poor 
people.  I wouldn’t be worried about getting in a fire-fight.…  You worry about 
somebody parking a U-Haul truck outside of your barracks and blowing you to 
smithereens when you are sleeping.”  His choice of imagery is common: A baby-
sitter is female, and she cares for the childish.  Prestige inside the army, he 
knew…would come through manly combat and arms, not personnel management, 
water purification detail, or the finance department, all tasks that required less 
strength or courage.  And like any reasonably attuned person in Fayetteville, he 
has heard that becoming a man through military service can begin with violence 
at the hands of other soldiers at Fort Bragg.  In initiation rites, soldiers are 
sometimes shocked with electricity, made to sit on garbage, have their necks hung 
with dead fish, and—to symbolize the gender they must never be—smeared with 
lipstick as camouflage paint.  [2001: 219-220] 
 
Lutz’s analysis focuses on the use of gendered discourse per se as a way to imply a negative 
assessment of the soldier’s interest in humanitarian missions with the attendant implication that 
the soldier himself is inhumane as a function of his allegiance to masculinist values.  But I would 
argue that the soldier is using gendered discourses to express a deeply-held Western moral and 
tactical principle: the best defense is a good offense.  Passivity in a context of threatened or 
actual violence is often an invitation to the actualization or more violence.  In short, the soldier is 
objecting to being rendered passive and so vulnerable.
10
  He uses stereotypic constructions of the 
feminine as passive and the masculine as active as tools to express a larger meaning that, in 
itself, appears gender-less.  Though the larger meaning—soldiers are active—may be expressed 
through the citation of a stereotypic masculinist discourse, this alone does not mean we are 
permitted to ignore or denigrate the larger meaning.  Yet, Lutz’s approach achieves just this 
while missing the larger meaning being expressed by the soldier. 
In this study, moreover, I will demonstrate that enduring violence and personal harm in 
the name of being a soldier and a man is a different matter than the simple (mindless?) enactment 
of stereotypic gender discourses, a difference that Lutz misses.  Smearing a proto-soldier with 
lipstick is not only an enforcement of gender divisions, but also an act that trades on gender 
divisions.  The point of initiation rites is to ensure that potential group member will choose to 
suffer in the name of, and for, the group.  The group is powerfully testing the proto-soldier’s 
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willingness to bear humiliation for the group by initiation that requires humiliation from the 
group.  We will see below in some detail how stereotypic, gendered discourses are used to 
promote selflessness for the common good.  This makes the ethnographic situation much more 
complex, fascinating, and perhaps surprising than we gather from Lutz’s presentation, especially 
since the implication is that gendered discourse is now the beginning, not the end, of the 
analysis. 
Lutz’s work is one of a number of studies that have emerged in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 
century that present a distinctive and interesting broadening of what counts as Anthropology of 
Warfare.  Research such as Cynthia Enloe’s Maneuvers: The International Politics of 
Militarizing Women’s Lives (2000) and Francine D’Amico and Laurie Weinstein’s Gender 
Camouflage: Women and the U.S. Military (1999) exemplify this expansion while taking up the 
spirit of Margaret Mead’s work.  Both books concern the fundamentally important roles women 
play, by choice, by mandate, and by cultural training, in a militarized world that downplays, 
ignores or disguises those roles.  Compared to this study, however, works such as these focus 
more on the impact of masculine values on women than on the generation or expression of those 
values in a combat or training-for-combat context.  This is not hairsplitting: Enloe herself draws 
a similar type of distinction when she claims that men are not “naturally” desirous of being 
soldiers, “Many men may be loathe to admit that they want to avoid soldiering.  That, however, 
is a different matter, a contingent story of individual men negotiating with society over the norms 
of masculinity” (2000: 235).  I want to use Enloe’s model to argue that discourses by men and 
women in and about combat are of a different sort than discourses by men and women about 
military service more generally. 
Similarly, outside of anthropology, in the field of International Relations, Joshua 
Goldstein’s War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (2001) 
provides an excellent cross-cultural survey of gender relations in warfare that focuses on U.S. 
combat troops.  Likewise, freelance journalist Stephanie Gutmann’s The Kinder, Gentler 
Military: Can America’s Gender-Neutral Fighting Force Still Win Wars? (2000) addresses the 
question of women’s participation in the infantry from the standpoint of the soldiers themselves.  
But the point is the politics of inclusion, not the enactment of violence in combat.  Like the 
works by Enloe and D’Amico and Weinstein, Goldstein and Gutmann’s studies do not focus on 
combat or combat training through the discourse of combatants. 
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In this study I do not replicate the any of the trends outlined above, nor do I assume that it 
is somehow more penetrating, politically effective, and/or powerful to focus on the phenomena 
of experience or the subjectivity of any constituency involved in warfare.  If as anthropologists 
we wish to get the military or politicians to think differently about warfare, soldiers’ actions in 
warfare, and the politics and consequences of warfare for civilian and military populations, then 
simply recounting the experience of those participants (willing or not) is a dead end.  What needs 
to be examined, first and foremost from a realist and grounded perspective, is who soldiers are 
from their point of view.  To be perfectly clear about my own personal anthropology as it affects 
this study, I am not a warmonger, nor am I a political hawk.  Nevertheless, I see in the 
ethnographic record that, sadly, there are people in the world (including some Americans both in 
and out of the military) who can and will commit themselves to their values absolutely.  In the 
clash of cultures and values sometimes there are cases in which no respectful discourse is 
possible.  In such cases, lethal violence can and often does ensue. 
The Anthropology of Warfare literature in its different variations, realistic or idealistic, 
reductive or ideological, renders the actual semiotic practices of persons irrelevant.  Failing to 
heed Morton et. Al.’s warning not to advance a political approach without a scientific grounding, 
opponents to the long-standing reductive tradition have lately begun to rely on phenomenology 
and focus on descriptions of subjective experience.  The result, at least in this literature, is the 
imposition of the ideological view of researchers rather than the exposition of the meaning of 
consultants.  As Simons argues, modern combat infantry are simply absent or have their 
identities defined for them.  If we are after new realist theoretical resources that are plausible and 
scientific to advance the project of resolving the contradiction between description and 
explanation and between biology and culture in informants’ discourse about courageous action, 
they will not be found in this literature. 
 110 
 
                                                
1
 There is a relevant philosophical tradition at work here that posits that what people do, overtly, is never actually what is meant 
and therefore is never actually important.  It is the Platonic tradition that locates the source of reality in a realm not accessible to 
(average) persons. 
2
 See Frank B. Linderman, Plenty-Coups: Chief of the Crows (1930). 
3
 There is a radical difference between science and positivism.  Most humanist anthropology appears to react to positivism—as 
well it should—as debilitating and simply wrong-headed.  Recently, Toulmin (1990) has delineated the historical picture of when 
and how positivism was adopted into the heart of the social sciences even as it was rejected by natural science.  What I refer to, 
therefore, is the idea that natural scientific work and theorizing as it has been actually practiced is non-positivist and could be 
used productively to push Mead’s critique in a productive direction that she could never have realized.   
4
 In 1968 Mead took part in another anthropological caucus on warfare.  In her later offering, Alternatives to War (1968), she still 
maintains that warfare is not biologically based and criticizes ethological data using ethnographic data—particularly the notion 
that the habitual use of weapons by women has rarely been given social sanction.  She attempts to turn the tables on ethology by 
taking a fundamental ethological principle seriously: if humans are indeed to be regarded as just one of the animals, then what 
ethological theory can or does account for the ethnographic fact that women have rarely been given social sanction to habitually 
use weaponry?  She notes that this ethnographic fact has not been “sufficiently integrated” into ethological discussions.  She then 
adds that it is significant that when Lorenz (1966) broaches human aggression, “all consideration of females disappears.” 
5
 It is significant that Mead uses the term “replacement” to characterize changes in invented ideas over time.  “Replacement” is a 
Humean term that, I would speculate, was Mead’s best option for avoiding the notion of causality as ideal mechanism.  There is 
no such thing as agentic change in such a system since cause and effect are linearly unified.  Although the Humean idea of 
causality is a failure because it too is a version of idealism, not realism, at the time, the immaterial basis of the notion may have 
attracted Mead.  It may have appeared to be an appropriate model for dealing with human thought where, quite spontaneously, 
one (immaterial) idea could be replaced by another.  The use of the term is therefore indicative of the lack of conceptual 
resources that offer an appropriately scientific account of social change over time. 
6
 Another of Simons’ works, The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Army Special Forces (1997) appears to try to remedy 
this situation.  It is a novel-like narrative about an elite army team during training.  Simons concentrates on personality profiles, 
personal interactions, relationships between her target team and other teams, and the “cohesion” of the unit.  Although the study 
foregrounds the notion of “cohesion,” it fails to analyze the actual vocal and embodied discursive practices that generate such a 
concept of collective action as does the study I present here.  Without this analytical element, Simons’ descriptive work seems 
superficial and so unsatisfying. 
7
 One phrase in particular has caught my attention for its ubiquity in late 20th century anthropological works, “As <insert name of 
anthropologist> insists…”.  This catch-phrase often appears in exactly those places where hard theoretical and analytical work is 
required to connect a bold or critical claim to some substantive grounding.  It serves to alleviate the author from engaging in 
actually explaining the connection between a bold or critical claim and a rational ground by inserting what might be called “the 
voice of the master.” 
8
 This is definitely a double-edged sword: a soldier honoring his or her own moral outrage could be a way to do the right thing, 
rather than the wrong thing.  Antoine Fugua’s film Tears of the Sun (2003) presents this issue explicitly in the moral choice 
facing a Navy SEAL played by Bruce Willis.  By obeying orders, Willis’s character would leave innocent civilians to die at the 
hands of genocidal soldiers in Nigera.  The same issue is explicitly presented as a personal reality in General Romeo Dallaire’s 
book Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (2003).  These two works illuminate a radical difference 
in approach between Waterston and the soldiers she erases.  As I will demonstrate in later chapters, soldiers often think deeply 
and wrestle with the moral judgments in situations of fundamental ambiguity, often under incredible time pressure. 
9
 Anthropologists Morton Fried, Marvin Harris and Robert Murphy voiced exactly the same concern in their 1968 volume War: 
The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression focused on the Vietnam War. 
10
 Interestingly, this tactical-moral principle can be seen expressed in on-line, “first-person shooter” video games in which 
players combat one another in a variety of worlds and landscapes.  One such popular game, Call of Duty II, is set in World War II 
and can include up to 64 players on two separate teams competing for various goals.  A common “objection” seen in in-game 
chat amongst players occurs when a player hides in a corner and waits until an enemy passes by only to be easily and quickly 
gunned down.  This is called “camping” and it can be the topic of intense, visceral debate: the “camper” claims the action 
indicates good defense, the objector claims the action indicates cowardice or unfair play.  The intense frustration demonstrated by 
the “victimized” objector, especially in light of the powerlessness of the objector to do anything else but type out a vociferous 
and often profanity-strewn ad hominem attack on the camper, is often itself the subject of gleeful or annoyed responses from still 
other players.  Objectors often make it a point to hunt down and kill the camper when the game “re-spawns” (brings back to 
playability) the dead virtual soldier.  On the other hand, the passivity of campers is a risk: Call of Duty II permits the virtual 
soldier to “bash” an opponent with a weapon (versus shooting the opponent from a distance).  Getting bashed is often taken as a 
sign of poor player skills as it denotes the player’s inability to prevent an enemy from closing in to the point that a bash is 
possible.  To formulate the tactical-moral prescription then, one must: move around actively and confront a similarly moving 
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enemy at a “reasonable” distance in a mutual test of dexterous operation of a virtual soldier (aiming, shooting, running, 
crouching, jumping, leaning).  Snipers, by the way, are both part of the game and often the subject of scorn: they kill from a 
distance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
A SCIENTIFICALLY PLAUSIBLE ONTOLOGY FOR STUDYING HUMAN SOCIAL 
ACTION: SEMASIOLOGY 
 
 
In human freedom in the philosophical sense I am definitely 
 a disbeliever.  Everybody acts not only under external compulsion 
 but also in accordance with inner necessity.  Schopenhauer’s 
 saying, that “ a man can do as he will, but not will as he will,” 
 has been an inspiration to me…  This feeling mercifully mitigates 
 the sense of responsibility which so easily becomes paralyzing, 
 and it prevents us from taking ourselves and other people too seriously. 
-- Albert Einstein, 1931 
 
 In the previous chapter I argued that realist but reductive frameworks as well as some 
idealist frameworks found in the Anthropology of Warfare literature are the wrong resources for 
interpreting human social action because they are fatally flawed in their ontology of human being 
and the causal source of human social action.  Hence, an insistence on their continued use 
(without the requisite explanation of how Hebb and Eccles are wrong in their understanding of 
human bio-physiology) would amount to a failure of ethical integrity in scholarship.   
In contrast, a coherent and scientifically plausible ontological schema for studying human 
social action within anthropology does exist.  It is found in semasiology, an approach to a 
broadly conceived  ‘anthropology of human movement’ created by socio-cultural anthropologist 
Drid Williams (1975).  Semasiology was inspired by concepts from the semiology of Ferdinand 
de Saussure and grounded in Harré’s casual powers theory.  I will highlight key concepts in 
semasiological theory as it relates to the interpretation of human embodied social action and to 
understanding military movement.  Movement, we learned in chapter 2, is a primary modality for 
expressing courageous action.  The path I will take leads through (1) a brief review of the realist, 
scientific roots of semasiology and the consequences drawn from those roots and (2) a careful 
semasiological consideration of some ethnographic and ethno-historic military movements.  I 
will end the chapter with an outline review of these key concepts in preparation for analysis of 
my fieldwork with U.S. Marines. 
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Semasiology: A Realist Conception of Human Agency 
 
Semasiology is an anthropological theory of human social action conceived by socio-
cultural anthropologist Drid Williams (1982, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1999), elaborated by socio-
cultural/linguistic anthropologist Brenda Farnell (1994, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1999, 2000, 2001) 
and systematically placed in appropriate philosophical, scientific and historical contexts by 
philosopher of social science Charles R. Varela (1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2003).  
Semasiology is distinguished from other approaches to human movement in its conception of the 
relationship between biology and culture.
1
  Semasiology specifies that relationship according to 
the resources of the aforementioned new realist meta-narrative, called critical realism.
2
  In 
semasiology the individual human organism (biology) and the embodied person (culture) are 
understood as one naturally occurring, unified entity.  From a scientific point of view, this unity 
is the only appropriately structured and so only plausible entity capable of producing the variable 
and rich ethnographic record so powerfully illustrative of human agency for anthropologists like 
Mead, Geertz, Sahlins, and Ortner.  This understanding helps the researcher guard against 
reifying inappropriate entities, like “social structure,” “language,” or “genes,” when representing 
persons anthropologically. 
On this point, Harré (1984) and Varela (1993) argue that while there is a unity in the 
embodied person, there is also a hierarchical relationship between the two: culture is primary and 
biology is secondary.  This reversal of the bio-reductive standpoint is rooted in the biological 
science of Hebb, Eccles, and Hauser that we encountered in the last chapter.  The human 
organism, our biology, is transformed into a culturally defined and socially constructed body 
through the mechanism of language-in-use (understood as speech and other sensory-semiotic 
resources): the human organism becomes functionally subordinated to the embodied person 
(Varela 1993).  This is an ontological, not a psychological or biological, transformation. 
To the ontology of human being as possessing both biophysical and socio-cultural 
components simultaneously and inseparably, semasiology adds the critical concept that human 
beings are structured to move.  They are not inert: active being is moving being (Varela 2009).  
This is the scientific principle of agency.  In this context, attributing agency to human beings 
claims for them the status of being genuinely and naturally causal, contra the bio-reductive 
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framework.  The dynamic movement of persons is the actualization of potential power in both 
the physical and socio-cultural sense (Varela 1993).  The means by which persons generate their 
socio-cultural worlds is through language.  We are built biologically to use it, but we are not 
built to use it in particular ways at particular times to mean particular things.  Through the use 
of language, persons become “efficient causes of their own actions” in their socio-cultural 
worlds, according to Williams (2003: 2).  It is on this basis that Farnell and Varela contend that, 
“all human action is the discursive practice of persons” (2008: 217).  To be clear, action is not 
merely vocalization.  Williams states, “In a living, moving human being, the verbal and actions 
are one” (2003: 5).
3
 
Semasiology’s understanding of the relationship between biology and culture is expressed 
in the novel conception of the human body as the “semasiological body” or “signifying body” 
(Williams 1975, 2003).  Since people are active agents, that is, dynamically embodied, and that 
the cultural subsumes the biological in the human socio-cultural world as we master the use of 
language in our locality, the ways people move express their conceptions of and value in living 
and being. 
Does this conception mean that if all people move, and all movement is meaningful, then 
all people mean the same thing when they move? The answer is no.  Williams (2003) 
distinguishes two levels of theoretical interest: (1) “structural invariants,” which refer to the fact 
that human bodies are material entities limited by their physical structure to moving in a finite 
number of ways and directions (human legs do not bend like bird legs); and (2) “semantic 
variance,” which refers to the idea that cultures and sub-cultures generate conventions that pick 
out from that finite number of ways of moving what counts as being semantically important by 
assigning meaning to them.  The same movement does not necessarily mean the same thing 
within a culture, across cultures, or even through time. 
 
Semasiology: Dynamic Embodiment and The Action-Sign 
 
Semasiology recognizes the agency of persons through the concept of dynamic 
embodiment.  People move themselves and can move others both physically and linguistically.  
This idea brings up the question of how exactly we are to understand that body movement 
constitutes language-in-use. Since culture in the form of language subsumes the physical, our 
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moving in space and time is a) always cultural and b) signifying.  Semasiology captures these 
ideas in the central concept of the action-sign defined by Farnell this way 
 
Action signs are units of human body movement that take their meaning(s) from 
their place within a system of signs. Like spoken languages, action-sign systems 
are open-ended semantic systems, and encompass all human uses of the medium 
of bodily movement. They range from the unmarked (i.e. ordinary) uses of 
manual and facial gestures, sign languages, posture, skills, and locomotion to 
highly marked deliberate choreographies of the kind that occur in rituals, 
ceremonies, dances, theatre, the martial arts, and sports. [Farnell 2000: fn.11] 
 
Even a relatively innocuous military action-sign, like a “salute” carries linguistic, that is 
semiotic, depth and complexity.  The salute of the U.S. Marine Corporal Casey Owens in Figure 
2 (in Figures section at end of this chapter) is an action-sign—an embodied movement phrase or 
utterance.  Following the Saussurian concept of the linguistic sign, an action sign is comprised of 
two inseparable elements, signifier and signified: that is, movement(s) is connected to meanings.  
The signifiers of this action sign—the movements and positions of the arm relative to the body 
and head—are his upright posture, his serious facial expression, the forward  “directedness” of 
his sight-line, the use of his right, not his left, arm, the rigidity or held tension of his bent arm, 
the extension of his hand and fingers, the alignment of his fingers, and the positioning of his 
right index finger touching the brim of his cap.  Williams (2003) calls the collected movements 
and body position a kineseme, a whole bodily ‘gesture’ or action sign that constitutes a 
meaningful whole within a semantic realm (a system of signs) in this case the realm of 
“American military action.”  Kineseme is further refined by the concept of the kineme, an 
analytic unit that identifies smaller constituent parts of an action sign, such as, in this case, the 
extended fingers or the upright, extended and rigidly held spine.   
The signified component of the action sign of a salute picks out or indexes a value 
position within the larger system of “American military action.”  The meanings attached to this 
action sign when used in a socio-cultural context can be, but are not normally, expressed in vocal 
terms perhaps related to the word “respect;” something like, “I recognize and respect your place 
in our organization, our common allegiance to a code of arms, and the duties that code obliges us 
to perform, including this salute.”  During my fieldwork with the U.S. Marines I came to realize 
that while a gesture or action sign such as this might be considered analytically equivalent to a 
vocal expression given a scholarly context in which the spoken and written word is valorized, in 
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a military context, the action sign means more than a vocal expression.  That is, the sub-cultural 
rules for enacting “respect” demand an embodied, that is, a gestural, not a vocal, modality.  To 
translate the salute into a vocal rather than gestural utterance would be to disregard the social 
conventions and rules for proper action in the military sub-culture.  It would be an insult. 
Studying embodied utterances semasiologically can include more familiar categories of 
anthropological study such as ‘identity’ and ‘context’.  Semasiology takes these categories into 
account through the “system of signs” Farnell mentions.
4
  In the United States, and in the 
military, one identity-generating sign is in fact the performance of a salute.  A few times during 
my fieldwork with the U.S. Marines, junior Marines—those on the lower end of the hierarchical 
scale of ranks such as privates and lance corporals—saluted me as they passed by (see Appendix 
B).  I noticed that this kind of event started after I adopted a regulation haircut and was provided 
with desert tan and forest green digital camouflage uniforms.  I noticed that I was not saluted all 
the time, but when I was, it occurred exclusively when I wore a “cover” (which in U.S. Marine 
Corps nomenclature means a hat) and my uniform “blouse” (meaning the button-down shirt) 
despite my having no markers of rank or nametag as is required by the regulations that all 
Marines are expected to know intimately.  Regulations oblige Marines to salute superiors when 
they are “under cover and buttoned up.” 
A Marine sergeant explained that the young Marines were practicing a “better safe than 
sorry” approach: salute, just in case…  I saluted them in turn.  The first time this happened, I was 
startled by the event but acted anyway, based on my understanding and appreciation of military 
practices through pictures, books, and movies.  I was startled because of the dissonance between 
my own understanding of my identity and my audience’s.  It can be argued that I should have 
disabused these Marines of their misconception.  In one sense I agree, since I was not actually a 
Marine.  At best I was a temporary or honorary Marine, and certainly not a legitimate superior 
commissioned officer.  I decided, however, that disrupting the ritual of respect would be more 
trouble than it was worth at that moment, especially since the Marines had already passed on into 
the distance. 
On reflection I thought that if and when such a mistake happened again, I could simply 
stop the Marines and ask them why they saluted me given that I had no proper rank or name 
markers, but I decided against this course of action.  I did not think checking the sergeant’s 
explanation against the Marines’ explanation of their actions was a substantive enough point to 
 117 
disrupt the ritual or help them realize their mistake.  But, I was thinking from the perspective of 
myself as a researcher, not as a proto-member of the U.S. Marine Corps.  If I had adopted the 
latter identity more fully, intervening could have made better Marines of the individuals either by 
drawing their attention to details they missed in the form of missing rank and name markers or 
by encouraging them to act on details they recognized.  This would have been in line with the 
strong principle of communal identity and valuing of teamwork that I encountered with the 
Marines.  Marine Captain and Public Affairs Officer Teresa Ovalle illustrated the depth and 
seriousness of the Marine commitment to this principle and value.  She explained to me that any 
Marine is obligated to approach another Marine who isn’t following regulations, even if the 
wrongdoer is a superior officer.  She provided the hypothetical example of a colonel or general 
who is not wearing his cover in a setting requiring it to be worn.  A private would be obligated to 
bring the mistake to the attention of the colonel or general. 
This discussion opens up the question of what a salute indexes, that is, what does it “point 
at” as the target of respect.  Who or what is it respecting?  The answer is not always clear.  There 
is a U.S. military adage that a salute respects the rank and uniform, not the man or woman 
wearing it.  But in my case, I think the young Marines were guessing that I was a superior of 
some sort because of my appearance.  I suspect they recognized the signs of age (I was 42 years 
old at the time I started my fieldwork) in my face, meaning that they equated age with rank.  Of 
course this assumes that I pulled off dressing like a Marine and walking like a Marine well 
enough to pass the young Marines’ cursory inspection.  Such appearance and way of walking 
would be yet another example of an embodied utterance.  I learned too that at Marine Corp Base 
Quantico (MCBQ), it is not unusual for rank markers to be removed from “cammies” or “utes” 
(digital camouflage utility uniform) for training purposes since they are metal and can seriously 
injure the wearer or another trainee.  This may have encouraged the “better safe than sorry” 
approach.  A salute’s respect, then, can be “aimed” not at a particular individual recipient, but at 
the uniform itself as a tangible symbol of the intangible values constitutive of the military way of 
life.  But does it hit its mark?  Not in all cases and not with the intended implications, as my 
fieldwork experience demonstrates. 
Returning to the point of a semasiological understanding of a salute, we can say that 
Corporal Owens (Figure 2) is talking with his body, or, embodying a value as a way to index his 
commitment to still other values.  It is important to note that, as Williams (2003) points out, we 
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often perceive what is signified (i.e. the meaning), but not the embodied movement—the 
signifier that achieves the action sign.  Perhaps the “properly attired whole body movement” of 
my presentation of “(possible) superior Marine” to the young Marines is what prevented them 
from recognizing or acting on missing details.  The import of this concept is that, in a case like 
Corporal Owens’s, the action-sign does not represent respect, as traditional theories of 
epistemology might have us believe, it is respect, at least when performed properly.  In this sense 
too, I was “Marine” to the young Marines, though I technically did not deserve the respect they 
rendered. 
As this example shows, in semasiology, unlike in the bio-reductive framework, a “unit of 
movement…always refer[s] to a recognizable pattern established by the agents’ (performers’) 
modes of specification for the whole dance, rite, ceremony—whatever kind of system that is 
under examination” (Williams 2003: 100).  Achieving understanding depends fundamentally on 
the standpoint of the actor or actors.  This means that, as researchers, we must take seriously the 
actors’ explanation of their actions and what they mean.  This does not require, however, that we 
take their explanation as correct, true, or universally applicable.  Sometimes consultants get it 
wrong, but the point is that their explanations should be granted serious weight in generating an 
interpretive understanding of them prior to an ethnographic representation.  In the bio-reductive 
framework, we saw that the content of theoretical categories like “survival value,” or “instinct” 
impose the explanation of and so the meaning of action.  Explaining the salute semasiologically 
as an action-sign (in light of Farnell’s “system of signs”) then, means understanding the 
historical and cultural ascription of meaning to the action, if possible.  For example, The U.S. 
Army Quartermaster Center and School states that the originating association of meaning with 
this action sign is not clear.
5
  The supposition is that the modern hand salute emerges from a 
historical practice of demonstrating one was disarmed upon approaching another with peaceful 
intentions.  The right hand was traditionally considered “the weapon-hand.” Opening the palm 
and holding it up for inspection accomplished the goal.  Another, compatible explanation focuses 
on requirements in the British Army of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century requiring juniors to remove 
headgear in the presence of superiors.  This practice changed over time into grasping, and then 
simply touching, the visor.  The Quartermaster School and Center website also notes evidence of 
left-handed and dual-handed salutes. 
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The following consideration of subtle details and changes over time in the purpose and 
meaning of the kinemes (parts of an action sign) that constitute a ‘salute’ alert us that the 
meaning of a salute is not obvious, even if salutes are integral to all modern, Western militaries.  
Even in the case of a very close cultural and linguistic relationship between the United States and 
Great Britain exemplified in a long tradition of shared military principles and training the 
ethnographic situation remains complex.
6
  Compare the American and British salutes in Figure 3 
(in Figures section at the end of this chapter).  At the level of modern military salutes both 
variations of the action sign mean the same: they are gestures of respect.  Each also conveys, 
however, a unique meaning compared to the other when considered on the level of kinemic 
details, the component parts of the utterance.  These details can be likened to an “accent” in a 
vocal modality.  I will concentrate on four of them.  First, the palm of each soldier is oriented 
differently.  Owens’ palm faces down, the hand being aligned on a horizontal plane while 
Sanders’s palm faces forward, with the hand aligned on a vertical plane.  Second, the last or 
pinky finger of each soldier is oriented differently.  Owens’s is flush against his fourth or ring 
finger while Sanders’ is slightly apart from the others.  Third, the elbow of each soldier is 
oriented differently.  Owens’s is in front of his body, creating a three dimensional triangle among 
his shoulder, elbow, and cap visor.  Sanders’s elbow is nearly flush with his body, creating a two 
dimensional triangle among his shoulder, elbow and cap visor.  Finally, and unobservable in the 
static photographic image shown here, Owens’s arm movement took a relatively direct line 
upward from the side of his torso to deliver his hand to his cap visor.  Sanders’s arm movement 
inscribed an arc oriented outward from the right side of his body.  The movements and 
differences in final position captured in each picture are cultural and convey the meanings 
“American” and “British” respectively.  Of course if we adopted a strictly bio-functional 
interpretive framework, these differences would be irrelevant to the interpretation of “respecting 
and maintaining hierarchy” when explaining a modern military salute.  But in a semasiological 
framework, these seemingly minor differences are the constitutive elements of cultural being and 
identity. 
 Pictures are effective for appreciating dynamically embodied semiotic practices but only 
to a point.  They capture a position not a movement.  A better way to “record” and appreciate 
distinctive gestural utterances is through Labanotation (see Figure 4 in Figures section at the end 
of this chapter).  The vertical axis represents time, so movement through time and space occurs 
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from bottom to top.  The horizontal axis represents simultaneous movements in time and space.  
The symbols used indicate speed of motion, direction of motion, parts of bodies, and interaction 
among body parts.  A Labanotated version of the American and British versions of the kineseme 
“salute” enables us to be more precise in our analysis of the different cultural conceptions of this 
gestural utterance.
7
 
Action-signs, as a modality of communication, do not simply convey information, they 
convey meaning.  The cultural quality of the difference between an American and British salute 
is critical because in enacting it, rather than some other formulation of a salute, the soldier is 
generating identity and providing context for further action.  It would be just as strange and 
provocative, if not angering, for a U.S. Marine to use a British salute as it would be if she did not 
salute at all when circumstances required it. 
 
Action-Signs: Understanding Military Movement Culturally 
 
This comparison of American and British salutes and the ways in which they constitute 
cultural being (as well as identity and context) lead us to the semasiological realization that, just 
like spoken phrases, gestural utterances require translation.  Semasiologically, dynamic bodily 
movements are taken to be “agentic, semiotic practices that are shared expressive resources 
which require translation from one culture to another” (Farnell and Graham 1998: 433). 
This concept has important implications for the anthropological study of the military as 
two historical examples from the 19
th
 century American Indian Wars demonstrate.  With these 
examples we will, see the cultural richness of bodies in motion.  The U.S. Seventh Cavalry was 
defeated at the Battle of the Little Bighorn in 1876 and its commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
George A. Custer, a popular American Civil War hero, was killed.  In the aftermath, his second 
in command, Major Marcus A. Reno was denounced as having failed in his responsibilities as an 
officer resulting in the defeat and Custer’s death.  Reno’s actions were later subjected to a 
military court of inquiry.  While some witnesses reported him to have acted “coolly” and 
competently at different points during the battle, others claimed he was “demoralized” or 
“unhinged,” especially after his Arikara scout, Bloody Knife, was shot in the head and killed 
within a few feet of him.
8
  The day afterward, a witness claimed to have asked Reno if he 
remembered Bloody Knife being killed, and Reno reputedly said, “Yes, and his blood and brains 
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spattered over me…” (In Reno 1997: 182).  The witness opined that he “Thought at the time it 
demoralized him [Reno] a great deal…” (In Reno 1997: 182).  The implication being offered by 
some of Reno’s accusers was that a psychological failure translated into a failure in command 
and control that resulted in the battle’s loss and Custer’s death. 
Compared to this psychological account, a semasiological account of Major Reno’s 
actions lead us to very different considerations and conclusions that demonstrate the cultural 
nature of dynamic embodiment.  Given our earlier encounters with explanations of human social 
action that located the cause of action somewhere other than with the person, we have reason 
immediately to be suspicious of the psychological account.  Psychologist James R. Averill 
(1996) notes that the West has developed a tradition of associating emotions with physiology 
based on preferred ethical symbolism rather than on science.  For example the tradition of 
radically distinguishing between passion and reason dating back to the ancient Greeks leads to a 
conception of passion being located in “lower” organs while reason is located in “higher” organs.  
Such a hierarchy of organs has no proper scientific basis.  As a consequence, the roles of 
cognition and society in shaping emotional behavior have been obscured.  Averill’s position is 
that 
 
Most emotional reactions are social constructions.  On this assumption, the 
experience of passivity may be treated as a kind of illusion.  Emotions are not 
something which just happen to an individual; rather, they are acts which a person 
performs.  In the case of an emotion, however, the individual is unwilling or 
unable to accept responsibility for his actions; the initiation of the response is 
therefore dissociated from consciousness. [Averill 1996: 224] 
 
Using Averill’s work, we can surmise that the psychological explanation of Major Reno’s 
actions has to do with the West’s cultural conventions about how one could and should act under 
stressful circumstances.  The idea that the relationship between event and emotion is not 
automatic and necessary resonates with the agentic viewpoint of semasiology.  Using 
semasiology, I suggest that we view “demoralized” and “unhinged” as preferred Western action 
signs associated with seeing another person shot in the head at close range.  They are cultural 
conventions about how one could and should act under stressful circumstances.  Their 
performance is an ethical matter of publicly recognizing the violation of the bodily integrity 
necessary for a valued other to exist and be a part of one’s life.  Today we are familiar with these 
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performances being accompanied by still other conventional performances, such as facial 
expressions of horror and revulsion. 
All these performances are traditionally based in the bio-reductive framework’s 
conception of mechanical Stimulus-Response (S-R).  Putatively, they signal the “impact” of the 
“shock” upon the nervous system and so bypass the person.  A person cannot help but re-act 
automatically since it is not the person, but his or her bio-physiology that is doing the acting.  In 
trumping self-control, an emotional response leads logically to the notion that one is focused not 
on what matters, in this case the military situation.  Nor is one focused on intangible values like 
“duty to others.”  This amounts to a failure to act and lead according to the military situation.  
This seems to be the gist of Major Reno’s detractors’ arguments. 
If, however, we adopt Averill’s viewpoint and meld it with a semasiological 
framework—that such embodied emotional performances are cultural conventions linked to 
preferred ethical ways of being—then we are free to consider a social and conceptual rather than 
an individualistic and mechanical interpretation of Major Reno’s actions.  So freed, we can now 
listen to Major Reno the person, not Major Reno the emotion machine, describe his perception of 
his predominantly Siouxan opponents. 
 
The Indians were peculiar in their manner of fighting; they don’t go in line or 
bodies, but in parties of 5 to 40.  You see them scattering in all directions. 
 
Bloody Knife [Reno’s Arikara scout] was within a few feet of me; I was trying to 
get from him by signs where the Indians were going. [In Reno 1997: 195-96] 
 
Since it is apparent that Reno, like Bloody Knife, could see the Native Americans, Reno’s 
professed ignorance of the Indians’ direction must have been based not on a failure of 
perception, but on a failure of conception: he could not conceive of what the Native Americans 
intended by watching their movements.
9
  If, as a semasiological framework claims, military 
movements constitute ways of talking with one’s body, then understanding dynamically 
embodied action-signs is a matter of literacy, of being able to read other’s body movement.  
Critically, when faced with an alternative cultural system, Reno found himself illiterate. 
Part of Reno’s failure of conception must have been his lack of familiarity with military 
action that did not depend on a Western way of organizing soldiers.  Western ways of organizing 
fighters into what Americans and Westerners would recognize as a “military formation” are 
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cultural conventions, and along with individual bodily movement, could be said to constitute a 
distinctive Western military movement dialect.  Reno’s problem with the multi-directionality of 
Native American movements was rooted in his own lived experience of fighting as part of a 
cohesive, hierarchical team with an identified leader and moving and fighting in a common 
direction with a common purpose.  Orienting bodies toward the enemy while maintaining a 
linear formation, thus creating clear “front,” “rear,” and “side,” was (and still often is) the norm.   
Enemies were always to be kept to the front where commanders could unify, concentrate, and so 
maximize the gunfire of their troops.  The line would then advance toward, over, and through the 
enemy while, ideally, maintaining formation.  Reno used this kind of formation for his soldiers at 
the Battle of the Little Bighorn.  If, for him, the prescribed military convention of the linear 
alignment of his troops called for moving them in ways that kept an enemy to the “front,” we can 
imagine how disconcerting it would be to see an enemy whose cultural conventions for fighting 
took fighters “sideways” or “rearward.”  This would make fighting impossible from Reno’s point 
of view.
10
  Yet, Reno’s men were being shot, wounded, and killed. 
Before going deeper into the problem of how best to understand the claim of Major 
Reno’s failure of responsibility and how best to interpret his actions, I want to solidify the 
semasiological point that body movement requires translation across cultures.  If Major Reno 
was illiterate in the semiotics of Siouxan body movement, we should expect to find evidence of 
the reverse situation.  Mari Sandoz provides just such an example, though unintentionally, in 
relating a story derived from oral histories of the life of the American Indian Chief Crazy Horse.  
She recounts that 
 
Here Crazy Horse and He Dog got to know more about the trader’s son called 
Grabber living with Sitting Bull.  It seemed the Hunkpapas had found him near 
the forks of the Missouri several years ago, little more than a boy, standing 
waiting for the warriors with his hands raised high over his head.  So he was 
named the Grabber, one who raises his hands as if grabbing for something. 
[Sandoz 1992: 263] 
 
The Hunkpapa Sioux Indian warriors were culturally illiterate with respect to the action-sign of 
“surrender” enacted by the half-Anglo Grabber. 
Returning to the case of Major Reno, it seems to me that he was neither “demoralized” 
nor “unhinged” by having Bloody Knife killed quite near to him and having the scout’s blood 
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and brains spattered on him.  I think that Major Reno’s psychology was and is given inordinate 
weight because of a) the unmarked but prevalent assumption of the mechanical and necessary 
relationship between stimulus and response (already institutionalized in principle if not in these 
exact terms in the late 19
th
 century), and b) the cultural conventions associating some emotional 
performances with ethical requirements for enacting proper personhood, which, in turn, leads to 
an expectation of such performances occurring.  Since there is a large, deep gap between “could 
and should” perform ‘demoralized’” and “did perform ‘demoralized’,” it is my sense that “a” 
above carries the weight of objections voiced by Major Reno’s detractors.  How so?  The overall 
evidence of how Reno actually acted is equivocal at worst and in Reno’s favor at best (after all 
that portion of the U.S. Seventh Cavalry under his command was not destroyed).  The main 
objection by Reno’s detractors—chiefly Custer’s wife Libby and a powerful newspaper reporter 
friend—was that Reno made no serious attempt to save Custer.   Reno, however, had made the 
military judgment, which militarily he was entitled to make, that charging through the vast camp 
of Indians as Custer had ordered him to do would have resulted in the destruction of his 
command.  This judgment was exercised after Custer had split his portion of the Seventh Cavalry 
off from Reno’s. 
One way to make a case against Reno is to use assumptions of a mechanical, necessary 
relationship between external stimulus and internal response to generate unanswerable charges.  
This shifts attention from contrary evidence including Reno’s success in saving his portion of the 
Seventh Cavalry from complete destruction and refocuses it on the individual.  We should pause 
to recognize, of course, that the contradiction represented by Reno’s detractors to blame him for 
the necessary operation of his biopsychology replicates the contradiction between description 
and explanation to which this study is directed.  On another level, it is interesting to note that 
Major Reno was in a difficult position—should he have tried to claim that his visceral experience 
of Bloody Knife’s death did not affect him at all, he might have opened himself to charges of, in 
19
th
 century terminology, “cold indifference” or “callousness,” and so branded a “monster” 
A semasiological perspective suggests that regardless of the status or consequences of 
Major Reno’s actions, his performances were his choice, not an automated response of his 
physiology.  In my estimation, the greater interpretive weight should be given to a socio-cultural 
explanation of any supposed defects in Major Reno’s military actions.  Without an understanding 
of the cultural ways in which his opponents were using their bodies, Reno’s ability to be 
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proactive was circumscribed.  He became more reactive and so adopted defensive tactics as a 
way to protect his command from events he could neither predict nor control.
11
 
These considerations expose the strong allegiance to offensive tactics throughout the 
existence of the American military, especially among formally trained officers.  Custer was an 
exemplar of such tactics because they worked.  The basic principle is that what the enemy is 
doing is, in a way, irrelevant, if they have no time to react to an organized, powerful attack.  The 
pursuit of surprise and overwhelming force is a way to end battles quickly, and Custer was a 
whole-hearted proponent of offensive tactics.  This was one important reason why Custer sought 
to attack a camp consisting of thousands of Indians with around seven hundred men.  Against 
this outlook and context, the use of defensive tactics, despite their military necessity (in my 
estimation, and Reno’s), would have seemed “cowardly.” 
 
Cultural Conventions about Cultural Conventions: What A Semasiological Approach 
Reveals about Fear and Courage 
 
I have spent considerable space clarifying the relationship of psychological emotions to 
embodied military action for a particular reason: I want to introduce the idea that a 
semasiological approach permits us to appreciate deeply that the Western and American 
conventions about fighting commits combat infantry to very specific views about space and 
direction.  These views about space and direction are, in turn, the basis for certain emotional 
performances the invitation to which combat infantry must refuse.  We saw that Major Reno was 
disconcerted if not confused by (by his own admission) the way his opponents moved.  The act 
of being disconcerted or confused is a cultural convention about how to act in just such 
situations.  The embodied performance of confusion—lack of speed in formulating a plan of 
action, lack of clarity in orders to subordinates, and so on—is consequent to the way Major Reno 
was taught to fight, indeed, what he was taught constituted fighting per se.  For Americans and 
Westerners generally, violation of cultural conceptions and expectations about what constitutes 
fighting invites an emotional performance.  This too is a cultural convention. 
Consider a startling parallel to Major Reno’s experience during the Battle of the Little 
Big Horn in 1876.  As background, we should note that the linear formations used by Major 
Reno, have, in the modern world, given way to dispersed formations of soldiers who train to 
 126 
fight in “disorderly battlefields” brought about by “the range and lethality of modern weapons” 
(Warfighting 2007: 11).  The invitation to performances of “disconcerted” and “confused” have 
not, however, disappeared.  In Afghanistan in 2006 a Taliban ambush of British soldiers took 
place that was later described by two of the participants in a video documentary.  According to 
Major “Paddy” Blair, the ambush 
 
started slowly around us, and then it builds up to a cresendo of fire another couple 
of groups popped up all around us and started engaging us from different 
directions the platoon to my front probably had 3 or 4 groups each of about 4 or 5 
Taliban engaging them from different directions. [In McNab 2008] 
 
A sniper in Blair’s unit, Lance Corporal Kyle Deerans comments on his experience of the small 
groups of Taliban attacking from multiple directions (must like Reno’s Sioux opponents) 
 
At stages you could see movement and the Taliban they’d literally as you lifted 
your rifle up to take aim again they were gone we couldn’t see exactly where they 
were going they were moving left and right and then they would just disappear 
they were there and then they were gone. [In McNab 2008] 
 
In his interview, Deerans conveyed a sense of frustration as well as some confusion about the 
lethal situation in which he and his unit were involved.  I want to suggest that Deerans’s 
frustration and slight confusion were the result of his inability to conceptualize a response to 
fluidity and multi-directionality of the Taliban fighters’ attacks, just like Reno.  Snipers, after all, 
need to achieve a laser-like focus in a single direction.  This achievement requires that other 
considerations be put out of focal awareness, such as monitoring how a larger, fluid situation is 
developing.  I think, then, that the source of Deerans’s frustration was his inability to exercise the 
agentic capabilities that he was trained to exercise—the Western way of fighting—as well as that 
provided his identity, purpose, and relevance to his group of comrades.
12
  The circumscription of 
Deerans’ agency was achieved by the intelligent refusal of the Taliban fighters to move in ways 
that subjected them either to the individual or the concentrated firepower of the British soldiers.  
Deerans, literally, had no one to shoot at given his training on how to acquire a target and shoot 
at it. 
I hasten to add that the grounds for my interpretation of Deerans’s as being frustrated are 
not fully evident in Deerans’s words, but rather in his facial expressions, the tone of his voice, 
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and the small and variable but discernable variations in his bodily posture and head alignment 
while he struggled to describe and explain his experience in the documentary.  In this 
ethnographic case, the meaning Deerans seeks to have us understand does not fully emerge in his 
words per se but rather in his use of his body to perform the emotional content he wants us to 
appreciate.
13
  A full appreciation of his meaning requires seeing and hearing the dynamics of his 
embodied presentation.  It also requires a conception of how bodily movements such as “stable 
posture” can and do constitute meanings like “encouraged” and “unafraid” that then result in a 
comment about Deerans like “I saw him pull himself together” offered by a British 
photojournalist that accompanied Deerans’ unit during the ambush.  Overcoming the 
conventional invitation to focus on the self and one’s own frustration or confusion, that is, on 
how one feels, constitutes the act of valuing others and the values that underwrite one’s identity 
and way of life.  In achieving a stable posture, Deerans rendered himself effective and killed a 
Taliban fighter.  Though the results of this achievement are many and can vary according to the 
onlooker, I suggest that two of the more important are that Deerans helped his unit to live and 
that he aligned himself with those values for which he and his unit collectively pledged 
themselves to live or die. 
 
Summary of Semasiological Theory 
 
 What lessons or principles can be drawn from the close consideration of military 
movement in cultural contexts using semasiology?  The shift in conceptual schema from 
behavioral-mechanical to agentic-creative permits anthropologists to see human agency in 
action.  Human beings are active and the mode of that activity is language use.  In addressing the 
“double hermeneutic,” anthropologists creating grammars of ethnographic representation can 
avoid two major pitfalls.  First, it is not legitimate, because it is not scientifically plausible, to 
overtly or covertly re-assign the capability of producing socio-cultural worlds through social, 
semiotic practices to human biology (the “instincts” and “genes” of evolutionary psychologists), 
human culture (the social structure of Durkheim), or any other entity, real or putatively real, that 
is not built to generate semiotic activity.  Human beings are uniquely capable of that activity 
based on their unique biological structure.  Second, it is not legitimate, because it is not 
scientifically plausible, to simply claim that human agency exists.  Required is a clear statement 
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of theoretical framework that connects perception with conception and vice versa via a robust 
understanding of causal powers and the corollary to that understanding: for human beings the 
cultural subsumes the biological (but does not and cannot simply ignore it). 
 The semasiological viewpoint emerging from this conceptual shift permits 
anthropologists to see human beings as dynamically embodied.  Human social action is primarily 
discursive, now understood as including both vocal and gestural modalities.  Depending on the 
situation, one or the other of these modalities may be primary, fundamentally modify the other, 
or even be in conflict with the other.  Semiotic practices are action-signs.  That is, (using the 
military context) the different ways soldiers move entails commitment to a value position, 
parallel to the way in which a soldier might state his or her allegiance to a particular value using 
vocalized words and sentences.  These embodied value commitments are idiomatic, dialectical 
sub-cultural conventions.  Through the ways in which they move, soldiers have real effects in the 
social worlds of persons.  By implication, those who can understand the particular idiom or 
dialect of a movement language appreciate more deeply and more clearly the meanings being 
made.  This stands in stark contrast to the traditional Western view that “nonverbal” behavior 
lacks both “language and mind” (Farnell 1999: 346). 
Farnell and Varela place the semasiological perspective in a helpful context, comparing it 
to objectivist and phenomenological approaches to embodiment. 
 
We can observe that in traditional disembodied social theory there is talk about 
the observed body from an objectivist intellectualist standpoint (e.g. 
symbolic/structural anthropology, psychoanalysis, Durkheimian sociology).  In 
the predominant dissenting tradition of embodied social theory in the first somatic 
revolution, there is talk of the experienced body from a subjectivist lived 
standpoint (e.g., the Jackson-Csordas paradigm).  Finally, in dynamically 
embodied social theory there is “talk” from the moving body (an agentist 
enactment standpoint).  Here we have the basis from which we can better identify 
the first somatic revolution in social science theory.  The Csordas-Jackson 
paradigm was a revolt against the deterministic reduction of the human body to a 
mechanical system: behaviourism, psychoanalysis and naturalistic sociology, 
were different ways to theorize that reified conception of human somatics. 
[Farnell and Varela 2008: 218] 
 
The objectivist approach, talk about the body, is implicit in the bio-reductive framework, and we 
encountered a number of the deleterious and inhumane consequences.  Talk of the body, the 
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subjectivist approach, is a more humane approach but also results in negative consequences.  
U.S. Marine Colonel Bryan P. McCoy in The Passion of Command wrote 
 
As for killing the enemy, I never had and never will have remorse for that.  In 
fact, I drew gratification from it then and still do.  But that doesn’t stem from 
blood lust; it is more akin to the satisfaction a sheep dog must feel after having 
successfully defended the flock from a predator.  An embedded reporter asked me 
after a firefight in Afak, during which I killed two enemy fighters attempting to 
fire into our flank [the vulnerable side of the Marine unit], how I felt about it.  My 
response was no more profound than an expression of having been ‘proficient’ at 
an everyday task, a business transaction.  Now, nearly two years removed from 
that day, my feelings have not changed. 
 I…saw children maimed and killed.  I, however, did not feel anything, nor 
was I moved to act.  I abandoned what may have been my duty as a fellow human 
being and continued forward into the attack, doing my duty as a commander. 
 
My indifference to suffering had been nothing more than a stone mask, an 
emotional flak jacket to prevent such pitiful scenes from robbing my body and 
mind of the precious energy and conviction I needed to keep my own men alive. 
[McCoy 2006: 73] 
 
In the context of being a warrior, a combat infantryman, McCoy’s feelings are, during and after 
combat, not the point.  In fact regard for talk of the body is strictly prohibited since potentially 
detracts from the commanders ability to focus on the infantry for whom he is responsible.  To 
understand combat and courageous action then is not about understanding subjective talk of the 
body because it has no place in the embodied conversation that occurs on the battlefield, at least 
for McCoy.
14
 
Since talk from the body is in fact a conversation, it requires translation, just like any 
vocalization.  Until we understand the concepts and values that inform it, watching McCoy and 
his Marines run past wounded Marines to engage enemy fighters would, perhaps, be 
unfathomable and deeply contradictory of a perspective informed by everyday American, 
civilian mores.  Similarly, as with vocalized discourse, a proper anthropological approach seeks 
to understand embodied discourse from the standpoint of the actors first, and then generates 
translations, interpretations, and conclusions.  We do not need to hear how McCoy felt or did not 
feel about his combat experience in order to understand his military identity.  Instead, we need to 
hear, or, rather, see the values he enacts socially and dynamically with his body.  With embodied 
discourse, then, it is not enough to simply videotape or photograph movement.  Instead, we need 
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a movement script that locks observed movement to the observer’s conceptual and value 
orientations.  With such a script, we are less likely to gloss over important, moved cultural 
meanings. 
From a semasiological perspective, explaining human social action means understanding 
human semiotic practices in light of conventions, values, and social rules of a particular cultural 
milieu.  Some good questions to start with are “What are the “rules” for being a person that 
matters to the members of the local cultural milieu?  Are the rules malleable?  What is the range 
of resources for being a person in the local cultural milieu?” Answers to these questions are a 
matter of meaning-laden reasons and values, not mechanical causes and species survival.  While 
these answers can be descriptive, their explanatory content of necessity includes an ontological 
statement of what exists.  Explaining the social actions of the central African shaman has to do 
with, at minimum, the local culture’s understanding of the capabilities and liabilities of an 
mbwiri (malevolent spirit).  But, it is also a question of what the researcher adds to the local 
culture’s self-understanding.  After all, not all cultural members philosophically reflect on their 
lives, they just live them and in this sense they may be wrong about what is going on.  Moreover, 
if a researcher is simply repeating an informant why not skip the middleman and simply talk to 
the informant? 
As the philosopher of social science, Peter T. Manicas states 
 
An ethnographic (and hermeneutic) moment is essential to grasping a social 
mechanism, but as Weber had long since noted, it was but the first step in social 
scientific inquiry.  That is, while we need to understand the social world as its 
members understand it, we need to go beyond this and to consider the adequacy 
of their understanding of their world.  Since social process is the product of our 
activity, and since members may well misunderstand their world, social science is 
potentially emancipatory. [Manicas 2006: 4]. 
 
In this light, it is important to realize that the researcher should take a position on, in this case, 
the question of whether or not an mbwiri actually exists.  Of course a detailed ethnography will 
require a position be taken if it aspires to anything more than simply re-description: it will be 
apparent in how the researcher represents the social milieu of the central African shaman.  This 
does not mean that the researcher is denigrating the beliefs of shamans, but rather accounting for 
them given the fact of her own cultural standpoint, which, in the West, must depend on realism if 
simple re-description is to be avoided. 
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Figure 2: U.S. Marine Corporal Casey Owens Saluting
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Figure 3: American Marine Corporal Casey Owens and British Army Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Sanders
16 
 
 132 
  
Figure 4: Labanotated American (left) and British (right) salutes 
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1
 Alternative but implausible or insufficient conceptions of human movement as it relates to human social action include the 
assumption of universal human gestures in the behaviorism of visual anthropologist J.H. Prost (1975, 1996) and the idea of 
bodily experience separate from or prior to socio-linguistic concepts in the phenomenology of socio-cultural anthropologists Jo 
Lee and Tim Ingold (2006).   
2
 E.g., Aronson, Harré, and Way (1995), Bhaskar (2008), Bunge (2001), Harré (1986), Keat and Urry (1975), Manicas (1991), 
and Shotter (1994) 
3
 Farnell (1999) identifies the Western Platonic-Cartesian notion of the person as a dualistic entity as a discourse that reflects and 
propagates the ontological mistake of assuming that matter is inert and the scientific mistake of violating the integrity of naturally 
occurring wholes, such as “the human person.”  She writes, 
 
Generally speaking, the Western model of person provides a conception of mind as the internal, nonmaterial 
locus of rationality, thought, language, and knowledge.  In opposition to this, the body is regarded as the 
mechanical, sensate, material locus of irrationality and feeling.  After Darwin (1872), such physicality has 
most often been understood as natural rather than cultural, a survival of our animal past perhaps. [Farnell 
1999: 345-346] 
 
With the bifurcation of mind and body embedded in the assumption of the inertness of matter, the search for what “motivates” 
human social action is open-ended and impossible to resolve in principle, but the West identifies language-use both as a symptom 
of what makes us uniquely human and associates it with “mind,” not “body” since bodies are, essentially, inert. Vocal language 
use becomes a symptom of our powerful, intangible “spirit,” an entity not subject to the inertness or mechanical determinism 
otherwise thought to rule the natural world.  Farnell points out that 
 
In Western academia, this bifurcation has led to a valorization of spoken and written signs as “real” 
knowledge, internal to the reasoning mind of the solipsistic individual, to the exclusion of other semiotic (i.e, 
meaning-making) practices, thereby bifurcating intelligent activities.  This, in turn, has produced a radical 
disjunction between verbal and so-called nonverbal aspects of communication in our meta-linguistic 
discourse. [Farnell 1999: 346] 
 
It is in this historical context of Western ideas that both Farnell and Williams claim that “many people simply do not 
see movement, and, although they see signifying acts (such as turn signals, face slapping or greeting gestures), they 
rarely connect these to movement (Williams 2003: 4). 
4
 By “system of signs” Farnell means the network of cultural conventions that assign to movements and to vocalizations as 
people make sense of their lives and generate valued life ways.  It is worth highlighting Farnell’s conception since it differs 
radically from some ethnographic conceptions.  Farnell’s use does not refer to a “system” as conceived by, for example, 
Anthropology and Cultural Studies Professor Roger N. Lancaster in his book Life is Hard: Machismo, Danger, and the Intimacy 
of Power in Nicaragua (1992).  He writes that 
 
Forms of consciousness are precisely what machismo, as a “field of productive relations,” produces… 
 
Lancaster thinks that “fields of productive relations” are systems of power relations, and 
 
Because systems function as systems, operating by and reproducing their own logic—no less in the 
personalities of people than in the realm of international commerce—the relations they engender are not 
easily redefined, even by deliberate, self-conscious efforts. [Lancaster 1992: 20] 
 
Lancaster’s conception of “system” suggests that the power to bring a system into existence is in the system itself.  People are 
somehow apart from the system and so their agency in terms of changing it is circumscribed.  Scientifically, this conception of 
system applied to the socio-cultural life of persons, is implausible because it assigns causal powers to a non-material, extra-
personal entity that does not exist as Lancaster supposes.  In anthropology this mistake is commonly known as “reification.”  But, 
as Varela (2003) argues, the problem with reification is not concretizing an abstraction, but rather assigning causal powers to an 
abstraction. 
Lancaster’s misconception of “system,” like other examples of ethnographic reification, leads to representations of 
persons as impotent victims.  Lancaster states “Nicaraguans themselves remain trapped in a discourse not of their own invention, 
unable to break the circuit of logorrhea” (1992: 230).  “Logorrhea” is Barthes’s neologism denoting “an uncontrolled torrent of 
speech.”  Being trapped and subject to the “imperialism of the [linguistic] sign” means that Nicaraguans are doomed to keep 
living the racist social order bequeathed to them by Spanish colonizers—even to the point of loving their darker-skinned children 
in a way that is conditioned by a sense of defeatist resignation to the “fact” of the lessened social stature of those children 
(Lancaster 1992: 229).  The ethnographic misrepresentation of persons here is not that Nicaraguans do not regard their darker 
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skinned children less, but that Lancaster’s presentation implies that are not to be held responsible for that activity given that their 
social relationships are determined by an impersonal system.  I think anthropologist Sherry Ortner sought (impotently) to avoid 
just this sense of “system” as a deterministic characteristic of human social life. 
5
 (http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/history/vignettes/respect1.html) 
6
 During the summer of 2008 I attended a meeting between the commanding Brigadier General of the British Royal Marines 
Commando training school and the Director of the U.S. Marine Corps Martial Arts Center of Excellence.  The point of the 
meeting was to solidify plans to exchange personnel to better understand training principles and goals in each program. 
7
 Labanotation permits the researcher to identify features of movement in two ways.  First, the researcher can pick out and call 
specific attention to movement that is important from the standpoint of informants. Second, the researcher can pick out and call 
specific attention to movement or components of movement that are important for the researcher’s analytical and explanatory 
purposes without collapsing one into the other.  For both American and British soldiers, the salute as a whole may be of primary 
importance while the researcher notices the subtle but ethnographically important and culturally definitive difference in the 
orientation of the palm.  Both, however, are clearly represented in the Labanotation.  In these aspects, Labanotation differs 
radically from the attempt to graphically represent movement found in, for example, Gell’s Style and Meaning in Umeda Dance 
(1985).  Gell develops “an ‘observer’s model’…within which relationships between [patterns of movement] can be made 
explicit” that “reduces Umeda dance movements simply to movements of the leg, seen sideways on” aimed at “uncovering gross 
features of the shapes produced by plotting Umeda dance movements on to graphs” (1985: 185, 187, 188).  There are at least two 
major problems here.  First, Gell’s “observationist” standpoint is clearly his, not that of his informants, which necessarily limits 
the representation to what he alone thinks is important.  Do the Umeda, for example, place some substantive emphasis or 
generate special meanings with the movements of their legs?  We do not know, and we cannot know give Gell’s approach.  This 
gives rise to the second problem: Gell has no way to justify why we should pay attention to the “gross features” of the shapes 
produced by plotting.  Umeda leg movements are plotted as a function the angles of bent knees and bent legs.  But since we have 
no way of knowing whether or not those functional relationships capture anything of semiotic importance to the Umeda, there is 
no way for Gell to protect himself from the charge of masquerading an artifact of his graphing as ethnographic data about the 
Umeda.  For example, it might be the case that for the Umeda, angles are irrelevant compared to, say, the speed of achievement 
of those angles. 
8
 Note that “coolly” and “unhinged” are individual terms that summarize the observers assessment of the quality of Reno’s 
actions both vocally and bodily.  That is, these terms reference in substantive ways the ways Reno moved and did not move as 
well as the ways he did and did not vocalize. 
9
 In the same was Harrington could not see the plane landing on the Hudson or Marion could not see the crawling Japanese 
soldiers as part of a patrol. 
10
 Two other witnesses during the battle described the Sioux way of fighting: “As a rule they fired from their horses, scampered 
around and pumped their Winchester rifles into us” (In Reno 1997: 178); and “Indians are individual fighters; each one has his 
own way of doing it” (In Reno 1997: 179).  Rather than the individual, most Western militaries historically have used at least two 
soldiers trained to operate as a single entity as the basic unit for warfighting. 
11
 In the United States, the traditional outlook has been that defensive tactics are to be avoided unless absolutely necessary.  Such 
tactics have been historically associated with timidity rather than aggressiveness. Custer’s style was aggressive.  Such tactics can 
and often did work.  In my judgment this is one of the reasons why Major Reno and Lieutenant Colonel Custer could have been, 
until the Battle of the Little Big Horn, successful inter-cultural fighters: the speed and firepower achieved by organized multi-
person teams with a unified purpose and shared commitment overwhelmed more individualistic enemies.  Also in my judgment 
this same quality is one of the principle reasons Major Reno found himself in the predicament he did: in his haste to attack and in 
his (over)confidence in aggressive attacks, Custer underestimated, discounted, or ignored the danger associated with the sheer 
number of Sioux warriors and their allies. 
12
 In modern warfare, another way that circumscription of the enemy’s agency is achieved is through firing at the general 
location of a target.  Even if the fire is not all that accurate, the perceived volume and directedness (at you!) of fire can hold 
soldiers in place.  In McNab’s Tour of Duty video, another British Paratrooper, Sergeant Major Mick Bolton described being 
“pinned down,” 
 
I was in a ditch and there was rounds you see it on the films the explosions all around you [unintelligible] I 
couldn’t move the O.C. was shouting for me and I just couldn’t move I was pinned down we were starting to 
get encircled by Taliban I could see them some of them were like 20 meters away [unintelligible] started 
getting his kit out I said pack it away we haven’t got time whatever we get we’re gonna get rolled up here and 
if we don’t move here we’re all gonna die here.  [In McNab 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YUp02m_duBw&feature=PlayList&p=09CD20B60EF04D7C&index=12
&playnext=3&playnext_from=PL 00:00-00:30] 
13
 Here are two relevant clips from the program 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DBv_iw4zhFw&feature=PlayList&p=09CD20B60EF04D7C&index=11&playnext=2&playne
xt_from=PL.  The locations are 4:28-4:33 and 5:59-6:15. 
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14
 This insight has direct implications for an American civilian perception of dedicated military members as emotionally cold, 
unfeeling, and heartless. 
15
 http://www.talkingproud.us/ImagesPhotoGallery/Patriot/MarineSalutesInjured.jpg 
16
  http://www.talkingproud.us/ImagesPhotoGallery/Patriot/MarineSalutesInjured.jpg and 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-479745/Basra-handover-defeat-insists-PM-Brown.html 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONTEXT: THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS AND THE MARTIAL ARTS CENTER 
OF EXCELLENCE 
 
 
The thought manifests as the word; the word manifests as the deed;  
The deed develops into habit; and habit hardens into character. 
-- The Buddha 
 
I have focused so far on developing the concepts necessary for a scientifically and 
philosophically plausible ethnography of the embodied value ‘courage’ among American Marine 
combat infantry.  The necessity comes from the realization that to see and understand 
phenomena, whether occurrences in the natural world like “continental drift” or in the social 
world like “an insult,” requires appropriate conceptual resources of how those events are caused 
and how they then cause other events in the physical and social worlds respectively.  Rigorous 
analytical study of the phenomena of human movement requires the right conceptual resources.  
The right concepts include the scientific and philosophical idea that (1) human beings as persons 
are uniquely capable among the organic life forms on the planet to use both vocal and gestural 
language to generate meaning interactively, (2) the competent use of both vocal and gestural 
language both creates and depends on irreducibly social and cultural contexts to generate 
meaning, and (3) a recognition that the researcher will take a position on the adequacy of his 
consultants’ view of their social world regardless of any overt intention to do so.  This implies 
that the researcher is morally responsible for, in turn, the adequacy of the theoretical framework 
he choose to generate that position. 
For the ethnographic component of this project this means that dynamically embodied 
persons are the only plausible, existing entities to which we can attribute the capability and so 
capability of producing the diverse socio-cultural milieu that includes “courageous action.”  The 
classic mistake in Western social science has been to ascribe the power to produce the human 
social world to entities that are scientifically implausible and so freakish such as a psychological 
unconscious, a biological instinct or DNA, a social fact, or a cultural rule.  This chapter then 
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focuses on the use of the right scientific and philosophical concepts to rigorously analyze the 
ethnographic context and detail of Marine combat training. 
I intend to show that the Marine Corps is a special kind of sub-culture, purpose- and 
value-driven in definitive ways based on their encounter with killing, life, and death.  As we 
might expect, the purpose and values of the Corps is evident in the activities of the local sub-
cultural unit in which I undertook my field research, the Martial Arts Center of Excellence in 
Quantico, Virginia and they constitute a critical context for the generation of meaning.  That is, 
the purposes and values of the larger cultural organization enable the generation of meaning in 
vocal and gestural discourse.  This constitutes an application of Farnell’s “system of signs.” 
It is a social scientific truism and so to be kept in mind that the semiotic practices of 
members may or may not be aligned with the overt purposes and values expressed in and through 
the larger organization.  The converse is also a truism, that organizations often have informal 
“rules” of conduct as well as formal rules.  Informal rules may not only spring from a single 
person but may actually be more important or more “valued” in some situations than the formal 
rules.  Careful analysis and judgment needs to be exercised in such cases since some values that 
are formally disapproved remain sanctioned informally both by local actors and the larger 
organization itself.  An example of the latter would be a Marine engaging in a formally 
prohibited act which is recognized by the organization but nevertheless goes unpunished.  An 
example in the same vein that has puzzled me for a great while is, given the near-religious 
commitment to teamwork in the American military, why do Americans and even the military 
generally value the actions of individuals over units in our moral hierarchy?  In popular and 
military thought, accounts of Congressional Medal of Honor recipients eclipse accounts of 
Presidential Unit Citation recipients. 
I will structure my analysis using the semasiological principle of “nesting,” which is 
illustrated in Figure 5 (see Figures section at the end of this chapter).  At this point most of my 
analysis will be located at levels IX through V.  For the sake of efficiency in presentation, I will 
not draw specific one-to-one correspondences between my topical material and the charted level 
in the text.  My goal is to provide a detailed analysis of the relevant context in order to conduct a 
detailed analysis of action—at levels IV through I—in the next chapter.  There I will examine 
how dynamically embodied movement in context is courage. 
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The United States Marine Corps: Warfighting as Purpose for Existence 
 
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) is America’s “quick reaction force,” meaning 
that the purpose of the organization is designed to be capable of “intervening” anywhere in the 
world within a matter of days.
1
  The USMC website characterizes the Corps as the  
 
First to fight, ready to win battles in the air, on land and at sea. 
 
When our nation’s commitment to democracy is challenged, when our national 
interests are threatened, in times of international disaster, crisis or war, the Marine 
Corps is ready.  We will be first on the scene, first to help and first to fight. For 
this, we have earned the reputation as “America’s 911 Force” — our nation’s first 
line of defense.  The Marine Corps is ready to respond on the ground, in the air 
and by sea. [http://www.marines.com/main/index/making_marines/culture/traditions/ 
first_to_fight] 
 
While the Marine Corps is capable of intervention in an “international disaster,” I want to argue 
that that capability is an offshoot of the Corps’ primary purpose: warfighting.  Marines do not 
train primarily to provide relief for international disasters instead they train primarily to win 
wars.  The discipline and organization of Marines to fight is the bedrock on which effectiveness 
in disaster relief is predicated.  Marines leverage some aspects of capabilities developed in the 
service of warfighting to meet the demands of roles other than warfighting. 
If warfighting is the primary purpose, what is war to the Marine Corps?  During my 
fieldwork, one of the Marine leaders of the training program in which I took part alerted me to 
the small volume called Warfighting (2007) that was, in his view, a concise summary of the 
Marines’ approach to war.  In it, the Corps defines war as “a violent struggle between two 
hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other.”  The 
Marines assert simply and directly that war is fundamentally an interactive social process 
focused on dominating the enemy, meaning other persons.  Warfighting warns Marines that it is 
critical to keep in mind that “the enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon but an 
independent and animate force with its own objectives and plans” (United States Marine Corps 
2007:3-4).  This warning directly references one of the main points of this study’s theoretical 
position: to think that people are inert is a fundamental error.  In war, this kind of error gets you 
killed.  The Corps’ terminology in their warning is a bit strange, however, particularly the use of 
the pronoun “its.”  We know that terminology and convention in the use of English permits if not 
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invites its users to turn intangible ideas into “things,” and “things” into empirical “problems” to 
be “solved” (Whorf 1956).  Speculatively, then, the use of the term indexes the strong tendency 
in the American military to objectify the other as part of a strategy to focus on the practical and 
utilitarian in warfare even as the Corps warns Marines not to objectify the enemy!   On this 
analysis, for the Corps to really honor its commitment to being realists in their assessment of and 
engagement with real world conflicts, it should use the term “his” or “her” instead of the term 
“its” and “person” not “force” (or, “the force of persons”) to characterize the enemy.  Only 
persons, not forces, can be animate in relation to “owning” objectives and plans.  The Corps’ 
advice, nevertheless, belies its realism: other creative, intelligent, causally powerful people with 
purposes and values are the source of, and so the problem in, warfighting.  
The constitution of the Corps itself is symptomatic of its warfighting purpose.  That 
constitution is oriented toward the principled management and application of violence.  The 
Corps states, “It is through the use of violence, or the credible threat of violence, that we compel 
our enemy to do our will.  Violence is an essential element of war and its immediate result is 
bloodshed, destruction, and suffering” (United States Marine Corps 2007: 14).  As one Marine 
Instructor-Trainer, Staff Sergeant Wilder, stated during a training class on “The Warrior 
Mindset” being a Marine is being a warrior and being a warrior is “being a Marine in combat.”  
According to SSgt. Wilder, all human dimensions of being a Marine center on this grounding 
principle (Fieldnotes, July 2, 2007).  The use of the Corps in an “intervention” therefore 
presumes that the target situation is dangerous, threatening, overtly hostile, or, potentially so. 
This combination of organizational purpose and member identity permits an important 
realization: even if the situation is not dangerous or potentially dangerous to begin with, the 
presence of armed Marines makes it so.  Combat and the potential for combat is assumed and 
generated by the Marine Corps.  At minimum, in, for example, a disaster relief scenario, an 
intervention entails ensuring the security of the Marines themselves.  Establishing security 
further presumes using force or the threat of force as a counter to actual or potential violence in 
the target situation.
2
  Again, the Corps assumes the potential for, if not the likelihood of, violence 
and combat.  We can conclude that the potential and likelihood is generated by the mere 
presence of the Corps in an environment. 
The imposition of will on any scale, however, from two to two million, in any situation 
from disaster relief to war, assumes the ability to control the will of others.  This can be 
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accomplished in many different ways, as Warfighting (2007) implies.  Through force, for 
example, by making “the enemy helpless to resist us by physically destroying his military 
capabilities” (United States Marine Corps 2007: 24-25).
3
  The Marines call this attrition.  
Control can also be achieved through force or the threat of force to “convince the enemy that 
accepting our terms will be less painful than continuing to resist” (United States Marine Corps 
2007: 25).  The Marines call this erosion.  Importantly, gaining control or imposing their will on 
others tacitly indexes a specific kind of physical location: land.  The Marines’ mission calls for 
being prepared in three kinds of environments, but, I would argue, their primary focus is on land 
since it is on land that, quite simply, socio-political will is based.  In short, enemy persons live 
their culture existentially but live materially on land.  Influencing the enemy’s agency in the 
form of their socio-politics can be accomplished in the air and on the sea, but controlling it must 
be accomplished on land. 
We can appreciate this tacit focus in the fact that Marine air and sea forces are designed 
to support the organization’s primary task of being able to control people on land.  The mission 
of the non-infantry components of the Corps, such as the Marine Air Wing, is “to support ground 
forces in support of the mission.”
4
  By contrast, consider the mission of the U.S. Air Force, 
which is to “fly, fight and win...in air, space and cyberspace.”
5
  Even more indicative of this tacit 
focus is the Corps’ requirement that all enlisted Marines receive training as riflemen and all 
officers receive training as infantry platoon leaders regardless of their job or Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS).
6
  The tagline used to capture this approach is, “Every Marine a 
rifleman.”  As a result, even cooks are trained to take on the role, if necessary, of infantry and 
learn to cooperate with twelve other Marines in physically approaching and eliminating enemy 
positions using rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, and other close combat weapons.  Similarly, 
all officers, including helicopter pilots for example, are trained to lead a platoon of about forty 
Marines in the same task.
7
 
We should note that in requiring every Marine to be capable of infantry fighting, the 
Marine Corps is requiring that every Marine be prepared to, as Marine Colonel and infantry 
combat veteran Bryan P. McCoy succinctly describes it, “violently close with the enemy” (2006: 
78).  A good place to start investigating this concept of “violently closing with the enemy” is to 
elaborate the Corps’ two main ways of establishing control: attrition and erosion.  The Corps 
seems to be inviting us to think that warfighting is mostly about the physical processes of 
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“reducing in numbers” and “eating away.”  The Corps’ conceptualization of warfighting, 
however, contradicts this invitation. 
 
Various aspects of war fall principally in the realm of science, which is the 
methodical application of the empirical laws of nature.  The science of war 
includes those activities directly subject to the laws of ballistics, mechanics, and 
like disciplines; for example, the application of fires, the effects of weapons, and 
the rates and methods of movement and resupply.  However, science does not 
describe the whole phenomenon. 
 An even greater part of the conduct of war falls under the realm of art, 
which is the employment of creative or intuitive skills.  Art includes the creative 
situational application of scientific knowledge through judgment and experience, 
and so the art of war subsumes the science of war.  The art of war requires the 
intuitive ability to grasp the essence of a unique military situation and the creative 
ability to devise a practical solution.  It involves conceiving strategies and tactics 
and developing plans of action to suit a given situation.  This still does not 
describe the whole phenomenon.  Owing to the vagaries of human behavior and 
the countless other intangible factors which influence war, there is far more to its 
conduct than can be explained by art and science.  Art and science stop short of 
explaining the fundamental dynamics of war. 
 War is a social phenomenon.  Its essential dynamic is the dynamic of 
competitive human interaction rather than the dynamic of art or science.  Human 
beings interact with each other in ways that are fundamentally different from the 
way a scientist works with chemicals or formulas or the way an artist works with 
paints or musical notes.  It is because of this dynamic of human interaction that 
fortitude, perseverance, boldness, esprit, and other traits not explainable by art or 
science are so essential in war.  We thus conclude that the conduct of war is 
fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both the 
knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power 
of human will. [United States Marine Corps 2007: 18-19] 
 
According to the Corps, attrition and erosion are brought into existence by and subject to, in 
realist scientific terms, the agency of Marines themselves as they seek to combine knowledge of 
the empirical world with creative use of their intelligence to meet the challenges of fighting 
conceived as a competitive social interaction.  “Will,” at least as the Marines are using it, is a 
traditional Western codeword for “agency.” 
In this light the Marines are using the term attrition, or reduction in numbers, in a literal 
sense to denote the destruction of tangible objects like soldiers, missiles, radar stations, and so 
forth.  The Marines are referring to the basic scientific fact that loss of physical integrity means 
the loss of the capability for action by physical objects (including human bodies), depending on 
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which particular parts of what kind of object are lost and on the extent of the loss.  With erosion, 
or eating away, however, the Marines are using the term metaphorically.  That is, “eating away” 
is a physical process applied to the social-psychological process of undermining the enemy’s 
“will to fight,” for example by reducing the number of his friends, eliminating his ability to 
communicate with other units or commanders, or destroying his weaponry.  To be clear, the 
Marines cannot mean that they directly undermine the enemy’s will to exercise her agency 
against American Marines, as if there was a mechanical causal relationship between their actions 
and the erosion of the enemy’s will; rather, non-physical failure to exercise agency is 
symptomatic of a choice on the part of the enemy to cease resisting to do what the Marines want 
them to do (or not do as the case may be). 
When a situation becomes overtly threatening or violent on any scale from two 
individuals to two million, the discursive framework becomes one of “challenge to control,” 
which calls into question the what the Corps thinks are the bases for individual action: the 
physical, mental, and character qualities of the Marine.
8
  Combat, we can conclude, is personal in 
the sense that it is about the exercise of agency in an idiom of embodied violence by the 
individual against other individuals.  Combat is about deciding whose purposes and values will 
determine the socio-political reality of a locality, whether that locality is a patch of sand behind a 
house in Iraq or an entire country like Afghanistan.  Combat, then, is a question of political 
freedom that mandates, and is based on, the resolution of the question of ontological freedom. 
I should note that this does not mean that Marines automatically start killing people once 
the discursive framework of personal challenge emerges, as a Stimulus-Response (S-R) 
framework would have us believe.  Rather, the Corps’ takes seriously the notion that the personal 
agency of Marines through its realist approach to agency is informed by its conceptions of 
warfighting as social, and of social situations as fluid.  That is, what people, Marines, and 
situations mean can change, remains stable, or be in some ambiguous or contradictory state.  
This variability requires ongoing assessments and choices about what level and kind violence, if 
any, Marines should use once control is called into question (United States Marine Corps 2007).  
What have here, in effect, an introduction to what the Corps envisions as a “good Marine.”  Not 
only does the good Marine need to be realistic in conducting himself in combat, but also she 
needs to subject her exercise of violence to intelligent judgment against Corps values and 
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principles.  This is, simply, discipline: Marines controlling their own actions to honor and 
achieve purposes and values in light of potential or real conflicting values and meanings. 
Our sense of the meaning of being disciplined comes from the purposes and values in the 
service of which self-control is being exercised.  Marines have shown that they will risk their 
own lives by holding their fire against insurgents in Iraq, for example, to uphold American 
values like “not killing civilians or women or children.”  This does not mean, however, that in 
some contexts, or in situations of conflicting values, decisions to kill civilians will not be made.  
Former U.S. Army officer and combat veteran Paul Rieckhoff said this about his experience 
manning checkpoints in Iraq: 
 
I spent roughly a year in Baghdad and manned countless checkpoints just like the 
one that's described in this incident.  I think the thing I want people to really 
understand is the enormous pressure that these soldiers are under and the enormity 
of the task that they're faced with. They're asked to make really split second 
decisions that could mean the difference between their own lives and obviously 
Iraqi civilian lives as well.  It's a tremendous amount of pressure and soldiers are 
forced to make these types of decisions in Iraq every single day.  It's really not a 
good duty that you want. I mean you're under tremendous pressure from car 
bombs, from RPG's, from insurgents. There's a million and one ways that an 
American soldier could be killed in these checkpoints and at the same time they 
are trying to preserve the lives of civilians. 
[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june05/checkpoint_3-7.html] 
 
Rieckhoff’s comments alert us to the fact that, at times, the lack of clarity in situations of 
potential or actual violence can lead to a fundamental lack of clarity about the status and 
meaning of soldiers’ actions.  Are those Marines who choose to fire on vehicles refusing to stop 
any less disciplined than those Marines who chose not to fire?  If we refuse to commit the 
irrational mistake of holding Marines accountable for knowing before the fact what could only 
be known after the fact—that the car was not loaded with explosives but refused to stop because 
the driver did not, for example, understand American hand signals—then how can we answer the 
question posed above?
9
 
 An important realization here is that situations that are clear can become unclear not 
simply through the dynamics of social interaction and interaction with the physical environment, 
but through allegiance to a value system as well.  This is a form of allegiance to ideals that, 
while foundational to the identity of a soldier as a good soldier and American, can get him killed.  
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U.S. Army Staff Sergeant David Bellavia is a recipient of the Silver Star and was recommended 
for the Congressional Medal of Honor.  He was in the infantry fighting in Iraq in 2003 when he 
spotted a gunman on a roof and snuck up behind him.  The gunman was 
 
a teenaged boy, maybe sixteen years old.  I could see him scanning for targets, his 
back to me.  He held an AK-47 without a stock.  Was he just a stupid kid trying to 
protect his family?  Was he one of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shiite fanatics?  I kept my 
eyes on him and prayed he’d put the AK down and just get back inside his own 
house.  I didn’t want to shoot him. 
 He turned and saw me, and I could see the terror on his sweat-streaked 
face.  I put him in my sights just as he adjusted his AK against his shoulder.  I had 
beaten him on the draw.  My own rifle was snug in my shoulder, the sight resting 
on him.  The kid stood no chance. 
 Please don’t do this.  You don’t need to die. 
 The AK went to full ready-up.  Was he aiming at me?  I couldn’t be sure, 
but the barrel was trained at my level.  Do I shoot?  Do I risk not shooting?  Was 
he silently trying to save me from some unseen threat?  I didn’t know.  I had to 
make a decision. 
 Please forgive me for this. 
 I pulled the trigger.  The kid’s chin fell to his chest, and a guttural moan 
escaped his lips.  I fired again, missed, then pulled the trigger one more time.  The 
bullet tore his jaw and ear off.  Sergeant Hall came up alongside me, saw the AK 
and the boy, and finished him with four shots to his chest.  He slumped against the 
low rooftop wall. 
 “Thanks, dude.  I lost my zero,” I said to Hall, explaining that my rifle 
sights were off-line, though that was the last thing going through my mind. [2007: 
6-7]. 
 
SSgt. Bellavia’s quandary is both similar to and radically different from that of U.S. Marine 
Sergeant Stevens’s quandary, which was whether or not to shoot the old Iraqi man who grabbed 
his rifle muzzle.  Both soldiers’ quandaries are ethical problems concerning the enactment of 
values.  The quandaries center on whether to enact the trained and institutionally expected (the 
Army’s) response to “hostile intent” or to modify the training lesson and abridge the institution’s 
value system in light of their own judgment of the meaning of the situation.  The other person in 
each soldiers’ case was judged to be afraid and both soldiers wanted to reconsider their initial 
understanding of the meaning of their respective situations in light of that judgment.  Both 
soldiers, moreover, had very little time in which to reassess the other person, their relationship to 
that person, and, based on the result, kill or not kill the other person. 
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There is a qualitative difference, however, in the grounds for each soldiers’ hesitation to 
kill pending reconsideration of the meaning of their respective situations.  In Sgt. Stevens’s case, 
an old man grabbed his rifle barrel in a dark house in the middle of the night.  In SSgt. Bellavia’s 
case, a boy leveled a combat rifle at him on a rooftop in daylight after scanning for targets.  
Beyond the context for and actions of each person, Stevens and Bellavia considered their 
respective identities.  The old man and the boy were being assessed as potentially harmless based 
on the soldiers’ (perhaps stereotyped) association of each with an age-based identity category.  In 
the United States, old men and boys are, generally protected when it comes to combat because 
they are defined as “harmless,” but not if they are armed and embodying the intention to use the 
weapon.  Here is a critical, realistic, factual distinction in each situation.  The old man was not 
armed, the boy was.  We can admire the self-control exercised by Stevens but what should we 
make of Bellavia’s? 
While we don’t know the full details of either soldier’s perceptual field—for example did 
Stevens simply assume or did he actually see that the old man was unarmed—but we can 
usefully posit a question as to how and why, in Bellavia’s more obvious situation, he hesitated.  I 
suggest that Bellavia was living out his ethical commitment to not killing children despite the 
fact that the boy was aiming to kill Bellavia.  Importantly, there is a kind of idealism at work in 
both Stevens’s and Bellavia’s cases, but each is of a different ‘flavor.’  Stevens’ idealism was 
qualified by what might be called the “level of threat” in the context of the old man’s actions and 
his being unarmed.  He saved the life of another by choosing not to follow-through on what he 
might have at least been legally within his rights to do and at most institutionally expected to do 
given his training.  His risk was to his own moral life in the name of the life of another who 
presented little threat.  Stevens’ risk was losing his moral life temporarily.  Bellavia’s risk was to 
his own life in the name of an idealized version of the actual person in front of him who 
presented an imminent lethal threat.  Bellavia’s risk was also losing his physical life 
permanently.  In the comparison, Bellavia’s quandary was a personal battle between idealism 
and realism in a moment of lethal danger.  Through this comparison we can appreciate that 
combat infantry choose to act fast, and to risk physically and morally lethal confrontations, in the 
midst of perceptual, conceptual, and moral ambiguity. 
We should note too the fact that often the actions of a combat infantryman in a moment 
of lethal danger impact, potentially or actually, his or her comrades.  Risk is endemic not only to 
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the combatants individually but to the combatants corporately and in close combat, it might be 
impossible to separate risk to self and risk to comrades.  Insurgents in Fallujah, Iraq, trapped 
SSgt. Bellavia and a number of his fellow soldiers in the living room of a house.  The insurgents 
were through a doorway, only feet from the soldiers.  As the insurgents were firing intermittently 
at the trapped soldiers one of Bellavia’s comrades, Misa, shouts 
 
“Frag out. Frag out” [which warns the soldiers that he is about to use a 
fragmentation grenade on the insurgents in the next room].  This mortifies 
[another soldier] Fitts.  “No,” he hisses.  Misa freezes.  Fitts continues, “They’ll 
bowl that bitch right back at us.  You’ve got no idea where they’re at.  You don’t 
know how many fucking dudes are in here.  Don’t frag out.  Put it away.”  Misa 
abandons the grenade idea. 
 Misa’s aborted plan gives me an idea.  A few days before we assaulted 
Fallujah, Staff Sergeant Hector Diaz…traded some shit with Special Forces to get 
me a flash-bang grenade.  It has a two-second use, and will stun anyone who is 
unfortunate enough to be around when it goes off.  I could throw it and stun the 
insurgents long enough for everyone to escape.  I mull this over while fingering 
the flash-bang’s cylindrical tube.  It looks like an oversized roll of Kodak film.  
I’ve never use one of these things before, and that gives me pause.  If I fuck up, I 
could flash out the entire platoon and incapacitate myself and my own men.  
That’s a pretty big risk.  I abandon the flash-bank idea. [2007: 210-211]. 
 
Interestingly, in this case, SSgt. Bellavia’s judgment is that using a weapon system he is 
unfamiliar with is a greater risk than enduring the direct fire of enemy insurgents just feet away 
from him and his fellow soldiers.  His judgment indexes the substantial self-discipline that 
combat infantry are required to exercise in fighting. 
Not all challenges to the physical, mental, and character qualities of soldiers and Marines 
as disciplined actors are as dramatic as SSgt. Bellavia’s.  They can be subtle.  Consider a 
criticism of the American tactic of sequestering troops in protected camps and armored vehicles 
while trying to battle insurgency in Iraq in 2006.  Former U.S. Marine infantryman during the 
Vietnam War and author of a number of studies on counter-insurgency warfare, F. J. “Bing” 
West, argued that the Iraqi insurgency’s “roots lie below the level of the military effort.  The 
Iraqi Army provides a [security] umbrella only as long as squad-sized patrols are present in an 
area” (West 2006: 5).  When the ground troops leave an area, insurgents are able to influence or 
control the local population to the detriment of American and Iraqi interests. 
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The new U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2007), a 
handbook containing principles for conducting a counterinsurgency for officers who lead groups 
of about six hundred infantrymen, states that “If military forces remain in their compounds, they 
lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to insurgents” 
(2007: 48).  Physical presence and direct action is acknowledged as necessary to achieve control.  
If we follow the logic of this requirement in conjunction with the purpose of the Marine Corps as 
I developed it above, we can conclude that establishing control requires judgments about the use 
of violence.  Such judgments in turn constitute an appreciation of why, and under what 
conditions, that physical presence and action is necessary.  Knowing the relationship between 
“security” and “control” and the potential for the use of violence in establishing that relationship, 
even a simple phrase like “secure that house” places the Marine’s presence and actions in an 
ethical frame.  A principle emerges here that is underwritten by semasiological theory: despite 
any seeming simplicity the actions of combat infantry are always framed in terms of some ethic. 
Placing the presence and actions of Marines into an ethical frame simply by using a 
phrase as seemingly utilitarian as “secure that house” suggests the further question of what 
Americans call “character:” “Are Marines willing to fight?  Will they enact the necessary 
physical presence by leaving their bases and vehicles thereby putting themselves at risk for death 
or long-term psychological issues?  Will they do the hard thought-work necessary to conducting 
their operations within legal and moral bounds?”  If we take seriously the conception of agency 
discussed in the first chapters of this study, there is no way to guarantee an affirmative answer to 
any of these questions.  Nor is there any way to pre-figure, with certainty or any approximation 
thereof, what judgments will need to be made in the face of novel or ambiguous situations, what 
value conflicts will arise, or what outcomes with ensue in the actual course of events. 
These realist acknowledgments about the nature of combat action result in a realistic 
approach to training combat infantry.  In my view, after experiencing it, the point is to increase 
the probability that Marines will fight, and that they will fight in ways that are within legal and 
moral bounds.  Ideally, the probability of “correct action” is to be increased through individual 
motivation and purpose rather than external oversight.  Realistically, teams of Marines are more 
effective than individuals in many ways, ranging from, simply, more firepower on a battlefield, to 
motivational support during combat, to conferees about competing courses of action and their 
potential consequences.  Highly motivated individual Marines in teams are, in my estimation, the 
 148 
ultimate goal, therefore, of training.  There are two basic infantry combat units in the Marine 
Corps.  One is the individual Marine and the other is the combination of the individual Marine 
and his or her “battle buddy.”
10
  Colonel McCoy’s (2006) book on leading Marines conveys the 
realization (on the Corps’ part) that the presence of a fellow Marine during combat is one 
important way to increase the likelihood that Marines will “violently close with the enemy” and, 
perhaps, die, in order to achieve the goal of killing or incapacitating them. 
The analysis so far has skirted a value that seems unmarked in Marine Corps discourse.  
That unmarked value, certainty, has to do with control and it requires some attention before we 
can move forward.  There is one way in particular to be certain of control of an area.  It is a 
corollary to “boots on the ground.”  To be certain of control one can denude an area of people by 
killing them all.  Since Marine and American values do not sanction this kind of activity—you 
cannot kill everyone because not everyone is a combatant, or, deserves to die—certainty is, at 
best, an ideal to be pursued, but never to be realized except in special situations where all the 
inhabitants of an area, such as a military fortification, are combatants.  For example, after 
cordoning off the city of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004 thus defining it as a battlefield, the American 
military permitted non-combatants to enter and leave the city based on the license plates on their 
cars.11  Given the Marine Corps’ realist recognition of persons as agents the attempt to allow 
residents some freedom of movement is antithetical to the logic of control and security that the 
Marines seek to establish in combat zones.  When Marines permit non-Marines into any 
environment they create uncertainty, not certainty.  After all, today’s ally can be tomorrow’s 
insurgent (and sometimes for good reasons).  Consequently, we should appreciate the depth of 
the Marine commitment to the value of not just the lives of others (non-combatants) but the 
quality of those lives.  Institutionally and formally, the Marines choose to live in a constant state 
of risk and uncertainty.  In fact, they create it, simply by adhering to their values, and, as I noted 
above, simply by their presence.  The U.S. Marine Corps is an organization that creates, invites, 
and risks the antithesis or destruction of itself in pursuit of its treasured values. 
Within the category of “combatant,” then, killing people is a means to certainty of control 
for the military.  Killing can be, and, for many of the Marines I interacted with, actually is 
conceived as a practical problem concerning the mechanics of strength, intelligent and speedy 
application of force, and efficient and accurate use of weaponry.  The more quickly and the more 
pointedly force is applied, the greater the chance that warfighting capabilities, whether enemy 
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weapons systems or bodies, are eliminated.  One example from my fieldwork can be seen in the 
video “MAIT 03-07” in Appendix A.  The time frame 8:52 to 9:04 illustrates my failure to apply 
a basic principle of the training I received: never go “strength-on-strength” with an opponent.  It 
wastes energy and time, which are precious in a combat situation.  The point of the exercise was 
for each team of Marines to dunk the heads of their opponents under the water (as a safety 
measure we were also responsible for ensuring they resurfaced) while being neck-deep and 
blindfolded in a river.  I am nearest the camera and the first to be dunked by my opponent, Staff 
Sergeant McCloskey.  SSgt. McCloskey had the nickname “Sergeant Smash” in light of his 
imposing stature and physical strength.  Nevertheless, he chose to apply his strength more 
intelligently than I: he grabbed my head while I grabbed his shoulders.  Trying to “muscle” him 
under was foolish and got me eliminated.  He used the principle, “where the head goes the body 
follows,” which we had learned during the training. 
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps (2007) calls the use of force a “kinetic” solution to a 
battlefield problem in their jointly issued Counterinsurgency Field Manual.  Kinetic solutions 
and their call for the application of practical principles to combat can translate into security for 
some period of time depending on the local circumstances.  For Americans, the cultural 
assumption seems to be that kinetic actions should result in kinetic actions in return, thereby 
promoting the emergence of “strength on strength” contests.  This assumption is, I think, what 
underlies the historical American global dominance on conventional battlefields.  We think in 
terms of what is vernacularly called “a pissing contest.” 
The brilliance of an insurgency is predicated on avoiding such contests.  Insurgents 
exploit weakness and seek to avoid a “strength-on-strength” contest since they will most often 
lose against the usually superior organization, firepower, and resources of conventional forces.  
“Non-kinetic” solutions to battlefield problems have emerged recently in light of the form of, for 
example, the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS).  “The HTS approach is to place the 
expertise and experience of social scientists and regional experts, coupled with reach-back, open-
source research, directly in support of deployed units engaging in full-spectrum operations.”
12
  It 
should be noted that, generally, non-kinetic solutions are employed chronologically prior to or 
after actual combat, with the point being to avoid killing and so undermine the hatred, contempt, 
or other motivators to combat with conventional forces.
13
  Emphasizing the radically different 
social situation for the employment of kinetic versus non-kinetic solutions, the 
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Counterinsurgency Field Manual states, “The admonition ‘Sometimes, the More Force Used, the 
Less Effective It Is’ does not apply when the enemy is ‘coming over the barricades’; however, 
that thought is applicable when increased security is achieved in an area” (2007: 48).  One of the 
most troubling components of an insurgency situation for American and Western soldiers is that 
battlefields, as spaces of physical conflict, emerge and disappear at the whim of combatants who 
choose when, where, how, and for how long, they remain combatants.  Insurgents’ refusal to 
overtly “hold” terrain and so establish clear “lines,” along with the ease with which they blend in 
with the local population, means that Marines assigned the task of leaving their defined bases 
must train to be constantly ready to make split-second choices like that of Sergeant Stevens 
between kinetic and non-kinetic “solutions.”  In fact, such split-second decisions were overtly 
conceptualized and discussed during my time as trainee and trainer with the Marines.  Combat 
veteran and fellow trainee Staff Sergeant Twiggs noted in the context of a discussion about 
checkpoints in Iraq that the Marines, as well as the rest of the U.S. military, did not realize that 
hand signals were not universal: 
 
Yeah, holding up your hand with palm outward, facing them, does NOT mean 
stop to Iraqis.  It’s a curled “o” with the thumb to fingers and it’s pointing toward 
you, not toward them, like this… 
 
The ensuing confusion caused by this lack of cross-cultural knowledge about dynamically 
embodied action-signs provided the basis for a further discussion of shoot/don’t-shoot decision-
making that led SSgt. Twiggs to remark in amazement, 
 
The way these Marines flip, the way their brains flip, you know especially these 
infantry, since they’re out here training to kill every day. [Fieldnotes, June 14, 
2007] 
 
Combat veteran and trainer Staff Sergeant Wyman told me that “the decision between lethal and 
non-lethal is instantaneous, and yes we can train it” (June 14, 2007).  In keeping with the 
theoretical position of this study I interpret the remarks of the staff sergeants to mean that Marine 
training is a distinct and special affair.  Marines are being trained to ‘act reflectively’, that is to  
‘decide in an instant’ whether or not to kill and thus to act spontaneously, they are not being 
trained as Skinnerian pigeons to ‘behave reflexively’ and so kill instantaneously.  Marines are 
persons, hence, persons are trained, not their brains.  “Reflexively” refers to the Behaviorist idea 
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of a natural tendency to be reactive (to react as if to a stimulus).  Marine training can not be 
about either a natural tendency to be reactive or automating responses to stimuli since both 
conceptions require the existence in humans of bio-physical machinery that simply does not exist 
for our species. 
Based on what has just been spelled out my point is that combat, no matter how fast, no 
matter how automatic it may appear, requires the use of judgment and therefore intelligence.  We 
will encounter this idea in substantial ethnographic detail in chapter 7 where we will find that a 
combatant has to decide whether or not to fight at all.  There is not such thing as the binary 
“fight or flight” instinct for humans.  The introduction of judgment and intelligence into this 
discussion sets off in bold relief some important characteristics of the problem-solution frame 
with which the Marines tend to view battlefield combat.  Within that discursive frame, values 
such as utility and efficiency become particularly prized.  I found that these values run quite deep 
in the Corps, and they are generally seen as physically oriented.  They become tropes that 
influence not only the very organization of the Corps but are expressed in Marine vocal and 
gestural discursive conventions. 
The hierarchical organization of the Corps (see Appendix B), like many modern 
militaries, is at the very least, an attempt to ensure the efficient execution of orders and so the 
precise application of force by assigning clear responsibility and demanding principled decision-
making.  Linguistically, the constant development and use of acronyms is an infamous symptom 
of the sub-cultural quest for utility and efficiency.  One Marine officer told me during an 
informal interview in 2006 that coming up with a good acronym for a program or event is a very 
serious matter with substantial time and effort being devoted to its creation.  Problematically of 
course the cipher-like shorthand of this discursive idiom presumes an insider status for the 
listener to know what the acronyms mean.
14
 
Once it is decided that violence, or kinetic solutions, will be used, Marines tend to 
conceive of killing as something to be done quickly, to save time, which equates with saving 
resources, like “energy” in the case of hand-to-hand fighting.  This is not inhuman, but quite 
humane when appreciated from a qualitative standpoint.  At the very least this can be understood 
from the standpoint of self-preservation, not an instinct for it, but a positive decision to value 
one’s own life when faced with an opponent wanting to kill you.  The Marines reveal this 
implicitly in their tacit call for respect in the act of killing others.  Where possible, killing is to be 
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done proportionally meaning that only the force necessary to the circumstances should be used.  
There are at least two judgments demanded by this formulation.  First, what exactly counts as a 
relevant “circumstance?”  Second, what force is legitimately applied in such circumstances?  We 
should remain aware that the word “necessary” might obscure the value judgments I just 
enumerated by implying, as it does, that the external world dictates a course of action.  This is 
yet another variation on the S-R formulation of human behavior. 
Marines take very seriously the fact that we are human beings, not just animals, where 
our humanity is incidental, and so they have designed a training system to transform one kind of 
person, a citizen, into another kind of person, a Marine combat soldier.  Thus, the principle that, 
‘Where possible, killing is to be done proportionally,’ is one good way to capture the 
‘humanitarianism’ alluded to above.  The Marines take this value, it seems to me, from larger 
American culture and give it its special sub-cultural meaning. 
To illustrate how Marines actually grapple with their practical formulation of killing 
proportionally consider this story related by a staff sergeant in my training squad in the summer 
of 2007.  The staff sergeant led a small group of Marines who happened upon an insurgent 
planting an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in a road.  It was after dark and there was some 
distance between the suspected insurgent and the Marines.  For the purposes of this discussion, 
we can say that among the possible courses of action, the staff sergeant could have chosen to 
have his small group close the distance and use rifles, close the distance and throw grenades, or 
rush the insurgent in hopes of capturing him (all variations on the them of “violently closing with 
and destroying the enemy”).  As it turned out he decided to employ a weapon called a Shoulder-
Launched Multi-Purpose Assault Weapon (or SMAW).  The SMAW is designed to destroy 
fortifications and tanks, not individual human beings.  The weapon practically vaporized the 
insurgent.  The use of the weapon was, by his admission, disproportionate.  To the extent that 
killing involves more or less force than is necessary Marines risk moral approbation centering 
on, for example, risking the lives of non-combatants (more) or permitting suffering in the service 
of an unsanctioned value, like revenge (less).  In American vernacular, the phrase “a quick, clean 
death” indexes pursuit of the value of respect in killing, though it may be that that battlefield 
situations, available weaponry, and the variability of combatants’ willingness to risk their own 
lives to achieve it, can make it quite elusive. 
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Some days after the staff sergeant related his story of the SMAW incident in Iraq, one of 
the Marine Instructor-Trainers held a discussion on the topic of “never being quite certain about 
what you’re facing on a battlefield.”  The staff sergeant wryly noted in a low-voiced, straight-
lipped, jaw-outthrust way, “that’s why I shot’im with the SMAW,” a comment that brought gales 
of laughter from my squad of Marines (Fieldnotes, July 17, 2007).  The laughter was generated 
both by the delivery and the shared sense of irony involved in being a Marine: while the Marines 
possess sufficient weaponry to generate the absolute certainty that creates absolute security and 
so a means to guarantee their own safety, nevertheless they are expected to assume personal and 
group risk to life and limb in order to honor the legal and moral principles that instantiate values 
like “respect for the enemy,” and “respect for life.” 
By way of comparison I suggest that jihadi combatants too, act to honor moral principles, 
but those principles differ radically from those of Americans exactly on the concept of “respect 
for life.”  Al-Qaeda bombers, for example, will kill everyone pre-defined as unbelievers to 
achieve certainty and so absolute security for their way of life.  If their way of life is not 
ascendant, no life, theirs or anyone else’s is permissible or worthwhile.  We can look to Laurent 
Murawiec’s work in The Mind of Jihad (2008) to get a sense of what this means.  He writes 
about two Israeli soldiers cornered and killed by a crowd in Palestine.  Included in the book is a 
picture of a young man who 
 
soaked his hands in [the dead Israelis’] blood and exuberantly displayed it to the 
jubilant crowd.  This was not just plain murder, it was human sacrifice: I (we) kill 
him (them) so that we can live. 
 Killing an enemy is part of war.  Why revel in it and wallow in the blood, 
why display ecstatic merriment to the delighted frenzy of the crowd?  Why does 
the crowd applaud and enthuse?  There is revenge and elation at avenging a 
perceived loss of dignity and honor.  The slaying is not instrumental: it is an act in 
itself; it is human sacrifice.  The blood of the enemy renews the identity of the 
lynch mob: To be a Palestinian is to spill the blood of Israelis.  Death is not 
instrumentality—like the death of the enemy on the battlefield—it has become an 
end in itself.  How else can we fathom the signs on the walls of Hamas 
kindergarten in Gaza, “The Children Are the Holy Martyrs of Tomorrow”?  Death 
is a source of unalloyed joy: “We love death.” [Murawiec 2008: 11-12] 
 
Interestingly and despite his topic, Murawiec sees Western battlefield killing as purely 
instrumental, a view that I think I have demonstrated as being without merit or foundation except 
insofar as it is a discursive strategy adopted by some members of the military as a way to 
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maintain a realist focus on killing those who need to be killed and destroying that which needs to 
be destroyed.15  Viewing killing on a battlefield instrumentally can, variously, function to protect 
the self-image of the soldiers doing the killing, assist in adopting a realistic view of battlefield 
problems, or even serve as a justification for killing when grounded in the kind of naturalism 
emerging from the bio-reductive framework (e.g., “it was him or me and I guess my survival 
instinct kicked in”).  But viewing battlefield killing in this way is only one discursive strategy 
among many with at least one alternative example being provided by Murawiec himself.  My 
point is that jihadi combatants like Al-Qaeda or Hamas have chosen a different value system, 
one that is quite alien to Westerners and Americans.  They love death in the way Americans love 
life. 
The ethical lines for Americans, however, can become blurred.  This issue was brought 
into bold relief during an interview with father and son veterans Randy (commissioned officer 
and non-combat veteran of the U.S. Army) and Michael Sandone (non-commissioned officer and 
combat veteran of the U.S. Marines in Iraq) in April of 2004.  The discussion focused on 
assessments of and consequent attitudes toward the enemy that resulted in differential actions on 
and off the battlefield, for example, in taking and treating prisoners.  Historically, American 
soldiers’ attitudes and actions toward German and Japanese soldiers in World War II differed 
radically, as I mentioned in chapter 2.
16
  One powerful, plausible reason for these differences was 
offered by Randy in our conversation and served to contextualize a revealing conversation about 
hand-to-hand combat and ethics. 
 
RS: The Germans…if their army was defeated they were defeated…and that’s why they 
would surrender as divisions or large groups of…and if they captured American soldiers 
or airmen for all intents and purposes they treated them with a reasonable degree of 
respect and decorum what have you…whereas the Japanese because their culture that 
surrender was so dishonorable in their culture that number one if they captured 
you…they would ascribe to you the dishonor that they believed…surrender…justified 
and so as a surrendering soldier you were not worthy of any respect or any decorum or 
any appropriate treatment you were the lowest form of…humanity that there was…as a 
consequence they acted that way they brutalized our prisoners…and our guys never 
forgot that by the same token they would not surrender the only way to defeat them was 
to kill them. 
 
[Comparing World War II to the Iraq War] And I think that…they’re different wars and 
different ways they approached it…it was a lot easier…I think…while Germans were 
surrendering I’ve read we were…American GI’s were respecting them and they were 
 155 
smoking cigarettes and that kind of thing…the Japanese they’re still just now getting over 
it…fifty years later 
 
FT: So, Mike, for you it sounds like there’s a similar issue in terms of the way the Iraqis 
chose to fight that there’s a certain level of…expectation of kind of a shared way of 
fighting that when it’s not shared you have a problem, so let’s call them what guerrilla 
fighters using the civilian population cause I think you were mentioning earlier that you 
never actually engaged a conventional Iraqi unit…so I would assume you mean then that 
you engaged irregulars or former conventional forces now… 
 
MS: Yeah guys would shed their uniforms and try to blend in but then fight from among 
the civilians and…you just I don’t know you just don’t respect that…that kind of…its not 
really military…really its… 
 
FT: Is it cowardly you think? 
 
MS: It’s hard to say…to a certain extent. 
 
FT: But with the firepower (unintelligible) what do you think? 
 
MS: Yeah, how would I act…in their shoes…face the best military in the world I mean 
how…if I knew I was gonna get killed I mean how would I fight?  I think that 
there’s…the big thing with the Germans and the Americans that there’s kind of a shared 
military culture…and something that both can relate to and (unintelligible)…I don’t 
understand Islam I don’t understand the fanaticism…that would make someone blow 
themselves up to kill children…I just don’t understand that. 
 
… 
 
RS: I could certainly empathize with the current GI’s I don’t see how I could ever 
reconcile myself with these guys…I don’t know…its not…the analogy is to step into a 
ring you know boxing ring and the guy pulls out a…gun and shoots you or something 
like that or a…bat and starts hitting you…you can’t respect him as a boxer…doing 
something like that... 
 
FT: It’s interesting to me because I’ve heard and maybe you can verify since I’ve never 
gone through the training but I’ve heard that…if it ever comes to close combat there are 
no rules I’ve heard that’s what you’re taught I don’t know if that’s accurate or not but…if 
its you versus him and I guess I take that point in Saving Private Ryan remember when 
the Tom Sizemore character faces off against that other German and they find them…and 
he throws his helmet and then he…take out the knife and they’re shooting pistols and 
they run out of ammunition and…but I don’t know what do you think?  Do you think 
there are even rules at that point or…? 
 
MS: Yeah I don’t think so if it’s gotten down to that…it’s gotten that bad then it’s all 
about survival at that point. 
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RS: Yeah I was gonna say that there are and there aren’t.  You know the Geneva 
Convention and the Uniform Code aren’t thrown away just because it’s mano-a-mano but 
as a practical matter…it’s survival…I mean Geneva Convention and the Uniform Code 
as it reflects that says that it doesn’t matter how brutal you’ve been fighting if the guy 
puts his hands out…you can’t that’s it he’s done…it’s over…and so in a one-on-one 
sense if it gets to the point that you’ve been fighting and finally you have a bayonet to his 
neck and he says I quit…are there…do the rules no longer apply can you just drive it on 
through?  The rules still apply but are you gonna drive it on through well…I don’t 
know…that’s the way it is…that’s what I mean yes and no…if he surrenders and you got 
a bayonet to this neck you’re not supposed to run him through. 
 
(Randy looks at Michael and vice versa, Randy shrugs a shoulder and flips his palm 
upward while raising an eyebrow signaling, “Can’t tell”) 
 
MS: (shrugs one shoulder) Run him through. 
 
RS: Probably would…cause it’s human nature to at that point...and I don’t think anybody 
would hold you to it, so…it’s an interesting topic you’ve chosen it’s very deep with a lot 
of different angles. [Interview, April 24, 2004] 
 
I have quoted this discussion at length for two reasons.  First, it suggests a limit to the kind of 
ethical action, or perhaps expectations for the enactment of the kind of ethical action that is being 
trained at the MACE.  In so doing, it, secondly, forces us to engage with the idea that some 
military actions might be appropriately moral but unrealistically idealistic while others are 
appropriately realistic but excusably immoral.  Consequently, we are invited to consider the 
relationship between realism and idealism in military action generally and amongst Marine 
combat infantry specifically.  This is a delicate matter because it implicates the moral character 
of the actors. 
For Randy (commissioned officer and non-combat veteran of the U.S. Army), the values 
of most Western militaries as embedded in the Geneva Convention and in the specifically 
American Uniform Code of Military Conduct are clear about what action is prescribed when an 
opponent in close combat embodies the concept of “surrender” by “throwing up his hands.”  
While the rules for conduct are clear for both, Randy offers two kinds of doubt about whether or 
not that conduct is realistically to be expected.  First, doubt that the rules are realistic; second, 
doubt that even if they are realistic, the rules are somehow trumped by human nature.  In the first 
form of doubt, Randy essentially gives us an ideal; that is, a goal that, in principle, cannot be 
achieved but is worth pursuing even if the result of the effort is an approximation.  In effect, 
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Randy reformulates the Convention and the Code from a set of prescribed and proscribed ways 
of acting into a set of ideals that are of dubious attainability.  In the second form of doubt, 
Randy, and then Michael, affirm that in a situation of life and death personal (hand-to-hand) 
combat, something changes, qualitatively. 
The context is symptomatic of this qualitative change: the rules (Convention and Code) 
do not apply.  The implication, it seems to me, is, really, that no rules apply.  But is this a 
description of the actual fact of the matter in hand-to-hand combat?  If so, how are we to 
understand it?  We can address this issue anthropologically by analyzing these comments from 
the Sandones after I asked if rules applied in hand-to-hand combat: 
 
MS: Yeah I don’t think so if it’s gotten down to that…it’s gotten that bad then it’s 
all about survival at that point. 
 
MS: (shrugs one shoulder) Run him through. 
 
RS: Probably would…cause it’s human nature to at that point...and I don’t think 
anybody would hold you to it… 
 
The Sandones’ contention that “no rules apply” can be set against the notion that, at least as far 
as the U.S. military is concerned, rules do apply.
17
   In light of their organization’s clear 
statement on how members must conduct themselves, the Sandones’ position must be a 
proscription, not a description.  I mean here that for Michael definitely, and Randy probably, the 
rules should not be seen as legitimate guides for action.  This means that actions taken, and so 
decisions made, during hand-to-hand combat are questioned by third parties at the moral peril of 
the third parties. 
Importantly, both Randy and Michael cite “nature” and “survival” as their explanation of 
why hand-to-hand combat is qualitatively exceptional and rule-less.  By now we know that these 
terms function as pseudo-scientific explanations of behavior.  In implausibly and so 
illegitimately reducing action to behavior, culture to biology, these terms function as 
justifications, not explanations.  From a critical realist anthropological perspective, the Sandones 
are offering a justification of their provocative position, not an explanation of the factual status 
of hand-to-hand combat.  This is, as we have seen, not unusual in a culture where bio-reductive 
deterministic explanations for human social action are so pervasive and powerful. 
 158 
In fact, however, another Marine combat veteran who I interviewed for this project, 
Colonel Bryan P. McCoy, denies the possibility of a biological explanation for combat in any 
form when he writes,     
 
America does not possess a warrior culture.  Let us disabuse ourselves 
of the notion of the mythical American Warrior.  To do otherwise is 
intellectual folly and reflects more wishful thinking and illusion 
than reality.  Any notion of some innate warrior culture or an 
inherent fighting ability of Americans is an idea born in a hothouse 
that will wilt once exposed to the brutality of real battle. [2006: 15] 
 
While I actually agree with the Sandones that there is something exceptional about hand-to-hand 
combat, I disagree about the reason: the difference in kind from other forms of fighting does not 
have to do with a survival instinct or species-specific evolved behaviors because from a critical 
realist and scientific point of view, there is no such possibility.  McCoy’s remarks alert us to this 
fact.  Moreover and instructively, Colonel McCoy’s argument applies both to killing and to not 
killing. 
I’d like to draw out four points in considering this issue.  First, the example of Sergeant 
Stevens in deciding not to fire at the moment of realizing the old Iraqi man’s hostile action did 
not mean hostile intent.  Second, Staff Sergeant Wyman’s contention that combat infantry can 
be, and indeed are, trained to make exactly the kind of split-second decisions exemplified by 
Sergeant Stevens.  Third, Colonel McCoy argues that killing and not killing are not instinctual 
and so, by implication, are fully subject to the decisions of the soldier and informed by that 
soldier’s values.  Fourth, McCoy’s argument is given realist substance by the fatal criticisms of 
the bio-reductive framework offered earlier in this study.  These considerations mean that we are 
left with an open question as to what moral basis a soldier would have for not accepting the 
surrender of an opponent in hand-to-hand combat.  Does hand-to-hand combat constitute a kind 
of moral dead-zone for Americans?  Is the contention that “no rules apply” functioning simply as 
a justification?  Are the Sandones contending that the rules should not be seen as legitimate 
guides for action because human nature, not the person in the form of the soldier, is the causal 
source of the action.  Or, are the Sandones expressing, however deterministically and indirectly, 
the right of the soldier to act according to whatever value the soldier wants to embody in the 
 159 
moment of having total control over the fate of an enemy?  If so, is there any moral basis for such 
an expression? 
 I want to consider, speculatively and imaginatively, what is going on in hand-to-hand 
combat as a social and cultural act.  My purpose is to try to understand what makes this type of 
fighting exceptional and so, perhaps, the basis of the near identity of combat and courage.  
“What,” in short, “makes the use of hands or a knife in trying to kill someone qualitatively 
different from the use of a rifle or a missile?”  It seems to me that close combat both constitutes 
and expresses an intention to kill or incapacitate an opponent, just as does firing a rifle.  What 
makes it different must be the quality of that intention.  The ‘talk’ in both hand-to-hand and rifle 
combat is from the body, but the former has some critical and distinctive characteristics. 
The physical proximity of the combatants—body-to-body—generates a number of 
important dynamics, not the last of which is the violation of otherwise sacrosanct “personal 
space” (Hall 1966).  The chances for escaping uninjured or alive are dramatically reduced 
because injury-producing actions are less likely to miss at two feet versus two hundred yards 
range.  The lead instructor for my training class, Gunnery Sergeant Friend, said to the trainees, 
“If you get in a fist-fight, you better be prepared to get hit, if you get in a knife-fight, you better 
be prepared to get cut” (Fieldnotes, June 12, 2007).  Similarly, a vast number of large and small 
options for action are eliminated.  As the saying goes, the combatants are “locked in mortal 
combat.”  Running away, stopping to catch one’s breath, avoiding injury or death through the use 
of obstacles (or “cover” as the Marines call it) are examples of unavailable options.  The 
personal characteristics of the combatants become critically important—balance, leg strength, 
determination, dexterity, quality of judgment, critical thinking skills, and so forth.  The 
dependence of such absolute outcomes as life or death on personal characteristics seems to me to 
be deeply antithetical to what I see as a pervasive sense of the value of individual equality in the 
United States. 
While these personal characteristics may be important in firing a rifle they do not usually 
define the outcome of the fight.  In the case of hand-to-hand fighting, however, differential leg 
strength can decide who lives or dies.  In short, the physical distance between combatants 
permitted by a rifle prioritizes the ability to handle the weapon and concentration as well as 
situational awareness, not leg strength.  These relationships and dynamics are not absolute: 
practiced skill and habituated embodied knowledge about, for instance, how to attack a 
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physically more powerful opponent, can render that opponents greater leg strength entirely 
irrelevant. 
I would like to direct the reader to the video clip entitled “Bear Pit” in Appendix A.  In 
the video (between 00:53-01.28), two male and one female Marines are fighting in an open pit 
filled with water to about knee height.  The two males are substantially larger than the female.  
The “mission” of the exercise is for each Marine to dunk the other two Marines under the dirty 
water (and as a safety measure ensure that the Marine who gets dunked comes back up) using 
hand-to-hand fighting techniques.  One previously successful techniques used by physically 
larger Marines on smaller Marines (male or female) had been to simply bowl over the opponent 
using body mass.  The fight begins and other Marines on shore are shouting encouragement and 
advice to the three in the pit.  One piece of advice was adopted by the female Marine: she let the 
two male Marines fight each other until they were exhausted and then succeeded in dunking 
them both.  The application of an intelligent strategy permitted the female Marine to pit the 
physicality of her two opponents against one another and not her, thereby rendering their greater 
strength irrelevant.  From examples like this we can liken the intelligence developed in training 
and ‘embodied concepts’ to a ‘rifle:’ they are all tools a combatant can use to exploit strengths 
and counter weaknesses in fighting.  Of course such strategies can be, and often were, in my 
training, countered by strategies implemented by opponents!  There is, then, a fundamental and 
permanent uncertainty in hand-to-hand fighting that is exacerbated by the speed with which the 
situation can change, moment-by-moment, by chance and by the purposeful actions of the 
combatants.  The consequences are life or death. 
We can say, then, that engaging in hand-to-hand combat signals the express purpose of 
killing an opponent despite the uncertainty and the likely dire consequences.  Purposefulness in 
this kind of action can be said to be absolute; that is, the combatants express the desire for an 
absolute outcome whose realization is up to their personal skill and commitment.  In a way, this 
is a choice to use one’s agency for an ultimate kind of purpose: extinguish the agency of another 
person.  This intention is conveyed personally and the reactions of the opponent to the damage 
suffered in the fight are immediately and viscerally conveyed.  It is done personally and in an 
environment of fundamental uncertainty.  This, I think, is why hand-to-hand combat is so awe-
some and fear-inspiring.  Even if two opponents surprise one another, we know that decisions to 
fight can and are made instantaneously.  “Freezing” is another option; that is, choosing not to 
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take any positive action at all.  “Freezing” means that the combatant is willing to accept what 
happens next, such as the likelihood of his or her own death, rather than mobilize his or her 
agentic capabilities to fight.  The decision to fight is one made over and over again through the 
course of a fight as illustrated by the act of  “giving up.” “Giving up” is an embodied way of 
stating that one would rather not try anymore. 
If, as this analysis suggests, hand-to-hand fighting requires intelligent judgment in 
deciding both whether and how to fight, as well as expresses, at the very least, the value-oriented 
meaning of preserving one’s own life by killing an opponent, then it is as ‘cultural’ as eating 
dinner with a friend.  Do the characteristics of hand-to-hand fighting—personal infliction of 
pain, suffering, and death, absolute and lethal consequences, the intention to realize the death of 
the other, and the fundamental uncertainty of the outcome—then combine to eliminate rules of 
conduct as the Sandones argued?  Such a position cannot be defended based on any implied 
delimitation imposed by the nature of the combat itself, for example the speed of such combat.  
We have seen that decisions can be made in a split-second and options for different forms of 
action, while limited, are available.  What the Sandones are expressing, then, in my estimation, is 
the idea that opponents in hand-to-hand combat forfeit their “right” to live should they choose to 
engage in it.  This seems to be a function of the framing of the combat as, exactly, absolute and 
mortal, to be worked out and decided right now, in this space.  There is a kind of “total 
commitment” required by this kind of fighting based, in my experience as we will see in the next 
chapter, on the notion that without total concentrations, focus and so the fight, can be lost.  We 
will also see that focus requires trust in oneself as well as one’s training; doubt can get one 
killed.  With such small margins for error in a type of fighting that is fundamentally uncertain 
and absolute in its outcome, thinking about anything other than executing one’s training can be 
deadly in its consequences. 
 Against this analysis, the Sandones’ naturalizing discourse about hand-to-hand combat 
and the idea of automated human behavior that it implies can be understood as functioning as a 
justification for the idea that soldiers should not be expected to “flip the switch” and 
instantaneously cease fighting in hand-to-hand combat.  Why might this be too much to expect?  
Such an expectation would require that, in the midst of mortal combat, one combatant must risk 
his own life by offering to re-establish trust in the social rules for interacting that proscribe 
killing another person, the very same rules that were, in the last moment, rejected in the 
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embodied intention to kill the other combatant.  Similarly, the other combatant must risk her own 
life by accepting the offer to re-establish trust in the social rules for interacting that proscribe 
killing another person that were in the last moment rejected in the embodied intention to kill the 
other combatant. 
  We should note too that in the offer and the acceptance there two modalities for 
communicating, bodily movement and vocalization.  What happens if or when those two 
modalities are contradictory in the midst of this kind of fight?  Earlier I mentioned the film 
Saving Private Ryan (1998).
18
  The film depicts a stunning version of hand-to-hand combat.  A 
German and an American soldier are fighting viciously, punching, biting, and throwing each 
other around.  They fall and roll on the ground.  The advantage in the fight shifts back and forth 
and it is unclear who will win.  The American draws his bayonet but the German takes it away.  
The German soldier eventually succeeds in maneuvering an American soldier into what I learned 
in my Marine training to be one of the most vulnerable positions possible: flat on your back.  The 
German is using his body weight to pin down the exhausted American.  The German is slowly 
pushing his bayonet toward the American’s chest while the American is trying to force the 
German’s arms upward.  The American is losing the fight.  As the bayonet comes closer, the 
American protests, saying, “No, no, listen to me, stop, stop,” concurrent with imploring facial 
expressions.  From a semasiological point of view the embodied intention of each combatant is to 
kill the other.  The vocalized intention is to re-establish the frame of sociability where people are 
not killed.  The American is trying to re-establish himself as a person to whom life should be 
granted as part of a humane fellowship. 
 Notably, the German soldier has time to, one might say, consider the American’s 
proposal if we assume the German understands English and the American’s facial expressions.  
But the fight to that moment had included vocalizations of all sorts from both combatants 
expressing determination, fear of the situation, calls for help, attempts to self-motivate, and so 
forth.  But should the German suddenly trust the American who, moments before, had fought his 
way to his own position of advantage and attempted to finalize the outcome with the German 
soldier’s death?  After all, the American is still resisting; on the other hand, that resistance is 
necessary if the American is to prevent the bayonet from entering his chest.  The German’s next 
actions and vocalizations suggest not only that this consideration seems not to have entered the 
German’s mind but that the intercultural communication issue is irrelevant.  The German says, in 
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rough translation, “It’s over now, let it go in,” and actually “shush’s” the American as if trying to 
quiet a child.  The German was totally focused—as perhaps he should be—on his goal of killing 
the person who tried to kill him. 
This is death at its most intimate—and, perhaps, its most malicious.  From our outsider’s 
position we might object that by “shushing” the American, the German recognizes what I am 
calling the American’s attempt to change the frame of the engagement—to re-establish the rules 
of sociality that have been compromised in the act of combat—from absolutely life or death to 
surrender and life. 
The German refuses the entreaty.  While this could indeed be a matter of trust (can the 
German trust the American to cease and desist if he, the German, were to stop trying to force the 
bayonet into the American’s chest?), we are faced with three mitigating circumstances grounded 
in the depiction of the German in the film.  The German is, first, a member of the Waffen SS, 
which signals his membership in a military unit dedicated to Nazi “master race” concept.  
Second, he is a physically and aesthetically imposing, tough-looking character.  Third, he had 
surrendered to the very same Americans he was now fighting earlier in the film and had groveled 
for his life, which the Americans granted.  In fact, they had turned him loose.  These depictions 
present the character of the German soldier as not simply merciless but malicious.  In treating the 
American like a protesting child, the German signals his refusal to treat the American “like a 
man.”  The German’s actions and vocalizations demonstrate that he takes the American to be, 
simply, pathetic.  How can a member of the master race respect such a creature?
19
  Indeed we 
might say that the idea of sparing the American would have been a betrayal of the ideological 
commitment that served as the basis for the German’s identity as a Nazi.  This scene serves, it 
seems to me, as a statement about the fundamental unfairness of warfare in general and hand-to-
hand combat in particular.  From an American point of view, “very bad guys” can and do win. 
We are now, I think, in a better position to work out a potential understanding of the 
Sandones’ argument.  We might ask whether an American should, would, or could spare the life 
of an Iraqi insurgent attempting to surrender in the midst of hand-to-hand combat.  Wouldn’t 
sparing an insurgent, whose fanaticism is expressed in the sub-cultural characteristic of blowing 
up children, be a betrayal of American values?  Perhaps then the Sandones’ naturalizing 
discourse is a way of expressing this deep cultural commitment to being an American and living 
according to American values in light of a realization that there is no changing the mind of a 
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fanatic.  That fanatics are indeed fanatics is demonstrated in their willingness to turn children 
into suicide bombers and killing children indiscriminately.  Implied in such a value position is 
the notion that no rational discourse is possible with ideologues.  Killing such people is not only 
the best option it is the only option.  To the extent that fighting and killing is value-driven, I want 
to now suggest that there exists an American, and insofar as the organization is distinctive as a 
sub-culture, a Marine way of fighting and killing.  I hasten to qualify this statement even as I 
write it.  We should, as researchers, expect multiple versions of “the Marine way of fighting and 
killing” based on the truism that there are formal rules promulgated by the organization, and 
informal rules worked out in situ by members of the organization.  In my opinion it is most 
informative to discover the latter through examination of the former.  
“Fighting,” we have seen, is not a monolithic concept.  It varies based on socio-cultural 
conventions, values, and even ideological commitments.  Fighting is not a “natural” action, 
although the capacity to fight using the physical body is indeed natural.  That is, in learning 
material and conceptual relationships between oneself and the world necessary for simply 
moving in it, the basic material and conceptual relationships for fighting become available; from 
the swing of an arm while walking, for example, comes the perception of mass-force 
relationships as anyone who has banged her hand on a table can appreciate.  On the cultural 
level, during my fieldwork, Marine instructors clearly demonstrated and constantly reinforced 
the distinction between fighting conceived in terms of sport and fighting conceived in terms of 
military action.  In the former, such as professional mixed martial arts in leagues like the 
Ultimate Fighting Championship (http://www.ufc.com), there are rules agreed upon by all 
parties, time limits, and third parties actively concerned with preventing death if not serious 
injury.  The point of this kind of fighting is to incapacitate, not kill, one’s opponent.  In the latter, 
such as MCMAP, there are some rules unilaterally adopted by the Marines (but not necessarily 
their opponents), no time limit, and no third parties concerned with preventing death if not 
serious injury.  In this kind of fighting, the point is to incapacitate or kill one’s opponent. 
 
The MACE: Training Leadership in the Principled Use of Violence 
 
In 2000, Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James L. Jones, established the 
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP).
20
  According to the Martial Arts Center of 
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Excellence Martial Arts Instructor Trainer Manual April 2007 Revision (hereafter MAITM 07), 
The United States Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP), is designed to: 
1) Improve the warfighting capabilities of individual Marines and units in a team 
framework 
2) Enhance Marines’ self-confidence and esprit de corps 
3) Foster the warrior ethos in the Corps
21
 
The program is further described as a “distinctively a weapons based system, integrating combat 
equipment, physical challenges, and tactics typically found in the combat arena” (MAITM 
07:Section 09, page 8).  On a more general plane, the program combines “the best combat-test 
martial arts skills, time honored Close Combat training techniques, with proven Marine Corps 
Core Values and Leadership training” (MAITM 07: Section 09, page 8).  
MCMAP is delivered to the Corps through the administrative and training center called 
the Martial Arts Center of Excellence (“the MACE” in Marine parlance) in Quantico, Virginia.  I 
participated in and observed active-duty Marine martial arts training programs in the summers of 
2007 and 2008 at the MACE.  All Marines are required to achieve the basic level of competence 
in MCMAP by order of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Marines have two options when 
participating in MCMAP.22  They can develop increasing levels of competence in MCMAP’s 
concepts and techniques to become better warriors and so better Marines.  They can also pursue 
higher levels of competence to become qualified to deliver martial arts training to the Marine 
units to which they are attached.  Qualification occurs through two special training courses 
Martial Arts Instructor (MAI) course and the Martial Arts Instructor Trainer (MAIT) course.   
The MAI training course runs for five weeks, while the MAIT course runs seven.  The 
difference denotes the additional complexity and difficulty of the concepts and techniques to be 
learned by trainees.  Increasing complexity and difficulty, and therefore increasing competence 
in MCMAP, is represented in a hierarchically ranked, color-coded “belt system” typical of other 
martial arts sytems.  There are five levels in ascending order: tan, gray, green, brown and black 
(MAITM 07: 10).  Within the black belt level, there is a further series of designations that denote 
substantial mastery of advanced concepts and techniques.  This includes, for example, the ability 
to teach a group of Marines effectively coupled with the capability of performing martial 
techniques using a “naked blade” (real, sharpened knives or bayonets as opposed to dull-edged 
plastic training knives) with a similarly armed opponent.  These further levels of mastery are 
represented by up to six ! inch wide strips of red cloth called “tabs” that are sewn onto the black 
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belt; they are, essentially, vertical red stripes.  Marines who had achieved the designation of 
Instructor Trainer (or “IT”) themselves led the training courses for Instructors (MAI) and the 
training courses for future IT’s (MAIT).  In most cases, the IT’s were not only black belts, but 
possessed one or more tabs.  Importantly, to be an IT at the MACE meant having had at least one 
combat tour of duty overseas.  This ensured that the IT’s were transmitting to trainees lessons 
learned first-hand about personal and team performance. 
The realist distinction between sport and combat, as well the realist appreciation of what 
actually happens in battles as a matter of historical fact underwrites the MCMAP program.  The 
Marine Corps believes that, for combat infantry, close-range combat is a universal event, 
meaning standard through time and across situations, for the Marines.  A primary focus of the 
MCMAP program, then, is to prepare Marines to face 
 
the dilemma of close-range combat; hand grenades, close-in assault fire, weapons 
fighting, and hand-to-hand engagement [that] will always be a part of the Marine 
Corps mission.  In this respect, the ethos of the United States Marine Corps is 
timeless.  The closeness of interpersonal violence remains unmatched, whether on 
the beaches of World War II or in downtown Mogadishu, Haiti, or East Timor. 
[MAITM 07: Section 09, page 6) 
 
Hand-to-hand combat is the archetypal form of combat for Marines because living or dying, or 
one’s friends living or dying, is (barring chance events) solely under the control of the Marine.  
We might say then that courage too thus emerges in its archetypal form and so reveals the basis 
for the near identity between courage and combat for Americans.  One way to see this is to 
realize that the constitution of agency is autonomy.  Effort, directed by judgment, realizes the 
autonomy.  Force is effort in motion.  Courage is the moral value and motive of the effort in 
motion even as that motion embodies the pursuit of other values, like, “saving the lives of my 
comrades.”  Courage, therefore, is directly expressive of (in Susanne K. Langer’s sense, hence 
not an expression of) dynamically embodied human agency. 
While it is, in effect, a worst-case scenario and a battlefield norm given the Marines’ 
conception of warfighting, the Marines do not prefer to fight hand-to-hand.  During my first 
summer of research, Master Sergeant James Coleman, a combat veteran (as are all the MACE 
Instructor-Trainers) and senior instructor at the MACE, told me that  
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The point [in combat] is to eliminate threats from a distance if at all possible 
though.  If I can call in air [support] over sending in an infantry company, that’s 
what I do.  Lower ranking Marines are not obligated to act like robots and march 
right at a bunker… ‘Hey Massergeant, why don’t we hit that bunker with the little 
gun first?’ and I might be like, ‘shit, yeah, go do it devil dog.’ [Fieldnotes, July 
12, 2007, emphasis added] 
 
Master Sergeant Coleman’s idea was repeated numerous times in different ways during the 
course of my training.  It served as a backdrop to the training: if you can use your rifle or a 
grenade, use them, but be prepared if you don’t have either of them and you have to use your 
fists, a stick, or a knife.  The Marines, as agents, discipline themselves into a team that acts like a 
machine that is not mechanical.  The agency of each individual is directed toward concerted 
effort.  This is a new conception of machine, a realist conception of machine comprised of the 
agency of each member’s effort toward achieving a common purpose. 
At the heart of the MAIT course (see Appendix C for a short description of the course 
and an example training day schedule) were the one hundred and twenty eight martial arts 
“techniques” that the trainees had to learn to qualify for the black belt level.  As the Marines 
used the term, “techniques” referred specifically to action signs within the vocabulary of the 
martial arts.  Also referred to as “moves,” techniques had names like “rolling knee bar” or 
“triangle choke from the guard.”
23
  The names are important in that they index the practical and 
utilitarian sensibility infusing Marine perceptions of combat.  There is an attendant temptation to 
think of learning the techniques as a matter of repetitive, mechanical utility.  This is indeed one 
way of thinking of the techniques, which some of the Marines expressed.  In fact, the Marines 
build regular repetition and practice of the techniques into their training regimen and call it 
“sustainment” (see Figure 6 in Figures section at the end of this chapter). 
But this is an overly narrow view of the techniques; one that is invited, especially, by the 
general American preference for bio-reductive explanations of human social action.  Consider 
the reasons given in the Martial Arts Instructor Trainer Manual for the development of 
MCMCAP that illuminate the values and meaning of the program.  They include: 
 
• Prepare Marines to “deal with complex situations mixed with the spectrum of violence,” 
meaning that Marines need to be able to use force lethally, non-lethally, or not at all.  The 
Marines could not perform missions like crowd control at a food distribution center 
without violating American civilian and military ethical and legal norms if all they are 
trained to do is kill. 
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• Prepare more Marines in a wider range of MOS’s to face these complex situations given 
the current call to “do more with less” required to cover manpower demands in combat 
zones.  A Marine helicopter mechanic might find herself escorting a supply convoy 
through the narrow streets of an urban downtown.  She has to be prepared to act as an 
infantryman if necessary. 
• Guard against an overreliance on technological solutions to battlefield situations: “some 
aspects of warfare and conflict will never change. The dilemma of close-range combat; 
hand grenades, close-in assault fire, weapons fighting, and hand-to-hand engagement will 
always be a part of the Marine Corps mission.”  As realists, Marines prepare for the 
worst, and as this reasoning demonstrates, the worst, for them, is hand-to-hand combat. 
[MAITM 2007 09: 6-8] 
 
Semasiologically, the meanings of Marine actions in training (and to the extent that Marines use 
them in combat, on the battlefield) are more or less grounded in these values and purposes. 
At this point I would like to direct the reader once again to the video entitled “MAIT 03-
07” located in Appendix A.  The video consists of a slideshow and short clips of the training 
course in which I participated.
24
  The movie is an interesting commemorative artifact in its own 
right, but I recommend the reader watch the video without sound by turning off the volume on 
your player.  Viewing the video in its entirety with no sound should give the reader a sense of the 
training itself and of the vast range of bodily movements, typical scenarios, and interactive 
contexts that comprised the training. 
 
Techniques, Values, and Violence 
 
The Marine Corps is an organization designed to manage violence, or as the Martial Arts 
Instructor Trainer Manual puts it, to respond effectively and quickly to “complex situations” 
throughout “the spectrum of violence” (also called “the continuum of force”).  The spectrum of 
violence refers to the “concept that there is a wide range of possible actions, ranging from verbal 
commands to the application of deadly force, which may be used to gain and maintain control of 
a potentially dangerous situation” (MAITM 2007 07: 9).  The principle implied here is that 
Marines must never forego or relinquish their ability to reconsider their action.  Martial arts 
techniques are not supposed to be an end in themselves, but only a means to an end.  The end 
should always be informed by both formal and informal judgments about how and why violence 
is to be employed, if at all. Discipline and focus become important corollary values to such a 
principle. 
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The IT’s at the MACE were at pains to explain to me how it is that the acquisition of 
physical skills necessary to performing the techniques, while the most obvious and central 
component of the MAIT training class I was in, were not the primary point of the training at all.  
Their explanations were difficult to articulate in the face of an amazingly strenuous training 
schedule that seemed to emphasize the sheer physicality of combat.  But in both formal and 
informal interviews with Marine Instructor-Trainers at the MACE, I learned that the practical 
application of martial arts techniques on the battlefield—the very place we would otherwise 
expect to observe the operation of instinct—was positioned as complementary to, not primary 
over, a holistic view of the Marine combatant.  
Consider, for example, a snippet from a conversation I had during my first summer of 
research.  Captain Jason Ford, Deputy Director of the MACE, grew frustrated at my questions 
about the battlefield applicability of the techniques of the program.  “Was it really possible for 
Marines in full combat gear to execute some of these techniques?” I asked.  His frustration was 
focused exactly on my simplistic reduction of Marine combat training to the level of the 
practical.  Captain Ford said 
 
It’s not about direct application to conventional warfare since it’s rare to have a 
knife-fight in combat but that’s not the point.  There are two important 
considerations, the range of situations in Iraq or Afghanistan where you’re doing 
a patrol and you’re literally walking by hundreds of people, some might be 
friendly, some might not, so the range of possible situations beyond conventional 
combat is limitless.  We need to prepare Marines to respond to these situations 
appropriately—under control, disciplined.  I don’t want lambs out there, I want 
dead bodies.  It’s about educating Marines to think quickly about what level of 
force is right for the situation. [Fieldnotes, June 27, 2007, emphasis added] 
 
Captain Ford clearly emphasizes the importance of training Marines to exercise judgment.  The 
context of threat in everyday situations in Iraq and Afghanistan would be ideal as a stimulus for 
what might otherwise thought to be the operation of instinctive responses.  Discipline and 
control, however, express the self-restraint that we would, normally and otherwise, expect to be 
missing given the bio-reductive framework.  Restraint means refusing inviting alternative courses 
of action in favor of the one or ones expressive of a prized value or purpose.  During my training 
there were plenty of opportunities to “cheese it” or “cheese-dick it,” meaning to slack off or not 
“put out,” in short to not give 100% effort.  Instead of running, building momentum and vaulting 
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over a series of stomach-high log obstacles on the Obstacle Course, one could cheese it by 
walking between the obstacles.  We know Captain Ford cannot mean instinct despite some of his 
language because there is no concept of “person” in the bio-reductive framework, no less a 
capability of “wanting.”  Captain Ford, then, is expressing the idea of training Marines to 
exercise restraint in order to enable them to think and judge situations prior to, and especially in, 
the moment of acting.  This notion fits well with the recognition of the split-second decision-
making we see expected on battlefields and exemplified by both Corporal Dunham and Sergeant 
Stevens. 
My interpretation of Captain Ford’s provocative phrase, “I don’t want lambs out there, I 
want dead bodies,” is based on the overall conversation, which was much longer than the 
quotation above.  Judging by the overall context I believe what Captain Ford meant that he 
wanted smart, aggressive Marines who could and would kill if appropriate.  And if appropriate, 
total commitment and effective execution were expected.  This is the point of his emphasis on 
training Marines to think and judge in order to control, incapacitate, and kill according to 
American and Marine ethical tenets.  In fact, the analogical usage of “lamb” suggests an 
important depth to Captain Ford’s construction: a passive Marine is not, by definition, actively 
engaged in the local situation and so is failing to realize the ethical values and tenets of mental 
and physical performance expected of Marines.  Not only do Marines invite challenges to their 
way of life by their very presence, they are expected to go find and develop those challenges.  
This should expose for us the knife-edge, as it were, that Marines have to walk every time they 
are “on the ground.” 
There is no theoretical, practical, or logical way to mesh this conception of Marine 
training with an instinct theory.  But, as we have seen over and over again, American discourse 
about human social action is infected with such bio-reductive concepts and Marines are no 
different in this regard.  Captain Ford went on to say that 
  
It’s not about affective behavior, it’s about predatory behavior.  It takes some 
thinking to fight well in close combat—blind rage will get you killed.  It’s 
instinctive to stalk…you know, when you’re sneaking up on your brother or 
sister. [Fieldnotes, June 27, 2007]  
 
I invite the reader to view the video clip called “Warrior Mindset” in Appendix A to see and hear 
exactly how the notion of predation was delivered by IT Staff Sergeant Wilder. 
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In American culture, situations of threat often invite “rage” as perhaps the preferred 
conventional response (how one ought to act) when threatened; traditionally, this is especially 
the case for men.  Marines, men or women, are not supposed to accept the invitation, at least in 
MCMAP training.  Ironically, not accepting the invitation is seen as a choice both overtly in 
conversation and tacitly in training.  Captain Ford uses the phrase “blind rage.”  Rage blinds 
Marines, and blind Marines cannot respond to situations very well: they would be focused on 
how they feel and not on the situation at hand or their responsibilities in that situation.  This 
represents a hallmark case of self- versus other-interest.  The Marines called this mistaken choice 
of focus “going internal,” a spatial metaphor that refers to concentrating on yourself and your 
pain (physical, emotional, mental or any other sort) rather than on the external world that 
otherwise should be the focus of your attention if you intend to be a good Marine.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Shusko illustrated this distinction when he addressed the training class as follows, 
 
While going through this, all this pain, remember this tie-in.  A doctor wrote 
home to his dad about a [wounded] Marine [he was treating] that affected him.  
He said that every morning, one private was trying to stand up and the doctor 
said, “You don’t have to do that devil dog,” and the Marine said, “But I’ve been 
trained to render proper respect to an officer in the U.S. military,” well, the 
private had no legs.  When you’re out there giving it 65% or 75%, think about 
these devil dogs.  You have to reach down sometimes, you’re pukin’ out there, 
brush it off and move on.  Think about your brothers.  They’ll pull you through 
and you’ll pull them through. [Fieldnotes, June 12, 2007] 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Shusko advised the trainees to choose to ignore, not focus on, what is 
(allegedly) an automatic biological response (vomiting) in favor of getting on with the mission 
at hand.  In doing so Colonel Shusko, like Captain Ford, propagates the idea of the primacy of 
the thinking, not the merely reactive Marine.  He emphasizes the social support available in the 
form of Marine teammates in making such a choice.  Clearly, that choice is not only possible 
from the Marine point of view, it is also built-in to the expectations for embodied performance at 
the MACE.  Care for the other is the care for self.  In this case we have a variation on this 
principle: care for the self is from the other.  It is not about “losing one’s self” in the Marine 
Corps, it is gaining a more extensive self that is radically more capable in the situation of 
combat. 
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 There remains, however, complexity and subtle contradictions in the various vocal 
discursive constructions offered by Captain Ford insofar as his references to “predation” and 
“stalking” index the on-going power of the bio-reductive framework and the pseudo-science that 
provides the veneer of scientific authority which underwrites that explanatory power.  Captain 
Ford’s comments that we all stalk without any training implies some sort of universal, evolved 
biological mechanism; the old conception of instinct is the only scientific category that is 
available in this situation.  Again, it is only through clarity in the use and application of a 
plausible theory of human social action as well as a commitment to honor the logic of that 
theoretical position that we can see that, ultimately, Captain Ford’s comments favor an agentic 
rather than a deterministic view of Marine training.  Understood from the standpoint of 
semasiology, Marine training is a process of socialization into an embodied semiotic of action, 
not a process of unlocking the expression of evolved instincts from a kind of cultural 
entombment.  That kind of nineteenth century theory of culture and biology, of which 
Freudianism was the most influential representation in the last century, is, for quite some time 
now, no longer viable in principle. 
And yet, as we see here, it lives on outside of the precincts of the social sciences in this 
century. This situation represents a moment of interpretive, and so theoretical, choice.  Which 
theory of human social action and so which interpretation best represents Marine training?  
Socialization into a way of life may result in conceptualizations of human life as sacred, and so 
position killing as a moral wrong, but the response for a Marine warrior is not to strip away 
culture.  It is, rather, to modify his or her conceptual schema with new moral tenets.  You are 
being most cultural when you naturalize the creative outcome: what is natural and what is 
deterministic are no longer necessarily equivalent.  What is natural for persons is to be 
determinative, not deterministic. This is the singular import of the thesis of the recovery, not the 
rescue, of human agency from the natural, and therefore, the cultural, world. 
This point is well illustrated in the non-military fighting of the American boxer Mike 
Tyson.  Tyson was, in his prime, a fearless, unstoppable fighter.  In a documentary interview 
about his life, however, Tyson told of his family’s move to a tough, violent neighborhood when 
he was a child. 
 
[The neighborhood was] very horrific very tough very gruesome kind of place, 
you know kill or be killed.  I could remember going to school and being bullied 
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and people taking my glasses and putting them in the trunk of a milk car.  I never 
had any kind of physical altercation with anybody at that particular time in my life 
so I couldn’t believe anybody would do that.  I never dreamed 
somebody…that…an absolute stranger would do that to me.  I didn’t know why I 
just ran I didn’t know what happened I just ran. [In Toback, Tyson 2009] 
 
Violence at that point was incomprehensible to Tyson and to the extent that it was 
incomprehensible, it did not exist.  Only after adjusting his conceptual schema, much like U.S. 
Marine Sergeant Marion and his fellow Marines on Guadalcanal during World War II, was 
Tyson able to develop a coherent sense of the meaning of his experience.  Learning concepts for 
making meaning and acting is the process of socialization.  
Socializing Marines into enacting violence in the principled and disciplined ways that the 
Corps wants often conflicts with bio-reductive discourse that pervades the training atmosphere.  
While some IT’s argued that the mental and character qualities of Marines are inseparable from 
the physical, the Marines themselves sometimes emphasized or prioritized one over the other.  
Consider this fascinating comment by Master Sergeant Coleman about courage: 
 
Courage is 99% physical, 1% is like moral or decision-making.  You gotta hump 
60 miles over broken terrain to get to the place and then fight, that’s when you’re 
making the decisions [after you get there].  Yes, courage can be trained, but guys 
have to have something, it’s instinctive, some instinctive aggressiveness.  You 
know some guys are just passive and quiet, and you know they’re not going to 
make it [through the MAIT course].  I’ve been fooled though, week 1 and 2 you 
think “shit he’s not going anywhere” but then week 3 and 4 you think, “huh, he’s 
improving, maybe”, then week 5 and 6, “shit, he’s really turned around.” 
[Fieldnotes, June 11, 2007] 
 
Master Sergeant Coleman’s comments go some way toward reinforcing what might be called a 
“physicalist” account of courage and MCMAP training; that is, the emphasis on physical action 
and martial arts techniques in the course would seem to support the idea that courage is “99% 
physical.”  Coleman’s remarks, however, do not necessarily contradict the case I have been 
building for an agentic view of courageous action amongst Marines.  I think that Coleman echoes 
Vegetius’ 4
th
 Century CE observation, “What can a soldier do who charges when out of breath?” 
(Vegetius 1985: 164).  The point is that a lack of superlative physical training undermines the 
ability to act, whether, for example, physically in the sense of lifting an ammunition box or 
mentally in terms of concentrating in order to determine the source of enemy machine gun fire.  
 174 
Moreover, the ability to act repeatedly, over time, is compromised.  Coleman, in my estimation, 
was repeating Vegetius’ sixteen hundred year old rhetorical question. 
Coleman’s reference to “something instinctive,” however, muddies the interpretive 
waters, especially since he implies that Marines arrive with or without “it,” whatever “it” is.   
This is a critical ethnographic moment for the researcher seeking to properly represent military 
culture as a chosen culture.  During my research a colleague asked me whether or not the Master 
Sergeant “really believed” that an innate ability to fight is the basis for being trained to be 
courageous.  I replied that I didn’t ask Master Sergeant Coleman whether or not he really 
believed what he said since his actions appeared to me to make what he meant clear: first, from 
what I observed, he trained and kept training Marines as long as they (not their instincts) tried to 
succeed and second, he would change his view of individual Marines from initially negative 
based on their initial passivity to positive based on newly demonstrated aggressiveness.  Even if 
Master Sergeant Coleman “really believed” that training chips away cultural obstructions to 
fighting instincts, we would be left with the traditional problem of variegated human action.  
That is, we must ask the question, “Why does training work for some Marines but not others?”  
How can we legitimately or convincingly hold individual Marine trainees culpable for “not 
having their cultural obstructions stripped away?” It seems to me that the act of attributing 
responsibility to Marines is possible only if we accept a glaring contradiction in the logic of the 
bio-reductive framework: that it is the Marine, not his or her instincts, that decide to strip away, 
or permit to be stripped away, cultural obstructions to instinctive behavior. The point of Marine 
combat training, then, is to discipline the effort of agentic precision in execution of purposes and 
meanings prized by the Marine Corps.  The effect of the disciplining is naturalization. 
If the primacy of the agentic person is tacitly if not overtly required in Marine training, 
then a corollary principle supported by semasiology emerges: physical movement and ethical 
content are inseparable for dynamically embodied human beings in social interaction.  Ethics are 
not simply evident in decisions about which actions to take, they are built in to Marine 
movements per se.  This fact is in many ways obscured if not denied by the long Western and 
American dependency on a conception of human being as composed of two radically distinct 
entities: mind and body.  The philosopher Renè Descartes generated this wrong-headed and 
debilitating split in the 17
th
 century.  It still haunts and confuses thinking about human social 
action and is a fundamental component of the bio-reductive model.  The idea that “culture” 
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somehow can be and should be “stripped away” to re-enable the operation of bodily instincts for 
fighting generated over the course of human evolution was a position advanced by some of the 
IT’s at the MACE when teaching Marine trainees.  Drawing on earlier arguments we can 
recognize in this theory the separation of culture and biology, mind and body demonstrated to be 
scientifically implausible.  To maintain it is an to enact and idealism quite at odds with the 
general realism practiced by the Marine Corps.  In this sense the Marine trainers’ explanation of 
the source of fighting contradicts their own training program.  That is, the realism of the Marine 
Corps and the combat veteran IT’s at the MACE expressed both in how they invite their trainees 
(not their trainees’ instincts) to revise or improve their performance and in their understanding of 
the inseparable connection between mind, body, and character is contradicted by the notion that 
culture/mind can be and should be separated from biology/body in order to permit, unimpeded, 
the operation of instinct.  This is a systematic implication of the deep contradiction in the Marine 
Corps belief system. 
The reflections of a naval aviator shot down during the Viet Nam war put the matter 
succinctly.  U.S. Navy Vice Admiral and Congressional Medal of Honor winner James Stockdale 
spent eight years as a prisoner of the North Vietnamese, two of them in leg irons, four of them in 
solitary confinement, and was tortured fifteen times.
25
  He reports of a kind of combat that he 
and his fellow prisoners of war engaged in 
 
In sorting out the story after our release, we found that most of us had come to 
combat constant mental and physical pressure in much the same way. 
 We found that over the course of time our minds had a tremendous 
capacity for invention and introspection, but had the weakness of being an 
integral part of our bodies.  I remembered Descartes and how in his philosophy he 
separated mind and body.  One time I cursed my body for the way it decayed my 
mind.  I had decided that I would become a Gandhi.  I would have to be carried 
around on a pallet and in that state I could not be used by my captors for 
propaganda purposes.  After about ten days of fasting, I found that I had become 
so depressed that soon I would risk going into interrogation ready to spill my guts 
just looking for a friend.  I tapped to the guy next door and I said, “Gosh, how I 
wish Descartes could have been right, but he’s wrong.”  He was a little slow to 
reply; I reviewed Descartes’ deduction with him and explained how I had 
discovered that body and mind are inseparable. [Stockdale 2006: 14] 
 
Stockdale’s reflections and the expectations for embodied performance as well as actual 
embodied performance in MACE training provide the empirical evidence that both supports and 
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emerges from a new realist theory of human social action.  In this light, a Marine IT “explaining” 
the source of combat as some sort of evolved instinct short-circuited by the dampening features 
of culture is, in reality, not offering an explanation at all.  The discourse actually functions as 
either a motivation for or a justification of fighting and killing in Marine-defined ways.  It draws 
its power to “convince” from its supposed basis in the scientific knowledge of allegedly 
exception-less deterministic laws of nature. If God or Nature are so conceived of, and hence 
believed in, in this way, compliance to the Word or the Law is, as human history has certainly 
shown, easily forthcoming. 
The presumption of agency that underlies training (despite the contradictory vocal 
explanations offered by some IT’s) is rooted in the organization’s emphasis on the importance of 
the three “disciplines” that are central to the conception of training Marines at the MACE.  These 
disciplines provide content for the Marines Corps’ concept of MCMAP training.  They are 
“character,” “mental,” and “physical.”  The relationship among these disciplines is conceived as, 
ideally, synergistic: the effect of these disciplines together is greater than the sum of the parts. 
We have here an instance of the Durkheimian principle of the social fact: the transformation of 
individual---the citizen--- being into social—military—being.  This “whole-person” approach 
echoes the theoretical insight offered by Farnell and Varela when they suggest a particular way 
of understanding the body and mind’s relationship to the person.  Farnell and Varela 
 
argue that neither minds nor bodies intend, only people do, because as embodied 
persons they are causally empowered to engage in social and reflexive 
commentary with the primary resources of vocal and kinetic systems of semiosis 
provided by their cultural ways of being human. [2008: 221] 
 
Farnell and Varela help us to refine Stockdale’s formulation of the relationship of body, mind, 
and person in action: ascribing the source of human social action to the mind (Cartesian) or the 
body (Merleau-Pontyan) is a theoretical mistake of the first order.  The Marine Corps, insofar as 
the MCMAP program represents it, understands this mistake and seeks to avoid making it. 
While the word “synergy” generally refers to cooperative action of two or more muscles 
or drugs, the Marines’ use of the term in this context refers to the qualitative increase in 
effectiveness or competence of a Marine in being a Marine.  Marines who weight these 
disciplines equally—in terms of seeking master all three of them through the ever-increasing 
challenges of the belt system—will achieve an in-kind difference in competence compared to 
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Marines who do not.  One way that the Marines conceive of the content and interrelationships 
among the disciplines is through the diagram provided in Figure 7 (see Figures section at the end 
of this chapter).  The diagram offers a visual representation of what is essentially the invisible 
meaningful context in which techniques are embedded.
26
  The idea of techniques as merely 
mechanical and utilitarian is untenable when put into the context of, for example, the 
“Responsible Use of Force” category in the Character Discipline.  A MCMAP-trained “person of 
force” would be irresponsible (and immoral and acting illegally) if she used a lethal technique on 
an unarmed civilian who did not act in a hostile manner or demonstrate hostile intent.  This is 
one example of the difference between “killing” and “murdering” in the American military: the 
responsible use of power for the requirement to use force in some situations. 
Techniques, mastering them, and learning how to instruct others in their proper 
execution, use, and application, provided the centerpiece of the MAIT course in which I 
participated, but the context of this functional goal was “strengthening the disciplines.”  In an 
aggressive, competitive environment like the U.S. Marine Corps, belts corresponding in color to 
higher levels of achievement create the potential for the owner to receive the respect and 
deference of other Marines who have not achieved the same level of competence.  In an 
introductory training class Staff Sergeant Demster asked the Marine trainees, “What’s the first 
thing every Marine looks at when you take your blouse (Marine terminology for a uniform shirt) 
off?” and he provided the answer, “Your belt.”
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  Who and what Marines respect—and so seek to 
emulate—carries a special meaning within the Corps given that it is an organization where what 
you do or do not do can get you or others killed. In fact, the training material stated that the 
martial arts are critical “on the battlefield, where armed opponents are engaged in a fight not 
only for their lives but the lives of their comrades and brothers” (MAITM 07: 11). 
The MACE therefore poses two rhetorical questions to trainees that illuminate the larger 
context of “strengthening the disciplines,” “What is the goal of MCMAP?  Strengthening the 
disciplines or wearing a belt?” (U.S. Marine Corps Martial Arts Center of Excellence, Martial 
Arts Instructor Trainer Manual, Revised April 2007: section 09, page 10, hereafter MAITM Rev. 
07).  The right answer is that “Reinforcing the disciplines must always be the priority…Marines 
don’t need these skills to show off some new form of decoration, Marines need these skills as 
force multiplier in conflict” (MAITM Rev. 07: section 09, page 10).  Apparent here is the idea 
that individual Marine trainees could—indeed, had to—choose how they would conceive of the 
 178 
training and what sort of Marine, therefore, they would choose to be.  The performance of 
techniques and all other training exercises had as its ultimate point preparation for enacting life-
and-death decisions on the battlefield. 
Given the conception of the warrior ethos as combining three synergistic disciplines, 
failing to “train in,” for example, the Marine Corps Core Values—Honor, Courage, and 
Commitment—jeopardizes life and limb just as much as failing to execute techniques properly.  
And of course, the jeopardy is not yours alone, but that of other Marines and persons you ought 
to be protecting.  Mastery of techniques, then, is inseparable from mastering the application of 
the ethical (and legal) code that governs their use, the spirit in which they are to be employed, 
and the attitude toward them that a Marine expresses.  This means, logically, that the quality of 
the performance of techniques is an expression of what kind of Marine you are (at least for the 
time and place of your actions).  Mind, body, and values are inseparable in this sense.  In their 
official position about the foundational intra-human relationships among “disciplines,” the 
Marines of the MACE value the unity of human being rather than a Cartesian split between mind 
and body.  This occurs despite individual Marines’ tendency, when pushed or asked to explain 
the source of fighting, to rely on the concepts of the bio-reductive framework to convey the 
meaning of human social action. 
The ‘spectrum of violence’ concept that, theoretically, covers all Marine actions, blends 
realism with the American ethical value that a broadly inclusive category of others is designated 
as “non-combatant.”  We encountered one “test” for membership in this category in the “hostile 
action equals hostile intent” principle used but not acted upon by Sergeant Stevens in his 
encounter with the elderly Iraqi man during a nighttime raid on a house.  While the meaning of 
actions are not always clear—as Sergeant Stevens in his (non)action in being confronted with a 
“clearly” hostile action proved—the Marine standard at least demands some empirical 
substantiation of hostility prior to intent, unlike, for example, the principle in light of which Al-
Qaeda suicide bombers will blow up anyone whom they unilaterally determine is either to be 
killed or expendable.  American Marines like Corporal Dunham can and do get themselves killed 
acting to honor this realist/ethical principle; after all, Dunham chose to smother with his body a 
grenade dropped by an insurgent who could have been just as easily shot dead by the Marines as 
they approached but for this very principle. 
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At this point I want to offer three statements about Marine training.  First, the actual 
practice of training to fight like a Marine and not, for example, like an MMA sport fighter, 
should not be necessary were the bio-reductive framework a reference to real forces and entities. 
The person uses the body to embody mind and body in a dynamically embodied execution of a 
performance of being and the be-ing of a Marine.  This is why the training is of Marines by 
Marines who address them as persons.  No Marine IT talks to the DNA or to the instincts of any 
of the Marines in actual ethnographic fact.  Second, the training itself does not constitute 
“stripping away” calqued-on layers of culture that obstruct the otherwise automatic operation of 
evolved instincts.  Rather it is habituating Marines into new ways of moving (new) embodied 
values.  Habits then become resources for intelligent use by Marines.  The degree of expertise 
brought about by repetition makes these moves appear to be automatic, but training, as we will 
see, constantly forces Marines to think and to make judgments even as they execute these 
habitual moves.  Autonomy constitutes automaticity of the practice, and this is why it is not 
mechanical.  The automaticity can only be realized by virtue of the reality of autonomy as an 
agentic embodied practice.  The person becomes charged with new, powerful alternatives for 
action. 
The sense of automated responses in combat situations is enhanced by the complex 
actions Marines engage in and resolve, in very little time.  The reason is that “complex 
situations” are modeled in training and responses are thought through, practiced, and turned 
into a habit during training.  Consider this assessment of a combat operation by Marine combat 
veteran Colonel Bryan P. McCoy that McCoy used as a basis for demanding tough, realistic 
training from his Marines: 
 
Major Martin Wetterauer had been a squad leader…in Operation Desert Storm in 
1991.  He told of a fight his platoon had with an entrenched enemy unit of six 
men.  He described how the firefight that should have been over in a few minutes 
lasted more than an hour because it was fought only with rifles and the M249 
SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon, essentially a machine-gun).  Even though 
Wetterauer’s unit had rockets, hand grenades, and M203 grenade launchers, they 
were never employed in that fight because they were forgotten in the heat of battle 
because integration of weapons had not been drilled.  Had the HE (High 
Explosives, such as grenades and rockets) been employed, the fight would have 
been over quickly. [2007: 27] 
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Battlefield effectiveness, according to McCoy, has to do with generating embodied knowledge.  
The speed with which a Marine can assess a situation, judge distance to a small aperture in a 
bunker, and in a remarkable feat of dexterity toss a grenade through it may invite us to consider a 
biological basis for fighting.  But what is happens in a situation like this has to do with 
conceiving and practicing ways of moving in light of a intelligent judgment exercised by the 
Marine.  Thinking about how to act occurs a priori, becomes embodied knowledge, and as such 
permits Marines to think of other things besides what they are doing with their bodies in the very 
moment of execution.  This means that they can, if they so choose, change their minds in media 
res. 
This is not unique to the military and certainly not news to anyone who watches 
American football, for example.  The sensitivity to the vulnerability of quarterbacks and kickers 
has resulted in severe penalties for opposing players should they use force beyond a certain 
point, specific blocks or tackles, or simply touch these players at certain points.  Video replay 
clips are filled with players “pulling back” or otherwise amending their bodily trajectory, even in 
mid-air.  This sophisticated kinesthetic capability grounds the legitimacy of an expectation for 
dynamically embodied ethical action.  The human capacity for dynamically embodied movement 
that is value-oriented and purpose-driven by the person forms the basis of socio-cultural 
conceptions of courageous action: ideally, at any time, under any circumstance, Marines are 
expected to be able to change their current movement in light of a new perception of the 
intentions of an opponent, the generation of a new intention on the part of the Marine, or an 
attempt to more fully realize an ethical principle.  This is not always possible given the limits 
imposed by the natural world where, for instance, a football player in mid-air cannot suddenly 
reverse direction.  Such mitigating factors are included in our deliberations about assignment of 
responsibility for events in the world and may in fact alleviate a person from responsibility.  
Third, courageous action is inseparable from movement in context—from combat—because the 
movements are social expressions of values, not just practical techniques for practical ends.  The 
conceptualization of hand-to-hand combat is foundational to what courage is to (Marine) combat 
infantry.  Critically, that conceptualization is embodied, meaning that the way Marines move in 
close combat is nearly identical with “courage” for not only them but for Americans generally.  
Understanding why and how this is the case requires a detailed analysis of combat training. 
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Pulling these strands together results in the following: Marines deploy themselves—
meaning their agency in the form of their bodies, vocalizations, creativity, and intelligence—
toward the end of controlling enemy.  The enemy, like the Marines, on pain of death, must be 
regarded as equally creative and intelligent in the use of violence toward to the same end: 
domination.  The point of domination is the achievement of certainty through control.  This leads 
to a rather startling conclusion: killing is not the point for the Marine Corps though that is their 
purpose and trained capability.  Rather, killing is one among a number of means to an end-state 
of domination in the service of control.  It is not Thou Shalt Not Kill because that is not the 
reality of war for Marines and the military generally.  It is Thou Shalt Not Kill Indiscriminately, 
Immoderately, or without Respect.  Death and killing is an absolute necessity in some cases 
exactly because the U.S. Marines and the military hold life so dear.  There is an inherent 
uncertainty about combat because of the presence of human beings who are intelligent and 
creative, who can anticipate and so plan for the actions of others.  There is also an inherent 
uncertainty about the natural world, chance occurrences, for example.  “If that rock hadn’t rolled 
down that hill at that point the insurgent would have stumbled right into me.  As it was he turned 
to look in the direction of the noise and I was able to shoot him.” 
 182 
Figures 
 
1. All theoretically possible human movement 
2. Different cultural manifestations     IX 
3. Different societal manifestations     VIII 
4. Separate ‘codes’; rites, rituals, martial arts systems, etc.  VII 
5. All martial arts, rites, rituals of one people    VI 
6. A single martial art, rite, ritual, etc.     V 
7. The totality of moves of one human actor    IV 
8. One group of phrases or utterances     III 
9. One utterance of moves/gestures     II 
One whole body gesture (kineseme)     I 
One part of one gesture (kineme) 
Figure 5: Illustration of the “nesting principle.”
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Figure 6: Marines from 3
rd
 Squad, Martial Arts Instructor-Trainer class 03-07 (MAIT 03-07) practice non-lethal 
martial arts techniques.  The Marine facing the camera is (my) 3
rd
 Squad leader Gunnery Sergeant Timothy 
Blanchard.
29
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Figure 7: Graphical representation of content and interrelationships among key disciplines of the U.S. Marine Corps 
Martial Arts Program 
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1
 The political and moral reasons for deploying Marines are of course critical considerations.  The Marine concept of the 
“mission” captures the close relationship between reasons for deploying and the permissible or necessary range of actions to be 
employed.  The Corps defines “mission” as “the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and 
the reason therefore” (2007: 106). Reasons for deploying Marines are separable only analytically from what Marines do once 
deployed because these reasons form the context for the deployment.  In most cases these reasons constitute the moral 
justification for the use of or threat of force and the violation of the otherwise sovereign borders of other nation-states.  This does 
not necessarily mean that there are not incongruities or even outright contradictions between reasons for deployment and actions 
taken. This kind of contradiction occurred during the Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II) when the reason “free Iraqi’s from a 
tyrannical government” was contradicted by Rumsfeldian “shock and awe” tactics on the ground that violated the Iraqi values 
like the sanctity of a household and non-exposure of women to men.  A related kind of contextual dissonance occurred on a 
different scale with the charge that the proffered reason for OIF II—“overthrow a terroristic regime threatening the world with 
weapons of mass destruction”—was exposed as a reason based on fabricated evidence, thus calling into question the moral 
justification of the operation.  My point in broaching these topics is to note that the discussion to follow will concentrate on a 
very specific component of “intervention”: the meaning of that term as it relates to Marine combat infantry and why and how 
they train to act in the ways they do.  This section of the study is then narrowly focused on the Marine conception of 
“warfighting,” and not, for example, “regime change,” “humanitarian relief,” “disaster recovery,” or “rebuilding,” all missions 
that the Corps has been tasked with, intentionally or unintentionally at one time or another. 
2 It is this conceptualization of the relationship between intervention, violence, and security that can produce a contradictory 
effect when Marines are attempting to intervene in the context of, for example, an insurgency.  The internet news story on 
globalpost.com entitled “Winning Hearts and Minds through Shock and Awe” captures this contradiction.  The authors juxtapose 
comments about a Marine mission in Afghanistan with those of an Afghani farmer. 
 
“What makes Operation Khanjar different from those that have occurred before is the massive size of the 
force introduced, the speed at which it will insert, and the fact that where we go we will stay, and where we 
stay, we will hold, build and work toward transition of all security responsibilities to Afghan forces,” said 
Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commanding general of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan, in a 
press release issued Thursday. 
 
It’s not going to be easy. No sooner had the tanks begun to roll out of Camp Leatherneck, in western 
Helmand Province, than the target population began to grumble. After more than seven years of a tug-of-war 
between the insurgents and the foreign armies, Helmand’s population is in no mood to be patient. 
 
“There are more than 60 tanks in our village,” said Sher Agha, a resident of Nawa district. “Instead of 
moving along the roads, they are in our fields. They have destroyed our farmland, and smashed everything. 
They are just like wild boars.” 
[MacKenzie and Dayee 2009 http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghanistan/090702/marines-offensive] 
 
3
 Notice the proper pronoun use in this quotation, “its” has changed to the more appropriate “his.” 
4 (http://www.marines.com/main/index/winning_battles/roles_in_the_corps/air_combat/air_combat_mission). 
5
 (http://www.af.mil/main/welcome.asp) 
6
 See Appendix B for a chart and short explanation of the difference between “enlisted” Marines and Marine “officers.” 
7
 At the rank level of cooks (privates or non-commissioned officers), their likely position in a ground combat situation would be 
as a squad leader.  A Marine rifle squad usually has thirteen members.  At the rank level of helicopter pilots (commissioned 
officers), their likely position in a ground combat situation would be platoon leader.  A Marine platoon usually has forty-one 
members. 
8
 How the Marines understand and use these qualities will be examined later in this chapter. 
9
 The fact that insurgents make themselves indistinguishable from the civilian population among whom they hide is the basis for 
the lack of clarity experienced at checkpoints.  Taking advantage of civilians in this way is not new or particularly “middle 
eastern.”  The Irish Republican Army actually took the notion to a different level in 1990 when they forced an Irishman, Patrick 
Gillespie, working as a cook for the British to drive a van loaded with explosives into a checkpoint manned by British soldiers 
from the King’s Regiment.  The explosives were detonated by remote control killing Gillespie and five British soldiers.  The IRA 
forced Gillespie to drive the van by holding his wife and three children hostage and threatening to kill them if he did not drive the 
van. (http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/28/world/evolution-in-europe-bishop-rebukes-ira-for-car-bomb-attacks.html) 
10
 My remarks here are supported by my training experiences during the summers of 2007 and 2008 as well as the structure of the 
training itself, which challenges both the individual and teams of varying sizes.  Sometimes the training pitted an individual 
against a team, an individual against another individual, or team against team. These claims will be borne out as the analysis 
proceeds.  The concept of the “battle buddy” and its application in both training and combat can be seen in McCoy The Passion 
of Command: The Moral Imperative of Leadership (2006). 
11
  (http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/05/iraq.main/index.html) 
12
 (http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/) 
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13
 See the Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2007) for a discussion of when and under what circumstances each type of solution 
can or should be applied. 
14
 I was party to numerous conversations in which it became clear later that one or all parties were not clear about an acronym’s 
meaning.  Interestingly, only when the acronym appeared to play a critical role relative to the larger context or content of the 
conversation did a conversant ask for clarification.  Although more research is necessary, my impression was that admitting to 
not knowing an acronym was seen as vaguely negative and sometimes elicited a slight sense of annoyance on the part of the 
speaker who’s quick and efficient talk was being interrupted.  This idiom then could be used as a tool for the negotiation of 
power relationships: who is “in the know” versus who is “not in the know.”  In one fascinating case I observed a non-
commissioned officer speaking with his superior commissioned officer.  The superior officer was a new 2
nd
 lieutenant (the most 
junior commissioned officer) and so quite inexperienced.  The non-commissioned officer was a gunnery sergeant with over 13 
years of experience.  The 2ndLt. did not understand the reference to an acronym used by the GySgt. as was made apparent by his 
answer to the GySgt.’s question (neither did I for that matter).  Though the GySgt. could have legitimately brought the issue to 
the fore and explained the acronym’s reference, he chose instead to re-present the question as a request for confirmation of the 
2ndLt.’s preferred course of action without using the acronym.  The 2ndLt.’s facial expression demonstrated that he realized his 
preferred course of action would not be appropriate given the acronym’s reference and so changed his reply to the GySgt.  The 
true art here was that the GySgt. extended a great kindness to the 2ndLt. by helping him to develop an appropriate course of 
action without calling overt attention to his lack of understanding, thereby preserving the 2ndLt.’s authority over the GySgt. 
himself! 
15
 Of course this can produce negative results accidentally or be imposed as an interpretive framework as a positive strategy for 
absolving enactors of violence from responsible for honoring competing or even more important values. 
16
 I am not referring here to the use of internment camps for Japanese-American civilians nor what I see as American hypocrisy 
resulting from the concurrent employment of Japanese-Americans as combat troops in Europe.  I am referring specifically to the 
context of combat and the battlefield, including treatment of prisoners. 
17
 In the larger discussion, Randy clearly struggles with this contradiction more than Michael.  This may or may be expressive of 
their differential service: Randy did not see combat while Michael did. 
18
 Whether the example affirms or confirms my point is somewhat of an open question.  It is certainly a plausible scenario based 
on accounts I have read of hand-to-hand combat in memoirs and letters but I am not clear that it is entirely believable.  I am 
hedging somewhat here because I have yet to explore this particular representation in depth with combat veterans 
ethnographically in interviews.  The scene, however, inspired my questions about “biting” opponents in hand-to-hand combat 
that I will review momentarily. 
19
 My interpretation of this fictional German character’s character was worked out in discussion with Dr. Charles Varela.  Our 
discussion was framed by the novel The Kindly Ones (2009) by Jonathan Littell that portrays the ideology and cultural 
commitment of a World War II German SS lawyer working for Heinrich Himmler.  By way of contrast, if the German soldier 
was to be depicted as simply a soldier, and not an ideologically-fueled Nazi, then it would have to have been shot differently.  
That is, there would have to have been some portrayal of a mitigating factor, such as the American simply losing his grip without 
having vocalized or embodied any protests.  Such as scene might be effective in depicting the hand-to-hand combat as merciless 
and unfair as opposed to malicious, merciless, and unfair. 
20
 From the Martial Arts Instructor Trainer Manual, 2007 revision, section 9, page 8.  Hereafter: MAITM 2007 09:8. 
21
 Some Marines I spoke with during my fieldwork objected to the term “warrior.”  The gist of their objection was that the term 
failed to carry with it unified purposefulness of the teamwork associated with their preferred term, “soldier.”  “Warrior” was too 
individualistic. 
22
 All Marines, regardless of rank, must achieve a basic level competence in MCMAP, a “tan belt” designation, by order of the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps. 
23 Realism and utility: the Senior Non-Commissioned Officer (an officer that gets promoted through the ranks rather than 
commissioned by the U.S. Congress) in charge of the all the IT’s at the MACE explained to me that the techniques being taught 
were chosen from a range of different martial arts around the world according to the interconnected principles of effectiveness, 
utility, and field-usability.  Effectiveness refers to the idea that the technique potentially produced a desired result quickly, 
depending on the judgment of the user.  For example, chokeholds that cut off the blood supply to the brain were chosen over 
chokeholds that cut off the supply of air to the lungs because the former resulted in the incapacitation of the opponent more 
quickly than the latter.  Utility refers to the applicability of the technique to scenarios that deployed Marines might face.  The 
various lethal knife and bayonet techniques, such as a “vertical slash” would not be the first choice in a crowd control scenario.  
A non-lethal technique like an “arm bar” would work better given the point of the mission.  The mission provides one component 
of the larger context for judgments about what counts as the best technique to utilize.  As we saw in a review of the actions of 
U.S. Marine Sergeant Samuel J. Stevens (chapter 2), however, the context or conditions never determine the actions: the 
judgment comes from and is authored by the Marine.  Field-usability refers to whether or not a Marine with a full field pack of 
equipment and weapons (perhaps up to 100 pounds) could execute the technique, which eliminates, for example, a “flying kick.”  
24
 Sergeant Betts, the only woman IT at the MACE during my training class, was responsible for creating this video.  A copy was 
given to each graduate to the training class.  See also The History Channel’s production of Human Weapon: Marine Corps 
Martial Arts, A&E Television Networks, 2007.  The production was shot during my fieldwork and offers additional footage of 
training situations.  Interestingly, no effort was made by the MACE staff to distinguish me from the “real” Marines being filmed 
and I appear in a few places in the program. 
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25
 O.S. Guiness in the Foreward to The World of Epictetus by James Stockdale, page 5. 
26
 After diagram in MCMAP and the Marine Warrior Ethos by Jamison Yi.  A Venn diagram normally represents all the possible 
logical relations among members of sets.  I have not yet explored why a Venn diagram was or is considered the best vehicle for 
the representation of the interrelationships among disciplines.  It may have been chosen for its visual utility.  
27
 SSgt. Demster also instructed the Marines in the moral rules that should be followed to not invite this kind of competitive 
comparison among Marines when he added, “On the other hand it’s not about taking your blouse off when you have a black belt 
with a red tab.” 
28
 After Williams 2003:63 
29
 Photo by author.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
COURAGE 
 
 
One who conquers himself is greater than another who 
conquers a thousand times a thousand on the battlefield. 
-- The Dhammapada 
 
Courage…must in the end remain a mystery. 
-- William Ian Miller, 2000 
 
Courage may be taught as a child is taught to speak. 
-- Euripides, 5
th
 Century BCE 
 
Courage is not the absence of fear. It is the ability to face fear 
 and overcome it. It is the mental, moral, and physical strength  
ingrained in every Marine. It steadies them in times of stress,  
carries them through every challenge and aids them in  
facing new and unknown confrontations. 
-- U.S. Marine Corps website, 2009 
 
Having set the theoretical and cultural context for the generation of embodied semiotic 
practices in American military training and combat in the last chapter (using the semasiological 
principle of nesting) I will now focus on connecting movement, meaning, and context in actual 
training (i.e., Figure 5 in the last chapter, levels V through I).  I will examine the vocal and 
gestural discursive practices used in Marine combat training and explicate the concept of 
“courage” that emerges from them.  In doing so, courage becomes comprehensible.  This means 
that the semasiological framework will be used to untangle the Marines’ contradictory discourses 
of and about courage.  This framework respects both their agentic descriptions and their agentic, 
embodied expressions of courage.  Also required is an exposition of the relationship between 
combat training and actual combat that will provide the ground for my claims about the nature of 
courage.  This exposition will be constituted by an analysis of two specific visible martial arts 
techniques, the “round kick” and the “counter to the round kick” in relation to (1) the Marine 
trainers’ tacit assumptions about the capabilities of Marines as persons and fighters, (2) their 
theoretical understanding of the nature of combat as a whole-person, value-oriented social 
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interaction, and (3) sometimes conflicting expectations for embodied performance that range 
from realistic to idealistic. (see Farnell 1995) 
In short, I aim to connect the visible techniques of Marine combat training with the 
invisible concepts that make possible the existence of “courageous action” as a way of being 
through dynamic embodiment for Marines.  Farnell and Varela call this anti-Cartesian endeavor 
“bringing together somatics and semiosis” (2008: 215).  These “invisible concepts” are nothing 
more than cultural conventions, the same shared meanings that, for example, permitted a British 
army officer to report that, “Often all that was needed at a Commanding Officer’s conference 
was an executive nod; the action, even of an intricate nature, then followed promptly and 
efficiently without any visible co-ordination whatsoever” (In Baynes 1967: xviii).  From a 
semasiological perspective we know that visible, tangible techniques du corps (in Marcel 
Mauss’s phrase) and invisible, intangible values like “courage” are inseparable.  The visible and 
the invisible are a duality in Giddens’s sense, not a dualism in the standard Saussurian sense.
1
  
Knowing, moving, and being in a culture is irreducibly value-laden.
2
  Rigorous and detailed 
ethnographic analysis is required show how exactly how somatics and semiosis, the visible and 
invisible components of ‘action-signs’, relate in any given local culture. 
The orienting questions this chapter is designed to answer are: “What is ‘courage’ is to 
U.S. combat infantry, specifically U.S. Marines, and can it be trained?  In the analytical sense 
that I am using it here, I want to offer a formulation of  “combat” as “a variable set of 
movements employed by a person to harm or kill another person in the social situation of an 
enemy who is engaged in a similar practice.”  The kind of combat I am referring to is close, or 
hand-to-hand, combat.  It should be noticed that without the tacit agreement of another person 
who defines him- or herself as an “enemy” through embodied practice, there is no combat.  
Combat is actualized in the moment-by-moment, interpersonal enactment of embodied meaning: 
in using their bodies in motion combatants are “speaking” intelligently and generating meaning.  
I present “training” as “domesticated combat,” meaning that it approximates and in some ways 
replicates actual combat, but it is never identical with it.
3
  The U.S. military in general and the 
Marines in particular express this when they espouse the prescription and description “train like 
you fight, fight like you train.”  As a consequence of the analysis we will be in a position to 
understand the basis for the near identity of courage and combat that has so far been assumed not 
only in this study but also in popular analogies between civilian and military actions.  
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Realism in Marine Corps Training: Domesticated Combat 
 
During both of my summers with the Marines at the MACE I heard a number of 
comments from both IT’s and trainees about the quality of the training.  The comments generally 
placed the MCMAP program as one of the toughest in the Marine Corps and it was compared in 
everyday banter to U.S. Army Ranger training.  The IT’s noted that past iterations such as the 
Linear Inline Neurological Override Engagement (L.I.N.E.) program, were, variously, “beat-
fests” or “beat downs,” meaning that the physicality of the course was overemphasized to a 
deleterious degree, and that the program was incongruous with the Marine philosophy of 
offensive movement.  Staff Sergeant Twiggs, an IT-in-training attached to the MACE told me, 
“the LINE program was the last martial arts program and it didn’t work.  It’s something like 
Linear In-Fighting Neuro-Override Engagement…?  It’s really defensive.” (June 14, 2007, 
emphasis added).  We will see momentarily how deeply such a defensive posture is rejected 
among U.S. Marines both organizationally and individually, and for good reasons.  The preferred 
posture is offensive.   
The IT’s and MACE leadership tended to distinguish the MCMAP program from its 
predecessors on the basis of the three-discipline approach.  The mental and character disciplines 
that we encountered in the last chapter are as important as the physical.  A clear difference 
between the MCMAP program and its predecessors is to be found in the inclusion of “tie-ins.”  
Tie-ins are events comprised of narrative accounts that I would classify as moral parables, and 
often focused on Marines who had won awards on the battlefield for their actions.  In a tie-in, an 
illustrative description of the battlefield (or other) actions of a Marine was followed by a 
discussion of the values expressed in those actions.  Tie-ins were usually delivered to the trainees 
right after a difficult, but not exhausting, drill.  (To get a sense of a tie-in in situ, I have included 
a video on DVD of an Obstacle Course Drill and a tie-in in Appendix A).  Usually, the IT in 
charge of the drill led the discussions. 
These events were remarkable from an anthropological perspective since they presented 
the members that make up an organization in the explicit act of reviewing and reaffirming the 
principle values of their way of life.  In this context, then, tie-ins constitute illustrations of being 
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a “good” Marine.  They were also remarkable from a semasiological perspective since they 
demonstrated the way the members of a value-driven organization ascribe moral values to 
embodied action.  Since the tie-ins were most often focused on battlefield actions, there is a clear 
and consistent message about what Marines do (fight), how they do it (selflessly), and why they 
do it (for their fellow Marines, the Corps, and their country).  In this model of an event structure 
there is one particular theme that cannot be over-emphasized: it is sometimes their words, but 
mostly it is what Marines do and so it is what they mean in using their bodies that counts most of 
all. 
The delivery of a tie-in after strenuous exercise is an overtly theoretical and so 
methodological decision by the MACE staff.  For them, the tie-in’s messages are appreciable to 
all Marines regardless of ethnic, socio-economic, or educational background if delivered after 
tough physical training.  Jack Hoban, retired Marine Captain, adviser to the MACE, and guest IT 
during my training noted that, “the Marines are ready to hear the content after a drill…it works 
on their emotions” (Fieldnotes, June 21, 2007).  Staff Sergeant Wyman echoed this 
understanding when he noted that tie-in methodology is based on a book called 
 
Developing the Ethical Warrior by Dr. Richard Strozzi-Heckler.  Physically 
draining the Marines makes them more receptive to the moral and ethical 
messages, it’s just how your brain is wired.  He based his book on research by Dr. 
Hummerls(?) who did a study. [Fieldnotes, June 14, 2007] 
 
According to Hoban’s and Wyman’s explanation of the methodology of delivering tie-ins, 
physical exhaustion permits the Marines to bypass what anthropologists would otherwise argue 
are irreducible and necessary components for cultural being in the world (ethnicity, class, 
gender) and deliver ethical content directly to mind.  The implication is that the brain, due to its 
structure, is the primary driver of human social behavior. 
In my view two important issues are inappropriately entangled in this conception.  First, 
in the semasiological and critical realist understanding of the mind-body duality (not dualism) 
we should expect that physical exhaustion and mental exhaustion can be related.  In fact, as we 
saw in the last chapter, U.S. Navy Vice Admiral and Congressional Medal of Honor winner 
James Stockdale experienced this very relationship during his time as a prisoner of the North 
Vietnamese during the Vietnam War.  MCMAP training, indeed, much military training, takes 
advantage of this relationship as a way, simultaneously, to teach combatants to be strong 
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mentally and to suggest acceptance of the new concepts and ethics that are required as part of the 
military sub-culture. 
Second, in the semasiological and critical realist understanding of the mind-body duality 
(not dualism) there can be no such thing as “talking directly to someone’s brain,” as the Hoban-
Wyman formulation could imply (if we adopted the bio-reductive framework).  A consequence 
of this understanding would be to interpret SSgt. Wyman’s comment that “it’s just how your 
brain is wired” as a bastardized version of “it’s a liability of being having a mind and body in 
close relationship.”  Importantly, we might see the Marines’ approach here as a form of 
“brainwashing.”  Since there is no such thing as washing a brain clean, even figuratively, we can 
conceive of the term as a metaphor for the social process of using physical-mental exhaustion to 
cajole, demand, persuade, or force, a change in the value system by which a person defines 
himself and guides his actions.
4
  In a non-trivial sense, moreover, the person subjected to 
brainwashing must agree to the change in values, which signals the process as fundamentally 
social and interactive, not biological and vectored.
5
 
Against this discussion, we can ask what, if anything, separates MCMAP MAIT training 
from brainwashing?  The training is designed to produce pain and exhaustion while the moral 
lesson of the training is that the Marines are not only supposed to act, but to act according to 
principles regardless of that pain and exhaustion.  Which principles and how best to express or 
honor them is often problematic, but the point is that principled action is required.  This 
requirement exists not because of but in spite of a properly functioning biological feedback 
system conveying pain in the back, burning in the thighs, and shortness of breath.  In this sense, 
the expectation built-in to training was to get the trainee to refuse the invitation offered by a 
properly functioning physiology.  That invitation is to pay attention to pain and exhaustion and 
then to seek to alleviate it with appropriate behaviors like slowing down, hunching over, 
dropping the weight, grabbing the side of the pool and so forth.  Since the course is entirely 
voluntary, the Marines who took part in the MAIT course asked to have their physical and 
mental disciplines challenged and so to risk a transformative experience in their character 
discipline.  Marines could (and some did) quit the training and risk the approbation of the MACE 
staff and the members of their home unit instead of pushing themselves perhaps to go beyond 
their own limits physically, mentally, and morally. 
 192 
 The primacy of the agency of individual Marines in the training—and so the distinction 
between training and brainwashing—is reflected in an admonishment offered by Lieutenant 
Colonel Shusko: 
 
When you’re out there giving it 65% or 75%, think about these [exemplary] devil 
dogs.  You have to reach down sometimes.  You’re pukin’ out there, brush it off 
and move on.  Think about your brothers, they’ll pull you through and you’ll pull 
them through. [Fieldnotes, June 13, 2007]
6
 
 
LtCol. Shusko asks the Marines to take themselves as objects of critical inquiry and act to 
express the prized values of the Corps and the MACE MAIT program.  Such acts are tacit 
refusals of the physiological messages being received as an invitation to focus on one’s own pain 
and discomfort.  In the refusal there is a personal denial of substandard performance on behalf of 
the social others in one’s group.  The use of familial or kinship terminology is one important, 
readily available, and generally understood way of indexing the kind of unwavering commitment 
to other Marines that LtCol. Shusko and the IT’s expected.  We can, say, then that the Marines 
who participated in the training asked (were not forced into) for the opportunity to risk a 
character transformation and in doing so they were agreeing to value others by performing at the 
peak of their abilities.  I suggest that the difference between MCMAP training and brainwashing 
is exactly in the agentic decision to risk personal transformation through the encounter with pain 
and exhaustion versus the requirement to transform based on unwanted pain and exhaustion. 
We can note, additionally, that LtCol. Shusko’s discourse addresses Marines as persons 
in unwavering social and cultural commitment to one another as brothers, not as emotion-driven 
organisms emotions with their brains as individuated organs.  The upshot of this kind of 
discourse is, it seems to me, is a Marine who chooses to monitor his or her own conduct and 
works to habituate thinking and acting that puts other Marines first.  There are other good 
reasons to deliver tie-ins, and perhaps there are even good reasons to deliver tie-ins after 
strenuous physical activity, but those reasons are not and can not be based in any plausible way 
on a claim about delivering cultural content directly to human brain structures and their 
functions.
7
  Tie-ins, for example, generate a connection between past, present, and the future 
when the battlefield actions of a World War II-era Marine are offered as exemplary for the 
present trainees to enact in and after the training class.  The act of remembering, and 
remembering together in the context of training, is one important way that the Marines generate 
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their tradition.  “Marines have a tradition to uphold” is a phrase that I heard repeatedly.  Perhaps 
more importantly, tie-ins illustrate the choice among Marines to commit themselves totally in 
their character, their minds, and their bodies to the values of the Corps.  In training and therefore 
on the battlefield, the totality of their commitment constitutes the totality of embodiment.  
Intrinsic to being a Marine is a constant moral struggle to give oneself entirely to others. 
 How Marines are using their bodies in difficult and certainly dangerous or deadly 
contexts is what counts, which fact can be appreciated given that the primary modality for the 
training is indeed physical.  The physical modality is one of the most effective ways of 
realistically replicating the stress, strain, and time compression while requiring ethical decision-
making on the battlefield (both in terms of thinking about what actions should be pursued and in 
terms of thinking from the body in executing actions).  Honoring Vegetius’s 1,700-year-old 
insight, the physical in one sense underpins training the mental and character disciplines at the 
MACE.  Colonel Bryan P. McCoy (2006) notes that among other things, physical fatigue, stress, 
loss of sleep, and heavy soldier load are critical factors that detract from a soldier’s will to fight.  
These are precisely the factors that can be and were replicated in training.  Since the physical and 
mental are intimately linked, physical exhaustion challenges Marines mentally. 
It is physical discipline, therefore, that I take to be the basis of the Marine Corps claim to 
“train like they fight and fight like they train.”  In fact, there are excellent grounds for thinking 
that the way Marines are taught to move in a training environment is replicated on a battlefield.  
Many combat veterans affirm this principle when they use phrases like, “then the training takes 
over,” to explain their actions after having set up a dangerous situation that invites fear.  For 
example, U.S. Marine and Congressional Medal of Honor recipient Hershel Williams operated a 
flamethrower during the Battle of Iwo Jima (now called by its original name of Iwo To) during 
World War II.  He crawled through machine-gun fire that bounced off the tanks of fuel on his 
back in order to destroy multiple Japanese bunkers.  In an interview he said, “Was I scared?  
Absolutely I was scared. That’s where the training comes in.  You don’t think you respond…I 
was doing the job I was trained to do” (Medal of Honor 2008). 
Similarly, one Marine in my training squad, Sergeant Desamours, had this to say when I 
questioned him about the relationship between combat and the training we were experiencing, 
 
Both physical and mental [disciplines are involved in] patrols in Iraq—they last 3-
4 hours and its not just physical—you have to be mentally ready to act, there are 
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people out there looking to kill you, so you have to be ready, or I’m going to get 
shot or my Marines are going to get shot, the course here is exactly related to 
combat since you have to combine the physical and mental to overcome the 
Obstacle Course obstacles. [Fieldnotes, June 12, 2007] 
 
Sergeant Desamours had been shot during a close firefight with insurgents.
8
  His remarks 
confirm the intimate interrelationship between physical, mental, and character disciplines in 
contexts of physical and moral danger. 
I use the principle of “train like you fight and fight like you train” as the foundation for 
upcoming claims about the relationship between training for combat and actual battlefield 
combat.  Though obviously not actually identical, training and combat are, nevertheless, virtually 
identical in terms of the way combat infantry are taught to move, and to do so in some important 
contextual and conditional ways.  Movement here includes the notions of thinking, judging, and 
deciding (i.e., mindedness), with the point being that dynamically embodied movement is 
thought in motion.  The context I refer to, for example, includes penalties on the last of the three 
training squads in any of our squad-versus-squad competitions for failing to accomplish a 
mission.  The “losing” squad had to carry “the log,” a sawn-off telephone pole so heavy that an 
entire squad had to be mobilized to transport it on their shoulders.  The squad assigned to the log 
had to bring it with them whenever they moved as a unit, near or far.  One IT commented, with a 
wry grin, that the point of the log was to teach Marines a basic principle, “while you don’t have 
to come in first, you can’t ever be last;” what the trainers understand and seek to replicate is that 
in combat, “you have to make the other guy come in last.  He dies, you live” (Fieldnotes, July 23, 
2007).  That one squad always carried the log is another lesson from combat: fairness may not 
exist.  The context also includes variable circumstances such as heat, noise, the unknown (as in 
starting on a run without any knowledge of the destination), and changing missions.  In the midst 
of trying to haul a life-size, two-hundred pound training dummy across an obstacle course, for 
example, two IT’s might approach the struggling squad and drop another dummy at their feet 
saying, “Ok, you have another wounded Marine,” and walk away. 
There are, of course, limits to my claim that training is “domesticated combat.”  Chapter 
2 provided an extended study of military analogies and metaphors that serve as guides to prized 
moral actions.  Some of those constructions were found to stretch the connecting tissue between 
the source model of action (military actions on a battlefield) and the action for comparison 
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(firefighting actions in a burning building) beyond the breaking point.  One obvious limit to any 
statements about the relationship between training and combat is the fact that, in training, others 
are not really trying to kill you.  What training cannot replicate is the reality of actual death and 
maiming, the horror, disgust, and the frustration of unfair, unjust death not only to soldiers, but 
to civilians, women, and children, animals, the destruction to property and landscapes, the 
uncertainty and fear of hunting other people as they hunt you, and host of other qualities and 
characteristics.  While films and movies about war similarly lack this reality, they also lack the 
reality of training, but not entirely.  Actors can and do train for fight scenes, and thereby 
illustrate or represent components of what has been discussed in this study.  Risks are present, 
but mitigated even more than in training.  For example, professional stunt men and women are 
called upon to perform the riskier dynamically embodied actions for the actors.  There are, in 
short, actors for the actors.  Overall, the actions of actors and their actors lack the intention on 
their part to actually fight in an actual lethal context with actual enemies possessing a similar 
intention. 
The Marines were fully aware of the difference between training and combat reflected in 
differential thinking and action in training.  As Sergeant Terrazas, a fellow trainee, told me, 
“Marines know when you’re in the field [in the presence of the enemy, near or on the 
battlefield], it’s serious and they give one hundred percent.  Not in the [training] course because 
its survival mode, not kill mode” (Fieldnotes, June 27, 2007).  Sgt. Terrazas characterized an 
approach adopted by some Marines wherein they sought to endure the course, not master it.  
Though not all Marines adopted this attitude, there were some who expressed a commitment to it 
by their lack of alacrity, their refusal to push themselves, and their attempt to find an easy way to 
meet a challenge (which they called “cheesing it” or “cheesedicking it”).  This attitude amongst 
the trainees formed the basis of what was perhaps the biggest challenge to the IT’s: motivating 
the trainees to play their part in making the training realistic by giving one hundred percent.  
Individual Marines, squads, and at times the entire training class was admonished at different 
times for not “putting out” one hundred percent.  The point was brought home in a particularly 
visceral and disconcerting way for me early during my own training in the summer of 2007.  An 
IT asked the class how many Marines routinely included swimming or water-based exercises in 
their training.  Only one out of thirty-two responded affirmatively.  The IT noted that this was 
evidence that the Corps had lost its way and become too bureaucratic in that it had unwittingly 
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focused all Marines on passing the required, universal Physical Fitness Test (PFT).  That test 
only included running, sit-ups, and push-ups.  The irony was clear: the traditional PFT not only 
discounted the water-borne origins and nature of the Marine Corps, but unrealistically reduced 
combat readiness to these three physical exercises.  To start to remedy this, the MCMAP 
program requires that Instructor-Trainer candidates pass a series of grueling water-based 
exercises.
9
 
On June 14, 2007 I stood, with substantial apprehension but also a glimmer of hope, on 
the edge of the Olympic sized training pool at Marine Corps Base Quantico. I had been in the 
MAIT training class for two days.  My apprehension came from the knowledge that I did not 
know what was to happen next but that whatever it was, it would be awfully difficult mentally 
and physically.
10
  Moreover I was sore and tired from two full days of training with Marines half 
my age so I doubted my ability to perform well physically.  On land I had quickly come to learn 
that such inability might result in vomiting, passing out, or collapsing onto the ground.  The 
potential consequence for lack of capability in the water is, of course, drowning.  But I had 
always been a good swimmer and thought I could at last at least keep up (contrary to my 
performance so far), especially in light of a comment from a member of my training squad, Staff 
Sergeant Strickland, who told me, “there’s a real problem in the Marine Corps with Marines that 
don’t know how to swim or have basic water survival skills” (Fieldnotes, June 14, 2007). 
At the conclusion of three distinct exercises that grew in complexity and physical-mental 
demand, I again stood on the edge of the pool, but this time I had on my camouflage utility 
uniform (“cammies” to the Marines), combat boots, flak jacket, Kevlar helmet, ALICE gear (All-
purpose Lightweight Individual Carrying Equipment, a series of straps and belts used to secure 
implements like canteens and knives to your body), and a backpack that had a small Styrofoam 
float in it.  The mission was, simply, to swim around the edge of the Olympic size swimming 
pool using only approved strokes and without “cutting the corners” or touching the bottom or the 
sides at any time.  Earlier, the look of dismay on my face and a quick request for advice as we 
were being instructed on how to conduct the upcoming drills brought these comments from Staff 
Sergeant Twiggs, a fellow trainee who was familiar with water drills: 
 
keep your flak jack loose so that you have better range of movement; keep your 
Kevlar (helmet) tight and lean backward and into it so that it acts like a float for 
your head.  The most important thing is to stay calm and use explosive breathing 
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(short, powerful breaths that do not entirely deflate the lungs) to stay afloat.  
Forgetting technique and getting tired is the real problem since, if you get tired 
and did not keep your back arched on a float, or if you get water in your mouth 
and breathed it in and panicked, your body comes out of alignment and instead of 
conserving energy by having a low profile in the water, you waste energy by 
trying to stay above water and won’t be moving forward. [Fieldnotes, June 14, 
2007] 
 
The complicating factor of this exercise was that there would be no Styrofoam float despite all 
the equipment, cammies, boots, and prior drills.  The conditions of this drill ensured that the 
Marines had to put out one hundred percent effort.  With no solid ground, no float, and little 
energy reserves, the Marines had no way of avoiding the effort that would be necessary to at 
least maintain their ability to breathe.  In this sense, the drill itself as designed by the IT’s 
admonished the Marines to exert effort and generate a focus to a level similar to a combat 
environment. 
SSgt. Twiggs’ comments, importantly, alert us to the substantive connection between the 
physical and the mental in the drill.  We had to focus on a kinesthetic sense of body alignment 
and keeping a “low profile,” which meant keeping horizontal to the water line or the line of 
travel, in order to stay afloat, move forward, and finish the drill prior to getting exhausted and 
sinking.  Failing to focus meant compromising alignment, creating drag, expending more energy, 
tiring quicker, and possibly drowning. 
In assessing my physical and mental state, as well as the distance around the outer edge 
of the pool, I actually thought that drowning or some no doubt painful and terrifying 
approximation awaited me.  And it is exactly on this point that the IT’s later upbraided the class 
and its relatively poor performance.  Although I made the swim (much to the satisfaction of the 
IT’s and myself), a number of Marines did not and required a life-saving float to be tossed to 
them from the pool’s edge or handed to them from one of the three IT’s monitoring the exercise 
from in the water.  The MACE IT in charge of the class, Gunnery Sergeant Friend, yelled at the 
assembled Marines saying, “Do you really think that we’d let you drown?!  Why was this not 
one hundred percent effort?!  Why didn’t you put out?!”  In response to their failure, GySgt. 
Friend amended the training schedule and the class spent the next hour in the gym going through 
a series of grueling drills. 
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Gunnery Sergeant Friend’s criticism of the failure of the Marines to exercise their agency 
to its fullest extent permits me to draw out an extremely important component of the training in 
terms of “courage.”  Given my interpretation of the drill itself mandating combat-environment-
like effort, on what basis could GySgt. Friend criticize the Marines for not putting out?   I think 
that what Gunnery Sergeant Friend meant by his criticism was that the Marines failed to live up 
to a foundational responsibility: despite the real difference between training and combat, their 
responsibility was to act as if they were in a combat environment through their own effort.  They 
were being challenged to use their imaginations and drive themselves to generate the stress and 
exhaustion that can compromise their capabilities as agents on the battlefield even as they were 
expected to fight to overcome it.  The Gunnery Sergeant’s unspoken demand, then, was that the 
Marine trainees should have struggled onward until they went down.
11
  The key indicator of their 
failure was embodied action: in reaching for the pool side or a float, they thought about 
themselves and not their mission.  While civilians might question a demand for this kind of 
apparently self-destructive effort, the Marine Corps does not, especially in light of their 
awareness of the realities of lethal combat.  The ethical principle was this: it is better to die 
trying than to give up. And the theoretical-moral principle is this: the absolute commitment to the 
principle of agency; but now, what makes that principle truly important, is the absolute 
commitment to the exercise of agency to the very limit, and virtually, to reach beyond it.  GySgt. 
Friend was training the moral value, then, of self-sacrifice. 
Gunnery Sergeant Friend later told me that the IT’s viewed the water exercise as 
particularly important for discovering the strengths and weaknesses of the trainees.  Later I asked 
him, half-jokingly, if he had expected the Marines who were struggling to “put out” until they 
passed out.  He replied in all seriousness that he did and that was why he upbraided the class. 
(Fieldnotes, June 18, 2007).  A Marine Corps Water Safety Instructor (MCWSI, pronounced 
“macwhis”) confirmed that Marines can and did exert themselves to the point of 
unconsciousness in training to become a MCWSI, especially during timed underwater drills.  
Two days into my training I had discovered not only that the training was realistic as a model of 
combat but that insofar as it was, it conveyed, demanded, and modeled moral values, like what it 
meant to fight to the end.  We can say that the latter is accomplished by offering trainees 
opportunities to strive, physically and mentally, to the point of incapacitation.  Whether or not 
any particular individual actually incapacitates him- or herself in an effort depends on the 
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individual’s choices.  The design and speed of the training, as well as the IT’s themselves, 
demand, expect, admonish, and encourage the Marine trainees to push themselves to their limits 
(and beyond).  The goal is the realization of the personal knowledge of one’s own limits, when 
and how those limits can or should be exceeded in pursuit of a value, whether it is accomplishing 
a mission or saving a wounded comrade.  That the program and IT’s are so oriented as to defy 
the very idea of an asymptote should not be confused with the fact that each Marine trainee 
chooses his or her own level of effort, moment-by-moment, situation-by-situation.  For, if 
becoming a Marine is taken to mean that one realize the ideal of incapacitation, the persistence 
required to do just that must be the moment-by-moment, situation-by-situation, determined 
exercise of agency.  Here, we have a meeting of Emile Durkheim’s social fact (a kind of social 
determinism) with G.H. Mead’s symbolic interactionism.  That is, the social fact of Marine 
cultural determinism is the fact of each Marine’s social interactional determination: the mutual 
role-taking action in this cultural case makes each individual a unique “other” for the taking, that 
is, there is the fusion of both the generalized and significant other.  Thus, the striving for 
incapacitation on the part of each Marine (as a self) is in the service of each Marine (as an 
other): the person and the collective have become one unit of action in reciprocal sacrifice.  
Caring for the other in this culture is the expressed in the ultimate act of dying for the other.  And 
this kind of choice of one’s level of effort demands a mutual act of total embodiment.
12
  
 This example illustrates my contention that MCMAP training is analogous to combat in 
important ways.  The nature of that analogous relationship can be understood in the same way 
that we understand that a scientific experiment, as Harré (1998) puts it, “domesticates Nature.”  
The natural setting of combat and its real threat to life is domesticated or modeled by the control 
for and delineation of outcomes represented by the presence and capabilities of the IT’s.  The 
interaction of tired, weighted-down Marines in deep water is mitigated by the IT’s swimming 
and standing close by.  The lack of armed, intelligent, creative persons trying to kill you is also a 
control.  But these controls were mitigated themselves by the trainees’ choice to participate at 
one hundred percent or not. Sergeant Terrazas’s description of Marines not putting out one 
hundred percent until they are really “in the field” now becomes the focal point for questions 
about the realism of the training. The extent to which participation was subpar was the extent to 
which the training did not emulate real combat. 
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The controls for realistic training could also be mitigated by the unpredictable response 
of some trainees at different times and in different circumstances.  During my second summer 
with the Marines as a guest Instructor-Trainer, one trainee suddenly dropped out of a three-mile 
run and fell onto the ground.  He mumbled something about the heat but the corpsman, “Doc” 
Young, said to me that he had no symptoms of heat exhaustion.  He was, for example, sweating 
properly.  The IT’s immediately concluded that he was faking injury to cover his lack of 
performance on the timed run.  He should have pushed himself to run until he actually suffered 
from the heat.  In focusing on himself, the Marine violated a basic principle for the combat-
focused Marine Corps: the group, not the individual, always comes first.  This was a betrayal of 
the first order.  Three IT’s, in addition to Doc Young, surrounded the Marine and yelled at him, 
threatening him with, amongst other things, expulsion from the program, dunking in an ice-bath 
in a nearby building reserved for (real) heat casualties, and administration of the “the silver 
bullet,” a long thermometer used rectally to measure interior body temperature.  The IT’s and 
Doc Young expressed a harsh contempt in their tone of voice. The Marine finally stood up and 
staggered over to the rest of the training class where his absence had been noted but not 
recognized.  That is, the rest of the class went on without him and without acknowledging his 
return.  This was a (mild?) form of ostracism. 
 
Marine Martial Arts Techniques: Thinking and Action, Courage and Values 
 
I now want to formulate an understanding of the relationship between the physical and 
mental disciplines in the context of MCMAP training.  So far I have used examples mostly at the 
kinesemic level.  These are “whole-body” movements.  As we move downward through the 
semasiological “nesting principle” hierarchy into levels of greater detail, we eventually come to 
an example of the smallest meaningful unit of movement in the MAIT training.  That is, the 
shortest understandable phrase “spoken” with the moving body.  This movement, we will see, is 
both offensive (as opposed to defensive) and foundational to the combat infantry conception of 
“courageous action.”  Before getting to the embodied phrase that enacts “in and toward” (an 
enemy), I want to clarify my claim that dynamically embodied movement is minded, not 
mindless.  LtCol. Shusko illustrated this point himself by prioritizing the mind over the body 
when he said, “Where the mind goes the body follows” (Fieldnotes, June 29, 2007).  LtCol. 
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Shusko’s comment challenges the MACE staff’s presentation of the three disciplines—physical, 
mental, and character—as co-equal for MCMAP training.  Given the theoretical orientation of 
this study, I understand him to mean that a Marine’s intelligent determination to move 
appropriately subordinates the phyical body as a resource for the purposeful exercise of agency, 
that is, to think and mean in moving.  This understanding fulfills the interpretive expectation 
emerging from my stated theoretical position that the cultural subsumes the biological and 
includes the social. 
In the sometimes overt and sometimes tacit recognition of the agency of Marines in 
training and in the capability of their being trained, the MACE staff implied prioritization of the 
three disciplines with character being at the top, mental or mind being second, and physical 
being third.  It is something like the vernacular English speaker’s conception of “mind over 
matter.”  We should note that this formulation meshes well with the idea that the sheer 
physicality of the program provides trainees with the opportunity to practice resolving the moral 
struggle between attending to the pain and exhaustion of the self as an opportunity to stop or quit 
and attending to the needs of other Marines and accomplishment of the assigned mission. 
There can be (and sometimes was) an idealism being advanced in such talk.  It is 
important to dwell on the complexity of this kind of discourse in terms of what Marines should 
or could “live up to,” if they so choose because it brings us into confrontation with what might be 
called “original acts of agency” and perhaps, into a zone of social action in which the rightness 
or wrongness of action is indeterminate given the extraordinary circumstances of events and the 
recognition of human beings as imperfect.  The Sandones suggested as much in the last chapter. 
A day or two before the pool drill discussed above, a Marine combat infantryman and 
fellow trainee Staff Sergeant Carr, sprained his ankle badly.  This type of injury had dogged him, 
he later told me, his entire military career.  For his injury SSgt. Carr received a pair of crutches, 
which he used to get to the pool deck.  During the drill I watched as SSgt. Carr, in obvious pain, 
attempted but failed to complete the drill, a failure that, if not remedied through supplemental 
training within a few weeks, would cause him to be disqualified from the course.  That very 
afternoon we were given a classroom session on caring for training injuries, the principles of 
which suggested that sprains ought to be iced and the joint elevated.  Ironically, there sat SSgt. 
Carr with ice on his ankle, but his foot on the floor in clear violation of the training he was at that 
very moment receiving.  We might be tempted to think that this was mostly a display of 
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machismo.  Whether it was or not depends on the extent to which we cast the enactment of the 
embodied strategy of thinking that “the sprain is not as bad as it seems to be” in light of a 
distinctively masculine ethic.  For now I want to leave that question aside and suggest that SSgt. 
Carr’s violation of the principles of injury care was a strategy for living out or living up to LtCol. 
Shusko’s notion that where the mind goes the body follows.  SSgt. Carr later affirmed the spirit 
of this interpretation when I asked him about his injury after the class.  He said, “Yeah, they (the 
base doctors) gave me seven days for recovery, but I’m giving myself two, well, two plus the 
weekend” (Fieldnotes, June 14, 2007).  Despite being given official leave from his training 
obligations SSgt. Carr not only attempted the pool drill, he amended the doctors’ judgment of a 
proper recovery period to fit his idea of when he ought to be ready to resume training in full.  In 
a way of life that routinely and overtly pits self- vs. other-interest, is SSgt. Carr’s action really 
just an expression of machismo or does it also, or, better, does it independently and therefore 
more deeply express commitment to a way of being in actual situations of lethal physical and 
moral danger?  In the terms of the latter, this would be strictly in keeping with the 
Durkheim/Mead principle that total commitment entails total embodiment and total embodiment 
entails total self-sacrifice. 
Nevertheless, we might ask if there isn’t a kind of foolishness involved here, a crossing 
of a realistic line from a kind of idealism that delineates a goal we all recognize is impossible to 
achieve but is nevertheless worthy of an attempt to a kind of idealism that delineates a goal we 
all recognize is impossible to achieve but ought to be achieved anyway.  After all, without the 
proper recovery period, SSgt. Carr’s ankle would not work, and, after a few days, this is exactly 
what happened.  SSgt. Carr had to leave the MAIT program because his injury prevented proper 
completion of the course.  The biological body is a structure that can break.  It is also a structure 
that can function with or without our active intervention.  An example of the latter is digesting 
food.  On the other hand, and as a counterpoint to these seeming realities, consider Marine 
Corporal James “Eddie” Wright whose story was introduced to me by LtCol Shusko (see Figure 
8 in the Figures section at the end of this chapter). 
 
Wright was the assistant team leader with B Company, 1st Reconnaissance 
Battalion, 1st Marine Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force in Al Anbar 
Province, Iraq, when his patrol came under small arms, mortar and rocket 
propelled grenade fire in an ambush. He immediately took action, returning fire 
with his M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon, until an RPG hit his humvee. 
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The blast severed both of his hands and severely wounded his left leg. 
Incredibly, he maintained his composure, instructing his Marines to use a radio to 
call for help and to apply tourniquets to his wounds. He led his Marines from the 
kill zone, directing fire on enemy machine gun positions. 
[U.S. Marine Major General Thomas S.] Jones listened to the young 
reconnaissance Marine's story in amazement. He then asked him how he managed 
to keep from going into shock and passing out. Wright replied, "Sir, I couldn't 
pass out. I was in charge." 
[http://www.mcnews.info/mcnewsinfo/marines/2005/20053RD/features/sgtwright
.shtml] 
 
MGen. Jones’s query to Sgt. Wright conveys the usual (realistic?) expectations about the nature 
and function of the human body as a biological organism: that it is automatic and automated. Sgt. 
Wright’s example is “amazing” in proportion to our (misplaced) reliance on the bio-reductive 
framework’s denial of our species-specific agentic capabilities and our culture-based 
enhancement of those agentic capabilities.  According to Wright, he had a different agenda in 
regard to his taking his body as a resource for the realization of his intentions as a Marine leader.  
The proof of Wright’s claim is in the fact of his embodied action—he instructed his Marines to 
apply tourniquets to his arms, led his Marines, and continued, through them, to fight.
13
 
 A phrase I appropriate to describing Wright’s actions is “presence of mind,” as in, “he 
had the presence of mind to instruct his Marines in applying tourniquets.”  Wright’s actions 
provide a model for Marines to emulate even as they provide empirical evidence that forces us to 
critically re-assess what is realistic and what is idealistic in our expectations for combat action.  
Whether a positive expectation can be or should be applied generally to the exercise of agency 
by Marines is a question that frames the actual practice of IT’s like Gunnery Sergeant Friend 
who expected his trainees to succeed or approximate drowning while trying.   In thinking rather 
than going into shock, Wright’s example grounds the notion that the intelligent agency of the 
Marine as a person trumps the “dictates” of his or her biology. 
The complex role of thinking in combat is highlighted by my experience with many 
combat and non-combat veterans as well as both trainers and trainees at the MACE who told me 
that thinking too much is often a way to get yourself or others killed.  This puzzled me given my 
theoretical position, LtCol Shusko’s comment, and a multitude of other examples of thinking-in-
the-moment such as those exhibited by Sgt. Stevens, Sgt. Wright, and others.  A captain at the 
MACE claimed, for example, that rigorous training produces “muscle memory,” meaning that, 
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“you don’t have to think about it, you just do it.”  This comment resonates with World War II 
Marine Hershel Williams’ statement that “you don’t think you respond.”  Was I here being faced 
with ethnographic evidence for the notion that training is indeed the difficult process of removing 
the obstructing and obfuscating layers of calqued-on culture from individual Marines so that 
combat, or fighting, and killing, was made possible if not so probable as to approach necessity? 
Conceptualization and thinking were not only present, but necessary for the trainees to 
learn to move in the ways the Marine Corps and the MCMAP program required to be effective 
leaders and combatants.  The persistent mistake in Western and American culture about combat 
is that it is mindless.  That mistake is grounded in the deeper issue of the scientifically 
implausible notion of human social action presumed by the bio-reductive framework.  To the 
contrary of that model, my ethnographic evidence suggests that not only do human beings learn, 
they can and do decide when and how to take what they learn as a motivation for action.  What 
the Marine captain at the MACE and Medal of Honor recipient Hershel Williams miss is the idea 
that while in actual combat thoughtfulness about actions in process is dangerous, the actions 
themselves are grounded in conceptualizations that occurred chronologically prior to their 
enactment.  What is learned, what is embodied today can be enacted tomorrow at the discretion 
of the person.  The phrases “not thinking about it” and “you don’t think you respond” that 
describe personal experience and suggest a bio-reductive explanatory framework are not simply 
about what the combatant is not doing—reflecting on actions in process—but they fail to make 
clear what the combatant is doing: trusting in and executing trained (habituated) movements in 
light of a conceptually-based appreciation of what is happening in the situation. 
These phrases are evidence that combat veterans generally and uncritically accept the 
bio-reductive framework embedded in the American vernacular.  The anti-Cartesian and 
anthropological insight, however, is that their phrasing ignores the possibility that they are 
thinking in and through their actions.  Farnell and Varela elaborate on an important insight 
offered by the Wittgensteinian philosopher of human movement David Best who writes, “to 
describe an action as thoughtful is not to say that the physical behavior is accompanied or 
preceded by an inner mental event: it is to describe the kind of action it is” (cited in, Farnell and 
Varela 2008: 227).  “Active engagement in any activity is thinking, which is not to say that one 
cannot also be reflective and think about the activity when one is not engaged in it” (Farnell and 
Varela 2008: 227).  Ethnographically, acting thoughtfully in moving is exemplified by a Marine 
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choosing to execute one among a range of possible bodily techniques in response to a move by 
his opponent.  In the case of simple or complex movements habituated in training, thinking 
occurs in mastering the movements and in mastering the conceptual appreciation of when, 
where, how, under what conditions, and in which contexts the movements should be employed.  
An opponent’s counter-move is similarly thoughtful action.  In this sense, fighting is a kind of 
conversation where the combatants attempt to “talk over” one another.  One limit to this analogy 
with vocal conversation is that embodied action can be articulated much faster and can be 
articulated simultaneously by the combatants. 
Equally important is the understanding that acting thoughtfully and thinking other 
thoughts is possible.  In the MAIT training course the IT’s presented the trainees with challenges 
to their “situational awareness,” as they termed it.  “Situational awareness” means, simply, being 
aware of the larger situation.  What constitutes the boundaries of the larger situation seems to be 
dependent on the rank, purposes, and understanding of the context in which the Marines are 
operating, as well as assessments of what the enemy is doing, not doing, or might be doing.  A 
well-bounded example from the training occurred in one challenge where two trainees were 
paired into a buddy team whose mission was to move along a wooded trail and engage any 
“threats” that appeared.  “Threats” referred to Marines performing as enemy combatants.  During 
their advance down the trail, two enemy combatants would engage the buddy team while a third, 
who is hidden nearby, waited until the fight was in progress to launch an attack.  The buddies 
need to fight their opponents, monitor and adapt to changes in each other’s condition and 
performance (one buddy may be considered killed or incapacitated by an IT observing the fight) 
as well in their opponents’ condition and performance, and monitor the general area. 
During their first iteration, most of the Marines failed to pick up on the need to remain 
aware of changes in the situation beyond their immediate spatial locality and opponent.  As a 
result, most of the buddy teams were “killed.”  The lesson was that quickly and efficiently 
eliminating your opponent gives you the time and energy to respond to changes in the larger 
situation.  This was both a tactical principle and a motivation for keeping your buddy and 
yourself alive.  From a personal standpoint in terms of the management of my thinking from my 
body and my thinking about my body and four others in the unfolding situation, I found this 
experience to be like trying to conduct one multiple, loud, angry, insistent vocal argument while 
listening and trying to understand another, and being challenged by a generalized third argument.  
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Thinking about my body was a monitoring of, not a reflection, action, meaning that I was 
monitoring myself in ways such as how I was balanced to how I was pivoting, identifying my 
opponent’s intention kinesthetically (i.e., how he was trying to trip me), seeing what 
technique(s), if any, my opponent was employing, estimating how far I need to move to make 
my opponent miss with the weapon (e.g., knife, baton, mokuju) he was using and so forth. 
What I was not doing was reflecting on, for example, why I was in Quantico, Virginia 
that day.  But this is was a matter of choice and the management of my focal awareness at the 
time.  As Farnell and Varela claim regarding the actor’s relationship to the experience of acting 
in the world: 
 
Active engagement in sensory experience is meaningful. The signifying here is 
not some semantico-referential meaning outside of the sensory act, it is 
meaningful because it is understood at some level, and therefore a semiosis—a 
meaning-making process—is at work. Sensory acts make sense without 
necessarily being thought about—i.e., engaging in reflective, abstract, critical, 
propositional, or theoretical thought. 
This is not to say that one cannot also be reflective and think about the 
meaning of sensory experience either at the time or later. It is also worth 
remembering that in the midst of social interaction, spoken discourse too is most 
often used without thinking about it. [2008: 227, emphasis added] 
 
I hasten to add, however, that such reflective thoughts as “why am I here at Quantico, Virginia 
today” were not only possible, but also more prevalent than I would like to admit given the 
stakes of hand-to-hand fighting.  While the potential for and the reality of reflective thinking in 
fighting can undermine a combatant’s focus, it is not necessarily undermining, even in actual 
combat, given a propitious alignment of the skill of the combatant, commitment to purpose, 
some luck, and unlucky or unskilled opponents.  By “skill of the combatant” I mean the 
habituated embodied competence in fighting that permits a combatant to fight without having to 
concentrate fully on the many movements required.  Fighting can remain out of focal awareness, 
more or less, for longer or shorter periods of time, in some situations.   
U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Wolfe, a member of the 101
st
 Airborne, represents a case in 
point.  In the summer of 2004 I informally interviewed SSgt. Wolfe after I learned that he was 
being considered for an award for bravery for clearing a trench of Iraqi soldiers who had 
ambushed his unit.  SSgt. Wolfe told me that he recalls running down the trench killing the 
enemy soldiers as he went using an assault rifle he took from one of their dead since he had run 
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out of ammunition.  Without prompting he told me, quite matter-of-factly, “I remember thinking 
[as he was conducting his assault] that my wife would kill me if she saw me doing what I was 
doing” (Fieldnotes, June 23, 2004). He gave a little laugh.  I got the distinct impression that he 
was a bit amazed and a bit baffled both by what he did and by what he was thinking about while 
he was doing it. 
I suggest that the MAIT training course challenge to situational awareness, therefore, can 
be understood as an attempt to teach the Marines that when a certain level of mastery of martial 
arts techniques and fighting is achieved, when their fighting capabilities become habituated, it is 
best to use one’s focal awareness to, for example, monitor the larger situation rather than reflect 
on irrelevant or tangential notions.  There is, perhaps, an interesting way to consider this issue in 
light of SSgt. Wolfe’s actions.  It may be that SSgt. Wolfe’s adoption of his wife’s perspective 
constituted a positive strategy for him to ensure that his habituated movements were executed 
without hesitation.  That is, if he concentrated on what he was doing and so risked introducing 
reflective thoughts about what his actions meant for him and for his opponents, and what he and 
his opponents were risking, he may have hesitated, stopped, or otherwise blocked the realization 
of own intention and purpose.  Speculatively, the experience of shooting multiple others at close 
range with an assault rifle might have been difficult to, in a sense, ignore.  In sum, SSgt. Wolfe’s 
strategy might have been to take his wife’s perspective in order to get out of his own way, so to 
speak.
14
 
Speculatively or not, SSgt. Wolfe’s focus, or lack thereof, is a choice, and so a personal 
achievement.  It is not the generation of some kind of learned instinct.  MAIT training, then, calls 
into question not only the traditional view that thinking is done “in the head,” but the speed and 
forms of thinking as relatively slow and linear.  The corrective idea is that thinking is done “by 
the person from the body” and that it can be instantaneous and multi-modal.  I want to suggest 
that MAIT training is designed to teach the Marines that when a certain level of mastery of 
martial arts techniques and fighting is achieved, when their fighting capabilities become 
habituated, it is best to use one’s focal awareness to, for example, monitor the larger situation 
rather than reflect on irrelevant or tangential notions.  The mental discipline is disciplined for 
total commitment to the execution of the intention and purpose of the combatant Marine. 
The foundation of this alternative interpretation of the relationships between thinking and 
acting in combat training and in actual combat is perhaps best appreciated through a detailed 
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examination of how my class of Marines were trained to counter a basic attacking technique 
called a “round kick.”  A visual representation of this counter move from the A&E Television 
Networks production Human Weapon: Marine Corps Martial Arts (2007) can be found here 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6nBTjiCz5k.
15
  My training class was formed into pairs of 
Marines that were to practice both the round kick and the counter to the round kick.  The training 
was structured so that participants practiced each move individually and then in combination.  
We started with round kicks against a passive opponent.  Round kicks are attacks designed to 
incapacitate or maim, if not kill, an opponent.  Generally, round kicks are aimed at the side of the 
opponent’s body anywhere on the vertical axis of the body from head to ankle.   
Where the kick is aimed can be understood as constituting the intention of the attacker.  
Aiming for the thigh, protected as it is by heavy muscle wrapped around a strong vertical bone, 
constitutes intent to inflict pain.  Aiming for the knee, a joining of two separate bones 
unprotected by heavy muscle and vulnerable to lateral forces constitutes intent to maim.  Aiming 
for the head constitutes intent to kill.  During the training we were made aware of these 
distinctions through prohibitions on certain moves in “sparring,” that is, free-form one-on-one 
practice using the techniques we were learning.  For example, a quick “no knees, no head” from 
an IT established the rules of the engagement.  Figure 9 (see Figures section at the end of this 
chapter) presents a transcription of a round kick in the movement script Labanotation.  As the 
transcript shows, we were practicing round kicks aimed at our opponent’s thigh.  The attacker’s 
goal is to land the top part of the combat-booted foot onto the defender’s outer thigh.  As a safety 
measure, the attacker was expected to expend at about 70% of his or her total power.  It is 
important to note here that the call for a “measured” attack means that the IT’s must be assuming 
that the attacker can and will control the strength of his or her kick.  Besides expectations for 
controlling the aim of the kick, we have here one of the most pervasive, tacit acceptances of 
personal control of the body in Marine combat training, contrary to what we should expect were 
the explanatory notion of instinct as an automatic reaction at work.  And it is also contrary to the 
commonsense tendency to believe that ‘trained habits’ are automated just because they are 
automatic.  Automatic habits, in being so trained, are thus under the autonomous control of the 
person.  This captures the sophistication of the principle that, “where the mind goes, the body 
follows.”  The fact of ‘training’ for ‘discipline’ is what unifies ‘mind’ and ‘body’ in this 
principle. 
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Marines who failed to control their body or improve the aim of their kicks drew the 
attention of the IT’s who delivered further instruction.  Further instruction in these instances 
focused primarily on an IT replicating the move(s) in slow motion with a third Marine serving as 
a passive defender so the Marine being instructed could watch the example of proper execution.  
The Marine under instruction often moved around the entangled bodies of the IT and defender to 
generate multiple perspectives on particular movements, placement of feet, orientation of 
shoulders, location of grip on a throat, or any of the variety of variables involved in the action 
In my own training I often recalled the image of the proper angle of an arm or the 
location of a foot in an engagement as I had seen it done by the IT’s and then actively sought to 
“fit” my own movements to reproduce the image.  Over time, the image became unnecessary 
except when a novelty emerged, such as an opponent with a physical stature quite unlike my 
training partners.  For example, a tacit and implied lesson in learning to “choke out” (into 
unconsciousness or death) an opponent was that if the opponent were significantly taller than 
you, you would not attempt to strangle her in the first place!
16
  Creative Marines would “solve” 
the problem by bringing the tall opponent to the ground for example with a technique called a 
“Reap” which involved sweeping a leg out from under the opponent.  Two important principles 
emerge here.  First, we were being taught not to offer an opponent an advantage by attacking a 
strength (height); second, we should use teamwork to overcome the strengths of an opponent 
whenever possible.  The variations on the latter principle were endless.  They included, for 
example, partnering with a tall Marine in a group competitive training exercise or attacking 
known strong or tall Marines with more than one Marine where possible and where permitted by 
the rules of the exercise. 
 During instruction the IT’s would often stop and emphasize specific movements that 
they thought were being performed at the wrong angle, the wrong speed, the wrong duration, and 
so on.  At times the IT’s would physically push, pull, or place a limb or a Marine’s entire body to 
demonstrate a proper or improper position or movement. Anthropologist Greg Downey (2008), 
who studies Brazilian capoeira (a martial art), calls this pedagogical technique “scaffolding” and 
calls attention to the sociality of learning to move martially. 
 
The instructor’s assistance helps to control the learner’s body, allowing the 
student to execute actions that will eventually flow with much less effort. When 
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the novice becomes more competent, scaffolding is incrementally withdrawn or 
“faded.” [2008: 207] 
 
The “stopping points” generated a beginning and an end to movement that led me to discover 
what the Marines took to be the smallest appreciable phrases of movement that were 
understandable.  Within those phrases it was not uncommon for the IT’s to seek to correct what 
we might think of as a particular word within a term or phrase.  This multi-level “parsing” of 
movement phrases occurred in ways similar to those employed in parsing a text.  Downey notes 
that 
 
On closer examination, however, the division of a smooth movement into myriad 
steps can actually make the technique more kinetically difficult.  To stop in the 
middle of the “stingray’s tail” kick, for example, demands greater balance and 
body control and requires that a student maintain an awkward bent-over posture. 
More acrobatic techniques done in stages can be even more challenging, if not 
impossible. In one particularly difficult exercise, an instructor asked us to delay in 
the middle position in an a´u fechado, a “closed cartwheel”; doing so meant 
balancing on one’s hands while bent in half at the waist so that the feet nearly 
touched the ground. Another instructor asked students to stop halfway through a 
cartwheel and balance before descending into a headstand. Both exercises met 
with groans from the students, and even fairly competent performers often could 
not meet the requirement to parse the movements that they could do at full speed. 
Capoeira instructors frequently tell students that a technique will be easier once it 
is reintegrated. [2008: 209] 
 
Quite opposite to “stripping away” culture in order to free evolved behaviors, the process of 
learning to move martially depends fundamentally on the socio-cultural interaction of persons.  
Parsing embodied techniques into component embodied phrases and action-signs does not reveal 
what we might otherwise expect to be an innate expertise in moving martially given the 
supposed source of such movements in evolved behaviors.  Rather, it reveals increased difficulty 
that needs to be resolved by the active person through the embodiment of new conceptions of 
how to move according to the larger concepts of the martial system. 
 Affirming this interpretation of learning to move martially is the variability among 
learners that we would expect to encounter.  Different Marines presented different levels of 
ability, not only in executing techniques appropriately but also in “picking up” the instruction 
being offered.  It took some Marines longer than others to achieve a basic level of proficiency in 
a particular technique, for instance.  Moreover, a Marine who otherwise picked up on specific 
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parsed movements quite quickly might not be able easily to integrate those techniques easily 
together in the ways we were being taught.  
In this light and returning to the “counter to the round kick” technique we were learning, 
it is instructive to consider the otherwise innocuous point of having a passive opponent in the 
training.  First, the only perceptible or perceptual stimulus that might count for the kind of 
Skinnerian conditioning underwriting combat training (as suggested by Sergeant Stevens based 
on his understanding of Lieutenant Colonel Grossman’s argument in chapter 2) is the threat 
defined in and through the imagination of the Marine practicing the kick.  The opponent is 
another Marine who shows no threatening posture or other “signal” of the intention to harm.  
Second, the passivity of the opponent allows the attacker time to think about his or her attack and 
execute it in slow motion, as it were.  The “thinking about” is a necessary component in learning 
as was illustrated by two Marines who were practicing near me.  One kicked the other too hard 
thus breaking the framing of the interaction as practice: the force of the kick violated the rules of 
the engagement and the defending Marine said to the attacking Marine, “What the fuck was that?  
What the fuck are you thinking?” (Fieldnotes, June 11, 2007).  Following anthropologist Gregory 
Bateson (1972) and Erving Goffman (1974), the anthropological issue here is that one Marine 
broke the linguistic-performative frame “this is practice.”  The frame provides a way to manage 
social relationships and expectations based on shared, prescribed and proscribed actions. 
We have here another distinction between training for combat and actual combat.  In 
training, embodied thought in action can be, indeed is required to be, slow.  Trainees are given 
time to learn new ways of holding and using their bodies, to learn the interrelationships between 
tactical principles and the use of their bodies, and the interrelationships between tactical 
principles, the use of their bodies, and the ethical reasons of and for fighting like American 
Marines, all without becoming casualties.
17
  This allows us to further clarify what Marines mean 
when they talk about “muscle memory.”  Muscle the development of memory is the personal 
memory of how to use learned physical skills without thinking about the execution of those 
skills.  It is a characteristic of the embodied person that includes neuro-muscular patterning (as in 
the development of “a sense of balance” for example).  It is not a characteristic of the person’s 
muscles or body separate from mind.  With enough practice, the Marines and I learned to control 
our bodies in many ways and so did not need to monitor our embodied movements as those 
movements were executed.  With enough practice, thought is embodied.  This is why repetition is 
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so critical.  The MCMAP program reflected this understanding by requiring and building into the 
course schedule time for “sustainment.”  Sustainment is practicing what was learned, 
repetitively, to enhance proficiency.  Practice and the gradual acquisition of skill frees Marines to 
think about other issues like, in real combat, monitoring a doorway through which her opponent 
just emerged so that she is not taken by surprise by other opponents.  It can also free the Marine 
to exercise creativity by exploiting the command of his or her body for novel actions or to take 
into account a novel action taken by an opponent.  In Downey’s terms, the scaffolding offered by 
both the IT’s and by the reflective intervention of the learner him- or herself in executing the 
moves, fades away. 
After practicing round kicks against passive opponents, the counter to the round kick was 
practiced against an attacker delivering the kick at slow speed.  During the first series of kicks 
from my opponent, Sergeant Kimble, I tried to avoid his leg and foot by moving back and away 
from the kick.  Sergeant Kimble stopped the practice and corrected me by saying, “No, you step 
offline and into me” (Fieldnotes, June 11, 2007).  I understood the “offline” idea, which meant 
that I was to disrupt the aim of his kick by removing my body from the impact area but I was 
somewhat taken aback with the notion that I was to move toward him.  Moving in and toward 
Sergeant Kimble (and toward imminent pain), I learned, I could generate multiple beneficial 
consequences that were the basis for the prescription of moving in and toward the opponent.  IT 
Staff Sergeant Demster affirmed the understanding that in fighting, avoiding pain is unrealistic, 
and he delineated one of the primary benefits of moving in and toward an opponent who is trying 
to kick you: 
 
“Crash the gap” between your attacker’s strike and you.  Don’t back away from a 
kick or a punch.  Expect to get hit, to get punched or kicked when you’re in hand-
to-hand combat.  Absorb the punch or kick, yes, but move into it so that you 
decrease the force being delivered. [Fieldnotes, June 21, 2007] 
 
One of the lessons, better, one of the hard lessons for me was that avoiding pain was unrealistic 
if not impossible.  But, one could manage the pain and the risk of harm by controlling the speed 
and lethality of the fight.  This meant trading some pain and risk in the short term for less pain 
and risk in the long term, even if the fight lasted only a few seconds.  This was a risk I refused to 
accept in one portion of my own training (see Endnote 17). 
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 Since it was clear that the Marines had the option to move back and away from an 
attacker (and sometimes you were expected to do so if you thought that by so doing you could 
maneuver the attacker into a lethal mistake), moving in and toward the attacker was a choice.  
Re-conceiving the mechanics of movement was inseparable from the acceptance of potential 
damage and pain.  In that acceptance resides a moral decision to accept the new movement 
direction—in and toward, not back and away—as “the right way to move.”  In accepting and 
executing “the right way to move” I would be positioning myself as a person who accepted the 
Marine preference for offensive fighting.  I would be a “good Marine.”  My squad leader and 
fellow trainee Gunnery Sergeant Blanchard told me, 
 
The martial arts techniques we’re learning are all about aggressiveness.  Moving 
in, toward, and through your opponent. [Fieldnotes, June 20, 2007] 
 
Enculturation into the Marine Corps is, it seems to me, primarily embodied re-conceptualization 
of one’s relationship to risk of pain and death.  It is a positive decision to, as the phrase goes, 
“put oneself in harm’s way.” 
 
The Mechanics of Movement, the Embodiment of Risk, and Agency 
 
The analysis so far should be suggestive of the mostly unexamined depth of meaning and 
complexity in what is otherwise regarded as a “basic” and, especially for Marines, unremarkable 
movement in training.  This unexamined depth and complexity include the following premises: 
1) There is a generally preferred but not absolute “right way” to move in combat 
2) That right way to move is the Marine way, or “aggressively in and toward” the enemy 
3) Such movement, especially in an actual combat context, conveys the intention to kill or 
incapacitate the enemy 
4) The enemy is willing to use intelligence, skill, and creativity to, in turn, try to kill or 
incapacitate you 
5) “In and toward” constitutes a personal choice to risk pain and death  
6) “In and toward” can appear automatic, but is actually a learned habit whose speed of 
execution depends on the agency of the actor 
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7) Risk is accepted in order to achieve or express a value ranging from, for example, “I want 
to live” to “I want her to live” to “I am defending my country” 
With these premises in mind we can now examine the mechanics of the larger, whole-body 
action-sign, or, kineseme that is built from such kinemic movements as “in and toward.”  This 
will give us a better appreciation of how risk is embodied and how risk is identified, provoked, 
refused, and managed in an equally embodied way.  Understanding the relationship between 
moving one’s body and the management of risk is a critical issue for understanding courageous 
action. 
  In delivering a round kick (with the right leg), the left leg stiffens and the front of the 
left foot pivots outward to present the hips as a swivel and fulcrum (the action of positioning the 
hips properly was called “opening the gate” by the Marines) that sets up the “whip” motion of 
the leg.  The whip motion delivers the power generated in the rotation of the hips and so the 
weight of the body through the leg to the foot and then to the opponent.  Stepping in and toward 
the oncoming leg interrupts the generation of force before maximum momentum is achieved.  
The aim of the kick is also disrupted as the contact surface shifts from the top of the oncoming 
foot to the ankle or the shin.  A secondary consequence is that the attacker is thrown off balance 
by an earlier-than-expected leg impact (as I learned from observing training fights and in 
experiencing many of my own).  The more experienced fighters were usually the only opponents 
who were capable of either adjusting to the early impact of their leg (instead of their foot) or, at 
least, adjusting more quickly. 
An equally beneficial consequence of the “in and toward” movement is that it decreases 
the power of the kick: as in American baseball, a ball hit off the portion of the bat closer to the 
rotating torso of the player suffers less impact.  Lessening the impact is important, but not just 
for the obvious reason that there is less damage to the organic components of the thigh.  I should 
mention here that in this training exercise, no padding or protection for the thigh was used.  The 
Marines called this “toughening.”  I cannot emphasize enough the importance of not wearing any 
protection: foregoing padding is a way of getting Marines to understand that they can get hit and 
feel pain without having their focal awareness (attention) diverted from the fight.  Having one’s 
attention diverted gives the initiative to the opponent, who now has the time (and so space) to 
choose to act in ways that realize her intentions.  Similarly, an early leg impact (versus on-time 
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foot impact) not only can throw the attacker off balance, but it can violate the attacker’s expected 
outcome of moving a limb in a round kick.
18
 
The attacker’s expectation is generated through the use of the kinesthetic sense.  Farnell 
and Varela note that this is a legitimate human sense, just like seeing, touching, smelling, 
hearing, and tasting, and it “provides information on the whole repertory of our motor actions, 
from the raising of an arm, to walking, even to the turn of the eyeballs and swallowing” (2008: 
222-223).  Potentially, the defender diverts the attacker’s attention away from the kick, the 
defender himself, the overall sense of the fight, and the larger context, and refocuses it on the 
attacker’s own deteriorating or compromised kinesthetic sense of bodily balance.  Highly 
competent fighters can adjust as they are executing the kick, meaning they can adjust their 
expectation of where their limb will land and compensate to re-balance using other limbs and 
muscles while maintaining a sense of how the fight is going, the state of the defender, and the 
larger context.  This agentic capability is, of course, why I have been using words like “can” and 
“potentially” in describing the consequences of the in and toward movement.  The physical-
mechanical aspects of movement are always “minded,” not mindless.  This is why it made 
perfect sense during training, whether practicing particular techniques or multi-person fights, to 
hear IT’s yell, “What was that?” or “What were you thinking?” without any of the trainees 
having vocalized a word. 
The “in and toward” movement of the whole body of the defender was my first 
experience in re-conceptualizing how and why to move my body in a principled, that is, Marine-
like, way.  Complementing that movement is a blocking action using the forearms.  This 
blocking action is the primary way a defender protects herself from the round kick.  It is 
simultaneously the basis for a transition to counter-attacking the attacker.  After the blocking 
action comes a counter-attack on the attacker.  The attacker’s leg is immobilized and the former 
defender then sweeps the attacker’s other leg while simultaneously using his free arm (the right 
arm when defending against a right round kick) to push through the attacker’s left shoulder.  The 
leg sweep removes the former attacker’s only vertical support and the shoulder push pivots the 
former attacker’s weight on his immobilized right hip and leg.  The counter-attack is designed to 
put the attacker on the ground, thereby undermining his ability to enact a wide range of 
techniques.  Being on his back, the attacker it made vulnerable to a wide range of techniques and 
options now available to the former defender.  This amounts to creating initiative, opportunity, 
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and advantage for the former defender.  Figure 10 (see Figures section at the end of this chapter) 
shows the block and follow up attack that constitute the counter to the round kick.  As I have 
presented it, the MCMAP technique “counter to the round kick” is an action sign that has two 
parts, each containing two distinct kinemic elements.  The first part includes the  “in and toward” 
movement against the attacker and the “dual-armed block.”  The second part contains “the leg 
grab” and “the shoulder push/leg sweep.”  My presentation of the distinctive kinemic elements 
copies the way in which IT’s trained individual Marines in the whole-body movement.  Each 
kinemic element was taught and learned as a distinct unit.  After repetitive practice of each unit, 
we were tasked with executing the whole-body movement (kineseme) as the complete action 
sign, “counter to the round kick”.  In actual performance, after mastery of the elements, the 
elements merge into one organic, fluid whole-body movement.  The enactment of one organic, 
fluid whole-body movement in the context of training constructs the meaning “I’m fighting you.”  
The enactment of one organic, fluid whole-body movement in the context of actual combat 
constructs the meaning “I’m fighting you and I intend to kill or incapacitate you.”  From a 
theoretical and anthropological standpoint, there is no such thing as “I’m fighting you” prior to 
the actual enactment of the movements.  Meaning, as we know, is generated between us.  
Enacting these movements against a person who refuses move in the same idiom is not properly 
termed a “fight,” rather it is termed a “beating.” 
 In teaching me the Marine version of “counter to the round kick” Sergeant Kimble was 
teaching me the Marine preference for offensive as opposed to defensive combat.  It was certainly 
clear that I had the option to move “back and away” from the incoming kick, and in some 
situations we were taught that to back away from an opponent was exactly the right thing to do, 
for instance if we wanted to get the opponent moving toward us in order to use her forward 
momentum as a means to execute a technique at which we were more proficient.  Given the fact 
that I had already been kicked (at about 50% of the force Sgt. Kimble was capable of producing), 
I had a pretty good sense of the potential pain experiences. 
This imaginative and actual appreciation of the pain I was risking and the decision to 
nevertheless engage in the training were both encased in a larger ethical decision that we can 
now tell directly justifies the ascription of “courage” to any person so involved: “would I accept 
choosing to move properly over and over again,” I asked myself, “and thereby subject myself to 
the risk of damage and pain in pursuit of the goal of learning to fight like a Marine, that is, 
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offensively?”  In doing so, was I willing to risk conveying my intention to pit my physical, 
mental, and character qualities against those of another in an open challenge?  My new 
understanding—that I “got it”—was not given evidentially through a vocal sign like saying, “I 
understand” (although I did indeed use that phrase multiple times).  Rather it was delivered in 
how I then chose to use my body in light of that understanding as assessed by Sergeant Kimble.  
His identification of the kineme, “in and toward” is the minimal meaningful unit that when 
enacted in the idiom of fighting as a whole-body movement, constitutes the basis for being 
considered courageous. 
Based on the depth of meaning and complexity that carries through from the constituent 
kinemes in combat movement to larger kinesemes I now want to argue that “courage” is built 
from such foundational, visible, movements such as “in and toward” in the context of “engaging 
in combat with an opponent.”  The invisible, ethical or character qualities of such movements are 
generated through the intrinsic risk to one’s physical and moral being (and to that of others) 
entailed by the movement in the context of larger cultural values.  How much risk is entailed 
helps define our sense of the “amount” of courage.  Which values movements are for help define 
our sense of the “kind” of courage.  
 
An Infantry Conception of Courage on the Battlefield 
 
So where exactly is “courage” in all this?  It is in the conventional value ascribed by 
American combat infantry generally and Marines specifically to the execution of the kinesemic 
and kinemic elements of the counter to the round kick.  The “in and toward” movement 
described above is the expression of courage given the context of the movement: an opponent 
seeking to incapacitate or kill you.  The principle being honored in the movement is this: risking 
oneself—one’s moral and physical being—in pursuit of values such as “I want to live” or “I want 
to kill only those who should be killed given my value system” or “I want my fellow Marines to 
live” or “I want to protect my way of life from those who want to destroy it.”  Which of these 
values, in which combinations, is a matter of ex post facto assessment of past or present 
intentions of the actor.  These might have been delivered vocally in an open discussion about 
future action, as in the case of Corporal Dunham’s theorization of containing a grenade blast 
with a Kevlar helmet (see chapter 2).  These could be delivered through embodied discourse in 
 218 
the present by the actions of an infantryman himself in a particular tactical context, like Sergeant 
Stevens who, simply, did not pull a trigger.  As is true generally and ultimately, however, 
deeming any action as “courageous” rests with whatever audience is relevant at the time of 
assessment and the theoretical and value frame they choose to employ in making the assessment 
(Harré 1979). 
For Marines, the most substantial “weight” in such assessments is placed on embodied 
discourse.  This is not surprising given that the most important expression of their commitment 
to their sub-cultural values is the actual commitment of and to their bodies as combatants.  Staff 
Sergeant Carr, the Marine trainee with the sprained ankle, connected the practiced habit of 
moving martially, said as much when he told me that, “Marine combat infantrymen don’t care 
about their bodies” (Fieldnotes, June 14, 2007).  He went on in an attempt to clarify his meaning: 
 
I’m an MOS [Military Occupational Specialty] 03…I’m an infantryman.  I can 
tell you what courage is.  Courage to a combat infantryman is the willingness to 
do anything possible to protect his Marines and take the fight to the enemy in any 
way possible without any thinking…without any hesitation. [Fieldnotes, June 14, 
2007] 
 
The body is the primary means for expressing the values of aggressive protection of other 
Marines and aggressive engagement with the enemy.  This is an assessment of the body’s status 
as a resource not just for surviving as a human being (biological species value), but also for 
existing (cultural membership value) as a good Marine.  Yet, combat infantry must be ready to 
commit—without thinking and without hesitation—in short, totally commit, the body to the 
expression of values.  This means that the body is simultaneously the most important resource 
Marines have for being a Marine and the primary source for expressing their values through the 
sacrifice of that very resource. 
 This idea was affirmed constantly during my time as a trainee and a guest instructor-
trainer at the MACE.  Sometimes a Marine would “shuffle” instead of run or drop her hands 
during a sparring match thus leaving her head open to attack or gradually put less and less force 
into mokuju thrusts at opponents.  The IT’s observing the drill used phrases like, “Do you want 
to be here?” “Do you want to quit?”  “It’s always about you isn’t it?” “That’s it, get in your little 
pain bubble.”  The IT’s vocalized a response to what they saw.  The dissonance for the IT’s was 
that the Marine trainees who were flagging or failing were, through their embodied action-signs, 
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contradicting earlier vocal and embodied discourse about their commitment to the MAIT course.  
In focusing on or attempting to avoid pain, discomfort, or significant exertion, they were failing 
to sacrifice their bodies, themselves, and so failing to express their commitment.  This failure is a 
form of betrayal of the values of the Marine Corps. 
Gunnery Sergeant Friend, lead IT for my training class, offered a similar formulation of 
the connection between the body as the primary resource for expression of values and sacrifice 
for values: 
 
Your job in the Marine Corps is for the lives of other Marines.  We want to make 
them better people, not just killers.  Really, the point of the program is not to 
teach martial arts, but to teach them to be leaders, to approach, close, and move 
through an opponent.  The point of moving offline of a punch or a kick is to give 
you the advantage to attack, not to avoid getting hit. If you get in a fistfight, you 
better be prepared to get hit, if you get in a knife-fight, you better be prepared to 
get cut. You might get punched or cut, but you will kill your opponent. 
[Fieldnotes, June 12, 2007] 
 
GySgt. Friend’s comments echo those of SSgt. Carr in their focus on the secondary importance 
of suffering harm in the act of using one’s body to effect the death of an opponent so that other 
Marines will live.  This is why killing is not simply the practical matter of ending the life of an 
enemy.  At least in the way Marines construct it, killing is not to end the life of others, but it is 
for the life of others; and that requires risking one’s moral status as well as pain, discomfort, 
injury, or death.  In teaching Marines how to move in combat, then, the MCMAP program is also 
teaching them why and how self-sacrifice is a necessary component of being a good Marine, 
meaning “totally committed to the values of the Marine Corps.” 
There are two necessary components of the combat infantry conception of courage 
without which the conception is empty.  The first is “selflessness” and the second is “choice.”  
Both SSgt. Carr and GySgt. Friend illuminated the notion of selflessness quite clearly: Marines 
are not supposed to value themselves over others, especially other Marines.  Their lives, 
professionally and professionally are, ideally, for others.  Their personal pain, whether physical 
or mental, is, ideally, irrelevant.  Marines are not forced into this value orientation.  Enlistment is 
voluntary and attending the MAIT training course is voluntary.  The challenges of the training 
program are an invitation to demonstrate loyalty to the values of the program and the Corps.  
Trainees are not forced to complete the training they can choose to leave.  Of course the 
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organization can remove that choice by forcing them to leave either for medical reasons or for 
failure to meet MAIT standards.  Selflessness and choice are foundational concepts in the tacit, 
descriptive, and embodied discourse of MCMAP training.  They are chimerical concepts in the 
bio-reductive framework that many Marines, like many Americans, use for explanations of 
human behavior.  The agentic, semasiological framework permits us not only to see what 
Marines and MCMAP trainers see but permits us to take what they see seriously.  Given this 
alignment of ethnographic data and theoretical framework, I think we can safely argue that to the 
extent that self-sacrifice for others–– acting for prized values in situations of lethal physical and 
moral danger without regard for the self–– is part of MCMAP training for combat, then such 
training trains courage. 
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Figure 8: U.S. Marine Corporal James “Eddie” Wright.19 
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Figure 9: Labanotated Round Kick 
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Figure 10: Counter to the Round Kick – A attacks B with Round Kick, B blocks and then attacks A 
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1
 See Farnell and Varela 2008: 221-228.  The “visible” and the “invisible” in semasiology originated in the application of the 
Sassurian concept of the linguistic sign as the signifier/signified duality.  Sassure was at pains to avoid a dualistic reading and 
emphasized that the two components of a linguistic sign are inseparable, as in the two sides of a coin.  Williams’s application to 
movement resulted in the idea that the signifier is the visible movement while the signified is the meaning of the movement. 
2
 This is a human universal: we are built to be dynamically embodied semioticians.  
3
 This phrase originates in the work of Rom Harré.  In his paper, “Recovering the Experiment” (1998), he uses the phrase 
“domesticated nature” to capture his sense of the approximation of “wild nature” achieved in scientific experiments.  His insight 
is that experiments are neither entirely natural, given the controls and limits placed on the operation of natural processes by the 
researcher, nor are they entirely unnatural, given that the controls and limits do not entirely change the operation on natural 
processes. 
4
 The use of the term in discourse assumes a competent adult actor since it is the radical change in the enactment of being a 
person that is marked by the term.  There can be no such thing as a competent adult actor who does not possess some cultural 
content by which she enacts being a person.  That is, no competent adult actor can be turned into a tabula rasa.  I would suggest 
“value-replacement” as opposed to “brain-washing.” 
5
 I am indebted to Dr. Brenda Farnell for her insight into the connection between the Marine tie-in methodology and 
brainwashing.  An important ethnographic moment that had puzzled me for some time was clarified due to her intervention.  In 
November of 2007, I visited with the MACE staff in Quantico, Virginia to thank them for their time and support.  There was a 
new IT, Gunnery Sergeant Woodall, who asked me whether or not I “saw things differently,” now that I had gone through the 
training.  Did I, “keep myself in shape,” and did I “walk down the street and notice who was coming toward me?”  I took these 
questions to mean that GySgt. Woodall wanted to know whether or not the training had turned me into a Marine warrior.  I told 
the Marines that I was keeping fit, but certainly not in “fighting shape,” and that at times I would “size up” potential opponents 
on the street.  GySgt. Woodall replied, “At least he’s honest.”  What puzzled me was why GySgt. Woodall thought I had turned 
into a Marine warrior.  There are two points to be made here.  First, the Marines think that being a Marine constitutes a 
transformation and second, the MACE staff thinks that the training itself further transforms Marines.  Lieutenant Colonel Shusko 
said as much to me when he commented that “many Marines change when they come through this course, one Marine cried and 
said how he witnessed a girl being attacked and had not done anything about it but now that he had the training he knew he 
would do the right thing in the future” (Fieldnotes, July 25, 2007).  One way we can make sense of this is that the training-
induced(?) transformation is presented as a kind of catharsis in which a Marine sheds detrimental values that inhibit right action 
and replaces them with positive values that demand right action.  A new way of looking at the world should ensue.  This, I think, 
was what GySgt. Woodall’s questions were exploring.  I got the sense that GySgt. Woodall was mildly perturbed when I did not 
present symptoms of the expected transformation.  This led, I think, to a degree of suspicion of both my capabilities and motives 
when I returned to the MACE during the summer of 2008.  Despite having completed the course, to him I wasn’t quite 
legitimately one of them. 
6
 The term “devil-dogs” is a translation of the German word teufelhunden, which the Germans bestowed upon the U.S. Marines 
for their ferocity in combat in World War I. 
7
 Dr. Charles Varela has developed a tongue-in-cheek but telling way of illustrating the implausibility of the reductive notion of 
language use directly impacting the brain.  Imagine a conversation in which a friend calls you and says, “Hi Frank, you know I 
have something important to tell you…but, you know, it’s so important I want to talk to your mind, put your mind on the 
phone…well, actually, you know, its extremely important and I don’t think your mind will get it, put your brain on the phone.”  
Using Sassure’s notion of la parole we can tell, ethnographically, that Americans and Westerners generally do not talk this way 
in everyday life.  They talk to persons, not to their minds or their brains.  Yet, in contexts where an explanation of behavior is 
required, they tend to posit a la langue that is tapped into or accessed by talk under certain sorts of conditions.  This move, in 
effect, turns the fantastical notion of a language-to-brain mechanical causation into a supposedly legitimate explanation of what is 
really happening in conversation.  Further comment requires a better understanding of Dr. Strozzi-Heckler’s work on my part. 
8
 Sergeant Desamours reinforced his perception of the strong analogy between training and combat five days later on June 19, 
2007 after a particularly difficult and challenging forty-minute drill called the Combat Conditioning Exercise (CCX).  The 
exercise takes place in a purposefully overheated room about 25’ by 25’ and includes a number of complex team-oriented and 
leadership tasks rooted in grueling physical exercises.  The room is filled with yelling and a soundtrack plays recordings of 
machine-gun fire, yells, babies crying, and other sounds at ear-splitting levels with a clear design to tempt the participating 
trainees into concentrating on themselves “going internal” rather than the mission and team.  Spontaneously Sergeant Desamours 
turned to me and said, 
 
You know I fought at Al Kut and Fallujah, I’m a radioman.  What was going on in that room was just like 
combat—the noise, heat, the physical exertion, the mental strain—in my first firefight, I froze, I’m not even 
gonna lie, I’ll say it.  I was laying in my rack and boom!  Mortars.  My staff sergeant hit me on the back of 
my helmet to get me going.  It’s loud, people are yelling, and you’re moving up and back, get to the side, 
move up, you’re moving all the time and I’m carrying all my gear and I have to keep up with my CO 
[Commanding Officer] who doesn’t have anything on except his flack and pistol!  I was carrying my own 
body weight in gear and I had to keep up with him.  And not just that, I had to listen to the radio for my CO’s 
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call sign while I was trying figure out what was happening, and in all this time, you have to keep thinking 
(points to his head) because you know, there’s rounds coming down range, so on top of everyone yelling and 
the confusion and being hot and not knowing what’s up ahead or over the next wall, or how far you have to 
go, you’re listening to the radio and fighting…DAMN! (shakes his head from side to side, looks down, half-
smiles and in lower voice says, “good times, good times. You know a lot of guys got a tattoo after OIP 1 that 
said, ‘Some gave some, some gave all.’” [Fieldnotes, June 19, 2007] 
9
 Toward the end of my second summer (2008) at the MACE I learned that the Marine Corps was on the verge of implementing 
an entirely new “Combat Readiness Test” that included realistic tests of the physical, mental, and character disciplines through 
exercises such as lifting and transporting heavy ammunition boxes, carrying and dragging fellow Marines, and throwing 
simulated grenades. 
10
 Retired U.S. Marine Sergeant and combat veteran Michael Sandone reported the following story to me of a young private in 
his unit during his combat tour in Iraq: 
 
There was a kid who had trouble getting out of our Amtraks a few times—the Amtraks is the armored 
personnel carriers—and he just wouldn’t get out, because he didn’t know what was outside and that…just not 
knowing was enough to scare him, to shake him not to stay in and its just something that, that you just have 
to overcome.  You’re not always gonna know the complete situation that just going out the door not knowing 
when to…you know you just don’t know what’s out there and…it was just something he could not do…he 
was…it was amazing…just, “No!” (shakes his head side-to-side) fin’ had to drag’em, drag his ass out of 
there. [Interview, April 24, 2004] 
 
Knowledge, or lack thereof, could be a definitive obstacle to action if one’s focus is on that knowledge (or lack thereof) and the 
threat or risk to oneself in light of it instead of on what one should be doing in the particular situation.  One critical purpose of 
Marine training (in my estimation) is to decrease the likelihood that a Marine will freeze or fail to act, even in situations of 
novelty, by teaching Marines to focus, laser-like, on mission accomplishment.  The means may be generated creatively or not, but 
the goal is supposed to be inviolate. 
11
 Film actors who train for a role in this way can be said to be pursuing combat training and not acting.  
12
 I am indebted to Dr. Charles Varela for this formulation of the Marines’ intersection with Durkheim and Mead. 
13
 This is a classic example of military teamwork in which some members of the team make up for a compromised or lacking 
ability on the part of another member. 
14
 The formulation of these ideas is happening as I construct this study.  Had I thought of them in the field I would have certainly 
asked SSgt. Wolfe about my speculative interpretation of his taking the perspective of his wife.  Of course I may be completely 
wrong in my interpretation, or, even more intriguing, indeterminate.  It may be that SSgt. Wolfe himself had and has no idea why 
he looked at his actions through his wife’s eyes in the moment of their performance. 
15
 While the video offers a visual representation of the counter move, the focus is on the effects of a properly executed counter to 
a round kick from the point of view of utility and mechanics.  There is much more to the counter move in two important ways.  
First in the agentic framework, embodied movement is always value-laden.  By concentrating only on mechanics and effects, the 
video completely misses the values instantiated in the move.  Second, there is a set of movements prior to the moves presented in 
the video that are critical to what I will argue are the moral values embodied in the counter move as a whole-body movement.  In 
this sense the video reveals only a partial view of a partial “movement phrase,” or a kineme, rather than a kineseme (whole body 
phrase) in semasiological terms. To get to a fuller understanding of the entire kineseme and its illustration of human agency as 
well as the moral content embedded in it, I will describe the counter move as I was taught to understand and use it during 
MCMAP training. 
16
  The “chokes” that we learned are misnamed since the point of these techniques was not to interdict the flow of air into the 
lungs via the throat since it takes a long time for someone to drop unconscious and die from asphyxiation.  The preferred 
techniques were “blood chokes” which cut off the supply of blood to the brain by pressure on the arteries in the side of the 
opponent’s neck.  I brought opponents and was brought by opponents to near unconsciousness in a matter of seconds using blood 
chokes. 
17
 I want to illustrate this point by referring to an incident involving fellow trainee Sergeant Terrazas and myself.  During a drill 
on July 25, 2007, our respective squads were in a wooded area with about 30 yards of distance between us.  Each squad was in 
protective gear (e.g., lacrosse helmets, padded gloves, padded groin protectors) and lined up facing away from the gap between 
the squads in a kneeling position.  In that space was located, randomly, a variety of training weapons ranging from knives to 
mokujus (wooden rifles with hard rubber tip to practice bayonet training).  The IT’s would tap one, two, or three Marines from 
each squad on the helmet.  The mission was to jump up, turn around, find a weapon if possible, close with the enemy and 
eliminate him using any techniques that had been learned.  Neither squad knew when a particular member would be selected or 
how many from their squad would be selected.  Neither squad knew how many opponents the chosen Marines would face. 
Techniques were to be executed full-speed and full power.  The only “safeties” were that there would be no weapons used on the 
groin or head. 
When I was selected I jumped up, turned around and started running toward the middle ground between the squads.  As 
the distance my opponent (who I later learned was Sgt. Terrazas) and myself rapidly diminished, I could not locate a weapon and 
so decided to simply charge at him.  In the last moments before the impact I saw that he had a mokuju that he pointed directly at 
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my upper chest.  I succeeded (much to my surprise) in using my left forearm to push the tip out of alignment with my body.  
Problematically, I decided to slow down at the last second in order to have a better chance at swiping away the mokuju.  
Additionally I angled my body offline and turned my shoulders so that if I missed the weapon, it would hit me in the left shoulder 
and not the throat area.  I should have trusted in my abilities by keeping my body aligned with his, swiping away his weapon and 
barreling straight into him with the probable result of putting him on the ground, on his back, and underneath me.  Quite quickly I 
could have completely eliminated his weapon-based advantage and given me the upper hand, so to speak.  As it turned out my 
slowing down increased the likelihood both of a successful swipe and of protecting my throat area, but it also permitted Sgt. 
Terrazas to say on his feet and retain the use of his weapon.  Since my momentum had brought me past the tip of the mokuju, Sgt. 
Terrazas swung the butt of the wooden rifle into my (helmeted) head three times in quick succession even as I was throwing my 
elbow into his.  I “lost” the encounter as Sgt. Terrazas continued to pummel me with the mokuju while eventually backing away 
enough from me to stab me with the hard rubber tip representing a bayonet. 
I was angry with Sgt. Terrazas for breaking the rules and angry with myself for my lack of competence.  I felt the lack 
of resources in fighting.  Literally I did not know what to do when my tactic failed, or, perhaps more properly, when I failed my 
tactic.  I ended up yelling at him “What the fuck was that?  No rifle-butts!!”  The only reply I received was pepper spray to the 
back of the neck from one of the IT’s—the penalty for losing the fight since actual wounds and death were not part of the training 
program.  Two months later I reviewed this incident with LtCol. Shusko (who had witnessed it).  He affirmed my interpretation 
of the situation to the effect that my responsibility was not to get angry, which is self-indulgent and beside the point, but to get 
better at fighting.  This is especially important in combat since the emotional upset presents a possible obstacle to clear thinking 
and recovering after a setback.  With more confidence in my self, meaning my combat skills, I would not have hesitated at the 
last moment.  In combat, opponents will not necessarily follow rules and my embodied skills would require more training if I was 
to survive.  As for Sergeant Terrazas, LtCol. Shusko said that the IT’s should have penalized him in some way as well since 
Marines are supposed to fight according to not just cultural values but actual rules for engaging the enemy.  In a way, this was a 
training failure on the part of the IT’s but again, the ultimate responsibility was with myself and Sgt. Terrazas.  The “feedback” 
that I received at “full-speed” was that I required a controlled environment in which to further increase my competence in my 
embodied performance, both physically and mentally. 
18
 Contrary to much anthropological focus and fascination with the experience of subjects, Marine training seeks to actively 
discount this kind of physical experience, or, feeling of the body, in service of the larger goal of staying alive in order to 
accomplish a mission.  I was introduced to this notion in an abrupt way during my second day of training in 2007.  We set off at a 
run to a training field to engage in grueling two-hour drill known as “The Heartbreaker.”  My squad was in a line, one Marine 
behind the other.  I was at the end and fairly close to the Marine in front of me.  His body blocked much of my view of the 
ground and I accidently stepped onto a tree branch with my left foot.  By doing so I locked the branch in place.  In bringing my 
right foot down, my right calf hit a sharp protruding sub-branch.  The sub-branch gouged a three-inch furrow into my calf and 
when my foot landed put a dime-sized hole in my calf at the top of the furrow.  The pain was terrible but I kept running.  During 
the ensuing drill, we were tasked with “buddy-squats.”  One Marine has another lay across his shoulders of another and then 
executes squats.  When my turn came to lie across Gunnery Sergeant Blanchard’s shoulders, my hips began to slip from up by the 
back of his head down his back.  This pulled my legs down his back as well and instead of holding them both by curling his right 
arm over them, he ended up holding my right foot, bent at the knee, over his shoulder while I essentially held on to his left 
shoulder.  As he executed the squats and I tried to stay on his back my injured right calf rubbed over his flak jacket.  I held on for 
a few repetitions but then told GySgt. Blanchard I had to get down.  He dropped me and I went to a few feet to the side to check 
my leg.  GySgt. Blanchard was told to do push-ups while I got myself in order.  Standing near me was Master Sergeant Coleman, 
the second most senior non-commissioned officer at the MACE, with his arms folded and an impassive look on his face.  I rolled 
up my cammie uniform leg and saw a yellow, green, blue, and black bruise with the furrow and hole caked with fresh and dried 
blood.  Master Sergeant Coleman bent ever so slightly to get a look and asked me, in a lighthearted way, “What’d you scratch 
yourself?”  He then turned back to watch the drill in progress and I was left to decide whether or not I wanted to get back into the 
drill.  The lesson was that pain is not the point. 
19
 The photo by U.S. Marine Sergeant Richard Stephens and is taken from 
http://www.mcnews.info/mcnewsinfo/marines/2005/20053RD/features/sgtwright.shtml.  We might note that the photograph 
conveys important semasiological detail.  Now a Sergeant, Wright’s arm positioning for the salute approximates the existence of 
his hand and wrist.  The replication of a salute learned using a fully extant limb demonstrates that the salute is conceptual-based 
and habitually trained using a kinesthetic sense of where the arm ought to be positioned.  In short, Wright is not using his sense of 
touch in order to modify his salute in light of his injury.  His salute is a Marine salute, not an injured Marine salute. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
THE ETHICS OF BEING AN ETHICAL WARRIOR 
 
 
In this chapter I will lay out a form of doubt about values and training at the MACE 
through an analysis of the views of one MACE staffer, Staff Sergeant Demster.  This doubt 
centers on the ethics of being an ethical warrior and captured in the question, “Whose ethics 
should we use in MACE training?”  SSgt. Demster’s views will lead us to consider one way to 
answer those concerns offered by retired Marine captain and master martial artist Jack Hoban 
(who we encountered in the last chapter).  Mr. Hoban’s formulation is not a pervasive, but rather 
a specific meta-narrative about the values being taught in the MCMAP program.  The concept of 
the Ethical Warrior (with a capital “E” and a capital “W”) he advances is founded on a supposed 
universal human value, called the “dual-life value” that, it is argued, serves as a universal 
standard for assessing the legitimacy of human action, especially the legitimacy of killing.  It is 
thought that properly grounded and so legitimate reasons for killing are especially important in 
preventing Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD).  Consideration of this meta-narrative will 
lead to an analysis of exemplary, and primarily vocal, discourses that simultaneously obscure 
and highlight the (ir)relevance of gender in being a good Marine.  The link between Mr. Hoban’s 
formulation and gender is to be found in a startlingly similar universal standard for assessing 
human action and especially the differential status of the sexes across cultures advanced by 
anthropologist Michelle Z. Rosaldo over thirty-five years ago.  After developing this analysis I 
will offer a few limited remarks on ethnicity.  My goal in this chapter is to add even more depth 
to the complexity facing combat infantry, specifically U.S. Marines, in trying to be good in and 
at their way of life.  
 
Whose Ethics? 
 
Although identifiable values are inseparable from movement in substantive ways (as 
inseparable as they are from vocal discourse), there yet exists a fundamental lack of clarity about 
which values should be pursued when, and by whom, within the MAIT course.  The last two 
chapters have demonstrated that such ambiguity is an irreducible component of acting on 
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battlefields and in training that may or may not be recognized, pursued, denied, achieved, or 
remain implicit.  Some value or values are always involved regardless of this ambiguity.  Oddly, 
perhaps, the domestication of combat in training appears to generate a similar ambiguity that has 
resulted in on-going discussions among leaders of the MAIT and MCMAP programs about 
whose ethics are, could be, or should be used in training.  I will say at the outset that the sources 
of ambiguity on the battlefield and in training are multi-facted and complex, similar and 
different, compared to training.  For reasons of space, I will not concentrate on a comparison 
between the two but on one ongoing discussion within the MACE to which I was introduced.  
That discussion centered on the desire to generate some positive statement about the values or 
morals for which Marines fight.  This desire was fueled, in part, by the serious problem of PTSD, 
which, some of the staff and advisors like Mr. Hoban thought, is connected to the morality of 
killing. 
During my second summer of training, I asked IT Staff Sergeant Demster about the moral 
or character discipline of MAIT training and why it seemed to me—after a year pondering it—to 
be somewhat in the background of the training.  He told me that every year a review board meets 
to consider the MCMAP program in all its components and every year there is discussion about 
the moral component of being a warrior.  “The problem,” he said succinctly, “is whose morals 
[should we follow]?” (Fieldnotes, July 1, 2008).  He illustrated the point by saying, 
 
who am I to tell you what your character should be?  That’s a matter of your 
upbringing and what you choose to do.  Some Marines it goes in one ear and out 
the other and some other Marines take it to heart.  You can say that you agree that 
being a good person means helping someone fix a flat on the side of the road but 
the next day you drive by a person with a flat and you say, “mmmm” (he tilts his 
head and grimaces to signify refusal to help the person with the flat tire). 
[Fieldnotes, July 1, 2008] 
 
SSgt. Demster raises two obstacles to overt advancement of values or morals in MAIT training.  
The first is his lack of authority to demand a certain kind of moral standard be met.  This 
obstacle is based on the idea that character ultimately depends on the unique experience of each 
Marine in the socialization process of becoming a person in conjunction with his or her agency—
moment-by-moment choices—through time and across situations.  The independence of personal 
decision-making and commitment appears to undermine SSgt. Demster’s confidence in the 
program’s ability to convey and inculcate values decisively.  Possible grounds for such authority 
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in his position as an IT, his clear competence, and his past combat experience seem not to 
emerge for consideration at all. 
 This situation is ironic in two ways.  First, when discussing battlefield actions and Marine 
Corps Core Values (Honor, Courage, Commitment) during, for example, presentation of tie-ins, 
there did not seem to be a similar level of concern about “whose moral code should we use?”  
Often the lead IT would ask the trainees, implicitly or explicitly, about the relationship between 
action and value.  The response most often would be a single term or short sentence that 
expressed the meaning of the movement.  In listening to approximately thirty tie-ins over my two 
summers with the Marines, not once did I hear what might be considered a “discussion,” no less 
any form of dispute, over the connection between movement and values.  Here is an example. 
During my first summer of training, IT Staff Sergeant Demster told our training class a 
tie-in after an Obstacle Course Drill.  He related the actions of a U.S. Marine named Private 
Alvin La Pointe who, during the Vietnam War, eliminated an enemy antiaircraft position single-
handedly using grenades and his bayonet after he ran out of ammunition for his weapon.  
According to SSgt. Demster, La Pointe saw that the antiaircraft gun was “tearing up” another 
platoon of Marines so, without any officers or support of NCO’s (non-commissioned officers) he 
took action (Fieldnotes, June 21, 2007).  When SSgt. Demster asked the class, “Why…why did 
La Pointe do that?  Why did he just go take out that gun,” trainee Staff Sergeant McCloskey 
answered, “He didn’t think about it, he just did it, he saw Marines in trouble and he just reacted.” 
SSgt. Demster replied, “Yeah, he killed those VC (Viet Cong fighters) because of, for, his fellow 
Marines, not for himself” (Fieldnotes, June 21, 2007).  There was no question in this case about 
what morals or whose morals were being expressed and which were to be pursued by the trainees 
in the future. 
From my outsider, anthropologist’s perspective, and assuming that SSgt. Demster’s 
presentation respected the facts of the case, however, what puzzled me was why La Pointe was a 
courageous hero when he left his own unit, apparently without the knowledge or permission of 
his own unit’s leaders as emphasized by SSgt. Demster?  If SSgt. Demster was trying to generate 
a sense of strong personal initiative about “doing what needs to be done” in a combat situation, 
he also generated a moral question for me.  Did La Pointe’s individual efforts simply reflect a 
battlefield fact that in close combat, units become separated and mixed up with other units?  
Were La Pointe’s actions indicative of an informal—but formally tolerated if not encouraged—
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ethic that permitted breaking some military rules when the value being pursued is the lives of 
Marines?  Or should I understand his individual efforts as a breach the formal military chain of 
command and, in a way, a betrayal of his fellow Marines who were depending on him to “watch 
their backs” as the saying goes?  Should La Pointe have actually been reprimanded for not 
thinking about his unit and the chain of command?
1
 
It took me some days to formulate these questions and concerns.  As I reviewed the tie-in 
I was struck by the fact that my questions and concerns did not seem to be shared by the 
Marines.  None of them, for example, expressed concern that La Pointe had left his comrades, or 
had left his unit without the knowledge or permission of his leaders.  The association of actions 
with values was immediate and unremarkable during the tie-in exchanges.  While these questions 
may be symptomatic of my outsider position—that is, in not being socialized into the Marine 
Corps I did not have the insider knowledge about why such questions were not relevant—there 
were other trainees present who, in being without combat experience, presented a similar 
outsider status.  While there might have been all sorts of other possible reasons for Marines not 
questioning the quick and easy association of La Pointe’s actions with selflessness, among them 
the idea that a Marine might make himself look foolish in front of his comrades by questioning 
something everyone “in the know” knows not to question, the point remains that there was a 
communal lack of concern, overt or covert, about any of these moral issues. 
 My discussion here implies that there should have been more overt talk about morals.  I 
want to suggest as much to the Marines for two reasons.  First, this study has shown that values 
are inseparable from the way they move.  Second, there is a substantive difference between being 
able to say what you see—that “those actions demonstrate selflessness” for example—and being 
able to say why you see it in the way you do.  Clarity is especially important, I want to suggest, 
in discussions about the morals expressed in life and death situations, especially for non-combat 
experienced Marines.  The presentation of tie-in’s by the IT’s and the inclusion of tie-in’s in all 
MCMAP training is evidence that the MACE staff appreciates this and attempts to achieve it.  
Mr. Hoban’s efforts, as we will see momentarily, convey a similar message about achieving 
clarity about the basis for decisions to kill or not to kill and so for being overt in discussions 
about the morality of killing. 
I want to suggest at least three issues that I think block this kind of talk and that cannot be 
accounted for in full by my outsider status.  First, like an iceberg, there is a vast amount of 
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relevant data about acting on a battlefield that gets omitted from the presentation of battlefield 
action during tie-ins.  The descriptive detail of the tie-in presentation of battlefield action selects 
and highlights those actions that are considered courageous to begin with.  This effect seems to 
be a byproduct of the IT’s use, in many cases (but not all) on citations for bravery or heroism that 
provide a concise description of actions and an overt association of the actions with prized 
values.
2
  Data that are otherwise critical in fully appreciating the richness and complexity of 
human action from a semasiological viewpoint, like refusing to leave an Amtrak prior to clearing 
an enemy-held building, a start and a stop prior to another start in charging a machine gun, 
running away from the enemy prior to stopping and fighting hand-to-hand, these types of action 
never appear in citations.  Such actions are not necessarily fatal to assessing action as 
“courageous” except perhaps in contexts like that of the Marine Corps where total commitment 
is valued and expected if not required. 
We have seen that, for example in the case of U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Wolfe, who took 
the perspective of his wife to reflect on his battlefield actions as he performed them, total 
commitment is not necessarily total, at least in the way that the Marines would prefer in order to 
increase the odds of surviving if not prevailing in combat.  Not only can there be a disjunction 
between thinking about action and thinking in action that nevertheless succeeds militarily, such 
disjunctions could serve to alert trainees to the complex issues they might face on a battlefield.  
Of course “thinking about what I should be thinking about” in combat provides a new and 
potentially deadly option for not focusing on—for not being totally committed to—eliminating 
the enemy.  The concentration on selected and highlighted action and the value(s) expressed by 
that action, on the other hand, obscures the presence of these omissions.
3
  From a military point 
of view, this, perhaps, is a way of helping trainees generate total commitment in the unique 
environment of lethal combat.  It is perhaps supported too, in the military, and especially in the 
Marine Corps, in the primacy of embodied action over what is thought or said. 
Third, as I was working through my puzzlement about these issues in the ascription of 
courage to actors in military settings I decided to ask another IT, Staff Sergeant Wilder, a 
hypothetical question based on a tactical principle I learned in the training.  The tactical principle 
and situation is this: Marines are responsible for continuing to “fight through” a near-ambush 
(enemies are close enough to see you and use rifles and grenades).  This is called a “counter-
ambush.”  The point is that in a near-ambush, the enemy has created an advantageous position in 
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which they have pre-targeted the areas in which the Marines would have to move in order to 
fight once the trap is sprung.  A corollary principle, then, is that Marines are positively forbidden 
to help fellow Marines who might be wounded in the ambush.  Such is the danger to the lives of 
the entire unit that the first priority is to kill the ambushers.  “But,” I asked SSgt. Wilder, “if a 
Marine braved the rifle fire and grenades to help a wounded Marine would he be considered a 
courageous hero or a guy who failed to honor a tactical principle designed to save the entire 
unit?”  He smiled wryly and said, “I guess it would depend on how the counter-ambush turned 
out!” (Fieldnotes, June 27, 2007). 
My hypothetical question revealed that an ascription of “courageous hero” or “betrayer of 
principles” might turn on the simple fact of whether or not the action achieved a positive 
outcome, the actor’s intention, or a salubrious impact on larger events.  If this is indeed the case, 
the moral risk and moral ambiguity to acting in situations of apparently conflicting ethical values 
is tremendous given that judgments about the actor’s moral standing are made ex post facto 
apparently at the potentially unqualified discretion of the audience!  I say this because in some 
cases, it is in principle unclear whether or not the actor’s intention was realized, and even if it 
was, it may have had an indeterminate or negative effect itself or on other events.  It would seem 
that this sense of the quality of an action and actor being dependent on a positive outcome is 
endemic to situations of risk and ambiguity.  It also seems to be pervasive enough to Americans 
to be presented in film.  In Enemy of the State (1998), approaching the climactic scene where the 
character portrayed by Will Smith is about to risk his life (and his moral standing) and that of the 
character portrayed by the actor Gene Hackman by tricking murderous government officials into 
a lethal confrontation with a mafia boss, Hackman’s character says to Smith’s character, “You’re 
either incredibly smart or incredibly stupid.”  Smith’s character replies, “We’ll see in a minute.” 
As a consequence, in my view, MAIT tie-in’s present a constricted discursive space in 
that they limit the range of possibilities for “answers.”  In short, the only real possibility for 
answers to questions about why some soldiers act in particular ways on a battlefield is to affirm a 
rather simplistic association of action with value where the content of that association is already 
assumed or given.  While this approach may fit well with the Marine Corps’ need to keep things 
simple in training given the vast variety of persons inducted into the organization (in terms of 
background, world view, values, physical and mental competence, education, and so forth) and 
with the training program’s pedagogical choice to try to infuse the trainees with preferred values, 
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it risks what may be a productive realism about combat that might otherwise serve as an 
excellent, added layer of challenge to the mental and character disciplines in training. 
The ironic relationship of Staff Sergeant Demster’s concern about whose morals should 
be used in overt ways during training to his lack of concern for whose morals were being 
affirmed during his tie-in presentation offers ethnographic evidence that it is possible 
simultaneously to see and not to see movement as an expression of values.  This is not an 
indictment of SSgt. Demster in any way.  He is an excellent leader of Marines in my opinion and 
taught me much about the Marine Corps, MCMAP, and the MACE.  Rather it suggests that there 
is substantial opportunity for, on the one hand, the social sciences to correct the traditional 
mistakes in thinking about human social action that they have permitted and promoted in the 
worldview of Americans and Westerners; and, on the other hand, for Marines to “live into” the 
ethics that are already present in their training program.  By the former I mean that traditional 
social scientific mistaken theoretical perspectives that embed semiotic content in biological 
functioning or in an idealized linguistic realm.  By the latter I mean that the Marines can, and 
perhaps should, be more explicit about the character discipline and what they expect of Marines 
in and through MCMAP training.  This is easier said than done but one good place to start would 
be in identifying some of the values already being expressed in their training, a project to which I 
hope I have contributed in writing this study.  To do so, of course, requires the shift in theoretical 
framework that is included. 
The second obstacle to overt discussion of morals in MAIT training raised by Staff 
Sergeant Demster in his comments (besides his lack of authority, as a Marine trainer, to demand 
a certain kind of moral standard be met) is his perception of the demonstrated lack of consistency 
among the Marines in holding themselves to a moral code.  This obstacle is based on the 
recognition of individual Marines having a choice about how and when to act and why they act.  
In short it is based on the recognition that Marines are agents who can and do change their 
actions through time and across situations.  But, as most of the IT’s at the MACE tacitly agreed, 
there is no way to force Marines to do exactly what the Marine Corps wants them to do either in 
all situations or at all times.  Discipline and offering resources for self-discipline are both ways 
to direct Marines toward, but never to guarantee, prescribed action. 
I want to engage this second obstacle and its implication for the ethics of training 
Marines to be ethical warriors by turning to the efforts of former Marine captain Jack Hoban, one 
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of a small cadre of important advisors to Lieutenant Colonel Shusko and the MACE staff.  We 
encountered him in the last chapter as an advocate of the tie-in pedagogy.  Though not a combat 
veteran, Hoban is a highly accomplished martial artist who has spent years studying and 
practicing personal combat with and without weapons.  In his advising MACE staff and Marine 
trainees, Hoban advances a conception of the ethical Marine warrior based on an explicit value 
system. 
Hoban’s conception, which he calls the Ethical Warrior concept (capital “E” and “W”) is 
founded on his encounter with the approach of former World War II Marine combat 
infantryman, attorney, and statesman Robert L. Humphrey toward inter-cultural conflict 
resolution.  In his book, Values For a New Millennium (2005), Humphrey uses a wide-range of 
empirical data focusing on his attempts to remedy disastrous American interactions with foreign 
cultures.  The case studies Humphrey offers range from the inter-cultural violence and poor 
relations resulting from the generalized American service personnel view of our Vietnamese 
allies as “gooks” to violence and poor relations resulting from the generalized American service 
personnel resentment toward the way Italian men treated American women.  Given this data and 
drawing on the work of the Scottish philosopher Frances Hutcheson, Humphrey argues that the 
source and solution to violence and poor relations is to be found in respect for, or failure to 
respect, the universal value of life amongst human beings.  The ethical concept is that “human 
equality is almost synonymous with the basic life value in the natural order of values” (2005:51). 
Humphrey conducted hundreds of studies with thousands of respondents in over a dozen 
cultures.  From this effort, and in light of the natural philosophy offered by Hutcheson, 
Humphrey found that the “basic life value” is actually a Dual-Life Value.  Humphrey puts it this 
way, “Life is humankind’s strongest earthly value.  And species-preservation (the lives of my 
loved ones) is the top half of the value.   Self is only a close second, even in strongly 
individualistic America” (2005:58).  The hierarchical relationship of species-preservation over 
self is mirrored in the relationship of the dual-life value to other values.  The taken-for-granted 
status of the dual-life value among most people is symptomatic of its being foundational in our 
species. Values like freedom and equality are by way of contrast, secondary and “conscious,” but 
are important in their function as protections against tyranny and bigotry (2005:59). 
One of the ways the primacy of the dual-life value and the slight edge in prioritization of 
the value of the lives of others over one’s own life was translated directly into the MAIT course 
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during a presentation on developing a combat mindset.  “Combat mindset” refers to the state of 
mental preparedness, focus, commitment, and determination to execute an attack on an enemy 
and follow through with whatever actions are necessary to eliminate the enemy.  Gunnery 
Sergeant Friend requested that the trainees visualize a snarling grizzly bear.  He asked, “Is the 
bear dangerous?”  A general chorus of “yeah” and “oo-rah” followed.
4
  “Now, picture a grizzly 
bear with three cubs,” he continued, “is the bear more or less dangerous?”  A general chorus of 
“more” and louder “oo-rah’s” followed.  “Yeah,” said GySgt. Friend, the bear is more dangerous 
when protecting her cubs.  That’s what combat mindset is all about.” (Fieldnotes, June 26, 2007).  
Here the value of the lives of others over one’s own life was being given a basis in the powerful 
example of a parent protecting its young.  This serves to ground the principle in a natural(ized), 
familial structure and to that extent render it obvious, inarguable and unquestionable.  The 
trainees were supposed to think about their role in executing violence in terms of being a 
protector in the same way that a bear protects its cubs.  Being violent in protecting one’s family 
is a deeply held American cultural value and I suspect the notion is that that cultural value is 
rooted in the natural example offered by the bear and his/her cubs. 
This example depends on the presence of a generalized threat.  GySgt. Friend made no 
attempt to ask the Marines to visualize another animal, another bear, or even a human hunter as a 
specific threat.  Nor did the trainees indicate any concern with why the bear was snarling before 
being asked to visualize the cubs.  The success of the thought experiment then depends on an 
assumed external threat that provokes the bear.  Bears don’t snarl unless provoked. The logic 
seems to go that Marines kill others only when provoked or when those whom the Marines are 
dedicated to protecting are threatened.  Much of the ethnographic evidence about combat and 
killing offered in this study demonstrates the strong emphasis on the disciplined use of force 
achieved through intelligent, active embodied judgment on the part of the Marines in the service 
of protecting, at the very least, other Marines.  If not examined in depth, Marine actions seem to 
support this genesis story for the Marine way of combat and the genesis story seems to support 
Marine ways of combat.  
Though the moral message of protecting others at, perhaps, the risk of one’s own life is 
one of the distinctive ways of being for Westerners, Americans, U.S. Marines, and combat 
infantry, we are still faced with important question remains about the legitimacy of the 
naturalistic example used, apparently, as an explanation of legitimate violence.  What I mean is 
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that we have already seen in great detail that the attendant, authoritative air of evolutionary 
authority in this kind of naturalistic analogy creates a dynamic that justifies but does not explain 
the use of violence when a human combatant is provoked and, especially, when a human 
combatant is protecting one’s family or young.  Ethological analogies, in fact, are subject to what 
I take to be a fatal objection: wild animals are not the right kind of thing to be used as a source 
model for understanding human behavior.  Harré argues that 
 
Territoriality, ritualization, displacement, aggression, and so on, have been 
studied in feral conditions and treated as analogous to human institutions like war, 
property, defense, urban living and so on.  But of course, human beings are not 
wild animals.  They are domesticated by the work of mothers, psychiatrists, 
priests, policemen, teachers, and so on.  The appropriate analogies, to my 
knowledge, have never been explored.  No one has asked how closely are those 
human life practices similar to the life forms of pussy cats, pet dogs, cows, horses, 
gerbils, budgerigars, and the like.  It is to the social psychology of farm animals 
and pets that we should be looking for useful analogies to sources of patterns of 
lives of human kind.  And by parity of reasoning these considerations suggest that 
the forms of life of domesticated animals are much more dependent on those of 
their human masters than they are on genetic endowment. [1979: 339] 
 
Even with the “right” source model—domesticated animals—Harré is skeptical, and rightly so, 
about any attempt to suggest that the behavior of such animals should be considered evidence of 
how human beings “really behave” since the source of that behavior is the social intervention of 
people and not the genetic make-up of the animals. 
More support for my interpretation, and more evidence of the dependence of the ethical 
system on a naturalized view of cultural values emerged in further conversation about the dual-
life value with Mr. Hoban.  He clarified the application of the system by contending that in 
“using Aristotelian logic, if someone is alive, then ‘A is A’ and they want to be alive.  This 
means that everyone everywhere who is alive values being alive, whether they demonstrate it or 
not.  This is the one and only value that is universal. All other values are culturally relative, like 
wearing a burka or not.  What is moral (by contrast with what is of value) is defined by whether 
or not the action in question preserves or destroys life; if it preserves life it is moral, if it destroys 
life, it is immoral.” According to this ethical system, in the case of a suicide we would say that 
something “misfired.”  People who indiscriminately kill others like sociopathic serial killers are 
“broken” (personal conversation, January 18, 2010). 
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Hoban asserts that all human actions should be assessed by their moral status—whether 
or not they preserve life—not their cultural value, which can be relative and so misleading.  
Moreover, the universal standard for assessing actions is whether or not they preserve all life, not 
just some lives.  This approach protects against the freedom to kill others based on relative 
values, which is immoral.  Marines do not kill others because those others are Muslim or because 
of the color of their skin or because they think they’re “dirty.”  Marines kill others whose lives 
are dedicated to the death of others, for example, suicide bombers.  Suicide bombers remove the 
ability of their targets to live lives whose content might challenge or contradict that of the 
bombers.  I take this to mean that Marines kill others who demonstrate a personal commitment to 
ending the lives of others whose lives, in turn, do not threaten the lives of anyone else.  In the 
case of people whose goal is causing the death of others (immorally) or in the case of a 
sociopath, it would be immoral not to kill them. 
It is important to clarify what Humphrey and Hoban mean by the terms “life” and “lives.”  
For them it is the material, physical state of the organism being alive.  Harré (1979) makes a 
useful distinction on exactly this point by arguing that for human beings, the organismic state of 
being alive is qualitatively different than living a socio-cultural, value-based life.  Within the 
socio-cultural realm, moreover, Harré further differentiates the practical matter of staying alive 
with the expressive matter of living a life.  In parallel with Humphrey and Hoban, Harré argues 
that the latter is more important issue: people can and will end their lives voluntarily to express a 
prized value.  But there is an important difference too.  For Harré, valuing life, whether one’s 
own or that of others, is an expressive, not a practical, matter. 
Applying these ideas to Humphrey and Hoban’s ethical system, we can see that they are 
advancing a formulation of ethics built on the sine qua non matter of survival, not existence or 
expressiveness.   There is, however, no such thing as valuing one’s life in any pre-cultural, non-
expressive way as Humphrey and Hoban seem to argue.  There is no universal regard for life per 
se.  If there is a universal involved here at all, it is the fact that the expressive quality of one’s life 
and the expressive quality of the lives of others are what counts.  While it is true that without a 
living human body there is no person, as Harré points out, this is a secondary, not a primary, 
concern, especially for Marines.  As I demonstrated in the last chapter, ideally, the life of a 
Marine is not for the Marine but for other Marines, at least within the contexts of the battlefield 
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and the Corps.  Even as a practical matter, being alive is subsumed by cultural value expression 
of living a life: 
 
It is indisputable that every human being from time to time feels thirsty.  But the 
drive to satisfy that bodily need, when it appears as a felt want, comes under the 
control of a meaning system and thus enters social life only through the meaning 
it has for members of a particular social group.  For example, according to those 
who adopt a form of social life in which mortification of the flesh is a dominant 
social good, thirst will be only barely satisfied and on special occasion not 
satisfied at all. [Harré 1979: 338] 
 
Life itself is subject to the expression of values.  Beyond Harré’s example, and that of the 
U.S. Marines, former U.S. Army Chaplain Captain James Yee (2005) recounts a carefully timed 
mass suicide attempt by Muslim detainees at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay (GITMO) in 
2003 as a response to the purposeful defiling of their Qur’ans by guards.  The plan was for one 
prisoner to hang himself (all the detainees were male) every fifteen minutes in order to 
overwhelm the capacity of the guards and medics to respond and save their lives.  Twenty-three 
prisoners tried to hang themselves over several days.  In trying to end the suicide attempts, 
Chaplain Yee consulted with a noted scholar of the Islamic tradition who was also stationed at 
GITMO.  While Yee knew that it was not permissible for Muslims to kill themselves, his 
consultant told him, “The solution to this problem is to address the root causes of that which 
drives these men to want to take their own lives.  Simply telling them they are disobeying the 
laws of Islam will likely not stop these desperate men, who surely understand that already” 
(2005:116).  The detainee’s survival was subject to their ability to lead an expressive existence as 
good Muslims.  Faced with the removal of their ability to be a good Muslim, their practical lives 
were forfeit, useable only, perhaps, as indirect weapons to shame their captors. 
These observations suggest the need for a more thorough, critical analysis of the 
Humphrey-Hoban vision of the ethics of being an Ethical Warrior.  To begin, we can juxtapose it 
to a similar argument made by U.S. Army intelligence officer and combat veteran of World War 
II J. Glenn Gray.  In his book The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (1970) Gray argues 
 
Preservative love, or concern, is clearly observed in combat in a soldier’s care for 
life other than his own. 
The impulse [to preservative love] is not restricted at all to those whose 
official duty it is to preserve [like doctors and corpsmen]; it sometimes becomes a 
general passion and finds a place in the majority of soldiers.  Waifs and orphans 
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and lost pets have a peculiar claim on the affections of combat soldiers, who 
lavish upon them unusual care and tenderness.  For the most part, there is little 
affinity between protector and protected in these cases.  The soldiers are moved 
by the impersonal compassion that the fragility and helplessness of mortal 
creatures can call up in most of us.  This frequently extends to enemy wounded.  
Medical men will risk their lives on occasion to rescue wounded enemy soldiers, 
and doctors in field hospitals will fight obstinately for the one as the other.  The 
distinction between friend and foe has here been erased by the recognition of the 
helplessness of a creature whose life is threatened with extinction. 
Superficially, this concern for preserving life other than one’s own appears 
to be separated by a deep gulf from the instinct for self-preservation.  The one 
begins, many will say, only when the other is assured.  Yet this is not so.  Often 
on the battlefield the desire to persevere in our being and the preservation of other 
life are seen to be closely related below the conscious level.  The thousand 
anonymous acts of concern for the life that is exposed to shot and shell is 
testimony to an ultimate unity between these impulses. 
Whether the concern is for one’s own being and chances of survival or 
whether it is directed to the preservation of other life, I doubt that if its nature is 
altered.  The object of one’s care is less essential than the presence of the need to 
take care and to preserve. [1970: 83-85] 
 
Gray is less optimistic about the supposed universality of selflessness as expressed in acts of care 
and tenderness but shares with Humphrey and Hoban the notion that the origination of such acts 
is biological since he uses terminology like “impulse” and “instinct.”   Gray differs with the 
Humphey-Hoban formulation in terms of what that biological basis means, however.  In the 
latter, “species-preservation” defined as “the lives of my loved ones” forms the basis for 
exercising preservative action while Gray offers ethnographic evidence preservative action is not 
focused on “loved ones.”  Rather, it is based on a species-wide, yet not universal compassion that 
is triggered by a perception of  “helplessness.”  The value of life per se and its universality is not 
the point in Gray’s formulation because both are situational.  Preservative action occurs in 
situations where there is helplessness and fragility, but not necessarily and not all the time. 
 An additional difference occurs in Gray’s presentation of the equal, not hierarchical 
relationship between preserving one’s own life versus preserving the life of another.  The need to 
care—compassion—is at the heart of Gray’s formulation, not life per se.  To me this difference 
between Gray and Humphrey-Hoban is decisive in two ways.  First, it exposes the lack of any 
clear basis for choosing between either Gray’s or Humphrey-Hoban’s formulation since each 
depends on an implied biological basis that is, in itself, implausible as the ground for a universal 
human value, and second, both are equally grounded in ethnographic evidence.  This dilemma 
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replicates the problem encountered in chapter 3 when we found anthropologist Sherry Ortner 
claiming that anthropologists see human agency in action in their ethnographic work while 
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss claimed that he saw just the opposite, ethnographically 
speaking.  The lesson there was that the choice of frameworks for understanding and interpreting 
the world is a theoretical, not an empirical problem because experience underdetermines theory.  
It then follows that empirical data exist only in light of a conceptual or theoretical framework.    
The theoretical problem in turn, as defined as the extent to which a framework is scientifically 
plausible. 
I will focus most of the following comments on the Humphrey-Hoban formulation since 
it is the one being advanced at the MACE.  If the source of the species-specific human dual-life 
value is our biology then the content of this study and its attendant conclusion that no such 
ethical content can be thought to exist at the level of human biology means that the formulation 
cannot be maintained in any scientifically plausible way.  Evidence of the implausibility of the 
formulation emerges in the use of certain key terms in critical positions within the framework.  
People committing suicide are thought to be “misfiring,” and the dual-life value is said to require 
“activation.”  For Humphrey, the dual-life value is not taught, it is “reinforced,” because it pre-
exists within the “natural” human conceptual and behavioral repertoire (2005:58).  The 
mechanical causal and deterministic sense of these terms is what carries their power to be 
convincing.  They serve to bridge the gap between empirical and theoretical frameworks by 
removing the person and so his or her agency from the equation.  In doing so the terms suggest 
the replication of the contradiction between biological explanation and agentic description under 
examination in this study.  The terms, essentially, mask the contradiction and permit a false sense 
of the universality of the value of life per se not by explaining, but by explaining away empirical 
exceptions like suicides.  Such persons are predefined as mechanically broken and so are not 
properly considered exceptions to the rule.  Gray, it seems to me, was less convinced of the 
universality of compassion and the value of life per se because these were not always evident in 
the actual fighting he witnessed.  While biologically-based, his formulation comes across as 
context-dependent and so situational. 
There may be excellent reasons for maintaining the meaning and value of the dual-life 
value, and perhaps even substantive reasons for us to think that it is shared in some form by all 
human beings.  But those differences in form could be decisive and the variability of the 
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ethnographic record suggests we should expect it to be so.  We might, therefore, want to 
reformulate the dual-life value in a more culture-specific way: that Marines kill and die in order 
to preserve the physical survival of all people instantiates the historical and cultural fact that 
Americans believe that all people are entitled to the pursuit of an expressive existence.  But that 
entitlement is not universal.  Those who commit their lives—both practical and expressive—to 
the destruction of the lives of others, who, in turn, do not share key beliefs, forfeit the 
entitlement.  This reformulation exposes what cannot legitimately be advanced, namely, the idea 
that the dual-life value is natural, universal, and pre- or a-cultural.  To persist in using dual-life 
value conceived in this way as a lever to promote moral, or life preserving, action toward oneself 
and others then must be considered an ideological and so morally problematic endeavor. 
 
A Comparative Case: Michelle Z. Rosaldo’s Universal Standard for Assessing Gender 
Relations 
 
An interesting parallel to Humphrey and Hoban’s universal standard for assessing action 
from within anthropology emerges in Michelle Z. Rosaldo’s work on gender. Though over three 
decades old, her theoretical formulation of a universal framework for assessing action, in her 
case the status of men and women relative to one another, provides a comparative case to the 
work of Humphrey and Hoban.  I want to use the comparison as a way to transition into a 
discussion of what some scholars have identified as a close competitor to the biological as a site 
for “obvious” gender differentiation: warfare.  In training for combat at the MACE, we will see, 
gender differentiation was used as a counterpoint to being a good Marine.  “Marine,” that is, is 
the more important category compared to “man” or “woman.” 
In a proposal for an institute on gender and war at Dartmouth College in 1990, faculty 
members Lynda Boose, Lynn Higgins, Marianne Hirsh, Al LaValley, and Brenda Silver offered 
an understanding of what seems to be a traditional assumption about the military. 
 
A culturally produced activity that is as rigidly defined by sex differentiation and 
as committed to sexual exclusion as is war points to a crucial site where meanings 
about gender are being produced, reproduced, and circulated back into society.  
After biological reproduction, war is perhaps the arena where division of labor 
along gender lines has been most obvious, and thus where sexual difference has 
seemed the most absolute and natural. [In Cooke and Woollacott 1993: ix] 
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Given the active use of naturalizing discourses, mostly in terms of the bio-reductive framework, 
we might expect this understanding to be borne out in the ethnographic evidence.  But, the edited 
volume resulting from the institute, Gendering War Talk (1993), “challenge[s] existing images, 
for example, that women are pacifists and that they are Patriotic Mothers; that men are 
essentially aggressive, or that they are threatened by their lack of aggressivity” (Cooke and 
Woollacott 1993:ix).  In my ethnographic evidence too, the situation is much more complicated 
and unsettled.  Rosaldo, I think, was dedicated to the same kind of unsettling of assumed 
absolute and naturalized gendered identities.  A central component of Rosaldo’s work in this 
effort was her “public/domestic dichotomy,” a formulation that the socio-cultural anthropologists 
Alejandro Lugo and Bill Maurer assert is the basis of Rosaldo’s contribution to today’s feminist 
anthropology; as they put it, Rosaldo’s relevance today can be traced to her “elaboration of the 
public/domestic dichotomy to explain women’s subordination” (2000:18). 
In Women, Culture & Society (1974) Rosaldo argues that 
 
An opposition between “domestic” and “public” provides the basis of a 
structural framework necessary to identify and explore the place of male and 
female in psychological, cultural, social, and economic aspects of human life.  
“Domestic,” as used here, refers to those minimal institutions and modes of 
activity that are organized immediately around one or more mothers and their 
children; “public” refers to activities, institutions, and forms of association that 
link, rank, organize, or subsume particular mother-child groups.  Though this 
opposition will be more or less salient in different social and ideological systems, 
it does provide a universal framework for conceptualizing the activities of the 
sexes.  The opposition does not determine cultural stereotypes or asymmetries in 
the evaluations of the sexes, but rather underlies them, to support a very general 
(and, for women, often demeaning) identification of women with domestic life 
and of men with public life. 
Although the fact that women give birth to and nurse children would seem 
to have no necessary entailments, it appears to provide a focus for the simplest 
distinction in the adult division of labor in any human group. [1974: 23-24] 
 
Like Humphrey and Hoban, Rosaldo claims that there exists a universal standard for assessing 
action: the opposition between “domestic” and “public.”  I mean that Rosaldo is claiming that 
the opposition is a tool by which the researcher can, on the one hand, pick out what counts as 
important or what counts as evidence among the phenomena of the socio-cultural world, and on 
the other hand, interpret the meaning of what is picked.  In short, the opposition promotes, as Dr. 
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Lugo and Dr. Maurer state, “the analysis of gender cross-culturally” (2000:18).  The opposition, 
then, provides a way for us to understand women’s subordination universally while the dual-life 
value provides a way for us to understand what is moral universally.  In addition, evidence for 
the existence of the opposition is, like (the value of) the dual-life value, to be found in the cross-
cultural ethnographic record. 
 Rosaldo, however, is careful to claim that the opposition is not a-historical.  She writes 
 
It should be stressed that, whereas a number of the empirical observations put 
forth here might seem to support those theorists who have claimed that men, as 
opposed to women, have a biological propensity for forming social “groups” (e.g., 
Tiger, 1969), my point is that what universals can be found in the social 
organization and position of men and women can be traced to social rather than 
biological considerations.  The universal association of women with young 
children and its various social, cultural, and psychological implications are seen 
as likely but not necessary (or desirable) outcomes, and they are more readily 
derived from organizational factors than from biology. [1974: 23, fn 5] 
 
Rosaldo specifically rejects a biological basis for the universal ethnographic fact in favor of a 
social organizational basis.  Instead, she thinks that the biological “underlies” and “supports” the 
general conventional association of women with domestic life.  This is a key point in her 
formulation and I would like to offer two observations about it. 
 First, the formulation appears to avoid the problem of embedding socio-cultural values 
and content in our biology, and so it presumes to fend off deriving any kind of a deterministic 
understanding of the “necessity” for all human beings, as a species, to behave socially in the 
same way, that is, to subordinate women.
5
  This of course opens up the possibility for agentic, 
personal intervention in changing the value system from subordination of women to equalization 
or super-ordination of women (relative to men).  Equalization of men and women’s status was a 
political goal central to Rosaldo’s work as a feminist.  Dr. Lugo states, “In 1974 Michelle 
Rosaldo had a clear and definite political agenda: “to understand the nature of female 
subordination and the ways it may be overcome” (2000:56).  The theoretical and political are 
intimately tied here, but we must ask, on what basis? 
 Once again, terminology becomes critical.  Rosaldo claims that the source of the 
ethnographic fact of universal women’s subordination is “the [biological] fact that women give 
birth to and nurse children [and while this fact] would seem to have no necessary entailments, it 
appears to provide a focus for the simplest distinction in the adult division of labor in any human 
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group” (1974:24).  Rosaldo’s formulation leads her to claim that a universal biological fact—
women give birth to and [have the capability to] nurse children—“leads” to a universal socio-
cultural interpretation of that fact—women should be considered domestic and so subordinate.  
This is the problem of the relationship between biology and culture writ small.  For her to claim 
to have in her possession a plausible and legitimate tool for universal assessment and 
understanding of human social, gender relations across cultures she needs to specify the nature of 
the relationship between biological fact and socio-cultural universal interpretation. 
Rosaldo puts forth this relationship and therefore the basis for the “universal” part of her 
claim by implying a “necessary entailment” between biological fact and socio-cultural, universal 
interpretation.  In so doing, she, in effect guarantees it.  But what is the nature of this guarantee 
of a “necessary entailment?”  The only available candidate for a species-wide, species-specific, 
shared socio-cultural meaning is a deterministic biological structure that functions (in both males 
and females apparently) to deliver the meaning.  In short, Rosaldo is offering some kind of 
instinct theory.  As parallel cases, both Stephen Pinker (1994) and E.O. Wilson’s (1999) claim a 
species-specific “language instinct,” the existence of which “entails” that human beings 
“necessarily” will “produce” and “perform” language.  But Rosaldo, rightly in my estimation, 
denies that option when she claims “biology becomes significant only as it is interpreted by 
human actors and associated with characteristic modes of action” (1974:23).  Rosaldo’s view 
here resonates with what we have already seen: that we are built to be semiotic does not entail 
what we mean in being semiotic.  That we are built to be interpreters and meaning-makers does 
not therefore specify what we must mean in generating our interpretations and meanings.  
Nevertheless, perhaps in support of her political agenda, or perhaps out of respect for what she 
sees in the ethnographic record, she formulates the claim, albeit reluctantly, using words like 
“appears,” “underlies,” and “supports” to connect the biological with the socio-cultural.  This 
might have been the best she, or anyone, could do at the time.  Today, however, we can see that 
Rosaldo’s terminology tends, along with the terminology used by Humphrey and Hoban, to 
obscure the fact that there can be no scientifically plausible or morally legitimate conception of 
the relationship between biology and culture such that biology in any direct or indirect way 
“supports,” “underlies,” and hence “leads to,” in short, determines, socio-cultural meaning. 
Second, the theoretical concerns raised above provide the basis for us to be skeptical of 
Rosaldo’s reliance on her perception and interpretation of the meaning of the ethnographic 
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record.  Without overt or covert reference to some mechanism to guarantee universality, like a 
biological structure for, or even an autonomous, socio-cultural structure for, the idea that all 
people everywhere, over time and through situations, could or will interpret the biological fact of 
child-bearing or the socio-cultural practice of child-rearing, in terms of the content of Rosaldo’s 
domestic/public dichotomy is implausible.   This idea is susceptible to the same in-principle 
objections I detailed in chapter 3 with reference to Sherry Ortner’s radical and naïve empiricism 
in her attempt to generate a claim that anthropologists see the same thing—human agency in 
action—due to their position “on the ground.”  The counter-example to Ortner’s claim was the 
interpretation of the ethnographic record by Claude Levi-Strauss wherein he saw nothing of the 
kind.  One counter-example is enough to show that the issue is not ethnographic or evidentiary 
but theoretical.  These concerns together suggest that that any claim to the existence of a 
universal interpretation of a biological fact of human species reproduction in an ethnographic 
record that holds exceptions to that very interpretation is not legitimate.  Rather, it is ideological.  
The implied question here of whether or not theory legitimately can be ideological is another 
matter.  At the very least this question has to do with one’s theory of objectivity, and also with a 
theory of the conflicting points of view between theorist and native. 
Rosaldo eventually changed her position about the basis of the opposition.  She argued 
that the dichotomy was actually a historical product of Victorian ideology and thus explicitly 
denied that the source of the dichotomy in empirical detail (Rosaldo 1980).  Instead, in The Use 
and Abuse of Anthropology: Reflections on Feminism and Cross-cultural Understanding (1980) 
she grounded “the inevitable ranking” of men’s over women’s activities in “the categories, 
biases, and limitations of a traditionally individualistic and male-oriented sociology” (In Lugo 
2000:64).  Changing the source of the opposition, however, according to Rosaldo, does not 
change the fact that the inevitable ranking is nevertheless correct.  This is truly a strange 
argument.  While Rosaldo’s historicization of the source of the domestic/public dichotomy in 
Victorian tenets and Enlightenment political philosophy and practice and hence its relocation in 
the “individualistic and male-oriented sociology” emergent from it further distances her from any 
plausible basis for claiming it as a universal fact of ethnographic reality or a universal tool for 
interpretation of the ethnographic record, she persists in calling its existence necessary or 
inevitable. 
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In moving even further away from a biological basis for the opposition to a socio-
cultural—and in Rosaldo’s terminology, “ideological”—basis for the opposition, she further 
undermines any plausible ground for the existence of a universal human behavior like ‘the 
interpretation of women’s place as domestic and status as subordinate.’  Given these concerns in 
sum, the use of the domestic/public dichotomy as a universal tool for assessing gender 
relationships must be considered, potentially, as much an ideological imposition by a researcher 
as the enactment of the dichotomy was, perhaps to the people living it.  What I mean is that to 
the extent that the scientific assumption of the universality of the opposition is implausible, its 
use as a framework for the researcher’s thinking about the meaning of any particular 
ethnographic instance of male/female relationship must carry the substantial risk of reducing the 
meaning of the action involved to the terms of the theoretician’s dichotomy, rather than to the 
meaning of the action according to the participants. 
Here, then, the conflict between the theoretician’s and the native’s point of view has been 
resolved in favor of the former.  In short, given the reasonable question of its plausibility, the 
dichotomy is likely to be an imposition of meanings associated with the conceptual structure of 
the opposition.  What we should not expect in this case is interpretation grounded in, or insight 
into, actual gender relationships.  There is nothing in the formulation that assists the researcher in 
controlling for the bias the opposition imposes.  It seems to me that the opposition’s explanatory 
usefulness is fatally compromised on this basis.  As such, the dichotomy is probably better 
understood as a proposal for a way of interpreting, not an explanation of, ethnographic reality.  
This, I want to argue, is exactly how we should regard the Humphrey/Hoban formulation of the 
dual-life value. 
 
Gender and MAIT Training: Are Women Subordinate to Men? 
 
If Boose, et. Al., are right in contending that war, after biology, is “perhaps the arena 
where the division of labor along gender lines has been most obvious, and thus where sexual 
difference has seemed the most absolute and natural,” then, to the extent that training to be a 
warfighter is a process of socialization into a value system, military training should be a rich site 
for examining the ethnographic details of gender and labor differentiation.  While Boose, et. Al., 
found the actual fact of the matter to be much more unsettled than the absolutist and naturalizing 
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discourses would lead us to expect, training for hand-to-hand combat was not a focus for any of 
their work after their institute.  For me, training for combat is the most difficult and the most 
telling case for examining gender relationships since the “talk” is from the body, not about it 
(objectivist) and not of it (subjectivist).  It is the kind of talk that performs identity, not the kind 
of talk that focuses on—and this is an overused, pseudo-scientific phrase among some socio-
cultural anthropologists concerned with identity—“the conditions for” the emergence of identity 
as if this topic was the most important in understanding identity. 
Rosaldo’s work is provocative against this assertion since she points at the heart of the 
matter: how men and women act.  Dr. Lugo recounts Rosaldo’s conception of women’s 
subordination as “sexual asymmetry embodied in ‘the fact that male, as opposed to female, 
activities are always recognized as predominantly important, and cultural systems give authority 
and value to the roles and activities of men’” (2000:57).  More specifically, 
  
The dichotomous categories (public and domestic) “underlay” the local 
“evaluations of the sexes”—that is, the culturally specific values attached to male 
and female activities.  The cultural values given to the sexual asymmetry were in 
themselves sources of power.  They could work either against women as sources 
of domination and oppression or, as Rosaldo would prefer for women as sources 
of empowerment and transformation. [Lugo 2000: 58].   
 
From this conception, Dr. Lugo shows the development of Rosaldo’s political agenda toward an 
idea based on an ethnographic insight into gender relationships among the Ilongot. 
 
We must, like the Ilongots, bring men into the sphere of domestic concerns and 
responsibilities…the Ilongot example…suggests that men who in the past have 
committed their lives to public achievement will recognize women as true equals 
only when men themselves help raise new generations by taking on the 
responsibilities of the home. [In Lugo 2000: 61] 
 
For Lugo, there is substantive worth in pursuing what he sees as an inherent if unacknowledged 
strategy offered in Rosaldo’s formulation that focuses precisely on embodied action.  That 
strategy is to challenge what Rosaldo called “the aura of authority” that men generate in their 
sacrosanct public activities by “bringing men into the household” (Lugo 2000:64).  Specifically, 
the aura of authority is mitigated when the activity of making public decisions occurs in the 
realm of the domestic women can have a legitimate public role. 
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 Problematically, however, Rosaldo’s political agenda is susceptible to a serious criticism 
described by psychologist Suzanne E. Hatty in Masculinities, Violence, and Culture (2000).  She 
focuses on feminist theorists who argue that 
 
Social inequities or harms directed at one gender by the other could be remedied 
through resocialization.  Such solutions have been proffered in many areas; for 
example it has often been suggest that the way to alter problematic behavior 
exhibited by men (e.g., violence, lack of nurturance, or other expressive 
behaviors) is to change socialization practices.  There have been calls, therefore, 
to involve men in childrearing, or to raise boys in a way to that does not instill 
extreme masculine values or reward exaggerated masculine behaviors. 
 According to [philosopher Moira] Gatens (1983), these approaches are 
premised on the idea of a neutral body, of the arbitrary coupling of gender and 
sex. 
The proponents of resocializing (or de-gendering), according to Gatens, 
base their argument on a rationalist view of consciousness and a belief that it is 
possible to alter individual experience through substituting one set of cultural 
practices for another.  For these proponents, the sex/gender distinction mirrors 
the body/mind distinction; socialization theorists are thus positioned within the 
parameters of the dualistic notions of the body. [2000: 115, emphasis added] 
 
Barring any plausible basis for understanding human movement as fully socio-cultural—as 
semiotic a process as vocal discourse—as provided by, for example, semasiology, Rosaldo’s 
formulation is open to this criticism.  The criticism exposes Rosaldo’s formulation to the 
criticism that it is disembodied.  As such, there is no way to determine if or when Rosaldo’s 
political agenda is effective, essentially because there is no way to distinguish genuine instances 
change.  For example, even as he cites the recent United States-based, middle-class phenomena 
of bringing men into the home as perhaps quite influential in producing whatever autonomy 
women now enjoy, Dr. Lugo argues that this “does not mean that these new men and new 
women escape the hegemony of domestic/public discourses” (2000:61). 
 With the semasiological framework in hand, however, Rosaldo’s work can be revitalized 
at least as a strong hypothetical statement against which to measure ethnographic reality.  I want 
to argue that not only can we identify clear cases, we can use them to critique inappropriate 
generalizations about the nature of gender relationships based on putative “hegemonic 
discourses” like those that can sometimes be found within the military.  In doing so we can honor 
the spirit of Rosaldo’s political agenda without looking over our collective shoulders, as it were.  
The management of gender relations among the Marines in my MAIT training class is one such 
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instance.
6
  While the “aura of authority” may be thought to be in its strongest form in a 
traditionally masculine organization like the U.S. Marine Corps, there is an inherent risk in 
training that subverts authority constantly.  To see this process in operation, however, requires a 
semasiological perspective since the subversion is primarily embodied. 
Training is fundamentally designed to challenge the agency of participants in terms of 
their embodied performance.  Embodied performance is the primary modality by which character 
is assessed.  Every training drill presents an opportunity to fail or to succeed in meeting the 
standards for embodied performance and so suffer a negative assessment of character.  On the 
first day of MAIT training in 2007, the trainees—including two women second lieutenants—
were introduced to the staff’s expectations for performance in the course.  Master Gunnery 
Sergeant Franklin asked the class if there was anyone who “didn’t want to be there,” and that if 
there was, “don’t wait and whine about injuries or other bullshit; don’t be a girl and frickin’ 
whine about it, frickin’ don’t be afraid to get out, don’t hit on no injuries, have a sack.”  He 
added, “in deference to the girls in the room; they’re Marines, not girls” (Fieldnotes, June 11, 
2007).  MGySgt. Franklin added that “big boy rules apply,” that “you shouldn’t do stupid shit, go 
out and get drunk, stuff to get you in trouble, cause you could be dropped from the course.”  
Moreover, “if there is anyone on Creatin or other kinds of performance-enhancers, that shit isn’t 
allowed since it can shut down your kidneys” (Fieldnotes, June 11, 2007).  Since a lot of the 
Marines were staying at the local Days Inn, on the government’s money, and that the Days Inn 
was providing them laundry service and breakfast, “you should have some common decency and 
not throw your shit around in your room at the hotel, don’t leave your shit ‘adrift’.”  Finally he 
warned them “don’t go out and blow all your money, put some away” (Fieldnotes, June 11, 
2007). 
 Being a man, in MGySgt. Franklin’s terms, is defined as being opposite to being a 
woman; that is in terms of acceptable responses to enduring the rigors of the course and, 
especially, injuries.  Women’s action is constructed as primarily avoidant: they refuse to look at 
themselves critically and accept responsibility for who they are or are not.  Fear about how a lack 
of commitment would reflect negatively on one’s character, and covert plans to use an injury 
(real or fabricated apparently) to mitigate that fear and hide that lack of commitment are 
constructed as a typical women’s strategy.  Being a man is constructed implicitly as employing 
the opposite of the typical women’s strategy.  It is constructed metaphorically through reference 
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to Marines (somehow) choosing to have male genitalia, specifically a scrotum.  Here, it seems, 
we have a classic example of what Rosaldo identified, albeit relative to men, not women.  A 
typical activity of men is valued while a typical activity of women is devalued.  But the story is 
much more complex. 
Importantly, and ironically, the construction of proper activity for men is metaphorical, 
and not literal.  Having a scrotum—biological maleness—is neither required nor a guarantee of 
acceptable performance since the implication is that Marines need to choose to have one!  That 
is, they need to choose to honor and enact the kinds of actions that the Corps values.  Just 
because men are involved in the public activity of training for warfighting, and by extension the 
public activity of actual combat, does not mean that they will succeed and so have that activity 
valued by other men.  Any sense of an easy or necessary association of men’s public activities 
with men’s biological equipment and socio-cultural activities is further unsettled by, as we have 
seen, the malleability of what counts as success in training and in combat.  Success depends on 
the context and the values being employed and pursued.  For example, my success in training 
was, at one time, measured in terms of a comparison between my capabilities associated with my 
age (forty-two years old) and my fellow trainees’ capabilities associated with their age (mid-
twenties on average).  In assessing my squad’s group performance after an iteration of the 
Combat Conditioning Exercise (CCX), IT Staff Sergeant Wyman said he’d give us a seven out of 
ten on the performance scale after the second round.  He said we were weak in the beginning, but 
started coming together in the later stages.  Giving 100% was what it was all about, and that if 
we weren’t going to give 100%, we could come back in on Saturday and run the room again.  He 
pointed at me and said “his 100% is probably half or 5% of yours, but he was giving 100% for 
where he’s at.  That’s what we want!”  Do we need to come back here on Saturday?  No?!  OK” 
(Fieldnotes, June 19, 2007). 
Members of my squad, Gunnery Sergeant Blanchard, Corporal Torcello, and 2
nd
 
Lieutenant Dalton, all echoed SSgt. Wyman’s assessment by saying, “Good job, sir” (Fieldnotes, 
June 19, 2007).  Lead IT Gunnery Sergeant Friend approached me later that day and, in front of 
SSgt. Wyman, said, “You did real well” in the room and asked if I was glad that I stepped into 
the ring [part of the CCX includes using a range of techniques in a boxing-ring type of space].  I 
said, yes, absolutely, “it was the right thing to do” (Fieldnotes, June 19, 2007).  He said that 
giving 100% was all that was asked, so even though I could hardly lift my arms (during the fight 
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given other exercises we had been executing), that that’s what it was all about.  He added that IT 
Master Sergeant Coleman also commented that I did well for not having prepared for the course 
(in the way the Marines were expected to).  GySgt. Friend added that Master Sergeant Coleman 
rarely said anything like that (about Marines, no less nasty civilians).  He also told me that I was 
the first civilian ever to be permitted in “the room” (a shorthand way of referring to the CCX).  
Though I clearly failed when measured against the physical conditioning requirements that 
would have otherwise permitted me to lift my arms and fight the IT’s in the ring during the CCX, 
I succeeded when measured against my pushing myself to my physical and mental limits.  Note 
too that what counts as “100%” is also malleable and susceptible to situation-based interpretation 
on the part of the person authorized to make such judgments.  Though I was close, I hadn’t, for 
example, pushed myself to the point of rendering myself unconscious, as was Gunnery Sergeant 
Friend’s expectation and requirement during the pool drill. 
Given these considerations, Rosaldo’s opposition is too general to be of much use in 
discerning the complexity of intra-gender relationships.  But it would need to be if it was going 
to be used in the context of the military.  American men have constructed a socio-cultural realm 
in which the aura of authority that surrounds their public activities and so character is publicly 
undermined and brought into question pending successful enactment of embodied standards of 
performance.  This situation was made more interesting from an anthropological and gender 
point of view by the presence in my training class of two women second lieutenants trainees and 
one woman IT whose rank was sergeant.
7
  Women being invited into the public space to, 
potentially, outperform men, created a new kind of risk for both the men and the women.  On the 
one hand, the men might be “beat by a girl,” and so emasculated and on the other the women 
might be beat by a man and so shown to be unworthy of having been invited into “the man’s 
world.”  I overheard, for example, a male Marine captain heatedly emphasizing the importance 
of top-notch performance, at the level of or beyond that of the men, to one of the female second 
lieutenants (Fieldnotes, June 12, 2007).  Not having heard the entire conversation, I was not sure 
if the second lieutenant had expressed doubt about or was referring to an actual sub-par 
performance.  Having heard other bits of the conversation, the impression I was left with was 
that the captain was as much concerned with the issue of rank as with that of gender: the all-male 
non-commissioned officers in the training class would be watching and assessing the female 
second lieutenant as an officer as much as if not more than as a female. 
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Women, in this sense, might indeed have to carry the extra burden of being a female but 
not categorically and not all the time.  In establishing their willingness to give one hundred 
percent and to pursue the values of the organization, the men had no grounds for criticizing them 
or treating them differently without exposing themselves to a counter-criticism of not being a 
good Marine.  This is exactly the benefit I received.  The baseline ethical standard for being an 
ethical Marine was to measure performance against a sense of whether or not a Marine had “put 
out” one hundred percent.  Since the context was training, there was no need to die in the 
process, only to achieve near or actual unconsciousness as a measure of the selflessness at the 
heart of being a Marine.  In a sense, any Marine would be thought to be importing an illicit 
standard for measuring Marine-ness if they judged other Marines in any other way during 
training.  Of course this does not necessarily stop the Marines from doing so covertly and 
perhaps thinking less of women generally.  Nor does it mean that all Marines, even IT’s will be 
fully cognizant of the bases or meanings of their actions, judgments, and reactions all the time.  
But the explicit goal for the Marines was to be a Marine. 
This analysis brings up the question of whether or not being a Marine is equivalent with 
being a man.  In short, are “masculine” and “Marine” coequal?  Another way to ask this is, “Are 
females Marines insofar as they are masculine?”  My answer is no.  There were two structural 
aspects of the MAIT course that clearly marked women as such.  One drill included an exercise 
where a forty-five pound iron plate usually used on a weightlifting bar was held in both hands at 
chest height while standing and “pressed” outward from the chest, fully extending the arms.  The 
male trainees used these forty-five pound weights while the female trainees used twenty-five 
pound weights.  The other aspect was that the female trainees as well as the female IT were 
required to wear their flak jackets any time that forceful physical contact with other trainees 
could occur in order to protect their chests.  In light of Rosaldo’s work and political agenda, 
these two structural aspects would be excellent grounds for the emergence of discourses of 
subordination like, “The women can’t ‘hang with the men,’ they’re weak.”  Or, “Women are not 
built to be fighters, they need chest protection.” 
While the lighter weights and flak jackets did mark and emphasize physical differences 
between men and women, no male authority-establishing discourses, either vocal or embodied, 
came to my attention during either summer of training.  Similarly, I found no vocal or embodied 
discourses expressive of women’s subordination during either summer’s training course.  How 
 253 
might we explain this absence?  I think one plausible interpretation is that the male Marines 
actually thought it was not appropriate to treat the females differently.  While I did not set out to 
explore these issues specifically in this project, I think the basis for this equality of treatment 
could be located in the explicit tone set by Master Gunnery Sergeant Franklin when he defined 
being a good Marine as a category of being unto itself, regardless of the sex, gender, or, by 
extension, ethnicity, religion or any other category.  The depth of this commitment can be 
appreciated by a particular kind of tattoo that I saw among, especially, some of the white, male, 
non-commissioned officers who are often called “the backbone” of the Marine Corps illustrated 
in Figure 11 (see Figures section at the end of this chapter).  In the tattoo, the actual skin of the 
Marine is presented as torn-open to reveal the iconic Marine digital camouflage underneath.  The 
graphic is a powerful demonstration of a commitment not to, for example, the way of being 
stereotypically associated one’s skin color, whether white, black, brown or some other color, but 
to the Marine way of life.  The graphic is especially powerful given the permanence of the tattoo 
and the body as the primary resource for the embodied practice of being a good Marine. 
We can see support for the basis of equality in gender relations in the recognition of 
common vulnerability among the male Marines.  Men, as well as women, for example, required 
groin protection in the form of strapped-on padding.  In fact, in one drill, the trainees were 
required to kick other trainees, and to be kicked by other trainees, in the groin.  The point of the 
drill was to undo the expectation of “incapacitating pain” when struck in the groin and 
disassociate that expectation with the culturally prescribed reaction: curling into a fetal position 
and falling on the ground.  In this case the men, not the women, were more vulnerable, yet the 
women did not begrudge the men their protection nor did the men seek to excuse the use of the 
protection.  The clear and constant lesson was that vulnerability was common for both 
sexes/genders though in different ways in different situations. 
In a similar vein, it was readily recognized by both genders of trainees and IT’s alike that 
any particular group will contain Marines with a wide array of competencies in the physical, 
mental, and character disciplines.  In some drills some male Marines turned out to be 
demonstrably weaker, physically, than the female Marines.  Yet the males did not jeer the 
weaker Marines based on their lack of performance relative to the women.  It seems to me that 
this outcome rested on a notion we encountered in the last chapter: the expectation is not some 
idealistic absolutely perfect achievement, but rather one hundred percent effort.  Moreover that 
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effort realistically is relative to the capabilities of the individual.  This was the basis for me being 
used as a positive example to the “real” Marines.  My age and lack of equivalent physical 
conditioning meant I was incapable of higher absolute output, but I did achieve one hundred 
percent output relative to my capabilities.  In the drill called the Bear Pit that I introduced in 
chapter 6 (video in Appendix A), the female trainee took a basic lesson of the MAIT course—
never go “strength on strength” with an opponent no matter how well rested or strong you are—
and applied it when fighting against two male Marines.  She let the two male Marines fight it out 
and then attacked and won against the weakened winner of that fight.  As a consequence, the 
variability in performance among men, relative to other men and to women, presents a serious 
obstacle to any attempt at claiming a super-ordinate position based on putative “necessary 
entailments” from the fact of difference in biological structure. 
This strong combination of an organizational ethic and demand to live the category of 
“Marine” as distinct from any other identity-political category, however ironically expressed by 
Master Gunnery Sergeant Franklin, as well as the constant exposure to common vulnerability, 
and finally the regular vicissitudes of embodied performance conspire to undermine the 
assumption of an aura of authority not only of men over women, but of men over men.  Looking 
back on my time with the Marines, offering a subordinating critique of women would have been 
strange because it would have been beside the point of any of the relevant experiences and 
lessons of the MAIT course.  This idea is illustrated by comments about the female second 
lieutenants in my training class offered by the class’s lead IT, Gunnery Sergeant Friend.  
 
The women lieutenants in the class are real good, they’re picking our brains all 
the time about how to command their Marines, not what their Marines want, well, 
a little of what they want.  Good lieutenants know that there’s a big difference 
between what officers do and what I [meaning non-commissioned officers] do.  
Lieutenants command Marines, we [non-commissioned officers] lead Marines.  
What’s a lieutenant gonna do if a Marine doesn’t want to do something?  Put’em 
in detention?  No.  Write’em up?  No.  They don’t have nuthin’ and if they run 
and tell the captain, who are they gonna back?  A lieutenant with one year or a 
Gunny with twelve years?  But the female lieutenants are good.  I told [one of the 
female lieutenants] that she has three problems in the Marine Corps.  First, she’s a 
woman; second, she’s a young lieutenant; and third, she’s a good looking woman, 
and in our culture, in our society [Gunny Friend put a serious, knowing look on 
his face] there’ll be males, guys, who come after her, hit on her, younger guys, 
older guys, guys who should and do know better will do it. [Fieldnotes, June 27, 
2007]. 
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In the way Gunnery Sergeant Friend seems to have meant these comments, he conveys the 
notion that women carry an additional burden as young commanders of Marines: being a woman.  
They also bear an additional burden if they are physically attractive. 
Some (not all) Marines can and will fail to enact their obligations to her rank as an 
officer, basing their choice to enact subordinating discourses perhaps on features of Western 
gender relationships that Rosaldo writes about.  I suspect that the belief in the structuring of 
human social relationships as deterministically based on evolved biological bonds between male 
and female must go some way toward enabling the kind of arrogance and self-indulgence that 
constitutes the meaning of a denial of respect for a female lieutenant.  If this suspicion is borne 
out, it would go some way toward exposing, as Rosaldo sought, the sources of those instances of 
female subordination.  But, and this is a key qualifier, this occurs not because of a universal 
necessary entailment, but because the offending Marine decides not to honor his commitment to 
the ethic of being a good Marine.  My point is that this situation, and GySgt. Friend’s 
identification of the problems facing the female lieutenant can only occur against a narrative 
within the Marine Corps that proscribes exactly that kind of action by men (and, conceivably, 
other women). 
Again, this does not meant that there are not situations in which women are treated as 
subordinate based on their gender that ought to be rejected by the military generally based on the 
principle of equality of genders presented by Marine leaders, especially if that principle is to 
apply to the embodied activities that define the purpose of the Marine Corps: warfighting and 
training to be warfighters.  This is not, however, a situation without serious challenges.  At the 
2009 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Karin K. De Angelis, a discussant 
on a panel for “Gender Issues in the Force” spoke about her research with graduates of the U.S. 
Air Force Academy and their perceptions of the Academy’s agenda for changing problematic 
attitudes among cadets and Air Force personnel generally.  She noted that operational 
effectiveness, the military standard for measuring the fitness of individuals, equipment, and 
systems for achieving military goals, was one way to assess who gets to occupy a Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS), like a “bomber pilot” or “bulk fueler” or “radio technician.”  
While seemingly gender neutral in the sense that both men and women can become Air Force 
officers, De Angelis stated that this standard, “fails to touch on the alarming levels of rape and 
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assault on women” (Fieldnotes, October 23, 2009).  As a result, she argued, “Women don’t 
report rape or attempted rape because it might harm the effort to keep them in the military,” and 
the discussant adopted the role of a hypothetical male saying, “See, you’re more vulnerable, you 
shouldn’t be in the military” (Fieldnotes, October 23, 2009).  According to the discussant, 
women in the Air Force Academy specifically and the U.S. military generally face this moral 
dilemma since the military is constantly testing allegiance to its values as a way to highlight and 
promote those values.  Women are challenged by the organization to constantly demonstrate 
their allegiance by “not rocking the boat” (Fieldnotes, October 23, 2009).  The clear implication 
is that the general structure and value system of the military prohibits women from challenging 
those instances where they have been wronged or violated.  The women, then, were seen as equal 
to men as Air Force officers on the one hand and on the other hand seen as “dating material” 
(Fieldnotes, October 23, 2009).  In terms of actual behavior, De Angelis reported that in common 
meetings, both sexes claim women are equal, but in private, women say the men don’t listen to 
them when they speak [in classroom environments]. 
What I take from this comment is that the neutralization of gender discourses in the 
generation of (non)gendered military identity may in some cases provide opportunity for women 
and at other times hide serious faults in organizational values guiding gender relationships.  To 
the extent that organizational leaders mistake traditional masculine discourses as identical to the 
values of the organization, they promote a contradictory vision of women.  In the case of the 
Marines, the vision would be simultaneously “Marine” and “date.”  Similarly, to the extent that 
organizational leaders mistake the military endeavor as one that prohibits organizational self-
criticism, they promote an idealism that is antithetical to the critical realism that has made 
Western militaries so effective on the conventional battlefield.  For example, should a Marine not 
be wearing his cover (hat) as regulations require, any and all Marines are required to bring the 
problem to the attention of the offending Marine regardless of rank.  Captain Teresa Ovalle of 
the Marine Corps Public Relations Office explained this to me and recounted her own experience 
as a lieutenant correcting a male Marine Colonel.  I had a similar experience.  I walked into 
Raider Hall, the building that houses the MACE on my first day of my own training while 
wearing my cover.  According to regulations, covers are not worn indoors except in special 
circumstances.  The first words out of Gunnery Sergeant Friend’s stern mouth were not, “Hello,” 
or “Welcome,” but “Take off your cover.” 
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We encountered a corollary of this principle in the comments of Master Sergeant James 
Coleman in Chapter 5.  In talking about the Marine preference for killing the enemy at a distance 
he noted that he was open to suggestions on how to attack a position from his subordinates.  
Together, both principles, one oriented toward Marine decorum and the other oriented to actual 
combat, suggest a unified organizational commitment to critical self-reflection.  So, while I have 
suggested that it is both difficult and contrary to traditional Western and American thinking, 
gender-neutrality in terms of training for warfare and in fighting is possible with strong 
organizational leadership that assumes a professional, not a masculine or patriarchal, value 
system.  Critical self-reflection would appear to be the strong basis on which such efforts are 
already under way.  Master Gunnery Sergeant Franklin’s (albeit clunky) comments illustrate this 
point.  Such critical realism has permitted us to see that men too face challenges that bring their 
masculinity and status as members of the group into question.  In the mutual acceptance of 
shared embodied challenge and vulnerability for common value is perhaps the basis for gender 
equality. 
I think that an aura of professionalism, not an aura of authority, permeated the MAIT 
course.  As such, the ethics of being an ethical warrior and so focus on being a good Marine 
remained at the forefront of the minds of the trainees.  To be insubordinate to, or to subordinate, 
any of the female Marines based simply on her gender would have been recognized as cheap and 
self-serving, a way of excusing one’s own lack of performance.  Given the substantive 
commitment to selflessness at the heart of being a U.S. Marine and a (potential) combat 
infantryman, it would generate a multi-layered betrayal of what it means to be a Marine.  
Similarly, I would argue, at the Air Force Academy, assuming De Angelis has it right.  The point 
is that the leadership, intentionally or not, was permitting a mistaken value orientation—“not 
rocking the boat”—based on a commitment not to critical realism but to idealism.  This enables 
if not promotes the self-indulgent treatment of women as ancillary or irrelevant.  Even if this was 
an informal organization value of course, leaders in the military, in the best American fashion, 
are still accountable. 
Now, to be perfectly clear, it is not that disregard of the realities of training and combat in 
terms of common vulnerability and variable performance is not possible or that any particular 
Marine is not capable of holding to contradictory ethical tenets simultaneously.  We have seen 
over and over again that dismissing reality in favor of an ideological position and holding 
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contradictory positions simultaneously are both possible, and in some cases, preferred, by the 
proponent.  Moreover I am not denying that there should be some level of righteous anger over 
the additional burdens women bear while laboring under a scientifically implausible and so 
morally illegitimate ground for assessing their status (the bio-reductive framework, if my 
suspicion is borne out).   Rather, my point is that, ethnographically speaking, I never heard or 
saw evidence of either subordination of any of the females in my training class or 
insubordination toward females of higher rank.  There appears to be no reason to think that the 
Marines were either overtly or covertly establishing an aura of authority or subordinating women 
during the vocal and embodied practice of their way of being, even as they recognized and 
marked biological difference between the sexes.  A reason can be fabricated, of course, in spite 
of what we have learned both about theories of human social action and about the realities of 
being a Marine if one assumes an otherwise illegitimate ideological position on the matter, such 
as choosing to employ a classical Freudian framework that licenses interpretive authoritarianism,  
In fact, if we use a logic-based approach to the ethnographic situation we come to what 
might be a surprising definition of masculinity: if being masculine is identical with being a 
Marine and being a Marine (combat infantryman) is identical with being selfless, then being 
masculine as a Marine is being selfless.  Discourses connecting masculinity and prescribed and 
prohibited actions were cited, in this sense as a means to accomplishing the end of being a good 
Marine defined as a selfless warrior-protector.  Whether or not this is constitutes the installation 
of a form of patriarchy requires additional analysis for which I lack space. 
While Rosaldo’s dichotomy as a universal framework for assessing human action, 
specifically the relative status of men and women, is a provocative hypothesis against which to 
measure ethnographic reality, it illuminates its own limitations and fundamental flaws when 
applied to the detail of Marine MAIT training.  This training should be one of the most powerful 
ethnographic examples of the truth of Rosaldo’s claim, but it has turned out not to be so.  Both 
intra- and inter-gender relationships are defined by an ethic of selflessness that, barring 
individual commitments to implausible and ideological frameworks, permits the Marine Corps as 
an organization to promote a vision of gender relationships as equal under the category 
“Marine.”  Women, in fact, can be and are positive exemplars of valued activity.  We would 
expect this valuing of women’s activity to be present in the ethnographic record given Master 
Gunnery Sergeant Franklin’s presentation, however ironically expressed: there is no necessary 
 259 
entailment between biological fact and interpretation of, or valuing of, either men’s super 
ordination or women’s subordination.  In Dr. Lugo’s presentation of Rosaldo’s work the point is 
that men must participate in effecting positive change by entering the domestic sphere, thereby 
undermining their ability to create an aura of authority.  In the case of the U.S. Marines, 
however, men can and do choose to modify their aura of authority and risk being out-performed 
physically, mentally, and in character by women, in the public sphere. 
If masculinity is thought to be “behind” the Marine Corps’ ethic for being an ethical 
warrior then, it will have to be shown exactly how it assumes a primary and defining role when, 
as it is employed in the generation of Marine identity, it questions and undoes itself as it is 
enacted.  Since I did not set out explicitly to examine gender relationships, further research 
would be required to fully examine questions that have occurred to me since my fieldwork.  
Questions about gender relationships that might fruitfully be explored include whether or not 
male Marines deploy a responsibility-alleviating deterministic discourse in enacting 
subordinating or insubordinate actions, and, whether or not female Marines see their burdens as 
in any way unique to their gender or as simply another of the many kinds of challenge that 
Marines face. 
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Figure 11: U.S. Marine tattoo showing torn-open skin revealing Marine digital camouflage underneath.
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1 The import and power of the military chain of command is expressed in Canadian Forces Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire’s 
(2003) account of Belgian peacekeepers who were being ordered to leave Rwanda as the mass killing there increased.  “When I 
announced the imminent withdrawal of the Belgians, the Belgian staff officers felt embarrassed, betrayed and angry.  They had 
been with me since November, and now that things were desperate they would be ordered to abandon Rwanda to its fate.  The 
military ethos of loyalty to the chain of command was sorely tested that morning” (2003: 296).  In being ordered to leave Rwanda 
at a moment of crisis, the purpose and identity of the officers—as military officers and peacekeepers—was rejected by the 
organization that trained them to have that purpose and identity and to give their lives for either or both.  Contextually, Dallaire 
makes it clear that the officers realized that unarmed people would be slaughtered without their presence and protection.  It 
wasn’t simply their purpose and identities that were at stake, but the lives of many Rwandans.  This adds a further layer of 
meaning to the sense of betrayal, and puts the officers in an impossible moral situation where they would have to suffer one of 
two moral deaths.  Either obey orders and leave people they were there to protect to die or disobey orders and betray their loyalty 
to their chain of command. 
2 Here is an example of a citation.  It is for U.S. Marine Private Alvin La Pointe who won the U.S. Navy Cross. 
 
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 
Washington 
 
The President of the United States, takes pride in presenting the NAVY CROSS to:  
 
PRIVATE ALVIN S. LA POINTE 
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 
 
for service as set forth in the following: 
 
CITATION: 
For extraordinary heroism while serving as a rifleman with Company C, First Battalion, Seventh Marines in Quang Ngai 
Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 28 March 1966. While engaged in a search and destroy operation against communist 
insurgent forces. Private La Pointe's platoon came under an intense volume of well aimed automatic weapons fire. While engaged 
in vicious hand-to-hand combat, Private La Pointe observed an enemy anitaircraft weapon raking his squad with a murderous 
volume of accurate fire. Facing almost certain death, he heroically crawled across the fire swept slope toward the enemy bunker 
armed only with his bayonet and hand grenades. Within ten feet of the emplacement, he fearlessly and agressively leaped into the 
position and, landing astride the gun, stabbed and killed the gunner. Seeing his comrade killed, the second Viet Cong fled into a 
tunnel within the position. Courageous and oblivious to the immenent danger, Private La Pointe unhesitatingly followed and 
killed him. Through his extraordinary initiative and inspiring valor in the face of almost certain death, he saved his comrades 
from injury and possible loss of life and enabled the platoon to seize and hold the vital enemy position. By his personal bravery, 
indomitable fighting spirit and devotion to duty, Private La Pointe reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and 
upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.  
 
For the President, 
Secretary of the Navy  
3 Thirty years ago sociologists of science Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979) alerted the social scientific community to the 
notion of defined ways of presenting important data about valued work within a sub-culture that omits what social scientists 
might otherwise consider critical detail.  Natural scientific papers often excise a great deal of information about the actual 
conduct of experiments as performed by scientists.  While I disagree fundamentally with Latour and Woolgar’s conclusions about 
what this means for the construction of scientific facts, I see a similar attempt to concisely illustrate what is real and what is really 
important for the military in its citations for bravery.  In both cases what social scientists take to be important if not critical 
information about the actual practices of the people they are studying is omitted.  I hasten to add, however, that this does not 
mean that the social scientists are either a) right, or, b) have in fact identified data that radically challenges the (self) perception of 
the people they are studying. 
In the case of military award citations exclusion of detail is a way of bringing into bold relief the embodied actions of a 
combatant and the values expressed by them. 
4 “Oo-rah” is a vocalization among Marines that signifies assent or agreement with a statement, action, or event.  The U.S. 
Army’s vocalization for assent or agreement is “Hoo-ah.”  The tone and volume of the vocalization is important in conveying the 
speaker’s meaning.  A very loud “oo-rah” signals strong agreement. 
5 We can detect an anticipatory tension here should a biological basis for women’s subordination be proposed: are only men 
“built” to subordinate women?  If so, where, exactly, in their biology should we locate the presumably evolved source of their 
behavioral differentiation from women?  What happens when we find, as we should expect to given the variability of the 
ethnographic record, women subordinating women, or women subordinating men?  These concerns are, of course, symptomatic 
of the implausibility of the bio-reductive framework.   
6 There were no women in the summer of 2008 MAIT course in which I was a guest IT. 
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7 I want to note that I am setting aside the issue of rank differences within the training class in considering inter-gender 
relationships.  The women second lieutenants were required by formal rules in the military generally that prohibit close 
“fraternization” between officers and other ranks like non-commissioned officers and privates.  They were required to maintain a 
certain social distance between themselves and their squad mates who were not only men but predominantly non-commissioned 
officers even as the training was expected to generate solidarity amongst squad mates.  More research is required for full 
consideration the dynamics of this situation, but I want to suggest, speculatively, that the women lieutenants’ ability to manage 
this tricky ground takes a similar form to the men’s management of inter-gender relationships given the women’s presence.  
Consideration of the latter will emerge in the pages below. 
8 From: http://www.checkoutmyink.com/tattoos/devildog2092/digital-cami-skin-tear 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Courage and Fear 
 
If courage on the battlefield in an abstract and penultimate sense is expressed in 
“engaging and dominating the enemy,” then fear can be a primary obstacle to that embodied 
achievement.  The Marine Corps, on its website, claims that “Courage is not the absence of fear. 
It is the ability to face fear and overcome it.  It is the mental, moral, and physical strength 
ingrained in every Marine. It steadies them in times of stress, carries them through every 
challenge and aids them in facing new and unknown confrontations.”
1
  Fear can be both positive 
and negative from the standpoint of a combat infantryman.  For example, in one training exercise 
we were wading and slipping along a rock-filled riverbed in thigh-deep water carrying about 100 
pounds of gear.  We had been moving and conducting competitive drills for about four hours 
when Gunnery Sergeant Blanchard, my training squad leader, asked me how I was doing.  I said 
that my back was killing me.  He smiled and said, “Complacency is what kills Marines.  You 
start hurting and you’re concentrating on hurting and you try to think about something else and 
you get complacent” (Fieldnotes, July 25, 2007).  Fear, in this situation, can be positive.  It can 
help keep a Marine focused not on his or her pain, but on the riverbank where a hidden enemy 
might lurk. 
Conversely, fear can be negative, an obstacle to action.  In a preparatory briefing, IT Staff 
Sergeant Sudbrock told the training class about the physical effects of getting sprayed with OC 
(Onion-Cinnamon chemical irritant or “pepper spray”), “Your eyes slam shut, burning sensation 
ensues, involuntary movement of hands to the face, tightness in the chest, mucus secretion” 
(Fieldnotes June 11, 2007).   He also told us about the psychological effects, “There is anxiety, 
fear, possibly a panic attack where people flee without thought for obstacles,” and here SSgt. 
Sudbrock showed us a short video of a Marine getting sprayed with OC and running straight into 
a wall.  In this case, the fear of what the OC feels like it is doing to your eyes (not what it is 
actually doing to your eyes) coupled with an inability to disconnect the irritant and one’s eyes 
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invites the Marine to focus almost completely on the experience of the burning pain.  This is the 
kind of response to fear that Marine training considers not only inappropriate but also 
unnecessary. 
I listened carefully to SSgt. Sudbrock’s insight when he said to “get rage, get pumped up, 
stay focused and drive hard…[experiencing the spray] is a way to test the mental attitude, 
teamwork.  You may want to drop to the ground in[to] the fetal position in front of thirty-two 
other Marines, but you don’t because they’re there” (Fieldnotes, June 11, 2007).  In my own 
case, my fear of potential embarrassment in front of the entire Marine training class helped me to 
focus on executing the drills that were required after being sprayed with OC.  While I’m not sure 
this is properly thought of as “teamwork,” although it may be the work of community 
expectation, the mere presence of the other Marines watching my decisions about how to act 
after being sprayed constituted a risk to my moral standing with them.  I did not want them to 
think I was selfish, that I could think only of my own pain and discomfort and not the execution 
of the assigned drills.  The implication is that in combat I would not think about them and their 
safety but my own discomfort or pain.  This is a form of betrayal. 
This presents another way in which “thinking” is inherently embodied and irreducibly 
tied to combat: knowing, not knowing, suspecting, and assessing risk.  In other words combat 
infantry exercise dynamically embodied agency in situations of fundamental value conflict, such 
as, “should I concentrate on the fact that my eyes feel like they’re melting or execute the drill of 
disarming a pistol-wielding enemy who threatens the lives of my fellow Marines.”
2
  That 
exercise of agency itself generates risk even as it is designed to manage risk.  The risk is of moral 
and physical death or damage to oneself or to others.  Since human agency is open to the 
spontaneous redirection of the person, and situations are themselves dynamic, especially when 
they include armed enemies, the outcomes are uncertain.  Combat infantry, intuitively or 
rationally, know that other soldiers have “frozen” as did Sergeant Desamours, and that 
knowledge is an invitation to question one’s own anticipated actions.  Suspecting the possibility 
of a confrontation with the enemy in a situation of inherent value conflict that requires near 
instantaneous resolution (e.g., the experiences of Sergeant Stevens and Staff Sergeant Bellavia) 
is an invitation to question one’s ability to “make the right decision.”  Not knowing where or 
who the enemy is can lead one to doubt one’s ability to decide in an instant whether or not to pull 
the trigger.  Knowledge, lack of knowledge, and suspicion of risk are all invitations to fear.  Fear 
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represents the (wrong) focus in combat.  It is a focus on oneself and potentially negative 
outcomes for oneself and for others.  Considering this discussion I propose we amend the 
definition of courage offered on the Marine Corps website.  Fear is not only an obstacle to 
overcome, it is potentially an aid to staying alive and is itself another risk factor to be managed 
by combat infantry.  The phrasing might read, “Courage is not the absence of fear. It is the 
ability to face fear, overcome it, and either ignore it or use it as the situation requires.” 
 
Some Insights into Studying Human Social Action 
 
I structure my remarks in this section in the form of a critical response to comments made 
about my proposed study.  These comments provide a good example of misunderstanding the 
capabilities of human beings as organisms and as persons.  This needs to be resolved before it is 
possible to appreciate the simultaneously visible and invisible relationship between a) 
dynamically embodied human movement and b) courageous action as a socio-cultural value.  
The reviewer wrote, 
 
I'm not sure the author will be in a circumstance to observe courage.  Much of his 
research methods rely on recording the movements of soldiers in fine detail. What 
are the chances of observing courageous movement in a training class? Under 
controlled conditions I would assume courageous events to be few and far 
between. 
 
It also seems unlikely that the author will be able to accurately record the types of 
subtle movements that seem so crucial to this approach. He proposes to use 
Labanotation (a way of recording body movements as a grammar). As an 
example, on page 6 he talks about the tilt of the hand and the rigidity of the palm 
and fingers [in a military salute]. Will all observations of movement be to this 
level of detail? I question his ability to act as an instructor and record these 
movements at the same time. 
 
I will identify three main conceptual failures in these comments as a way of highlighting key 
findings in this study.  The confusion that attends such misunderstanding emulates what we 
found in trying to understand the basis for the powerful American image of courageous action on 
the battlefield.  I suggest that the power of this image emerges from the purposeful and selfless 
exercise of personal agency in situations of fundamental ambiguity that carry the threat of moral 
and physical death.  Moreover, as an exercise of personal agency, the action of combat infantry 
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fundamentally contradicts the American (and Western) cultural fascination with bio-reductive 
theories that consider human behavior to be determined by internal or external forces.  As a 
result the enactment of personal agency is viewed as somehow unnatural for it also contradicts 
the correlative bio-reductive thesis that selfishness (self-interest as against other/group-interest) 
is instinctive and so natural and automatic.  In the bio-reductive way of looking at it, the action 
of combat infantry described above seems impossible. 
The reviewer’s concerns convey a similar kind of doubt.  They describe an inability to 
imagine the researcher possessing the requisite perceptual capabilities, but on what basis?  While 
the pronouncements are ex cathedra and stem, apparently, from the reviewer’s “common sense,” 
they are actually conceptual.  Aside from my specialized training in the anthropology of human 
movement systems, plus the perceptual and conceptual skills afforded by my becoming literate in 
a movement script such as Labanotation, that human beings are capable of detecting “subtle 
movements” is not extraordinary.  In everyday situations like driving a car, for example, ordinary 
people make split-second decisions based on identification of small details, like a “glint” off the 
windshield of an approaching vehicle.  In the military arena, likewise, soldiers decide to kill or 
not to kill, spontaneously, depending on a perceived “look” in the eyes of a potential opponent.  
In both cases, while seeing a “glint” or a “look” is made possible by the biophysical capabilities 
of the human eye and nervous system, the ability to perceive them as such and therefore 
understand what they mean is a conceptual issue. 
The reviewer characterizes the training environment as “controlled” in order to ground a 
rejection of the possibility of anyone observing courageous action.  In the scientific sense (which 
the reviewer appears to convey by using the term), however, controlled environments are created 
in order to promote observation of details.  So, are we to conclude that the researcher lacks the 
capacity to detect subtle detail in a controlled environment that itself promotes the observation of 
subtle detail?  This is not just sloppy thinking.  It represents a failure of imagination that is 
theoretically relevant.  The reviewer’s assumption that controlled conditions cannot produce 
courageous action suggests that behind this lies the notion that fighting has to do with instincts.  
Key here is the belief that the conditions, not the actions of the persons, are the proper focus of 
the researcher’s interest.  My suspicion is that the reviewer believes that the expected behavior 
cannot be elicited without the appropriate triggering conditions!  This is a classic behaviorist 
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construction of human social action that I have analyzed and rejected in this study as 
scientifically implausible and morally indefensible. 
In sharp theoretical contrast I have confirmed and affirmed ethnographically that people 
can perceive that something is going on at different levels of detail in or out of controlled 
environments.  Refining that perception and generating a workable understanding of what is 
going on, moreover, is a social matter of negotiating and using concepts that are available to the 
observer, such as what kind of movement and organization of soldiers constitutes a military 
patrol or that an airplane can land on a river.  The reviewer’s related doubt about the researcher’s 
capacity to instruct and record movements simultaneously (if not on paper then in mind) is flatly 
contradicted by the success of just about any physical training program like that at the U.S. 
Marine Corps Martial Arts Center of Excellence.  The Martial Arts Instructor Trainers routinely 
instruct and ‘record’ subtle movements of trainees in the sense of ‘registering’ action in great 
detail in order to correct the embodied techniques of trainees.  While these observations are not 
recorded on paper in the moment, they are used later for diagramming action in, for example, 
training manuals.
3
  In fact, this capability provides the basis for any substance that is contained in 
the Marine mantra, “train like you fight, fight like you train.”  The reviewer’s doubts in both 
cases, then, emerge from the twin failures to understand a) the biophysical perceptual capabilities 
of homo sapiens sapiens and b) the necessary and critical role that a conceptual framework plays 
in directing perception. 
The ability to detect “subtle movements” that express socio-cultural values, which the 
reviewer apparently takes for granted, is made possible through conceptual resources, in the form 
of cultural conventions that underwrite the semiotic capabilities of persons in their local socio-
cultural realm.  This is a matter of the neuro-physiological agency of human beings and the 
socio-cultural (linguistic) agency of persons.  We saw in chapter 2 that a critical realist, 
scientifically based conception of causal powers in the natural world provides a theoretical 
framework for the ontological freedom of humans in that natural world.
4
  A critical realist, 
linguistically based conception of vocal and embodied powers in the social world provides a 
theoretical framework for the conceptually-based political freedom of persons in socio-cultural 
worlds.  This realist approach yields the clarifying distinction in forms of talk, namely, talk about 
the body (objectivist), talk of the body (subjectivist), and talk from the body (semasiological) 
(see Farnell 1994).  It is ‘talk from the body,’ a concept traditionally absent from anthropological 
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discourse that has enabled this serious examination of dynamically embodied human movement 
as the primary modality in, and through which, “courageous action” is expressed on the 
battlefield for American (and Western) combatants.  Ethnographically, analysis of the expression 
of values in and through movement has to do with understanding the cultural conventions 
assigned to them by the local community, the intentions of the actor, and the local context of the 
action.  The better the researcher commands knowledge of each of these areas, the more subtle 
his or her perception of important (i.e., constituent) movements and his or her conception of the 
meaning of that movement.  My goal in this study has been to detect such subtlety in the pursuit 
of clarity of meaning, and, if clarity is impossible in principle, as in, for example, the values to 
be expressed or denied in hand-to-hand combat, then the identification of fundamental ambiguity 
is itself clarifying. 
In short, the semasiological principle that respects human agency in both its ontological 
and socio-cultural formulations connects human movement with meaning.  This principle is 
necessary for realizing that the ability to detect subtlety in an actor’s dynamically embodied 
expression is actually made possible when the researcher is competent in the actor’s movement 
system and practices.  Increasing competence in the movement system increases the researcher’s 
ability to detect subtlety as well.  This situation is analogous to vocal expression.  Detecting 
subtle variations in spoken expression and so subtle variation in meaning using the ear (versus 
the eye and kinesthetic sense in moved expression) depends on the recognition that people 
normally ‘mean’ when speaking.  To detect the subtlest variations depends on increasing 
pragmatic knowledge in the language.  Likewise, in adopting a conceptual framework that 
defines people as dynamically embodied semioticians, the researcher increasingly develops the 
ability to detect not simply gross movements, but to discern which details count as 
ethnographically important to the actor generating meaning. 
I submit that this study has provided a correction to deleterious consequences of a 
traditional objectivist approach to the body in anthropology, which is exemplified by the 
reviewer’s comments in two particular ways.  First, without critical realism’s appreciation of the 
relationship between perception and conception underwritten by a plausible causal powers theory 
and ontology of human beings and human persons, the reviewer has no way to account for 
agentic human social interaction.  As such, the reviewer assumes that participant-observation 
occurs without any social interaction between the researcher and his informants.  This means that 
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the reviewer cannot imagine the possibility of informants teaching the researcher what 
movements to look for and why, thus providing a means to learn to detect those subtle 
movements that are relevant as constituent elements of action-signs. 
A second and more telling corollary is the reviewer’s assumption that participant-
observation occurs without the kind of participation that requires the researcher to monitor his 
own actions—his own body—against the model offered by his informants, thereby alerting him 
to small and large details in his attempt to master the performance.  As MACE IT Staff Sergeant 
Sudbrock said to me on my first day of training, “The best way to observe is to participate” 
(Fieldnotes, June 11, 2007).  Embodied being is a sine qua non for participant-observation (see 
Jackson 1989: 135). 
Without a plausible, grounded theory of human social action in hand, the reviewer is left 
with a severely circumscribed objectivism with which to assess any semasiological study of 
human movement.  That objectivism provides absolutely no means by which the researcher can 
conceive of his or her active role in participant-observation.  The final consequence is that the 
researcher has no principled way of checking whether or not his or her interpretations faithfully 
represent informants’ semiotic practices.  In sum, frameworks like the reviewer’s that lack a 
robust, plausible theory of human social action probably misrepresent informants and their 
meaning because the source of human agency is mislocated in some supernatural or imaginary 
power.  The consequences range from superficiality to incomprehensibility. 
Insofar as the reviewer above is representative, the U.S. Marine Corps far outstrips much 
of the professional social scientific community in its appreciation of human social action.  They 
embody, I think, Paul Tillich’s insight that “Courage is an ethical reality, but it is rooted in the 
whole breadth of human existence and ultimately in the structure of being itself.  It must be 
considered ontologically in order to be understood ethically” (1952: 1).  We saw that human 
beings as persons are executive; they direct their power to do things in the world through 
language in both vocal and embodied forms.  These are best conceived as linguistic signs and 
action-signs, culturally convened meanings of vocal and kinetic embodied actions.  Not running 
away from insurgents in Iraq, for example, means the same thing as vocalizing the sentence, 
“I’m staying here.”  Fighting insurgents in Iraq means the same thing as vocalizing the sentence, 
“(In staying here) I’m going to kill or incapacitate you, or die trying.” 
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We saw that the risk to life and moral standing involved in these situations is found in a 
domesticated form in training.  Upon informing Lieutenant Colonel Shusko of the reviewer’s 
assumption that courageous events were few and far between in training, he looked incredulous 
and shook his head from side-to-side adding a comment about “100-pound heads.”  The 
reference is to imaginary persons who are all head, all thinking, and no body, no acting.  The 
implication is that such disengagement with fully embodied action cripples their ability to fully 
appreciate reality.  The Marines know courage when they see it.  They may not acknowledge it 
as such (by using disclaimers such as, “I was just doing my job,” or “I was doing what any other 
Marine would do for me”) or they may not understand why they see it or they recognize that they 
contradict their own descriptions of it when they try to explain it “(i.e., [insofar as fighting and 
courage are nearly identical] it’s in our DNA”). 
 
Some Insights into Courage 
 
The issues facing Marines in understanding their core value “courage,” and our attempt to 
understand it and them in relation to it, find their roots in the foundations of the Western cultural 
tradition.  Tillich (1952) formulates this concisely. 
 
In the course of [Plato’s dialogue Laches] several preliminary definitions [of 
courage] are rejected.  Then Nikias, the well-known general, tries again.  As a 
military leader he should know what courage is and he should be able to define it.  
But his definition, like the others, proves to be inadequate.  If courage as he 
asserts, is the knowledge of “what is to be dreaded and what dared,” then the 
question tends to become universal, for in order to answer it one must have “a 
knowledge concerning all goods and evils under all circumstances.” But this 
definition contradicts the previous statement that courage is only a part of virtue.  
“Thus,” Socrates concludes, “we have failed to discover what courage really is.”  
And this failure is quite serious within the frame of Socratic thinking.  According 
to Socrates virtue is knowledge, and ignorance about what courage is makes any 
action in accordance with the true nature of courage impossible.  But this Socratic 
failure is more important than most of the seemingly successful definitions of 
courage (even those of Plato himself and Aristotle). For the failure to find a 
definition of courage as a virtue among other virtues reveals a basic problem of 
human existence.  It shows than an understanding of courage presupposes an 
understanding of man and of his world, its structures and values.  Only he who 
knows this knows what to affirm and what to negate. [Tillich 1952: 1] 
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In this study we found that courage can be defined as risking one’s physical and moral existence 
in dangerous contexts.  Ascribing courage to action is a judgment on the part of the viewer and 
so indicates that values and conceptual frameworks are being employed.  As such, which values 
and frameworks are employed in making judgments are critical to the outcome of the judgment.   
 Courage, we have determined, is not a thing or quantity of a person.  It is neither a part of 
a Marine’s “make-up” nor a quality of the mind.  Instead, courage is a social event, constituted in 
and by ways of moving in pursuit of prized values ranging from protecting the lives of Iraqis to 
advancing the security interests of the United States.  Coupled with the definition of courage 
offered above, we can conclude that there are different degrees, if not kinds, of courage, because 
different situations carry different kinds and degrees of risk.  Charging a combat-experienced 
enemy operating a machine gun is an entirely different risk level than lying in a deep bunker 
while light mortar shells rain down.  Knowing where the enemy is before acting in his presence 
is quite different from not knowing where the enemy is and nevertheless acting.  The term 
“courage” then is a kind of abstract placeholder whose content is linked necessarily to the 
concrete action event(s) that generate its ascription.  That concrete action can be analyzed 
productively using the idea that the smallest comprehensible movement, that is, the shortest 
“phrase” soldiers “speak” with their bodies while in combat, is value laden, intersubjective, and 
cultural.  In fact, it is at this level of the smallest comprehensible movement phrase that we 
located courage. 
 In this examination we encountered the provocative question whether or not “courage” is 
identical to “masculine” in order to offer some preliminary conclusions about the relationship(s) 
among men and women in the U.S. Marines.  Were women “equivalent” to men in the public 
activity of training for warfare?  Women are indeed equivalent to men in the sense of 
contributing genuine, embodied performances of prized Marine values.  In that the Marines’ 
primary modality for being a good Marine is embodied performance, whether that body is 
biologically male or female is irrelevant.  We saw this captured in the use of the term “Marine” 
to signify a category of being that was neither male nor female, nor, for that matter, black, white, 
brown or any other representative ethnic/racial color.  This conclusion was supported by the 
inherent risk in the requirement for constant and consistent public performance.  The 
construction of masculinity in this sense was found to be publicly self-subverting in the service 
of the larger cultural value and performative goal of self-sacrifice.  That goal is not gendered.  In 
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its concentration on action and performance of dynamically embodied values, Marine discourse 
uses gendered discourses about being a man or a woman as a means to actively promote a 
conception of organizational and cultural values that is gender-less.  This situation, perhaps, has 
its roots in the experience of combat.  Marine combat infantry choose to accept and actively 
pursue the potentially rule-less situation of combat, and especially hand-to-hand combat in 
pursuit of or in honor of the values for which they exist as Marines.  In doing so, whether man or 
woman, they bet their own lives that they can manage it. 
 We saw in this study that the Marine and combat infantry conception of courage not only 
posits and depends on a conception of agentic action, that is, dynamically embodied action, it 
also posits and depends on a conception of persons as intelligent and capable of self- and other-
directed learning.  The Marine approach to training demonstrates that intelligence is both 
abstract-conceptual and embodied-conceptual.  By the ‘abstract-conceptual’ I mean that learning 
to conceive of an Obstacle Course as a domesticated form of combat that presents some degree 
of risk or danger, as well as a task that faces the trainee with a difficult challenge to be overcome 
is an imaginative achievement toward which the trainees must work.  By the ‘conceptual-
embodied’ I mean that learning to enact a series of martial techniques in ways that challenge a 
trainee’s kinesthetic sense of proper directional movement of one’s body relative to impending 
physical or moral pain is a conceptual achievement. 
Intelligence and learning are directed toward becoming competent in the embodied idiom 
of Marine-style combat—aggressive, effective, efficient, forward-oriented, and professional.  
That competence is in the service of increasing the resources of Marines not only for fighting, 
but also as they are called upon to modify their usual role as shock infantry to include activities 
such as peacekeeping, crowd control, infrastructure building and maintenance, community and 
inter-cultural negotiations, and so forth.  In short, through training, Marines are learning in both 
abstract and embodied forms not only how to kill, but whether or not they should kill, and if so, 
why, when, and how.  This means that their abstract and embodied intelligence and learning are 
also directed toward developing personal judgment that uses principles and values ranging from 
“the value of life” to “the spectrum of force” to “hostile intent.”   
The Marines’ knowledge of courageous action is based on a keen sense of the reality of 
the agency of people in both its physical and socio-cultural forms.  This knowledge has not faded 
completely from the general American cultural milieu despite the powerful folk wisdom holding 
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the bio-reductive framework as the only and best explanatory resource for accounting for human 
behavior bequeathed to them by misguided social scientists (against, my guess is, a pseudo-
religious supernaturalism that offers accounts in terms that predate the scientific revolution).  
The dynamically embodied action by which they can “tell” if a Marine is being courageous is the 
mental and physical effort directed toward the achievement of prized goals, such as protecting 
the lives of those who should be protected, according to American cultural values, or sacrificing 
one’s life both physically and morally for that value.  Their training tacitly demonstrates their 
firm commitment to the enculturation of dynamically embodied movement as a value and for 
these values.  Training, we can say, would not be necessary, or even possible, if agency were not 
a fact. 
We also saw that the body is the primary resource for being a good Marine.  If necessary, 
it is to be sacrificed despite it being the means and the end of their value system.  We concluded 
on the basis of this examination that Marines referring to “DNA” or “instincts” or “genes” in 
locating the source of fighting and combat action had to be justifying, not explaining such 
actions.  More field research is necessary but we can hypothesize that such justification is a 
resource for Marines to engage with and kill others, a way, perhaps, of helping Marines generate 
the kind of focus and commitment to killing that is sought in the context of lethal warfare in 
order to ensure survival if not victory. 
One serious and fascinating issue regarding Marine focus and commitment that arose in 
this study had to do with moral obligation and moral ambiguity in hand-to-hand combat.  The 
lethal “all-or-nothing” quality of hand-to-hand combat may abrogate responsibility to, for 
example, the Uniform Code of Conduct and the Geneva Convention.  Yet, in the Marine ability 
to “flip the switch,” that is, to decide spontaneously to kill in one moment and to not kill in the 
next, we find no basis upon which to entertain the idea of a point beyond which human beings 
are incapable of amending their intended action.  The issue requires more research, but it may be 
that a combatant may not want to amend the intended action in order not to risk a change of heart 
on the part of a surrendering opponent.  Yet another possibility is that amending the intended 
action violates a cultural conception about the rightness of killing those who either seek to kill or 
who simply should die. 
An issue that appears to be related, and certainly supports the idea of the Marine Corps 
spending more time discussing a formulation of their moral code, is that of training Marines how 
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to live with killing and how to live with the fact that Marines die.  The inherent ambiguity of 
combat and the sometimes novel and unique moral contradictions faced by soldiers can be 
deeply disturbing.  Shooting while simultaneously not wanting to shoot a sixteen year old boy 
with an AK-47 assault rifle on the roof of a house in an Iraqi city has serious potential to cause 
severe psychological distress given a larger American, cultural allegiance to respect and preserve 
life.  Beyond the issue of moral ambiguity in combat, there seems to be a point in training for 
combat in which expectations for action cross over from being a difficult challenge to 
impossible.  This is the dividing line between realism and idealism.  In Marine training, we saw 
an expectation that Marines exert themselves toward accomplishing their mission until they 
come close to or actually achieve unconsciousness.  This is a domesticated form of a combat 
“last stand” and realism is present as a limit to what is expected.  Marines are not supposed to 
kill themselves in training for combat as a domesticated form of combat death. 
Conversely, a line seems to be crossed when an expectation is taken too far individually 
or by the organization, intentionally or not.  I had the honor of training for a few weeks in July of 
2007 with Staff Sergeant Travis Twiggs, a veteran of four combat tours in Iraq and one in 
Afghanistan.  SSgt. Twiggs’ commitment to the Marine Corps was, in my opinion, 
unquestionable.  He sported one of the tattoos illustrated in the last chapter showing Marine 
digital camouflage under his skin.  I learned over time that SSgt. Twiggs was suffering from 
severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  He was at the MACE training to be an IT.  The 
staff told me that Lieutenant Colonel Shusko “found him a home at the MACE as a way to keep 
him in the Corps” and perhaps allow him to work through his condition through training with 
fellow Marines.  He eventually related his story to me, which I will paraphrase since I did not 
think it appropriate to take notes. 
On his last tour, he lost two of the Marines under his leadership.  He wrote to the dead 
Marines’ families.  He led them to believe that their sons had died in combat.  His intention was 
to spare them additional emotional pain since they actually died from an explosion of some sort 
and their caskets were closed, meaning that it was not recommended that the family view the 
remains because of the extent of the damage.  Unbeknownst to SSgt. Twiggs, a Marine officer 
(inappropriately, apparently) related the true version of their deaths to the families.  Upon 
arriving back in the United States, he was questioned by the dead Marines’ families.  At this 
point in relating his story, SSgt. Twiggs had to fight to keep himself composed.  His face 
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contorted into a grimace.  Not only did he have to admit that he had misled them about how their 
sons died, he was obligated to admit to them that he had lost their sons; Marines who he had 
promised to bring home alive.  It was at this juncture that I grew puzzled: I had thought that the 
American military principle of “bringing everyone home” demonstrated the cultural commitment 
to the deep bond amongst and deep respect for combat infantry killed in combat (wonderfully 
portrayed in the HBO Films movie Taking Chance). 
I did not think that the principle of “bringing everyone home” meant that they all were to 
be brought home alive; realistically, after all, it is combat, and people die.  SSgt. Twiggs, 
however, concentrated on, and repeated to me whenever we talked about it, that he had failed in 
his duty to bring his Marines home, and that he had failed in his promise to his Marines’ families 
to bring them home.  He meant he had failed to bring them home alive.
5
  He doubted whether he 
had “done enough” as their leader.  He did not elaborate.  While I did not and have not learned 
the exact circumstances of the deaths of his Marines (which could be decisive in trying to 
understand the situation), SSgt. Twiggs positioned himself as an agent whose capabilities, 
perhaps, were out of line with reality.  It is not that he was not in some way responsible as a 
leader; rather, it is that in his discourse he implied that the standard for self-criticism was his 
sense of being responsible absolutely.  He appeared constantly to hold himself totally responsible 
for circumstances over which he appears not to have had absolute control.  His sense of ethical 
obligation, it appears, crossed into an impossible idealism that he worked hard to maintain, and 
so positioned, generated moral angst over an absolute failure.   
I saw him some days during training, sweating profusely, sitting, alone, after having 
exercised himself.  One day I asked him what he was doing.  He said he had just run through the 
Endurance Course and it was his habit to find an unwieldy, gnarly log to carry on his shoulders, 
but that he always thought that he should be carrying a heavier one, so he would find a bigger log 
and run with it.  In a realistic context, this would be a commendable demonstration of striving to 
grow stronger to be the best possible combatant and Marine.  In the context of his impossible 
idealism, it seemed to me that SSgt. Twiggs was exercising as a way to prove to himself, over 
and over again, that he was in control and that he was a good Marine.  Some of my fellow 
trainees and a few of the MACE staffers were concerned about him but no one had much of an 
idea about how to help, or if help was even possible. 
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My question became, “How does an experienced combat veteran well aware of the 
realities of combat, generate such an impossible expectation of himself and then work so hard to 
maintain it?”  Was this the “actual issue” or an issue that served as a placeholder for a host of 
issues?  Did the Marine Corps invite or promote the content of this kind of thinking in the 
politico-military concern for, for example, “force protection?” 
SSgt. Twiggs was “authoring” his self-talk when he identified himself as absolutely 
responsible for circumstances that are perhaps not entirely in anyone’s control.  Even if they are, 
it is impossible to think that such circumstances are controlled absolutely in war.  This is human 
and personal agency regarded ideally, not realistically.  This is not to blame SSgt. Twiggs’ for his 
condition (although some Marines did), but to locate the source of it: him, not his psychology or 
biology.  PTSD, at least as exemplified by SSgt. Twiggs’ case is a social and ethical matter of 
conscious self-talk, not a private and psychological matter of unconscious forces.  Here I want to 
draw a comparison with the outlook on hand-to-hand combat offered by the Sandones (see 
chapter 6).  SSgt. Twiggs apparently discounted the same situational physical, social, and moral 
ambiguity that the Sandones suggested was endemic to (hand-to-hand) combat and so alleviated 
responsibility for moral obligations for the enactment of cultural values.  For me, this more than 
anything points to his impossible idealism. 
Taken together, the ethnographic demonstration of combatants’ generally similar views 
of combat as a space of physical, social, and moral ambiguity that nevertheless results in 
radically different regard of that space in relation to ethical decision-making suggests that the 
U.S. military in general and the U.S. Marine Corps could usefully focus more training on this 
very topic.  As this study demonstrates, it is not a matter merely of medicating soldiers (although 
this may be necessary initially to create a space of different self-talk), it is a matter of teaching 
them how and why they can and should live with their actions.  Psychologizing the problem, as 
does Lieutenant Colonel Grossman in On Killing (1995, see chapter 2 for discussion), is a 
fundamental mistake since the problem is psychological because it is first social, not the reverse.  
Against a critical realist ontology of human being, Skinner’s behaviorism, which grounds 
Grossman’s approach represents fails to provide a scientifically plausible ontology of human 
being and so generates a mistaken framework for understanding human social action.  It would 
be a further mistake, then, to rely on the core of his work for any such project undertaken by the 
U.S. military or the Corps. 
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SSgt. Twiggs had been writing publicly about PTSD and his struggles with it.  He offered 
to talk to me further off the base, at his home.  He reported that his wife, Kellee, upon learning 
that I was an anthropologist who studied Americans (not Iraqis or Afghanis) said, “It’s about 
time we’re looking at ourselves” (Fieldnotes, July, 2007).  He invited me to a bar-b-que at his 
home, but the date came and went.  I tried contacting him twice immediately afterward but he 
did not return my calls.  He did not recall anything about the arrangement when I saw him later 
on base.  I had heard he was on medication for his condition, so I did not pursue the issue.  I did 
not see SSgt. Twigs after the MAIT course ended.  In May of 2008 he shot himself and his 
brother.  The existence of PTSD as a matter of one’s personal sense of ethical and social 
responsibility and in its potential consequences should, at the very least, add to our appreciation 
of what Western combat infantry risk in the name of prized cultural values. 
 
Some Insights into Views About Soldiers 
 
This study allows us to appreciate the intent and character of certain discourses about 
soldiers and their way of life.  For example, we can appreciate just how wrong and unjust the 
Nobel Prize-winning theoretical physicist Albert Einstein was when he wrote, 
 
This topic brings me to that worst outcrop of the herd nature, the military system, 
which I abhor.  That a man can take pleasure in marching in formation to the 
strains of a band is enough to make me despise him. He has only been given his 
big brain by mistake; a backbone was all he needed.  This plague-spot of 
civilization ought to be abolished with all possible speed.  Heroism by order, 
senseless violence, and all the pestilent nonsense that goes by the name of 
patriotism; how I hate them!  War seems to me a mean, contemptible thing: I 
would rather be hacked in pieces than take part in such an abominable business.  
[2006: 14]  
 
While it is one thing to denounce war as “a mean and contemptible thing,” it is another thing 
entirely to demean combat infantry in the service of making that point.   How does this happen?  
We can use the insights we generated in this study to find out.  On the one hand, soldiers are 
portrayed as if they were lower animals and so unintelligent, despite their species-differentiating 
nervous system that provides the real, material, and unique basis of human intelligence.  On the 
other, soldiers are held out as objects of contempt.  In acting as if they were lower animals and 
 278 
unintelligent, soldiers apparently fail to see what Einstein sees and so revel in martial activity 
instead of rejecting it with their entire being.  In failing to use their intelligence in the service of a 
critical outlook, Einstein has indicted soldiers as ideologues.  Apparently, if soldiers used their 
intelligence and judgment, they would conclude, as Einstein does, that the mean and 
contemptible thing that is war ought to be rejected even at the price of their own lives.  Certainly 
Einstein is principled in his stated commitment, but we have seen that soldiers are too. 
An ideological commitment to militarism is not what most soldiers engage in producing.  
As this study has sought to demonstrate, combat infantry generally are realists who pursue ideals 
intelligently, however imperfect they may be in execution.  Those ideals include prized cultural 
values such as selflessness and self-sacrifice especially when expressed in the defense of those 
whose lives are considered valuable or inviolate.  Experienced combat infantry in most cases 
agree with Einstein that war is mean and contemptible.  But they engage in it despite that fact 
because of their principled commitment to values beyond themselves.  We saw this especially in 
chapter 7 where we saw that the Durkheimian social fact of Marine cultural determinism is 
constituted by the fact of each Marine’s social interactional determination.  The generalized and 
the significant other are fused as each individual Marine and all Marines are simultaneously the 
source and the target of taking the role of the other in the service of each other.  The person and 
the collective become one unit of action in pursuit of the principle of reciprocal sacrifice.  Caring 
for the other in this culture is the expressed in the ultimate act of dying for the other.  As a 
corollary point, we can see here a new way to engage with the topic of military unit cohesion 
(i.e., why do some groups ‘stick together’ while others disintegrate?).  The individual-society 
dichotomy that underlies much of the consternation and mystery about unit cohesion is replaced 
by an agentic schema focused on the choice by individuals to act in principled ways for the 
benefit of others, that is, the group.  
On what basis, then, does Einstein deny soldiers their principled commitments?  Einstein, 
who clearly knows better, exploits the fact of the ontological difference between humans and 
other animal species to improperly attribute roboticism to soldiers.  Failing to maintain a realistic 
view of the ontology of persons might lead to an ideological view of people and social action.  
Purposefully ignoring a realistic view of the ontology of persons, as does Einstein, is the 
exemplary activity of an ideologue.  His, not theirs, is the problematic use of intelligence and 
judgment. 
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 The following quotation exemplifies the consequences of this kind of misperception of 
combat infantry.  NBC News reporter Peter Jeary posted a story on January 27, 2010 about an 
artist in London, England, who has hand-drawn almost every one of the 5,158 American dead 
from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The drawings are in a gallery open to the public.  
Jeary cites Wldemar Januszczak, an art critic at London’s Sunday Times newspaper as writing 
that the artist’s work is a “powerful…and grim memorial to wasted life.”  In response, a blogger 
named “VET FT. Bragg” wrote 
 
As a member of the military and a veteran of these wars I am offended that when 
we die we are called “wasted life.”  Ever have your buddy rescue a child from a 
blast?  Then you die the next day stopping one that would have hurt many others?  
That’s what happened to a great many over there.  “Wasted life.”  Whoever wrote 
that must be dumb or something. 
[http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2010/01/27/2185754.aspx] 
 
The lack of understanding and appreciation of combat infantry that this study has sought to 
address leads to this kind of failure to appreciate the values for which combat infantry live and 
die.  Januszczak’s appears less malicious than Einstein’s, but even in this more palatable version, 
such lack of understanding can be offensive.  It suggests too, some questions about Einstein’s 
formulation.  Though written in 1931, should we, as Einstein suggests we ought, condemn as 
“senseless” the warfare and the violence by the Allies against Nazism in the upcoming Second 
World War?  Should we condemn as “senseless” violence used in defense of the lives of children 
“senseless?” 
While, given this study, it is difficult to imagine any violence enacted by persons as 
“senseless,” what Einstein seems to have meant is that violence and warfare ought to be foregone 
since it is clear that people are capable of using their intelligence to set aside temporarily their 
most treasured beliefs in order to consider peaceful conflict resolution.  But, as history 
demonstrates, not all persons are so equipped or are so inclined to assume the kind of critical 
approach in which people hold in abeyance their deepest beliefs in order to discover perhaps a 
new or better way of being.  The West, I think, has learned this particular historical lesson quite 
well.  But Einstein’s own position exemplifies just such a lack of criticality since he himself fails 
to use his intelligence as he attributes to soldiers a lack of intelligence that he knows is not 
possible, given their bio-physiology: they do have brains and they use them.  Einstein’s own 
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scientific knowledge should have given him pause.  Acting as if one is unintelligent does not 
mean that one is unintelligent categorically.  In presenting soldiers and their way of life (and 
death) unjustly, I think Einstein’s formulation would go some way toward inviting the violence 
he says he abhors.  “No justice, no peace,” as the American civil rights saying goes. 
In this study we saw the threat to a rich conception of courage as a self-claimed core 
value for one globally important American socio-cultural organization, the U.S. military 
generally and the U.S. Marine Corps in particular.  Courage disappears from the ethnographic 
record if placed within a framework of bio-physical or bio-psychological forces that putatively 
control peoples’ behavior.  Alternatively, it is ignored or twisted at the whim of a researcher’s 
ideological or political agenda. 
A semasiological framework brings substantial clarity to the kind of vocal discourses 
about courage as opposed to discourses of courage that we see in the battlefield actions of 
combat infantry.  Vocal discourses about courage include the following responses of two Marine 
trainees, Staff Sergeant Stephenson and Sergeant Terrazas.  I asked them what courage was.  
They responded that it was “three things—doing what needs to be done even if you’re afraid, 
doing what needs to be done even if it’s dangerous, doing what needs to be done to accomplish 
your mission and/or to help the Marine to your right and left” (Fieldnotes, July 23, 2007).  SSgt. 
Stephenson, moreover, thought that different people define courage differently, that 
organizations like the Marine Corps, have their own definition just like individual people do.  
Other examples come from an anonymous survey I gave to my fellow trainees.  In it I asked, 
“What is courage?”  One Marine answered: 
 
I believe true courage comes when a man is faced with adversity.  I think it comes 
out in Marines every day in combat environments.  I constantly have people 
telling me, “Marines are stupid.  Who moves towards enemies firing?”  The only 
answer I can come up with is every Marine wants to be in the fight. [Survey, July 
23, 2007] 
 
Another wrote, 
 
It’s to do the right thing no matter where you are or what you are doing.  To never 
give up in anything you do whether it be on your mission, your buddies, or your 
country.  Courage is the commitment to uphold your honor at all times. [Survey, 
July 23, 2007] 
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Finally, “Courage is a reaction to fear.  Knowing the danger of the Marine’s action, but pushing 
through the fear” (Survey, July 23, 2007).  I have suggested a particular interpretative stance to 
take when encountering this kind of talk about courage that should help the reader or listener 
distinguish it from embodied discourses of courage. 
I offer the general conclusion that social scientists in general and anthropologists in 
particular would be well-advised to revisit the polarizing divisions between description and 
explanation, biology and culture, and science and humanism from a critical realist philosophy of 
science perspective.  At risk is the clarity, integrity, and meaning of the lives and deaths of those 
we seek to understand and represent.  Also at risk is a potential grounding for the value of life 
and freedom in both their ontological and political senses.  Human beings have bio-physical 
agency; in short, human beings move.  The freedom to move appears to be a goal that promotes 
what the human organism is built to do.  Persons also have socio-cultural agency through their 
semiotic abilities, which are both vocal and kinetically embodied; in short, persons act 
expressively.  The freedom to act expressively appears to be a goal that promotes what persons 
do.  Preferring an agnostic approach to the relationship between biology and culture promotes 
the implausible, immoral kind of formulation about human social action exemplified by the 
reviewer, the malicious, ideological formulation exemplified by Einstein, and the innocent but 
insulting political formulation exemplified by Januszczak.  In the entailed derogation or 
demotion of the value or worth of the existence of the targeted persons is the invitation to 
violence. 
 
Relevance of this Study to Anthropology and Possibilities for Further Research 
 
 For socio-cultural anthropology, this study suggests one way of relating theory to 
ethnography in productive and responsible ways.  I used three interrelated theory-families:  
critical realism, a theory of causal powers, and semasiology were chosen as the best candidates 
for developing a robust conception of the relationship between biology and culture.  I needed to 
specify that relationship needed, not only to render comprehensible the actual discourses of 
Americans in general and U.S. Marines in particular, but also to offer the same for 
anthropologists engaging in ethnographic research. My point was, and is, to monitor the use of 
predicates and so help the researcher a) honor the scientifically more plausible agentic 
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framework for interpreting consultants’ lives, b) avoid invitations to reification, and c) develop a 
standard for deciding if or when an ideological position was being used surreptitiously to impose 
meaning on consultants’ lives.  
  Within a larger disciplinary frame, my attempt to specify the relationship between 
biology and culture is part of a persistent though substantially de-emphasized conversation in 
current anthropology, one that I believe could be productively brought to the fore in 
appropriately theoretical terms such as those suggested here, un-inflected by concerns over what 
some consider to be preceding categories of identity such as race, ethnicity, gender, and so forth. 
 By focusing narrowly on how and why the U.S. Marines use their bodies as their primary 
semiotic resource in training and in combat, I have articulated a standard by which they, and we, 
can assess their actions against their most treasured values.  There are numerous anthropological 
applications and questions that arise for further ethnographic research. For example, my 
conclusion in chapter 8 that stereotypical, gendered discourses are used in ways that promote 
what appear to be gender-less embodied values would be an excellent means for engaging the 
issue of sexual orientation in the military.  We might ask military personnel who object to gays 
in the military, “If the Marine in question embodies prized Marine values in training and on the 
battlefield, to what is the objection directed?”  This kind of question is directly linked to the 
aforementioned topic of unit cohesion in that a common, popular refrain is that gays would 
disrupt that cohesion.  This kind of question could also, therefore, help refine the terms of the 
conversation and so provoke new insights and new political stances. 
 Similarly, the valorization of gender-less embodied performance in training and in 
combat could provoke more detailed research on the complexity of gender relationships if, as 
Karin K. De Angelis contends and Pentagon statistics confirm, rape and other forms of sexual 
assault occur at substantially increased rates in the military.  If De Angelis is right and her 
comments are applicable to the Marine Corps, it may be that larger cultural notions of gender 
and power relationships are not being addressed sufficiently in Marine training generally, given 
the centrality of training for operational effectiveness and the general definition of that concept 
in terms of combat capability.
6
  The social and cultural value system of gender construction in 
the United States may be too central to the construction of American identity for the value 
system of operational effectiveness to replace it entirely, especially when the context changes 
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from ‘training,’ or ‘combat,’ to ‘off-hours’ or ‘firm-base.’  These remarks, though speculative, 
may be applied to other topics such as ethnicity, sexual orientation, and so forth. 
 Another intriguing extension of this study would be to examine the role of religion, 
especially Christianity, as a source of some of the values that comprise the core values of the 
Marine Corps.  The Christian doctrine of Christ’s sacrifice provides a powerful model for 
selflessness in the name of others and in the name of larger values for the West.  Beyond the 
potential for ethnographic study of religious belief as a source of prized military values is the 
question of religious explanations in soldiers’ and Marines’ accounts of their actions in training 
and in combat.  While this study has focused primarily on countering the bio-reductive model of 
explaining human social behavior, religious accounts may place the locus of agency not in 
persons or in their biology, but in God.  We might ask, “How does religious discourse align with 
the ascription of ‘courage’ to individuals and combat units?”  Versions of the contradiction 
between description and explanation might increase in number as a result, or we might find a 
serious tension between religious and bio-reductive accounts of courageous action. 
 Finally, new configurations of the relationship between technology and warfare make this 
study directly relevant to larger anthropological questions about realism, embodiment, and life 
‘in context’.  For example, the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s or ‘drones’) piloted by 
men and women in air-conditioned trailers in the Nevada desert and aiming to kill Taliban 
fighters in Afghanistan certainly protects the operators from physical or moral risk in the local 
context.  There is emerging evidence, however, that this kind of killing, while disembodied, is 
not without risk or necessarily ‘pure’ or ideal in the sense of being relieved of the ethical 
dilemmas confronted in hand to hand combat.   Digital Nation reporter Caitlin McNally posted 
the following story on May 13, 2009. 
 
One of the most poignant parts of the story for me was the description by a Lt. 
Col. of the disconnect between his days as a UAV pilot and his life at home. He 
told 60 Minutes: "To go and work and do bad things to bad people ... and then 
when I go home and I go to church and try to be a productive member of society, 
those don't necessarily mesh well."  In this new kind of warfare, it seems that the 
idea of a "band of brothers" is completely redefined. Although drone pilots at 
Creech suit up in flight gear and are part of a traditional Air Force squadron, their 
experience of war must differ enormously from troops on the ground. Without 
physical immersion in the intimacy and camaraderie of the battlefield, these pilots 
gain the clarity of distance and stay out of harm's way, but can they also be 
insulated from the risk of mental injury?
7
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Not only is the radical daily change from military (killer) to civilian (productive member of 
society) problematic for the Lt. Col. but the embodiment of military values as discussed in this 
study is at the very least different, perhaps radically so.  Indeed it is unclear if what UAV pilots 
do can, or should, be considered “combat,” as McNally identifies.  Disembodied warfare through 
advanced technology may solve some emotional, social, and physical problems faced on modern 
battlefields, but it may do so in exchange for entirely novel problems or, perhaps, simply 
exacerbate those that already exist.  There is the potential here for an ethnographic comparison 
among different kinds of combatants on the basis of bodily proximity or distance (e.g. infantry 
versus pilots), and their values relative to killing.  We may uncover here entirely different and 
complex ideas of what counts as courage. 
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1
 http://www.marines.com/main/index/making_marines/culture/traditions/core_values 
2
 I am not suggesting that this kind of narrative is being spoken inside a Marine’s head as she acts.  The linguistic philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) argues that this would be a mistake.  Embodied actions are not “echoes” of internal language use.  
3
 While diagrams are helpful, they are not entirely clear since diagrams underdetermine the range of possible ways of executing 
even basic actions.  Labanotation is a far superior way of capturing the details of action from the actors point of view. 
4
 “Critical realism” is the terminology used to capture the approach to realism I introduced in chapter 2. 
5
 SSgt. Twiggs wrote this note to one of his Marines, Lance Corporal Robert F. Eckfield, Jr. 
 
I just finished writing a letter to Jared and it applies to both of you as does this one. I know you are at peace 
where you are, but I wish you were here with your family and your Lady. I wish that I could erase that 
horrible day from my memory...but I can't. I feel responsible and always will for not bringing you both 
home. Kellee and I pray daily that your family can find peace. I miss you brother. 
Twiggs Family of Quantico, Va. (http://www.fallenheroesmemorial.com/oif/profiles/eckfieldjrrobertf.html) 
 
“Jared” is Lance Corporal Jared J. Kremm, the other Marine killed in the explosion. 
6
 A March 8, 2010 article in Time Magazine by Nancy Gibbs states 
 
The Pentagon's latest figures show that nearly 3,000 women were sexually assaulted in fiscal year 2008, up 
9% from the year before; among women serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, the number rose 25%. When you 
look at the entire universe of female veterans, close to a third say they were victims of rape or assault while 
they were serving — twice the rate in the civilian population. 
[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1968110,00.html#ixzz0kWjJ5Zhi] 
 
7
 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/digitalnation/blog/2009/05/a-new-kind-of-stress.html 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
VIDEO FILES 
 
 
1. MAIT 03-07.wmv is a commemorative movie made by IT Sergeant Betts consisting of 
still photos and short video clips from major events during the Martial Arts Instructor-
Trainer class in the summer of 2007. 
 
2. Warrior Mindset.mov shows a class on the relationship of mind to action by IT Staff 
Sergeant Wilder during the summer of 2007. 
 
3. Bear Pit.mov depicts two female 2
nd
 Lieutenants in hand-to-hand fighting with male 
Marines.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
U.S. MARINE ENLISTED AND OFFICER RANKS 
 
 Enlisted Marines are inducted into it by virtue of the authority of the Corps itself.  
Enlisted ranks above Lance Corporal (see Figure 14 in Figures section below) are considered 
“non-commissioned officers” (NCO’s).  They are given their office, and therefore their 
command responsibilities, through the authority of the Corps.  Marine NCO’s are promoted up 
through the ranks after starting as a private.  Marines at the upper levels of the enlisted rank 
structure often have spent fifteen to thirty years in the Corps.  Marine officers, on the other hand, 
are commissioned into the Corps by the President of the United States and confirmed by the 
United States Senate.  They outrank all enlisted Marines despite the fact that they may be only 
twenty-two years old at the end of Officer Candidate School (OCS).  This makes for fascinating 
interpersonal dynamics: in the Marine infantry, a twenty-two year old 2
nd
 lieutenant with one 
year of experience in the Corps an no combat experience might be in command of a staff 
sergeant thirty-three year old staff sergeant with fifteen years in the Corps and three tours of 
combat duty overseas.  The third class of Marine is the Warrant Officer.  They are commissioned 
and confirmed like regular officers but stand as a distinct class due to the specialized knowledge 
and responsibilities of their positions.  They are subordinate to regular officers but superior to 
enlisted ranks. See Figures 12 and 13 in the Figures section below for graphical representations 
of the Marine Corp rank structure. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 12: Enlisted Marine ranks in ascending order from top left to bottom right.  From 
http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/showthread.php%3Ft%3D78555&h=627&w=899&sz=267&tbnid=bbcodnapR
bB32M:&tbnh=102&tbnw=146&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dus%2Bmarine%2Branks&hl=en&usg=__dXSwfkstRxEB
LyKGe2cCj5trMVY=&ei=SYmJSrqvB5W8NoWwmfsO&sa=X&oi=image_result&resnum=7&ct=image 
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Figure 13: Marine officer ranks in ascending order from top left to bottom right.  From 
http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/showthread.php%3Ft%3D78555&h=627&w=899&sz=267&tbnid=bbcodnapR
bB32M:&tbnh=102&tbnw=146&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dus%2Bmarine%2Branks&hl=en&usg=__dXSwfkstRxEB
LyKGe2cCj5trMVY=&ei=SYmJSrqvB5W8NoWwmfsO&sa=X&oi=image_result&resnum=7&ct=image 
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APPENDIX C 
 
A CLOSER LOOK AT MAIT 03-07 
 
 
 The training class in which I participated started June 11, 2007 and ended July 27, 2007.  
The class began with thirty-four Marines; twenty-five finished the course.  The MCMAP 
Instructor Trainer course is the most challenging out of the training repertory at the Martial Arts 
Center of Excellence.  The perception of high quality and substantive challenge meant the course 
was in high demand, and some of the Marines I spoke with had been trying for over two years to 
get into the course.  The Marines all had to apply to attend the training, which included, 
significantly, a letter of recommendation from their commanding officer attesting to consistent 
quality in their “Fitness Reports” which is essentially a review of all aspects of the Marine’s 
performance.  Especially important was the commanding officer’s guarantee of the level of 
physical fitness of the Marine attendee.  As one of my squad mates, Sergeant Judice, put it to me, 
“Sir, you’re dealing with the studs of the Marine Corps” (June 28, 2007).  It became apparent 
quite quickly, however, that not all guarantees could be taken as such.  Two Marines were nearly 
dropped from the program the first day because of their inability to perform runs and obstacle 
courses in allotted timeframes. 
 Generally, the MAIT course targets non-commissioned officers, who, in most cases, 
represent the rank level responsible for the actual training of Marines in their home unit.
1
  In 
MAIT 03-07, unusually apparently, there were four commissioned officers.  Two were captains 
whose performance had led them up through the ranks and into officer candidate school.  The 
Marines call such officers “mustangs.”  Two were new second lieutenants.  These second 
lieutenants were the only females in my training class.  The ethnic composition of the course was 
1 African American, 17 Hispanic Americans, and 14 Anglo-Americans.
2
  The oldest trainee was 
37, the youngest was 20, and the average age was 25. 
 The Marines came from a range of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS’s), such as a 
Fixed-Wing Aircraft Flight Engineer or a Bulk Fueler and from a range of duty locations, such as 
Okinawa, Japan.  All but three of the Marines in my training class had deployed to Iraq or 
Afghanistan at least once, and about one-half had some form of combat experience.  All ten IT’s 
assigned to lead or support my training class were combat experienced, with multiple overseas 
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tours.  Each trainee class is broken down into “squads” of eight to ten Marines who, for the most 
part, were meeting each other for the first time.  Each squad had assigned to it a Squad IT, 
meaning a member of the MACE staff who was directly responsible for the squad’s training.  My 
squad’s Squad IT was Sergeant Brandon Meng.  Squad IT’s were responsible for planning and 
executing portions of the training specifically targeted at squad (versus individual, buddy, or 
whole-class training).  Additionally, Squad IT’s had to plan and execute the training as a whole 
in cooperation with the other Squad IT’s.  The Class IT led the Squad IT’s (in my case Gunnery 
Sergeant Brantley Friend) and had overall responsibility for training the class. 
The squad and class IT’s were mirrored by a trainee squad leader and trainee class 
commander.  Gunnery Sergeant Timothy Blanchard was the squad leader for my squad.  
Gunnery Sergeant Gonzalez was the class leader for the class.  The mirror leadership structure 
permitted trainees to discuss issues within the training class prior to or instead of bringing them 
to the attention of the IT’s.  This gave the training class and squads a measure of self-governance 
as well as a structure of working out performance issues of squads and individuals.  For example, 
one squad had a particularly problematic Marine who, according to, especially, his squad mates, 
consistently failed to meet his responsibilities during some training exercises.  This failure was 
expressed in sometimes very loud, vocal, expletive-filled criticisms of his failure to act promptly 
to meet challenges facing the squad.  The interpretation was that the Marine “didn’t get it.”  His 
squad leader had attempted to speak with him in privately and, failing that intervention, the 
squad itself took the matter up, often publicly.  The squad sought to police the Marine’s actions 
in situ during training events.  There was a degree of frustration being expressed in these public 
criticisms that, on the one hand appeared to suggest a lack of self-control among the Marines, but 
on the other, did not fail to bring home to the Marine that his actions could, in a combat situation, 
get other Marines killed.  These ministrations often were observed but not interfered with by the 
Squad IT’s and the Class IT. 
A typical training day can be seen in Figure 14  (see Figures section below), taken from 
my second summer at the MACE.  The day started at around 6:30 AM as the Marines arrived at 
the MACE from their off-base hotel (some Marines stayed in the barracks on base but most who 
were from out of the area were put up at a local Days Inn).  The Marines would go into a 
classroom and get instructions on changes for the day or updates on open issues and then would 
exit the building.  “LZ-6” stands for Landing Zone 6 and refers to a large open area near the 
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MACE used for helicopter landings.  The area served as training ground as well.  The IT’s and 
trainees used it to conduct exercises and events.  On this day the point was to stretch and warm 
up muscles in preparation for running to the Stamina Course.  The Stamina Course is a trail 
through wooded, hilly, and broken terrain that is designed to test and increase the user’s stamina.  
Other courses included the Obstacle Course and the Endurance Course. 
 The two and one-half hours devoted to the event called “The Last of the Mohicans” are 
designed to substantively challenge the trainees’ use of bayonet techniques against multiple 
opponents in a free-ranging series of fights.  The title of the event refers to the 1992 film of the 
same name in which occurs a climactic sequence following Daniel Day-Lewis’ character as he 
fights and overcomes multiple enemies while running along a mountainous trail using a variety 
of weapons.  This exercise from my training class in 2007 is captured in the latter part of the 
MAIT 03-07 video on the DVD located in Appendix A.  Individuals and teams of Marines in 
protective gear practice a whole-body movement called a “combat glide.”  The combat glide is a 
distinctive way of moving in the context of a battlefield.  The Marine assumes a partial crouch 
and moves quickly and purposefully toward a target location or an enemy.  The Marine wields a 
wooden bayonet trainer called a mokuju.  Mokujus approximate the shape and length of a rifle 
with a hard rubber tip.  In the exercise, teams of two Marines move along the course and engage 
one, two, or three enemies who are played by IT’s.  The teams do not know how many enemies 
they will engage, how many times, or if they will be hidden or in a visible position.  The 
enemies, on the hand, are armed with a range of weapons from plastic training knives to mokujus 
and engage the approaching Marine teams in a wide variety of ways.  Engagements ranged from 
aggressively attacking the Marines to assuming a ready stance to await the actions of the 
approaching team. 
 The staff used “IT Time” each day to talk to the different trainees either individually or as 
squads.  Issues such as individual or squad performance, conflicts within squads or between 
trainees, clarification of course goals and drills, and proper nutrition and hydration were often 
covered. 
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Figures 
 
Time Subject Location Gear/Uniform Instructors 
     
0645-0700 Formation/Morning Report Raider Hall
3
 U Class Commander 
0700-0730 Warm Up/Movement to Stamina Crs. LZ-6 U, FH SQD IT’s 
0730-1000 Last of the Mohicans #1 Stamina Crs. U, FH Sgt Kaiser 
1000-1200 Chow TBD U Class Commander 
1200-1400 MAIT 07 Continuum of Force Classroom U Sgt Davis 
1400-1500 Brown Nonlethal Baton LZ-6 U, F SSgt Demster 
1500-1600 Brown Knife Techniques LZ-6 U, F Sgt Thompson 
1600-TBD IT Time TBD U SQD IT’s 
 
Figure 14: Example Training Day, Martial Arts Instructor Trainer Course 04-08, Tuesday, July 15, 2008 
 309 
 
                                                
1
 Non-commissioned officers (NCO’s) get their rank through appointment by a commissioned officer.  NCO ranks include for 
example, “corporal,” and “sergeant.”  Commissioned ranks include “lieutenant,” and “captain.”  Commissioned officers receive 
their rank through approval of the U.S. Congress.  See Appendix B for U.S. Marine rank charts. 
2
 Having studied a number of works on ethnic and gender relations during my graduate coursework, I was expecting discourses 
of ethnicity and gender not only to be present during the training, but perhaps defining.  Interestingly, the overt ethnic and gender 
talk that I encountered was generally secondary to discourses focused on being a good Marine and performing in training in ways 
that honored the conceptions of being a good Marine implicit therein.  Whether you were white, black, brown, man or woman, 
the question was, did you perform?  If so, to what level and in what ways did your actions impact your team, your squad, your 
training class, yourself.  If not, why not?  A follow up question was whether or not you were going to not perform at or above 
standard in the future.  I hasten to add two points.  First, I was not privy to all the relationships and conversations among the 
Marines in the training class, either as a trainee in 2007 or as guest Instructor Trainer in 2008.  Second, and I warn the reader that 
this is speculative, the conception of what counts as a “good Marine,” is, perhaps grounded in a white, middle class, Christian 
ethic.  Such speculation requires further study, but the notion that what you meant by how you moved in training was what 
counted. 
3
 “Raider Hall” is an alternate name for the MACE.  The Marine Raiders were a unit of Marines trained in martial arts and close 
combat for action against the Japanese in World War II.  The MACE building serves simultaneously as the MCMAP 
administrative center and a museum of artifacts from the World War II Marine Raiders. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
POOL DRILL, JUNE 14, 2007 
 
The following is an excerpt from my fieldnotes. 
 
I was pretty apprehensive about the pool, especially since I was hurting, aching, so much 
from the first few days.  There were lots of IT’s, including MCWIS IT’s, and that was both 
reassuring and threatening.  I didn’t want to sink to the bottom of the pool and have to get saved.  
We went to Ramer Hall as a class and all of us had on our cammies.  Some of the guys were 
clearly concerned.  While they were hell on land, in the water, things were different.  Later, in 
talking to Gunny Friend, he said that, “Yeah, the program is about finding out strengths and 
weaknesses.  Some Marines are good on land, others are good in the water.  Since the MAIT’s 
train instructors, they have to be certified up to a certain level in water survival.”  Throughout 
this event I was relying on SSgt. Twiggs to give me pointers and help adjust the equipment.  In 
some exercises, he told me to keep the flak jack loose so that I could have better range of 
movement, while in others he told me to keep the Kevlar tight and lean backward and into it so 
that it acts like a float for your head.  The most important thing was to remain calm, and use 
explosive breathing (short, powerful breaths that do not entirely deflate the lungs) in order to 
assist in staying afloat.  Forgetting technique and getting tired would be a real problem since, if 
you got tired and did not keep your back arched on a float, or if you got water in your mouth and 
breathed it in and panicked, your body would come out of alignment and instead of conserving 
energy by having a low profile in the water, you would waste energy by trying to stay above 
water and would not be moving forward. 
We were told to take our boots off.  Our first task was to get into the water and swim 
across the pool (Olympic size) using one or more of the five approved strokes that the MCWIS 
instructors demonstrated.  I used the sidestroke.  The water was warm, and the exercise actually 
felt pretty good after feeling so sore.  The second task was a simulated “abandon ship” drill.  We 
had to get up on the high tower (about 15-20 feet high) and step to the edge in groups of four.  
Put your toes over the edge, cross hands over shoulders, look up (to make sure no one is jumping 
off the ship above you), look down (to make sure no one is jumping off the ship below you and 
to identify any possible debris in the water) and then take one thirty-inch step outboard, cross 
your legs, come to the surface, get to the wall of the pool.  After the class did this, we were 
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divided into groups of 8 and required to float for four minutes using one of four approved 
techniques including turning your pants into a life vest by taking them off and tying the ends, 
turning your blouse into a balloon by curling the collar and blowing into it, simply treading 
water, or holding your breath, floating just under the water, and then popping up for air when 
necessary.  I just tread water.  My shoulders were aching badly by the three minute mark.   
Next we had to put our boots one, repeat the tower jump, and this time swim across the 
pool using one of the five approved strokes.  I used the sidestroke again.  Next, we had to don 
Kevlar, flak, canteen belt, mock M-16, and a pack (with some sort of floatation, perhaps foam, in 
it).  At port arms, we had to jump into the pool at the shallow end, walk across the pool, sling 
arms, walk back across the pool, then float on the back and do a combat crawl (bicycle the 
feet/knees for stability and sweep hands from belt out to sides toward shoulders for propulsion) 
down the length of the pool and then across it. 
Next we had to jump off the lower tower, maybe 8 feet high, with the combat load on, 
surface, un-sling the rifle from the shoulder and re-sling it around your neck.  Then combat crawl 
about 7 meters, take the pack (your float!) off, and bring it around to your front, hold it under 
your chest and use it as a float, then swim the rest of the length of the pool. 
The next exercise was to remove the pack (no floatation!), but keep on all the combat 
gear, get in the pool at the right side, walk 5 metres to a cone, and then swim the rest of the 
length of the pool, across the width, and then about 2/3 back down the other side to another cone 
using sidestroke, backstroke, and/or breaststroke.  This was a killer since I was tired from the 
first exercises and my arms hurt.  I started off pretty well, once again using sidestroke.  By this 
time the IT’s were pretty sure I was ok in the water and they said so, “No problem, stay relaxed, 
pull”.  Some of the guys just couldn’t make it however, and they were thrown either a life ring or 
a long, foam float.  In the case of ring or float, the Marine requiring one failed the exercise.  If 
any of the Marines does not pass the swim test, s/he cannot pass the MAIT course!  I just about 
made it around the pool before my strength gave out.  Doc Young told me that I was not 
“exploding outward” with my arms during my sidestroke, and toward the end, as he watched 
from poolside, he could see that I was using a lot of energy staying afloat instead of moving 
forward. 
The final exercise was a buddy tow.  Your buddy, in all the combat gear, grabs two of the 
floatation packs and floats on his back with his feet on the edge of the pool.  You, without any 
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floatation, but with all the combat gear, grab him (palm up, so that you don’t start pulling him 
underwater if you’re using an overhand grip and start getting tired) by the flak jacket handle (at 
the top of the rear collar) and tow him the length of the pool.  He is supposed to lay back, arch 
his back, and cross his feet, to give the best profile in the water, thus making your tow much 
easier.  I was the “victim” first and my buddy successfully towed me across.  But in doing so, my 
arms, already tired from the last exercise, and then tired even more from actively grasping and 
keeping in close to my chest the floatation packs, became really spent.  On my turn to tow, we 
made it about ! way down the length of the pool and, as I got more and more tired, so did my 
buddy, whose arms (I imagine) were also pretty spent.  He seemed uncomfortable laying back 
fully and so when I kicked, at times I kicked a piece of his equipment, like the M-16 or his belt.  
SSgt. Twiggs said he saw my buddy doing this and starting to let his butt droop down into the 
water.  He wasn’t keeping good form and this was slowing me down.  I was so tired that I was 
going to use my buddy to rest a second, and as I turned to move toward him, he dropped the two 
floatation packs.  This set both of us to sinking, and the IT’s were hollering to get back in 
control, to not touch the bottom of the pool, to keep going and so forth.   They also started 
yelling at my buddy, “What’s THAT staff sergeant?”  I finally got to the end and was told that I 
had been “buddy fucked” where your buddy lets you down.  Doc Young said so, as did many of 
the IT’s who saw it!  They didn’t blame me for having to touch bottom to get the rest of the way 
across.  Of course, my performance doesn’t count either way, but they were quick to point out 
that the failure was, in their eyes, not my fault. 
I felt very happy with my performance in the pool.  I felt comfortable in the water, and 
though I was, in my mind, seeking a way to NOT do the exercises when it came to having the 
combat load on, I tacitly went ahead anyway.  I was afraid that I would embarrass myself or 
worse, panic in the water.  Looking back at this and other events, my fear comes primarily from 
a lack of confidence in my physical abilities.  This is an example of what the course is designed 
to “cure.”  My mental strength is compromised by my perceived lack of expertise in handling 
myself physically—and vice-versa! 
 
 
